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In this dissertation, I attempt to improve our understanding of truthmaker theory (TT) by
defending the modest importance of TT for philosophy via addressing in-house issues.
I am not addressing the TT-skeptic. In Part 1, I articulate a metaphysically modest
version of TT which focuses on the notion of aboutness. In Part 2, I apply this version
to three further debates, to which TT has been thought to have substantial applications,
radically reinterpreting each of these applications in a metaphysically modest way.
Part 1 starts, in §1, with a presentation of what I call the basic account of TT
(BATT), which posits the bare-bones requirements of TT, stripping it of its immodest
and question-begging metaphysical commitments concerning the nature of truthbearers
and truthmakers. In §2, I present my favoured, aboutness-based, version of TT (TAAT)
which goes beyond BATT in an explicitly modest way. In §3, I sketch how TAAT can
provide a piecemeal strategy to address the problem of negative truths. In §4, I detail
TAAT’s metaphysical modesty.
Part 2 starts, in §5, by rejecting a rival account which I call Truthmaker Fundamen-
talism. In §6, I undermine the orthodox conception of “cheater-catching” and reinterpret
that task as semantical rather than metaphysical. In §7, I argue that TT, on pain of
being question-begging, must retreat from its association with substantial realism to
what I call Modest Realism, which is compatible with anti-realism. In §8, I distinguish
between truth-conditions, truthmakers, and truthmaker-conditions and articulate a two-
step conception of inquiry and a modest conception of understanding truthmakers.
In conclusion, I hope to have defended and reinvigorated an approach to understand-
ing the relation between truth and reality, which has been much neglected in the recent
TT-literature, but which must be taken seriously as a metaphysically modest alternative
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Introduction
0.1 General Aims of the Dissertation: A Plea For
Modesty
In philosophy, as in other areas of life, modesty and moderation are supreme virtues.
Thus, the starting point of this dissertation is what I call the Modesty Principle:
Modesty Principle (MP): If one can be modest about anything, one should be.
This general principle applies to one’s estimations of one’s abilities and also of one’s
aims, but it can also be applied more specifically in philosophy. When philosophising
about any subject matter, one can formulate a more specific version of this general MP,
applying it to the subject matter:
Applied Modesty Principle (AMP): For some subject matter S, if one’s theory of S
can be more modest, one’s theory should be more modest.
I shall assume that any proposed theory about some subject matter S, which adheres
to AMP better than rivals, is the more plausible theory about S. The main, general aim
of this dissertation is to apply MP to the subject matter of truthmaking. By present-
ing a version of truthmaker theory (TT) that is as modest as possible, I aim to argue
that truthmaking is important for philosophy, but only modestly so. My specific aims
are two-fold. First, in Part One, I present my preferred version of TT as a modest,
and hence more plausible, alternative to the more extravagant rival theories, which now
constitute TT-orthodoxy. After presenting the basic assumptions of TT (§1) and my
favoured, aboutness-based account (§2), I address the problem of negative truths (§3)
and explain what metaphysical modesty is in more depth (§4). Second, in Part Two,
in the light of MP, I try to settle the most important in-house disputes amongst truth-
maker theorists (TT-ists, for short)1, concerning TT’s relationship to fundamentality
(§5), cheater-catching (§6), realism (§7), and inquiry (§8).
Also included are six appendices which are not to be read as part of the examination
of this dissertation. They expand on the positions that I defend in the various chapters
in ways that go beyond what is necessary for the dissertation but which bring added
1Throughout the dissertation, I add ‘-ist’ to abbreviations to designate those who hold the views or
theories designated by the abbreviated names.
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support to the overall project and sketch avenues where my project can move forward
in the future. At the very end, after the bibliography, there is an index, which con-
tains page numbers indicating where principles, abbreviations, and some key phrases are
informatively introduced or defined.
0.2 Note About TT-skepticism: I am not addressing
the skeptic
There is a wealth of recent and not-so-recent work which is skeptical about truth in
general (by, for instance, claiming that there are no truths, that truth is impossible,
or that there is no such property as being true), or skeptical about the reality of a
truthmaking relation, the generally or mainly asymmetric dependence relation which
non-skeptics hold to exist between truths and reality.
There are a variety of ways to argue for these sorts of claims, and to use the arguments
for these claims to undermine the project of TT. However, I shall not engage directly
with these TT-skeptical arguments or views in this dissertation. My aim is not to
motivate or defend TT against the TT-skeptic. Rather, I aim to address those who
accept the main intuitions behind TT but who are undecided about which version of TT
is most plausible. I give those already very sympathetic to TT a modest alternative to
extravagant orthodoxy. Thus, I can leave unanswered some of the main problems that
plague all versions of TT.
This said, I think that TT-skepticism has many virtues, which, unfortunately, I do
not have space to extol or discuss in depth here. Throughout the dissertation, however,
I shall discuss some of the most powerful, but also illuminating, skeptical worries that
any TT-ist must address. I see these skeptical worries as useful challenges for TT-ists,
not just to address the skeptic, but to address rival attempts to build a version of TT.
In particular, to embrace MP and give a modest account of TT, one cannot beg the
question against one’s rival TT-ists. I discuss these skeptical challenges, not in order
to save TT from skepticism, but, rather, in order to do some much needed in-house,
spring cleaning. In short, although I assume the position of non-skepticism, I shall try to
undermine TT-orthodoxy and completely re-imagine TT in a modest way. I make the
case for what I call the aboutness-based account of truthmaking (TAAT), supplemented
by the most important details of what I take to be the right, truth-relevant theory of
aboutness, what I call the strict and full account of aboutness (SAC). The very viability
of my modest account serves as an additional, albeit generally non-skeptical, challenge
to the metaphysical immodesty that pervades the current orthodoxy in regard to the
importance and the nature of the relation between truth and reality.
Part I
A Modest Proposal:





The Basic Account of Truthmaking
1.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I present what I call the Basic Account of Truthmaking (BATT). I first
(in §1.2) explain the basic assumptions of TT that will guide the rest of the discussion
in my dissertation, and will lay the foundations on which my preferred version of TT
modestly builds (§2 onwards). I then explain what I take to be BATT’s assumptions and
lack of assumptions about the nature of truthbearers (TBRs, for short) (§1.3), relations
(§1.4), truth (§1.5), and truthmakers (TMKs, for short) (§1.7). Throughout, I shall also
present what I take to be some of the consequences of using BATT to build further
versions of TT.
1.2 Some Basic Assumptions of TT
TT is the theory neutrally and minimally understood as articulating a particular sort of
relation which holds between truth and reality, which is commonly called TRUTHMAKING
or making true, or, as I am abbreviating it here, T-REL. A basic form of TT can be
expressed with a generalised conditional thus:
TRUTHMAKING (TM): a TBR is true if some part(s) of reality makes it true.1
We shall see (§3) that there are serious versions of TT which hold that not all TBRs
are made true by any part of reality. So as not to exclude these accounts, TM needs
to be put in terms of a conditional rather than a biconditional. The making true done
by “some part(s) of reality”,2 the TMKs, is best understood as a generally asymmetric
relation.3 Thus, the first basic requirement of TT is:
1I use the terms ‘world’ and ‘reality’ interchangeably. Van Fraassen (1995: 139ff; 2002: 5) argues
that there is an underlying ambiguity in the term ‘world’ and that the notion of the-world-as-a-whole is
a term of philosopher’s art in a similar way that the God of Descartes (1985: Meditations 3–5 [1641])
and Spinoza (2009 [1677]) is. I assume that any of the ambiguities inherent in the normal English word
‘world’ have analogues in ‘reality’.
2As I’ll make clear, there is no need to reify-as-entities the parts of reality that serve as TMKs.
3Remember, I am not aiming to respond to the TT-skeptic who would deny this basic assump-
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CLAIM TRUTHMAKING-RELATION (T-REL-C): There is a generally asymmet-
ric relation between truths and reality, which is commonly known as truthmaking
or making true, abbreviated here as T-REL.
Later, I reject standard attempts to put T-REL in terms of ENTAILMENT (ET) or NE-
CESSITATION (NEC). Neutrally and minimally, T-REL is understood as a DEPENDENCE
relation. We might say, then, that any TT should adhere to the following:
TRUTHMAKER DEPENDENCE (TD): T-REL is a species of dependence; truths
depend for their truth on TMKs.
There are, of course, many other kinds of dependence relations which are not asymmetric,
such as relations of interdependence or mutual dependence or co-dependence. So, it is
important to make it clear that T-REL is a generally asymmetric sort of dependence.
That is, truths (true TBRs) depend for their truth on the being4 of their TMKs, but
TMKs do not depend for their being on the truth of the TBRs which they make true.
A variety of different kinds of dependence relations are distinguished not along sym-
metry lines. For example, causal dependence, essential dependence, and constitutive
dependence are distinguished along other lines. What kind of relation T-REL is in these
terms is a matter of dispute. I shall touch on this when discussing whether T-REL is a
species of grounding in §5. However, it is generally agreed that the sort of dependence
is not a causal one.5
tion of TT. For reasons to think T-REL is not asymmetric, see (David 2009: 152–4). See (Hornsby
2005: 41–42), who argues against Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005), claiming that truthmaking is not a relation
and that the truth–reality asymmetry can be captured by the sentential connective ‘because’. However,
her criticism is focused on Rodriguez-Pereyra’s (2005: 21) claim that truthmaking is an asymmetric
grounding relation between entities. I shall also reject this kind of claim in various ways in this dis-
sertation. (For example in §5, I reject the idea that T-REL is a grounding relation, and in §4, I reject
the idea that TMKs must be entities. Both ideas require a metaphysically immodest account of TT.)
Despite Hornsby’s criticism and her TT-skepticism, she might have no truck with my account and my
way of spelling out BATT. Hornsby makes a distinction between grounding and dependence and says,
“In one good sense, then, the truth of <the rose is red> depends upon the rose’s being red” (ibid.: 45).
She argues that this is a different claim from “the rose’s being red is an entity, which, given <the rose
is red>’s truth, stands to <the rose is red> in a relation of grounding” (ibid.). As will become clear
(especially in §4.1), I agree. However, I think it’s important to understand T-REL as a relation. But,
as I shall stipulate and explain in §1.4, relations come easy; relations don’t only relate entities, but
anything that’s real.
4I say ‘being’ here instead of ‘existence’ for reasons I make explicit in §1.2.2.
5See (Beebee and Dodd 2005a: 2) and (Armstrong 2004: 5). A reason for this is that causation is
deeply tied with time and process, while truthmaking is not temporal, but instantaneous. Also, the view
that T-REL is causal is not the same as the view called “causal truthmaking” (Stenwall 2010: 214ff),
which takes TMKs to be causal facts. The former is what all TT-ists reject. Stenwall’s (2010) view is a
novel view about the nature of TMKs, not the nature of T-REL He argues that his view helps solve the
problem of finding TMKs for negative truths in such a way as not to have to posit problematic negative
entities. I address the problem of negative truths in §3. Also, traditionally, TT-ists cite Aristotle as a
proto-TT-ist. However, Aristotle clearly thinks that the asymmetric relation between truths and reality
is causal when he says:
[I]f there is a man, the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, and
reciprocally – since if the statement whereby we say that there is a man is true, there
is a man. And whereas the true statement is in no way the cause of the actual thing’s
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Furthermore, it is important to note that dependence is different from related notions
such as reduction. For example, some X can depend on Y, but X might not be reducible
to Y. According to all TT-ists, at least some truths depend for their truth on TMKs,
but in no way are those truths reducible to TMKs. See (Heil 2003: 53–54).
1.2.1 T-REL and Entailment: T-REL Isn’t a Logical Relation
Further, T-REL is not a logical relation. For instance, T-REL is not ENTAILMENT
(ET). ET is essentially a relationship between TBRs, such as sentences, propositions,
and statements. ET captures the follows from relation of logical consequence that two
truth-apt entities can have. And T-REL is basically construed as a relation between
truths and reality. All truths are true TBRs. But, not all TMKs are TBRs. Of course,
sometimes the TMKs are TBRs. Consider the truth ‘There is at least one TBR.’6 This
truth is most plausibly made true by a TBR. But this is not the case for the majority
of truths which plausibly have other aspects of reality as their TMKs. For example, the
TBR ‘there is at least one atom’ is plausibly made true by an atom rather than a TBR.
Atoms are not truth-apt, and hence are not TBRs. Thus, whatever account of T-REL
is the right one, it needs to be able to capture this aspect of the relation:
Requirement that T-REL Does Not Relate Only TBRs (R-ROT): T-REL is a
relation which, given normal linguistic practices, only rarely has TBRs on both
sides of the relation.
ET cannot meet R-ROT. So, accounts which claim that T-REL is ET are not adequate.
The right account of TT will be compatible with R-ROT. There is of course more to
say about this, but I think this point is decisive against ET being or capturing T-REL.
It is important, however, to be careful not to misunderstand what I am claiming here.
existence, the actual thing does seem in some way the cause of the statement’s being
true: it is because the actual thing exists or does not exist that the statement is called
true or false. [Categories (1995: 14a14–22)]
However, Aristotle’s notion of cause includes not just causation as we understand it, for example when
Jonny caused Sally to cry by giving her a wedding ring, but includes what we would consider as non-
causal dependence relations. Thus, although Aristotle is correctly translated as using the term ‘cause’,
his view can be understood as compatible with TT.
6I follow the standard convention of using single quotation marks to mark the use/mention distinction
and to talk about (mention) linguistic items and constructions, including TBRs. See (Bergmann 1959a:
19f), (Quine 1940: 26), and (Tarski 1933: 159). For reasons that will become clear in §1.3, when talking
about linguistic items that are truth-apt, I shall use single quotation marks to mention TBRs in general
(and not just sentences). If I am explicitly discussing propositions, then I follow the convention of using
triangle brackets. If I am discussing sentences specifically, then I shall use single quotation marks, but it
will be indicated or clear from the context that I am speaking about sentences rather than about TBRs
in general. I shall normally only talk about specific types of TBRs to make a particular point about
them, or to engage with an author who talks about them or uses them as their example of TBRs. I use
double quotation marks, when not used as two single quotation marks (this should be clear from the
context), mainly to use the quoted text, while attributing them to the author I am quoting, but also
to mention what an author says in order to discuss it.
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T-ET-ists7 claim that ET captures T-REL. One way to capture T-REL in terms of ET
is to claim that T-REL just is ET. As we saw, this is clearly wrong. Let’s take T-ET*
to be the view that ET captures T-REL in some other way. Bigelow (1988), often cited
as a main proponent of T-ET, I think, is best understood as a T-ET*-ist. He writes,
I suppose that entailment is to be a relation between propositions (whatever
they are). Truthmaker should not be construed as saying that an object
entails a truth; rather, it requires that the proposition that that object exists
entails the truth in question. [Bigelow 1988: 126; his emphases]
Bigelow is right and I think he would agree with what I have said so far. R-ROT is
not incompatible with what he says, and is not incompatible with T-ET*. One might
say that ET captures T-REL by providing a principle, articulated in terms of a logical
relation between propositions (or between other TBRs), for instance, the proposition
that these TMKs exist and the proposition that this TBR is true. In this way, that ET
captures T-REL is compatible with taking T-REL itself to be a relation that requires
R-ROT. Bigelow (1988) clearly takes this line; even though he captures T-REL with
ET, he takes T-REL itself to be a supervenience relation when he writes, “The essence of
Truthmaker, I urge, is the idea that truth is supervenient on being” (1988: 132), where
the relevant being on the right-side of the relation is not just a matter of TBRs.
However, as I shall argue in §2.3, ET is not a plausible candidate even if we understand
T-ET* in this way. At best, we would need to include a relevance constraint to ET.
I prefer to talk about trying to understand or account for T-REL itself rather than
principles that are meant to capture the logical relations between TBRs which refer to
T-REL and its relata: TMKs and other TBRs.
1.2.2 T-REL as Dependence on the Being of TMKs and not
just on the Existence of TMKs
Finally, BATT must say that truth depends asymmetrically on the being of TMKs instead
of the existence of TMKs. I say ‘being’ here because it is more general than a term such
as ‘existence’, which only applies to entities such as objects (for example people, tables,
or valleys) and processes (such as oxidation, hydrogenation, or non-violent democratic
revolution), and not to ways entities can be (such as being a worker, being green, or
being a prime number), which instead of existing can have being by being instantiated in
objects that exist. As I shall make clearer in §1.7, substantial metaphysical commitments
about the nature of TMKs cannot be built into BATT.
This will strike some as odd, especially those who follow Armstrong (2004: 5–7)
in thinking that the TT-ist must motivate the truthmaker principle qua metaphysical
7I use ‘T-ET’ to designate the theory that holds that T-REL is ET, and ‘T-ET-ist’ to designate those
theorists who believe T-ET. I use a similar abbreviation-scheme throughout, for example, ‘T-NEC’
similarly designates the theory which holds that T-REL is NEC.
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principle head on.8 However, this understanding of TT assumes that truthmaker ne-
cessitarianism (T-NEC) is the only view of TT or that TT must be a metaphysically
substantial view, giving only metaphysically substantial TMKs, usually considered to be
states of affairs (SOAs), or some other complex, structured, supposedly existing entity.
My aim is to understand the enterprise of TT completely differently, as the basic
enterprise of giving an account of the relation between truth and reality. BATT must strip
itself of this metaphysical substantiality and only include it if it is necessary to give an
account of the nature of T-REL. If an account that goes beyond BATT can be persuasive
without building in such metaphysically substantial commitments (for instance, without
having to accept T-NEC9 or without having to accept SOAs as TMKs), then I think
such a view should be favoured over others, even at the expense of rejecting orthodoxy.
This is a cornerstone both of my generally modest proposal for TT, and the reason why
my preferred version of TT and account of TMKs should be favoured. TMKs should
be construed as metaphysically modest as opposed to the orthodoxy which usually just
starts off from the position that TT must be metaphysically substantial, or as I shall put
it, metaphysically immodest or extravagant.
An important part of this metaphysical modesty is that the term ‘being’ needs to be
understood in an unrestrictive way to capture what I take to be the variety of modes of
being. Thus, I am not only speaking about being as Bigelow understands it when he says
that “the essence of Truthmaker, I urge, is the idea that truth is supervenient on being:
that you could not have any difference in what things are true unless there were some
difference in what things exist” (1988: 132).10 Beebee and Dodd [2005a: 4] understand
Bigelow’s view of being here as truth supervening on “whether things are.”11 Rather,
the right, less ontologically immodest understanding of being requires us to understand
8This is Dodd’s phrase (Dodd and Friend 2014: 3 and 7; from the examiners’ report).
9I do not stand alone in rejecting NEC. Mellor (2003: 213), for instance, does not think that NEC
is necessary for truthmaking. I shall argue in §2.9 that my favoured account can reject NEC altogether.
In fact, my skeptical sympathies lead me to reject or at least avoid any blanket acceptance of necessary
connections of any sort. I still consider my view to be a version of TT however. The truthmaker
enterprise should not just assume from the start that some mysterious and unsavoury metaphysical
relations such as necessary connections exist and that the relation between truth and reality is such
a relation. Any motivation for such a view must be built from the ground up, if at all. However,
I agree with Liggins (2008) among others, that the TT-enterprise, construed as only including such
metaphysically immodest views, is impossible to motivate (see especially [Beebee and Dodd 2005b] for
a collection of essays most of which are skeptical of TT, but as I see it, are skeptical not of TT, but
of the metaphysical immodesty of most versions of TT). BATT and the view I articulate which goes
beyond BATT retain the modesty I think is essential to TT (and for philosophy in general). This will
become clearer in §2.9, §4, and elsewhere.
10See also (Bigelow 1996: 38), where he clearly states that his preferred way of putting things on
which “truth supervenes on being” (ibid.) is a way of expressing the truthmaker principle.
11However, as I shall touch on in §4.1.2, Bigelow (1988: 158–165) clearly contrasts what he takes
to be the Truthmaker axiom with what he takes to be an “alternative” (ibid.: 159) strategy: second-
order quantification. He thinks that to take second-order quantification seriously, we need to distinguish
between second-order claims which are about “somehow that things are” (ibid: 164; my italics) and first-
order claims “that there are some further entities, however called” (ibid.). My suggestion concerning
‘being’ is that a TT-ist can just as well consider the ways things are to be part of TMKs without
thinking of such ways things are as further entities over and above the entities which are those ways.
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the basic TT claim as truth supervening on how things are. See (Dodd 2002a: 73–81)
who argues for this important point, which I shall discuss in more depth in §4.1. Thus,
‘being’ must be at least open to be understood as not just whether things are but
also how things are. Beebee and Dodd say that it is a “moot point whether this weaker
supervenience claim deserves to be regarded as a variant of truthmaker theory” (ibid.: 4).
However, in the spirit of non-skepticism, I shall assume that it is crucial and important
that it is regarded as a variant of TT.12 Whether or not all TT-ists would accept such
an ontologically neutral and modest view of being, I consider it a basic assumption of
the basic account of TT, which in my eyes, must remain as neutral as possible.
1.3 A Note on the Nature of TBRs: Tolerance
BATT should be agnostic and generally neutral about the nature of both TBRs and
TMKs. In fact, I do not see why BATT should not be compatible with rejecting the
claim that there is a nature to TMKs and TBRs at all. BATT should be compatible with
and leave open a pluralism about TMKs and TBRs where there is no specific nature
that all TMKs or all TBRs share (what unites them is that they are sometimes externally
related in certain, similar ways13). Of course, the right, full version of TT might have
to give a full account of what the TBRs and TMKs are. However, I have already made
it clear (in §0.2) that my aim is not to defend TT against TT-skepticism.14
12See (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 20), who also construes Dodd’s point in this way, when he says,
“although Dodd rejects that truth supervenes upon whether things are, he accepts that truth supervenes
upon how things are” (ibid.). We’ll take the latter, weaker supervenience claim, to be a variant, and
indeed a much more convincing variant, of TT. Elsewhere, Rodriguez-Pereyra assumes that those who
take “truth [to be] grounded not in entities but in how entities are [. . . ] believe in truthmaking but
not in truthmakers” (2006b: 186). Further, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 24f) argues that how things are
with things needs to be reified, that is, construed as entities. See Hornsby (2005: 40f) for a response.
Rodriguez-Pereyra’s stance, I assume, straddles TT with strong metaphysical assumptions about the
nature of TMKs which make TT implausible and rules out views which, as I describe in §1.7, do not
have such strong assumptions about the nature of TMKs. Thus, in the spirit of modesty, plausibility,
and pluralism, I reject this assumed contrast. I say more about this in §4.1. On the basic account,
whatever has being—and not only entities—can be a TMK.
13I think that it is fair to say that most TT-ists follow Armstrong (2004: 9) in thinking that T-REL
is an internal relation, such that the essences of TMKs-qua-TMKs and true TBRs-qua-TBRs are in
part constituted by the relation they have with each other. Or as Armstrong understands this notion,
a relation is internal if “given just the terms of the relation, the relation between them is necessitated”
(ibid.). I think that BATT should leave this open, as this is a substantial metaphysical assumption.
Armstrong suggests that it is “an attractive ontological hypothesis that such a relation is no addition
to being” (ibid.). I do not see how having internal relations understood in this necessitating way, or in
fact in any way at all, is “no addition to being” if the relation indeed exists whenever the relata exist
(that some relation coincides necessarily with its relata does not mean that it is no addition to being),
nor do I see how it is at all an “attractive ontological hypothesis” (ibid.; my emphasis) rather than a
flagrantly immodest one.
14See MacBride (2014: §0) who points out that TT must answer these five questions to defend it
against TT-skepticism: (1) What is it to be a TMK?; (2) What range of truths have TMKs?; (3) What
is the ontological nature of the entities that are TMKs?; (4) What are the TBRs?; (5) What motivates
TT? I say some things to address each of these questions throughout the dissertation. However,
because I am not addressing the skeptic but rather presenting my favoured views as an attempt to do
some in-house housecleaning, I do not have to say more than is necessary for this aim. Nevertheless,
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I shall now focus on TBRs, and, in §1.7, on TMKs. Overall, there is no consensus as
to what the nature of TBRs is. Kirkham (1992: 59–64) argues for a “tolerant attitude
about truth bearers” (ibid.: 59). According to this tolerant attitude “there is no ‘correct’
answer to the question of what kind of thing can possess truth values. The matter is
one of choice, not discovery” (ibid.). He explains that there is a great variety of kinds
of entities which philosophers have claimed to be the right kind of entity to bear truth:
Among the candidates are beliefs, propositions, judgments, assertions, state-
ments, theories, remarks, ideas, acts of thought, utterances, sentence to-
kens, sentence types, sentences (unspecified), and speech acts.[15] Even if
all philosophers reached sufficient agreement to identify by name the one
right bearer of truth, our problems would hardly be at an end, for there is
also disagreement about the nature of the things named by each of these
terms. One person’s idea of a sentence may be different from the next
person’s. [ibid.: 54]
Given the considerable disagreement about the nature of TBRs amongst both TT-ists
and other theorists concerned with truth, let alone those philosophers such as Platts
(1997: 33–35, 37–42) who argue that the issue is philosophically uninteresting, I think
that BATT would need to remain agnostic about the nature of the right TBRs. TT-ists
of various persuasions can take a variety of different routes with regard to the nature
of TBRs. One may side with the Quineans and think that it is “madness” (ibid.: 38)
to take a philosophical term of art such as propositions as TBRs, considering them as
“dubious things at best” (ibid.: 40). (As a good Quinean in this regard, Platts [ibid.: 40]
tentatively takes relativised sentences to be the main TBRs.) Or, one might side with
Armstrong (2004: 12ff), as is popular amongst TT-ists, who also only tentatively takes
propositions to be what he calls the “primary” TBRs; he calls them “primary” as he
thinks other entities such as sentences are also TBRs but only derivatively by expressing
propositions.16 Or, one may side with Kirkham who takes a skeptical though permissive
stance, claiming that it is just a matter of choice and thus completely arbitrary which
it will turn out that my favoured version of TT as a metaphysically modest view can also be seen as
constituting further skeptical challenges to the more metaphysically substantial views. In short, the
overall plausibility of my account is an extended argument against metaphysically immodest TT-ists’
ability to answer MacBride’s questions in the way that they would like, and generally think they can.
15Even this extensive list is missing at least one other candidate, namely thoughts. See Fumerton
(2002: 13ff; 2010: 92ff) for such an account and (2002: 42ff) for what Fumerton thinks thoughts are.
Interestingly, his account is adamantly realist (2002: §1; and 2010: §3) but maintains that thoughts (as
TBRs) play a “robust role” (2010: 91) in “creating truth” (ibid.: 91f) in “partnership” (ibid.: 97) with
TMKs. The robust role is summarised as “introducing the possibility of correspondence[;] [i]t is only
because an object can correspond or fail to correspond to some thought of triangularity that it is true
that the object is a triangle” (ibid.). On my aboutness account (see §2), I similarly take TBRs to have
a central, partnership role in truthmaking, which is captured by the idea that truths are about their
potential TMKs and which I shall later call the duality of truthmaking and aboutness (§2.3). Fumerton’s
idea is slightly different. But, that TBRs introduce the possibility of truthmaking, especially in my way
of describing the partnership, is compatible with TBRs being not just thoughts but many or any of the
TBRs on this list; in short, my view is that the aboutness of the TBRs ensures that the TBRs can be
made true by their TMKs, and all of the TBRs on the list can be relevantly about their TMKs (see
§2.4.2.1–2.4.2.7 for further discussion).
16To complicate things further, David (2005: 156–159) makes clear a very unsettling fact for those
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TBRs one takes to be right or primary.17 But what is clear is that given this tentativeness
and lack of agreement about the nature of TBRs, BATT should remain agnostic and
consider one or the other TBRs as the one to speak about only as a matter of easing
one’s exposition of more important matters. BATT has only one TBR requirement:
Truthbearer Requirement (R-TBR): one of the relata of T-REL is a TBR and must
be truth-apt, and when properly related to a TMK is made true by that TMK.
Whatever a TBR is, according to TT when it is related by T-REL to a TMK, then it is
true, and whenever a TMK is related to something by T-REL and hence makes it true,
that thing must be a TBR. R-TBR is a requirement which complements the requirement
that T-REL is not purely logical (see §1.2.1) for it states that at least one of the relata
must be a TBR. And as far as I can see, this is the only requirement on TBRs that is
essential to BATT.
1.4 The Relations-come-easy view of Relations
In the way that I understand them, relations are kinds of properties.18 They are distin-
guished from other properties that we call “monadic properties,” which are instantiated
by one object at a time, by the fact that they come in degrees larger than one, meaning
that they are instantiated by more than one object at a time. Relations, by contrast
to monadic properties, are properties which can take on an “adicity” or “arity” of more
than one. We sometimes talk about relations having places, where objects can be. For
instance love is a relation with adicity of two in that it is a two-place relation which
relates one object, say Jon, to a second object, say Mary. This relation is not reflexive in
that even though Jon can love himself, he might not, and it is generally non-symmetric
in that if Jon loves Mary, it is not necessarily the case that Mary loves Jon (making
it not symmetric) even though sometimes the sentiment is reciprocal (making it not
asymmetric).
who follow Armstrong in his TT. Armstrong, as a good Naturalist, does not even believe in propositions.
Armstrong writes, “no Naturalist can be happy with a realm of propositions. [. . . ] [They are not] to be
taken with metaphysical seriousness” (1997: 131; David [2005: 156] discusses this quote). Instead, he
thinks that talk of propositions is a way of typing token beliefs and thoughts (David ibid.). Armstrong
writes, “What exists are classes of intentionally equivalent tokens. The fundamental correspondence,
therefore, is not between entities called truths and their truthmakers, but between the token beliefs
and thoughts on the one hand, and truthmakers on the other” (1997: 131). This is most problematic
for Armstrongians, as David argues, because taking token beliefs and thoughts as primary TBRs makes
us reject the idea that T-REL is an internal relation which relates TBRs essentially or necessarily with
their TMKs. This, I think, is because token beliefs will stay the same token beliefs even if what
they are about changes (see §2.9 below for further discussion). This would be a major problem for
Armstrongians because it means that not even Armstrong would accept T-NEC when pressed. See
especially (David ibid.: 158–9). Later, I reject T-NEC (§2.8) and claim that Armstrong’s insistence on
NEC being essential to TT is metaphysically immodest (§2.9).
17Just as another example, Mumford (2007: 45) is also explicit about his TBR-neutrality.
18It is also standard to take monadic properties to be unary relations, and hence to take properties
to be kinds of relations. If one prefers this understanding of relations, then please read what I say here
in that way; nothing I say about the relations-come-easy view will be affected.
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In this dissertation, I assume what I call the relations-come-easy view of relations.
What I mean by this is that any being (including an entity such as an object and also
other kinds of beings such as properties19) that can be grouped together with itself or
with others in some way is related to itself or those other beings in some way.
Let’s look at some examples. As we know, identity is a relation. Constitution is
a relation. Being closer to is a relation. And, logical relations such as entailment are
also relations. That logical connections are also relations is accepted in the way that
many people talk about them. For one, Bigelow (1988), who rejects talk of ‘virtue’ as
unhelpful, claims that “[t]he ‘making’ in ‘making true’ is essentially logical entailment”
(ibid.: 125) and “I suppose that entailment is to be a relation between propositions
(whatever they are)” (ibid.: 126; my emphasis20).
I shall assume that explanatory relations such as conceptually explains are also rela-
tions. For conceptual explanation also signifies some sort of relation between explanans
and explanandum. Whenever X explains Y, there is a relation of explanatoriness between
X and Y, whether the explanation is that of conceptual explanation, causal explanation,
or any other explanation. One may talk about ‘because’ and ‘in virtue of’ as connec-
tives similar to ‘and’, albeit as non-truth-functional ones. Connectives merely combine
sentences to make new sentences. One may interpret connectives, then, as merely con-
necting sentences without relating them. Relations are normally thought to be the
semantic values of predicates, which take designators to form sentences, and not the se-
mantic values of connectives, which take sentences to form complex sentences. There is
indeed a grammatical difference between connectives and predicates, and hence relations.
But, on the relations-come-easy view, any sort of grouping of one or more entities,
including linguistic entities such as sentences, marks the presence of some relation be-
tween them. In the explanatory case, where X explains Y, X and Y are grouped in some
way and are hence related in some way. The explanation purports to describe some sort
of relation between explanans and explanandum, even if formally or grammatically they
are not connected by predicates but by connectives. Describing the explanation further
as a conceptual explanation merely further specifies the explanatory relation that holds
between X and Y.21 Part of the TT-project is to make clear what the relation is that
is marked by a certain asymmetry that holds between TBRs and TMKs. I shall assume
that there is no reason to exclude logical relations and logical groupings from the set of
all relations, but I shall also assume, as I stated in §1.2.1, that T-REL is some sort of
non-purely logical relation, for T-REL generally relates truth-apt entities of various sorts
19I include other properties here, for properties can also be related to each other. For instance the
property being red-7 is related to the property being red-8 at least in one way, that is, by the relation
being lighter than.
20Be aware, when quoting, I normally only say when I have added emphasis. Only when I think that
the emphasis is striking do I mention that the quoted author added emphasis.
21I say more about these matters in Appendix 1, where I discuss Künne’s useful distinctions on this
issue. But, what I say here should be sufficient. A further discussion and defense of the relations-come-
easy view here would be to engage with the TT-skeptic, and as I stated, this is not my aim.
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when they are true to mostly non-truth-apt entities of various sorts and how things are
with those entities.
What I say about TT is compatible with at least one reading of Dummett’s Principle C
(Dummett 1976: 53, 51–55), VIRTUE,22 and Künne’s Schema P (Künne 2003: 150),
namely the “ontic reading” (ibid.: 158–165). But, if we accept the relations-come-
easy view of relations, truthmaking’s being a relation is also compatible with what
Künne calls the “propositional reading” (ibid.: 154–157, 165–169), on which truthmaking
is just conceptual explanation.23 The details of these alternative and subtle ways of
understanding TT, which purport to raise skepticism towards the view that truthmaking
is a relation, is not essential to the dissertation. In Appendix 1, I present a more in-depth
discussion of Dummett and especially Künne.
1.5 TT and the Correspondence Theory of Truth
TTs are also taken by some philosophers to be closely related to what are called corre-
spondence theories of truth (CTs). For instance, David (2009) claims, “One feels that
there is a natural kinship between the two” (ibid.: 137). Perhaps the simplest version of
CT captures the truth-property with a generalised biconditional:
CORRESPONDENCE: a proposition is true iff it corresponds with a fact (or object
or other kind of entity).24
So, when a proposition does not correspond with a fact, then the proposition is false (or at
least, not true). Correspondence is clearly also meant to be a relation that holds between
a fact and a true proposition. And the facts to which true propositions correspond are
elements in reality to which these propositions are properly related when they are true.25
Thus, the basic claim of CT is that there is a relation of correspondence that holds
between propositions when they are true and some fact. Perhaps this correspondence
relation is nothing more than a mere correlation between truths and reality, but perhaps
22I follow Sundholm who states that Dummett’s Principle C (‘C’ is short for ‘correspondence’) or
VIRTUE is “clearly nothing but a formulation of a truth-maker condition on truth” (1994: 123–4).
23I won’t go into the details of this here, but the propositional reading is unacceptable to BATT-ists
for other reasons, that is, it violates R-ROT (§1.2.1).
24According to David (2009), this captures the basic idea behind correspondence, for all CT-ists.
Specifically, see (David ibid.: 143–144) to see how other versions of the theory that, importantly, do
not use a generalised biconditional are implausible. This basic form doesn’t make a claim about the
nature of facts. I added the parentheses to include other categories and other forms of correspondence
that are not fact-based, but object-based, event-based, or based on other kinds of entities, which
are taken to play the role of correspondent. See (Künne 2003: §3) for an in-depth discussion of the
difference between object-based and fact-based versions of CT. I shall leave off the brackets and speak
just of facts for brevity. Also, as is standard, ‘iff’ stands for ‘if and only if’.
25This remark assumes that the correspondents of true propositions are elements in reality. Though,
one might try to reject this assumption. For example, one might try to do this by construing facts as
(other) true propositions. However, as long as propositions are real, the facts to which they correspond
(even construed as true propositions themselves) are elements of reality. I assume that true propositions
corresponding to some kind of elements in reality is central to the relevant notion of correspondence.
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the relation is slightly more substantial than a mere correlation. I assume that a central,
basic claim of CT is that there is some sort of relation between truths and reality.
It is clear that CTs seem to share a commitment to T-REL with TT.26 However, it
is important to distinguish CTs from TTs, because CTs generally come with many more
commitments than those accepted by BATT. That TT strips away the additional, and
to some problematic, commitments of CT is summed up by Oliver, “The truth-maker
principle is a sanitised version of a correspondence theory of truth” (1996: 69), and
Dummett:
Baﬄed by the attempt to describe in general the relation between language
and reality, we have nowadays abandoned the correspondence theory of truth
[. . . ] Nevertheless the correspondence theory expresses one important fea-
ture of the concept of truth which is not expressed by the law “It is true that
p if and only if p” and which we have so far left quite out of account: that
a statement is true only if there is something in the world in virtue of which
it is true. [1959: 14; my emphasis]
Let’s read Oliver and Dummett as making or implying the good point that CT and TT
are distinct because TT strips down and sanitizes CT.
Here is a potential counterexample to the claim that CT and TT are the same. A
certain version of CT might hold that some TBRs can have multiple TMKs but can
only have one single, specific correspondent. This would be a version of CT which
clearly distinguishes the TMKs, one of the relata in the truthmaking relation, from
correspondents, which would be considered relata of a different correspondence relation.
I don’t see why this is not a possible pair of views to hold.
Amongst CT-ists, there is no consensus on what the right notion of correspondence
is; no specific explication is common to all accounts. For example, the notion of corre-
spondence can be interpreted almost spatially as stating a kind of isomorphism between
the spatial structure of the corresponding worldly facts, and the grammatical form of the
truthbearing sentence; facts or SOAs have some structure S which is isomorphic with the
structure of sentences. CTs do not always have this assumption about isomorphic cor-
respondence, however. Even though there is similarly no consensus concerning T-REL,
some TT-ists extravagantly accept this isomorphism by positing SOAs as TMKs.
However, even according to Armstrong (2004: 16–17; 2010: 62), who posits SOAs
as the TMKs for most truths (2004: 48–49), the central difference between CT and
TT is that TT expands the relevant truth-to-reality relation to include not only one-
26I shall not go too deeply into the debate about whether CT is in fact closely related to TT. However,
David (2009) makes a strong case for thinking that correspondence is symmetric (ibid.: 138–147) while
T-REL is supposed to be asymmetric (ibid.: 146); though David also questions whether T-REL is in
fact asymmetric (ibid.: 152–154). David also covers other potential similarities and differences between
correspondence and T-REL, illustrating that understanding the connection between the two is a very
thorny matter. I shall assume that at least some versions of CT take correspondence to be asymmetric,
and that according to TT, T-REL is asymmetric in the relevant sense as well.
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to-one correspondence relations but one-to-many and many-to-many correspondence.27
According to him, one of the hallmarks of T-RELs, which distinguishes them from cor-
respondence relations that on the CT are taken to be only one-to-one, is that they can
be one-to-many and many-to-many.
The way that I shall understand TT, however, is that it consists in the aspect of
any theory that makes a claim about the presence and nature of a particular relation
between truth and reality, where the asymmetry is understood as going from reality-to-
truth, rather than truth-to-reality. Thus, whatever the relation between CT and TT, it
is clear that CT contains a version of TT insofar as it makes claims about the presence
and nature of an asymmetric relation between truths and reality, however the nature of
this relation is cashed out.
1.6 TT and Theories of Truth
One complication for the relation between CT and TT, which I shall now discuss, is
a general concern about the relation between TTs and theories of truth (ToTs). In
my understanding of the relation between TT and ToTs, TT and CT are two separate
theories with distinct aims.28 CT is a version of a ToT. TT is not. TT does not try to
account for the nature of truth and only tries to account for the relation between truths
and reality. TT is a theory in part about truth, which is distinct from a theory of truth.
Because CT tries to give an account of the nature of truth and not just the relation
between truth and reality, it tries to do more than TT, making the latter not a version
of the former.
Also, since CT attempts to account for the nature of truth, the right-hand side of the
biconditional for a version of CT, or any ToT, cannot mention truth or contain the word
‘true’. Because TT merely gives an account of the relation between truth and reality, it
does not have this restriction. Recall
(TM): p is true if something makes it true.
TM has ‘true’ on the right-hand side, which is allowable for a statement of TT but not
for any version of CT or any ToT. So, TT is not a ToT.
There is no need for us to expand on the reasons for distinguishing TT from CT
beyond what I have done now. So, I shall from now on leave aside discussion of CT.
However, this argument about the relation between TT and ToT is illuminating for
other reasons as well. TT is clearly not a version of CT for the reason that TT is not
27Coincidentally, Armstrong (2004: 16) argues that TT (and even Horwich’s Minimalism) is preferable
to CT because although CT is “quite similar” (ibid.) to TT, by positing one-one correspondence
relations, it is a “metaphysically very extravagant theory” (ibid.). This is relevant because I argue
especially in §4.1.2 that the version of TT presented by Armstrong, though perhaps less metaphysically
extravagant than CT, is still too extravagant.
28See also Merricks (2007: 15).
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a ToT, while CT is. But, a further, interesting question arises about how TT relates
to the main rivals of CT, namely the coherence theory of truth (COT), the pragmatic
theory of truth (POT), the identity theory of truth (IOT), and the various forms of
deflationism such as Minimalism. Discussing these in depth will lead my discussion too
far off-track. However, the general point that TT is not a version of ToT should give
us strong reason to think that none of these views threaten or are rivals to TT. All
of these views are versions of a ToT, or, in the case of deflationism and Minimalism,
versions of ToT-skepticism. They only threaten TT insofar as the version of each of
these views attempts to deny that there is a relation between truths and reality. And
it is very unclear that a commitment to any of these views constitutes such a denial.
COT-ists, for example, can accept that there’s a relation between truths and aspects
of reality which make them true; this reality just happens to be other true TBRs or
a network of other truths. In what follows, I make this point discussing the POT-ist,
IOT-ist, and deflationist.
1.6.1 Example 1: TT is Compatible with Pragmatism & Reject-
ing T-NEC
James (1909: §8) writes that pragmatists and what he calls “intellectualists” both agree
that truth is “agreement, as falsity is disagreement, with reality” (1909: 823). They differ
in what account of TMKs is given. James clearly presents a TT-POT, which claims that
TBRs are made true by things outside of TBRs, when he writes:
The truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. Truth happens
to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an
event, a process, the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification.
Its validity is the process of its validation. [ibid.; his emphases]
This captures the central assumptions of BATT (especially T-REL-C, §1.2). Pihlström
(2009: especially 15–33) sums up his contemporary version of TT-POT thus,
It is, then, the pragmatic efficacy of our beliefs about the world that makes
(in a broadly interpreted sense) those beliefs true, by making us able to
orientate in the world they are about. [ibid.: 30]
POT-ists can build a version of TT by fleshing out an account of the nature of TMKs
in terms of what they call the “pragmatic efficacy of our beliefs” thus:
POT in terms of TT (TT-POT): any TBR, p, is true iff there is a TMK x and p is
pragmatically efficacious for subject S who utters, thinks, believes (etc.) p as a
result of x.29
29Obviously, this is just one way to try to articulate TT in terms of POT.
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As long as the POT-ist can accept the basic features of BATT, POT and TT are
compatible. As we have clearly seen in this section, POT-ists can attempt to flesh out
their own version of TT. Any candidate version of BATT must accommodate this fact.
Not only does TT-POT give a pragmatic account of TMKs but it understands T-REL
itself in terms of pragmatic efficacy rather than the dominant account in terms of
necessitation (NEC). Pihlström writes,
This is a further consideration in favor of pragmatism, to be added to the
unclarity and sheer implausibility of the metaphysical realist’s postulation
of mysterious cross-categorial necessitating relations (etc.) in order to ex-
plain our perfectly ordinary concepts of truth and the world. [2009: 30; my
emphasis]
Pihlström writes that TT-POT is not committed to truths being eternally true nor to
a “timeless, abstract, unchanging relation eternally obtaining between a true idea and
something that exists independently of it” (2009: 19). If we accept the natural thought
that TBRs can change in terms of truth-value, then we can reject T-NEC, the view that
T-REL is a necessitation relation.
To reject NEC, one needs to accept the idea that truths are connected to their
TMKs in such a way that it is still possible that (1) the TBR exists and (2) the usually
corresponding TMK, to which the TBR has a necessitation relation, exists, but (3) the
TBR is false (or not true). According to James, the TMKs are most plausibly construed
as acts of verification. Such acts of verification are related to ideas, which bear the
property true, by T-REL; that is, the idea is true if and only if the verification of that
idea is pragmatically “expedient in the way of our thinking”30 (1909: 824). On this
account, (1) the TBR can exist and (2) its usually corresponding TMK(s) exist, but
(3) the TBR is not true, if for instance the TBR and the TMKs are not pragmatically
expedient for S in the circumstances. So, NEC can be rejected.31
1.6.2 Example 2: TT is Compatible with Some Versions of the
Identity Theory of Truth
Even certain versions of IOT are compatible with TT. In fact, some IOT-ists explicitly
put their theory in terms of truthmaking. Candlish and Damnjanovic articulate IOT
explicitly in terms of truthmaking when they say:
The simplest and most general statement of the identity theory of truth is
that when a truth-bearer (e.g., a proposition) is true, there is a truthmaker
30James defines his terms thus: “What does agreement with reality mean? It means verifiability.
Verifiability means ability to guide us prosperously through experience” (1907: 484). This is also
congenial to what other pragmatists think. See for instance, (Dewey 1920: 169–71; and 1916: 98–115).
31I argue similarly but in terms of aboutness rather than expediency in §2.8–2.9.
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(e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists
in its identity with the latter. [2011: §0]
Thus, the simplest and most general statement of the theory can be put thus:
IOT in terms of TT (TT-IOT): any TBR, p, is true iff there is a TMK x and p is
identical with x.
It is clear that one can formulate IOT in terms of truthmaking. Hence, IOT and TT are,
at least prima facie, compatible.32
1.6.3 Example 3: TT is Compatible with Non-Substantive The-
ories of Truth
Minimalism, deflationism, and other non-substantive theories (NSTs) which state that
truth has no (substantial) nature and which, as David states, are better understood as
“antitheor[ies] of truth” (1994: 3), are also compatible with TT.33 In fact, Horwich, the
Minimalist, writes:
[Minimalism] does not deny that truths do correspond—in some sense—to
the facts; it acknowledges that statements owe their truth to the nature of
reality; and it does not dispute the existence of relationships between truth,
reference, and predicate satisfaction. Thus we might hope to accommodate
much of what the correspondence theorist wishes to say without retreating
an inch from our deflationary position. [1998: 104–5]
Horwich thinks that Minimalism and deflationism are compatible with what he calls the
“correspondence intuition” (ibid.: 104), and thereby with TT. What such views reject is
the idea that truth has any substantive nature. They do not necessarily deny that there
is any relation between truths and reality or that truths are in some sense made true, or,
to use Horwich’s phrase (above), “owe their truth to the nature of reality” (ibid.). Thus,
(ToT-skeptical) NSTs are, at least prima facie, compatible with TT.
32Of course, other IOT-ists might reject this picture. For example, (Candlish 1999: 200–201, 213)
thinks that IOT should not be put in terms of an identity between TBRs and TMKs because talking in
this way already seems to imply some sort of distinction between TBRs and TMKs, when what IOT-ists
believe is that they are identical. See also (Gaskin 2015: §3) for discussion. My response to this is that
identity is clearly a relation. So, however unsettling it is to talk about TBRs and TMKs separately,
IOT-ists must posit some sort of an identity, and, whether they want to call the relata TBRs and TMKs
or something else, they seem to be providing some sort of account of T-REL, making even such IOTs
potentially compatible with BATT.
33I call it this only because it has become common to call deflationary theories non-substantive theories
of truth. But see (Asay 2014), who argues that “there is no metaphysically substantive property of
truth” (ibid.: 147). He argues against what he calls “metaphysical substantivism” about truth on which
“the property of truth is a sparse (non-abundant) property, regardless of how one understands the nature
of sparse properties (as universals, tropes, or natural classes)” (ibid.). He argues that if we posit such a
property, then we are left with a contradictory or unmotivated view. But he also argues that although
the property truth is metaphysically deflationary, this fully respects the metaphysical ambitions of TT.
Asay’s (2014) arguments lend support to the overall point I am making here that TT is compatible
with deflationism.
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1.6.4 Conclusion: TT’s Compatibility with Most ToTs and Anti-
ToTs
In conclusion, it is clear that TT is compatible with various ToTs and anti-ToTs, and
not just CT, the view it has been most associated with. This is because ToTs and TT
have distinct aims, respectively, to account for the nature of truth and to account for
the nature of the relation between truth and reality.
Further, theorists with all sorts of leanings which lead them to specific versions of ToT
(e.g. COT-ists, POT-ists, CT-ists, IOT-ists)34 can try to move beyond their ToT and
try to build a corresponding version of TT. BATT, which is captured by commitments to
TM, T-REL-C, and TD, is compatible with a great variety of different ToTs. Pragmatists,
coherentists, correspondence theorists, identity theorists, can try to build versions of TT
by adding a specific story, most fruitfully, about either the nature of the T-REL or the
nature of TMKs. Whether such views can be made to be plausible accounts of TT is
another matter.
1.7 A Note on the Nature of TMKs: Pluralism
In §1.3, we saw that no metaphysically detailed account of the nature of TBRs is essential
to TT and that BATT should be neutral about the nature of TBRs. In this section,
I shall make plausible the analogous claim that BATT can also be neutral about the
nature of TMKs; that is there is no specific, metaphysically detailed account of the
nature of TMKs which is essential to TT.
Many disparate philosophical tendencies can not only articulate alternative ToTs,
but, as we saw in §1.6, they should also be able to build their own versions of TT by
going beyond BATT. So, BATT should be incompatible with them. Thus, BATT should
be neutral about the nature of TMKs.
The pragmatist, coherentist, identity theorist, correspondence theorist, or any other
theorist with a particular philosophical leaning can try to build their own version of TT.35
34Another noteworthy alternative, which I don’t have space to discuss in depth, is (Asay 2012) which
as he says, “explore[s] the possibility of projectivist truthmaking, and show[s] how it makes sense of
quasi-realism” (ibid.: 373). My claim in this section is merely that all these options are indeed available
to explore, and BATT must make room for such exploration.
35As should be clear by the end of this section, and also by the end of §7 where I argue for this
in more detail, I take TT to be compatible with most forms of anti-realism. Blackburn has a nice
list of the various competitors to realism: “Realists are contrasted with a variety of alleged opponents:
reductionsists, idealists, instrumentalists, pragmatists, verificationists, internalists, neo-Wittgensteinian
neutralists, and no doubt others” (1984: 145). To this list, Asay helpfully adds: “quietists, expressivists,
fictionalists, nominalists, semantic anti-realists, conventionalists, non-cognitivists, constructivists, rela-
tivists, intuitionists, subjectivists, quasi-realists, non-factualists, error theorists, and probably still others”
(2012: 391–392). I do not claim that all of these views, which are said to be competitors to realism,
are compatible with TT. In Appendix 5, I argue that certain versions of anti-realism have problematic
consequences when they adopt TT. In this section I argue that TT is compatible with a variety of
philosophical views.
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This will most often take the form of articulating metaphysical commitments concerning
the nature of TMKs (and sometimes also of T-REL36). These versions can differ from
each other in so far as they will restrict their theory of the nature of TMKs (or T-REL)
in their preferred way. For instance, a pragmatist can attempt to give an account of the
TMKs in terms of the utility or pragmatic expediency of the truths for some subject S,
while a coherentist might claim that all TMKs are webs of other TBRs.
Of course, different theorists with similar philosophical leanings might also differ in
their account of the TMKs. One coherentist TT-ist might take the TMKs to be webs
of beliefs, while another might take the TMKs to be webs of propositions, while yet
another might be pluralist and take the TMKs to be webs of beliefs, propositions, and
other TBRs.
TT-ists with the same general philosophical leanings can also differ in terms of what
one might call the categorial ontology of TMKs. For instance, as we saw in §1.6.1,
James can plausibly be interpreted as thinking that the TMKs are acts of verification
which are pragmatically expedient. James talks about the things which make ideas true
as being “events” or “processes” (1909: 823) as acts undoubtedly are.37 This specifi-
cation is a specification of the ontological category of the TMKs. Another pragmatist
36See, for instance, Livet who seems to understand the anti-realists’ understanding of T-REL as
a strengthening of “epistemic accessibility” (2014: 101). It is suggested that consideration of the
anti-realist has consequences on the nature of the connection between TBRs and TMKs, making the
“attachment of the truthmaker doctrine to a stronger and more intimate tie than the one of a relation”
(ibid.) which Livet attributes to Mulligan (2007) as “the tie of essence” (Livet ibid.: 99; Mulligan
ibid.: 8). My relations-come-easy view does not distinguish between ties and relations. For another
good example, see (Asay 2012: §5, especially 383–385) where he engages in what he calls the “tricky
business” (ibid.: 382) of correctly categorizing quasi-realism as an anti-realist view. The mark of quasi-
realism is that it tries, as he concisely describes it, to “mimic realism even so far as to say that our
moral judgments are made true by the mind-independent features of the natural world” (ibid.: 384).
Despite Blackburn’s hostility towards TT (see [1987: 119–120] and [2009: 207]), Asay clearly argues
that quasi-realists can embrace TT, and that TT can in fact make clear how quasi-realism is different
from other forms of anti-realism and in particular does not collapse into subjectivism. The strategy
is to say that quasi-realists will give an anti-realist account not of the TMKs for moral judgments,
but rather of the truthmaking relation which relates these judgments with their TMKs. In effect, the
quasi-realist can give a realist account of the TMKs, for instance, by claiming that there are natural,
mind-independent TMKs for moral judgments (2012: 384). What makes her an anti-realist, according
to Asay, is that some natural TMK N makes true TBR p by N’s playing the TMK-role towards p in an
anti-realist way. As Asay says, “N is a [TMK] for p because of our practices of projection, not because
of their de re modal features. Quasi-realists, I’m arguing, should locate the mind-dependence relevant
to ethical thought inside the truthmaking relation itself, and not the [TMKs]” (ibid.). This is a clear way
that the quasi-realist can argue that her view does not collapse into subjectivism, which presumably
would give a subjectivist account of the TMKs, not of T-REL. My main aim in this footnote is to
illustrate that versions of anti-realism are compatible with TT, not just by giving an anti-realist account
of TMKs, but also by giving an anti-realist account of T-REL. Recall also that in §1.6.1, I argued that
one can understand TT-POT as also giving an alternative account of T-REL, and not just of TMKs.
In what follows I mostly talk about anti-realisms which give an anti-realist account of the nature of
TMKs, but the general points I make also apply to anti-realisms which are best articulated by giving
an anti-realist account of the nature of T-REL.
37I am not endorsing James’s view here. Rather, I am arguing that its details are generally compatible
with BATT. In Appendix 5, I discuss arguments against verificationist views on aboutness grounds.
One might also object to such a view by saying that there are truths that no-one has verified at all.
I shall not explore how the verificationist would respond to worries such as these.
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might try to build their TT along other categorial lines by claiming that TMKs are not
acts, processes or events, but rather of a different ontological category. For instance,
they might think that they are states of affairs (SOAs, sometimes also called “Russel-
lian facts”), understood in a way that makes them categorially different from events or
processes, such as the state of something’s being expedient. Or instead, they might
take TMKs to be instantiated or particularised properties (sometimes called “tropes” or
“modes”), such as the expediency of some particular act.
These differences do not come from TT-commitments, based on considerations to
do with truth. They come from commitments concerning what the theorists take to be
the right categorial metaphysics. For instance, whether one thinks that the TMKs must
be SOAs rather than particularised properties (PAPs) usually depends on independent
considerations.38
Some theorists, however, take TT, and in particular the account of the nature of
T-REL, to have consequences for the nature of TMKs.
For instance, take a T-NEC-ist, who believes that TMKs must necessitate TBRs in
such a way that in all possible worlds where the TMKs exist and the corresponding TBRs
exist, the TBRs must be true. Such a theorist will claim that for a TBR such as the
utterance by Jon’s mother, ‘Jon is a doctor’, the TMK cannot merely be the object Jon,
nor merely the property being a doctor, but must be something that can necessitate
the truth of that utterance. Jon cannot necessitate the truth of the utterance because
Jon may not have been a doctor. So, there are possible worlds where Jon exists, the
utterance exists (by being made), and the utterance is not true.
The same goes for the property being a doctor. The property may exist, the utterance
may be made (and hence exist), but the utterance may not be true.
However, if the SOA Jon’s being a doctor or the (nontransferable) PAP the doctor-
ness that Jon instantiates exists, and the utterance exists, then the utterance, it seems,
38See especially (Dodd 2000: §1; and 2009) for an excellent critical discussion of some of these
independent considerations, but also for a presentation of some of the main issues in the debate
between TMKs as PAPs (non-structured entities) and TMKs as SOAs (structured, complex entities).
In (2009: 331–332), he raises what he calls the “problem of instantiation,” the problem of avoiding what
is commonly called Bradley’s Regress. (Dodd 2000: 8–9) also argues that the benefits of PAP over SOA
are not as clear-cut as they seem. In particular, he argues that because PAPs are transferable, i.e. even
if they are properties of one thing a, they might have been properties of another thing b, they cannot
play the TMK-role. This is because a PAP such as the F-ness of a cannot guarantee the truth of a is
F. According to Dodd, the PAP a’s F-ness could have been the b’s F-ness instead. Against this, Martin
(2008: 44), among others, thinks that PAPs are “nontransferable” (ibid.), by which he means: “the
redness or sphericity of this tomato cannot migrate to another tomato. This, in fact, is a consequence
of the idea that properties are particular ways things are. The identity of a property—its being the
property it is—is bound up with the identity of its possessor” (ibid.). However, Dodd argues that
because we identify PAPs by the particulars which have them, i.e. we identify a’s F-ness as numerically
distinct from b’s F-ness or c’s F-ness, it would be ad hoc to stipulate that PAPs are non-transferable.
This is because all that follows from the fact that we identify PAPs in this way is that we refer to PAPs
by means of referring to the particulars which have them, not that they are somehow linked to these
particulars essentially. I think that this is an important point about PAPs, since it helps us understand
why PAPs are unstructured simples while SOAs, which do have their constituent particulars essentially,
are structured entities.
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must be true. The TMK as a SOA or PAP39 seems to necessitate the utterance where the
mere existence of Jon or the property-as-universal being a doctor does not necessitate
the truth of the utterance.
The T-NEC-ist might then try to generalise this argument by claiming that all truths
have a similar structure and that this structure of TBRs gives TMKs a corresponding
structure, and on this basis claim that all TMKs must be SOAs or PAPs. I’m not saying
that this is how all T-NEC-ists would argue (and I am definitely not saying that the
T-NEC-ist is right here). Armstrong, for one, would reject this generalising move. He
(2004: 6) thinks that existence is not a property. So even though Armstrong says that
“ ‘exists’ is a perfectly good predicate” (ibid.), we do not need a SOA T’s existing to
make true the proposition <T exists>.40 All we need to play the TMK-role and to
necessitate that proposition, according to Armstrong, is T. Thus, a version of TT, in
this case with a specific NEC-account of T-REL, can seem to commit us to a particular
account of the nature of TMKs. However, as we saw with Armstrong, differences can
arise in the details for independent reasons (for instance, what account one gives of
existence can have an effect on the details).
It should nonetheless be clear that this is only a consequence of a view which takes
on further assumptions or builds into TT more commitments than those of the basic
account. T-NEC may commit us to SOAs or PAPs to play the role of TMK for many
truths. But this is an additional commitment that is not essential to BATT. The
conjunction of TM, T-REL-C, TD, R-ROT, R-TBR, which make up some of the main,
actual commitments of BATT does not give us any further commitments about the
nature of TMKs. Thus, I think that the following is the only basic requirement about
the nature of TMKs for TT:
The Truthmaker Requirement (R-TMK): one of the relata of the T-REL is a TMK,
which is not always an entity that is truth-apt, and when properly related to a TBR
makes true that TBR.
R-TMK is compatible with any further specification of TT in terms of pragmatism, co-
herentism, or whatever. R-TMK is pluralist, since it is compatible with TMKs having
natures as claimed by the pragmatist, coherentist, etc. It is also pluralist in terms of
categorial ontology. For instance, it is compatible with monistic theories of catego-
rial ontology, such as PAP-only theories,41 SOA-only-theories,42 or object-only theories,
39However, as I mentioned in the previous footnote, Dodd (1999: 149–50; 2000: 8–9; 2002a: 81)
gives clear reasons to think that the transferability of PAPs makes it that PAPs cannot necessitate
TBRs in the way that Mulligan, Simons, and Smith (1984) think they can.
40I only use the example of propositions here because Armstrong does. He tentatively holds that
propositions are the primary TBRs (see [2004: 12] for his discussion of propositions as TBRs).
41For example, Paul (2013 and forthcoming) is a recent defender of a “One Category Ontology”
(forthcoming: 1), on which the only fundamental ontological category is that of PAP.
42For example, Westerhoff (2005: see especially §3) argues that SOAs are basic and that an ontology
of SOAs, what he calls a “factualist” ontology (ibid.: 66), is preferred over what he calls a “thingist”
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where the only entities that exist, let alone the entities that can play the TMK-role, are
PAPs, SOAs, or objects, respectively. It is also compatible with a pluralism concerning
the categorial ontology specifically of TMKs, where there are many entities of a plurality
of different categories (e.g. objects, SOAs, events, facts, properties, universals) that are
TMKs and play the TMK-role.
Overall, I take it to be a virtue of an account of TT if it can retain BATT’s compat-
ibility with TMK-pluralism. Nothing in BATT, as I’ve presented it, requires us to make
any decisions about these substantial metaphysical matters. Applying the Modesty Prin-
ciple (§0.1), any account of TT that tries to go beyond BATT while avoiding substantial
metaphysical commitments and thus retaining BATT’s metaphysical modesty should be
taken to be virtuous. In §2, I present my favoured way of going beyond BATT. In §4
and in Part Two, I explain how my account is metaphysically modest.
1.8 Conclusion of this Chapter
So far, I have: (1) presented elements of BATT, namely TM, T-REL, TD, R-TMK,
R-ROT, and R-TBR; and (2) argued that TT is compatible with both the enterprise
of giving a ToT and also prima facie compatible with ToT-skepticism. Regarding (2),
I argued, further, that different philosophies, whether of pragmatist, coherentist, or
deflationary inclinations can attempt to build a version of TT. To accomodate these
views, BATT should be tolerant and neutral about the nature of TBRs and TMKs.
Whether or not their views will amount to the right version of TT and whether or not
their version will add the right further specifications to BATT is a matter of what the
right steps are in going beyond BATT.
ontology (ibid.). Without mentioning what Armstrong (1997: 113–119) calls the “truthmaker argument”
at all, he distinguishes between two types of argument, the “semantic” argument (2005: 72–77) and
the “cognitional” argument (ibid.: 66). But, against such an account, see (Dodd 1999: passim; and
2000: 8).
Chapter 2
Truthmaking and Aboutness: My
Favoured Account
2.1 Introduction: TT, SAC, and going beyond the
Basic Account
In this chapter, I present what I call The Aboutness Account of Truthmaking (TAAT),
with my specifications for going beyond BATT. In §2.2, I introduce the aboutness
condition of truthmaking. In §2.3, I discuss the history and current state of TAAT.
In §2.4, I distinguish between what the best semantic account says TBRs are about
(SEM-TAC) and notions irrelevant for truth such as folk-aboutness and metaphorical-
aboutness. I then introduce what I call strict and full aboutness (SAC) as capturing the
main, relevant aspects of SEM-TAC and the central concept behind my version of TAAT.
In §2.5–2.7, I present some of the basic elements of my version of TAAT, discussing issues
to do with asymmetry, intentionality, and satisfaction. In §2.8–2.9, I introduce further
theoretical machinery to help clarify the view and to argue that my favoured account
can give us a way of avoiding commitment to the NEC, a metaphysically immodest kind
of relation, which must be avoided if it can be.
2.2 The Aboutness Condition of Truthmaking
Consider
T1: This table exists.
Being a truth, T1 is a TBR with the property being true. What makes this TBR true?
As we saw, there are different accounts which could attempt to account for what makes
T1 true, each potentially with radically different stories of what exactly T1, T-REL and
T1’s TMKs are. TAAT is one of these accounts and starts with a simple question: What
in the world is T1 about?
To answer this question we can start, in this case, by answering that at least one of
the things that T1 is about is a particular table. Starting with this intuitive thought,
39
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one might be moved to think that a very natural way to proceed, to identify fully what
the TMKs are for T1, is to identify fully what T1 is about. Thus, the first main claim
or condition, which TAAT adds to BATT, is what I shall call the aboutness condition of
truthmaking (AC):
(AC): truths are made true by the parts (or aspects) of reality which they are about.
Truths are TBRs that are true and made true by what they are about. TBRs are those
entities which can be true and which can be about entities and how things are with
those entities. And, TMKs are those entities and the ways things are with those entities
which truths are about. Only TAAT, via AC and further elements of the account, can
specify, in any given instance of T-REL, what makes any hypothetical TMK suitable to
play this truthmaking aboutness role (TABR). Whatever other commitments one might
have about the nature of TMKs that are compatible with TABR, but which are not
a consequence of TABR, are commitments about the nature of TMKs that one might
have in addition to the commitments of TAAT. These same points hold for the nature
of TBRs, T-REL, and truths.
2.3 Historical and Current TAATs: Aboutness and
T-REL as Dual Relations
To give the reader a sense of the background to my own version of TAAT before going
into its details, I shall now briefly discuss the ideas of some fellow TAAT-ists.
Yablo (2014) expresses our shared puzzlement about the relative neglect of aboutness
in the philosophical literature when he writes,
And yet the notion plays no serious role in philosophical semantics. This is
surprising—sentences have aboutness properties, if anything does—so let me
explain. One leading theory, the truth-conditional theory, gives the meaning
of a sentence, Quisling betrayed Norway, say, by listing the scenarios in which
it is true, or false. Nothing is said about the principle of selection, about
why the sentence would be true, or false, in those scenarios. Subject matter
is the missing link here. A sentence is true because of how matters stand
where its subject matter is concerned. [2014: 1; my emphasis on the final
sentence]
Unlike Yablo, however, my aim is not to present what is called a “truthmaker semantics,”1
which is supposed to replace truth-conditional semantics, and where the notion of subject
matter is understood in terms of TMKs and provides the missing link that mere truth-
conditions cannot.2 The semantic sketch that I give of TT is plausible independent
of whether or not a full TMK-semantics can be given. Yablo implies, in the passage
1See also especially Fine (2015a: §1–2).
2The closest I come is in §8.4 where I distinguish between truth-conditions and TMK-conditions.
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above, that what exactly the best semantic account says that truths are about is an as
yet underdeveloped area of philosophical semantics. This significantly constrains how
detailed we can be in our analysis of what truths are about on the basis of SEM-TAC.
However, in what follows I contribute to the development of articulating what the
best semantic account of aboutness says that truths are about by fleshing out only the
main aspects of such an account that I think are necessary to address the most pressing
in-house debates in TT. Giving a full account of the best semantic account of aboutness
is unnecessary and would make us stray too far from the main task of this dissertation.
My presentation of the TT-relevant aspects of aboutness, however, will constitute a
significant contribution both to this important, underdeveloped area of philosophy and
to paving the path for articulating the right, modest, aboutness-based account of TT.
Yablo and I are not the only TAAT-ists. Even though there have not been many
TT-ists who have been explicit adherents to TAAT and AC, the account has a good
pedigree. Lewis for instance writes, “roughly speaking, truths must have things as their
subject matter ” (1999a: 206; my emphasis on ‘subject matter’). He also writes, “Any
proposition has a subject matter, on which its truth value supervenes” (2003: 25). Barry
Smith points out that “A truthmaker for a given judgement must be [that] which the
judgement is about, must satisfy some relevance constraint” (1999: 279; his emphasis).
Both Lewis and Smith clearly take aboutness and subject matter to be central to truth
and truthmaking.
The main motivation for adding aboutness and thereby fixing what Smith calls “some
relevance constraint” has been to avoid paradoxical consequences such as contingent
facts making true necessary truths even though they have no relevance to each other.3
AC has been mainly presented as a tool to fix other accounts such as T-ET and T-NEC.
NEC-ists, following Merricks (2007: 34), see the relevance constraint as an addition to
NEC, not as a rival. T-ET-ists see it as a constraint on ET, or a way to replace or
update classical ET. In particular, Smith (ibid.), Restall (1996), and Read (2000) are
T-ET-ists who explore the strategy of construing T-REL not in terms of ET but in terms
of RELEVANT ENTAILMENT (R-ET), which is what one might call a relevantist revision
of classical logic (Heathcote 2003: 345).4 In short, according to this view, for A to entail
B, A and B must be relevant to each other in some appropriate sense.5 Relevantists use
this to criticise classical logic, which permits supposedly paradoxical entailments such as
Ex Falso Quodlibet, which is of the form ‘A and not-A, therefore B’ and is permitted
3See §2.8 for in-depth discussion.
4Heathcote (2003) is a skeptic about R-ET however. See also (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006b: 187) for a
less extensive argument against replacing ET with R-ET. See (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2006a: 970ff) for an
argument that R-ET is committed to what is called “the Conjunction Thesis” (Read 2000: 71), which
he argues is false. Since my account is more general and rejects ET, I will not discuss these criticisms.
5Exactly how to cash out ‘relevance’ to give a satisfactory revision of classical logical consequence
which incorporates relevance is a matter of dispute. See (Read 1995: 54–60) and (Mares 2004: §1) for
introductions to relevant logic and (Jago 2013a) for a recent survey with a focus on how quantifiers
work in relevant logic.
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even if A and B are completely irrelevant to one another. Relevantist-T-ET-ists explain
that the relevant notion of ET is not classical ET, but must be R-ET.
This follows the TT-strategy first sketched out, but since then almost completely
neglected,6 by van Fraassen (1969). Van Fraassen attempts to formulate some basic
elements of TT and uses it to give a “semantic explication of tautological entailment” (see
especially [ibid.: 484–486] for the proofs and the explication). Tautological entailment, in
part, gives us a way to understand what makes true necessary or logical truths in such a
way that we avoid Anderson and Belnap’s “fallacy of relevance” ([van Fraassen ibid.: 485];
see [Anderson and Belnap 1967: 1–22] for the formal presentation and discussion of the
fallacy). The fallacy is, in short, that if A is a tautology (or a necessary truth), then B
strictly implies A, but according to Anderson and Belnap (in the words of van Fraassen),
“the premise of an inference should be relevant to its conclusion, and the conclusion’s
being tautological does not make it so” (ibid.). Van Fraassen puts this explicitly in terms
of making true, when he writes, “what makes A ∨ ¬A true is exactly what makes A true
if A is true, or what makes ¬A true if ¬A is true. But what makes B true has, in general,
nothing to do with what makes A or ¬A true” (ibid.).7 According to van Fraassen, the
right way of explicating what he calls “tautological entailment” is in terms of making
true (see [ibid.: 485–486] for his proof). In short, van Fraassen understands T-REL in
terms of what he calls Russell’s truism:8
Russell’s Truism: “A sentence A is true [false] if and only if some fact that makes A
true [false] is the case.” [ibid.: 479; van Fraassen’s square brackets]
Van Fraassen’s early theory is meant to be not just an application of Russell’s Truism,
but also an explanation of the importance of facts for explicating these logical notions.
However, as I stated (§1.7), we should remain pluralist about the nature of TMK. Certain
key elements of his discussion are, despite this, important for our purposes.
Van Fraassen discusses C. I. Lewis’s (1943) theory of states of affairs, which Lewis
puts in terms not of making true but of signification. Together, SOAs and signification
are used to build Lewis’s understanding of truth, which van Fraassen captures thus:
Signification-Truth: “A sentence A is true if and only if every fact that A describes as
being the case (or signifies) is the case.” [ibid.: 481; the name is mine]
Signification-Truth clearly puts truth in terms of a TBR’s being related to the TMKs by
a relation called ‘signification’.
About this relation, van Fraassen, interestingly, says, “signification is a relation “dual”
to making true” (ibid.), and, to avoid having a theory which is “trivial” or “arbitrary,”
6However, recent discussions include Read (2000: 67) and Heathcote (2003: 11–12).
7I shall explicate the analogue of this point about entailment, as the Relevance Objection to T-ET
and T-NEC in §2.8. See Read (2000) who discusses and tries to undermine the thesis capturing van
Fraassen’s first point in the quotation, which Read calls “the Disjunction Thesis (DT), that whatever
makes a disjunction true must make one or other disjunct true” (ibid: 67).
8The source of van Fraassen’s presentation of Russell’s TT truism is (Russell 1956: 211–214).
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we must accept both Signification-Truth and Russell’s Truism.9 Also, he approvingly
cites (Dunn 1966) saying that “Dunn showed [. . . ] that tautological entailment could
be explicated in terms of the topics that sentences are “about,” but this relation of
being about was not further explicated” (ibid.: 485). So, signification and aboutness are
clearly taken to be at least similar notions. My explication of TT in terms of aboutness
is motivated by similar general reasons that motivate Dunn’s talk of aboutness and van
Fraassen’s inclusion of signification into what we might construe as an early TAAT.
The story presented in this section illustrates a clear evolution in the literature.
Discussion of the notion of relevance stems from work on relevant logic by Anderson and
Belnap (especially [1962] and [1975]). It takes up an important role in van Fraassen’s
(1969) thinking about truth and TT when he uses a fact-or-SOA-based approach to
TT to develop a fuller semantics for Anderson and Belnap’s notion of entailment and
relevance. Recent, important work on TT by Restall (1996) and Jago (2012), among
others, picks up where van Fraassen left off.
However, the revival seems to take the explanatory story in one direction: the TMK
framework can help us understand relevant logic10 and it can help us develop a new
semantics, now popularly called TMK-semantics.11
My proposal is to take the explanatory story in the other direction: that we can get
a grip of the nature of T-REL itself by thinking of how it relates to aboutness. My aim
is not to give a full, robust TT, in the sense that Restall (1996: 339) talks about, but
rather, the aim is to make a case for modest ways that we can go beyond BATT while
learning from aboutness and its affinity to T-REL. And, I think it is important not just
to think of the role of aboutness in the relevance sense in which attempts are made to
capture T-REL in terms of ET (see §1.2.1 for the distinction between capturing T-REL
by some logical principle such as ET and understanding or accounting for what T-REL
is). My account tries to understand T-REL as the “dual” or as I shall also call it the
“complement” to aboutness (§2.5–2.6).12 What sets what I say apart from the historical
and current TAATs which I mentioned in this section is that I do not see AC as merely
an addition to NEC or ET, but as a notion which should replace them (see §2.7–2.9).
9See (van Fraassen ibid.: 481) for the details of why accepting only one or the other is arbitrary.
Accepting both leads to a “generous [. . . ], not parsimonious” (ibid.) theory of TT, which I would accept
as part of pluralism.
10Restall says, “see[ing] the fine structure of truthmakers [. . . ] gives us access to a more discriminating
account of entailment, which can support our pre-theoretic notions of truthmaking. I recommend it to
all those who seem to understand contemporary work on relevant logic, and for those who wish to form
a robust theory of truthmaking” (1996: 339).
11See my earlier references to Yablo and Fine for examples. Also, Jago, Fine’s collaborator, confirmed
in conversation (August 2015) that I am summing things up accurately.
12Although Fine and Yablo’s approach is prima facie compatible with my approach because of duality,
they might reject duality, if they want to give a more general account of aboutness in terms of truth-
making which leaves open the idea that truthmaking may be more than just the dual of aboutness.
See (Fine 2015b: 1) on the notion of duality which we are familiar with in classical logic.
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2.4 Some Basic Commitments of TAAT:
Strict and Full Aboutness & What the Best Se-
mantic Account Says TBRs are About
In §2.4.1, I distinguish between different types of aboutness, namely folk-aboutness,13
apparent-aboutness, metaphorical-aboutness, and semantic-aboutness. In §2.4.2, I in-
troduce what I call strict and full aboutness as capturing some of the main, relevant
features of this best semantic account of what TBRs are about.
2.4.1 What the Best Semantic Account Says TBRs are About
First, there are many different types of aboutness. For instance, the folk14 might claim,
unthinkingly accepting a subjectivist view of truth, that statements of truth such as “God
is good’ is true’ are just statements of opinion and, as a result, are just about those
opinions. It is doubtful that this is a good theory of what truths are about.15 Here’s
another example. The folk theory of aboutness, in particular one that is mathematically
illiterate,16 might hold that the TBR ‘The average, middle-income family is economically
less well off in 2016 than in 2008’ is about an entity the average, middle income family.
Such a theory is clearly inadequate. A better theory might hold that what the TBR is
about is not one thing but a plurality of things and ways these things are; perhaps it
is about all middle-income families and their well-being measurements summed up and
divided by the number of middle-income families. What TBRs are about is sometimes
not obvious. Clearly, an uninformed folk theory is inadequate for our purposes.
One might say that ‘Ghosts live among us’ is metaphorically about human suffering
or mourning. Or, as Max Black reports, when one says, “Nixon is an image surrounding
a vacuum” (1993: 39), presumably one is not literally talking about Nixon and stating
that he is an image surrounding a vacuum, and hence not literally talking about these
things. What one might be metaphorically talking about, if there even is a coherent
notion of metaphorical aboutness, is anyone’s guess.17
13In his early account of ‘about’, Goodman (1961) points out that the ordinary notions of ‘about’
are “readily shown to be inconsistent” (ibid.: 1). We aboutness-theorists must aim for a more rigorous
and consistent notion of aboutness than that which the folk provides.
14By ‘folk’ I mean to refer to what Kant calls “the great unthinking mass” (1784: 55) or what Strawson
calls the “unthinking multitude” (1972: 18’ 37”). Of course, it would be the hope of every good democrat
that the multitude would become a thinking multitude, and part of the role of the philosopher is to
pave the way by clearing up the issues relevant to this thinking, including issues to do with aboutness.
15See (Lynch 2004: 32–35) for a relevant discussion.
16Gorman (2006: 140) uses this term in a similar example to make a similar point.
17I cite Black here, partly because he thinks that what he calls “strong metaphors [. . . ] can, and
sometimes do, generate insights about “how things are” in reality” (ibid.). But it is clear that the
aboutness involved in such strong metaphors is a metaphorical aboutness much less straightforward
than the aboutness that we are concerned with. He cites Austin (1962: 98–99) as one who rejects the
question “Can metaphorical statements be true?” (Black ibid.: 38). According to Austin (ibid.), not
every statement aims at truth. For instance, the metaphorical use of a statement is a use where truth
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What should be clear is that the aboutness that we are concerned with when we talk
about the aboutness of truths, is what the best semantic account says that they are
about (SEM-TAC), assuming of course that there is such an account and that semantics
says anything about aboutness at all. It is obviously not just what the uninformed folk
take them to be about, or what they might be metaphorically about.
One last, classic example should suffice to make it clear that SEM-TAC is much less
straightforward than folk accounts. Take the TBR ‘Brakeless trains are dangerous.’18
At first reading, and presumably this would be the apparent and folk understanding of
what this TBR is about, one might think that we are referring to all the brakeless trains
there are, and saying of them that they are dangerous.
However, let’s say that there are no actual instantiations of any of these things:
there are no brakeless trains. On my analysis so far, and on the standard analysis, these
TBRs would not be true (and would be either false on a Russellian analysis or neither
true nor false on a Strawsonian understanding). The problem with understanding these
TBRs in a folk or unreflective way (and then supplementing it with the standard story
of reference failure) is that we get the wrong result. Brakeless trains would be and are
indeed dangerous. In fact, it is likely that the reason why there are no brakeless trains is
that they are dangerous. This TBR is true even though the things it is apparently about
do not exist. A better semantic analysis would make the TBR out not to be about any
brakeless trains, which do not exist, but about brakeless trains in general (or if they were
to exist). Perhaps this is a law of some sort; a law concerning brakeless trains. Laws
hold and statements of laws are true even if nothing is subject to them at some given
time. Thus, it is clear that the best semantic analysis of TBRs is not as straightforward
as the folk or the unreflective analyser might take them to be.
To sum up, we are talking about literal, semantic aboutness, rather than other notions
such as folk or metaphorical aboutness.
2.4.2 Strict and Full Aboutness as What the Best Semantic Ac-
count Says TBRs are About
Now I want to introduce what I call strict and full aboutness. This notion of aboutness
captures the essentials of the best SEM-TAC that is relevant for TT. And it is the heart
of my preferred strict-and-full -aboutness-based account of TT (SAC; I shall use this
abbreviation both for the notion of aboutness and for the account based on this notion
of aboutness).
and falsity are irrelevant, and hence, may not generate any insights about how things are in reality.
Whether Black or Austin is right in what they say about metaphor and truth, whatever link to the world
metaphors have, the metaphorical aboutness link, if there is one, is a much less straightforward one
than the literal aboutness of non-metaphorical TBRs.
18This example is due to Johnson (1924: part III, 12). It is discussed by Armstrong (1983: 21–22).
Yablo (2012: 1025) attributes the example to Lewis.
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2.4.2.1 Aboutness Apparatuses, Existence-entailing Expressions, and Context-
Sensitivity
SAC, as the best SEM-TAC, requires that aboutness is not just a matter of reference,
narrowly construed as the relation that relates singular and plural terms to their real-
world-correspondents. But it is a matter of the aboutness of all the parts of the TBR
that one can use to be about entities and how things are with those entities. This is an
important part of the doctrine of intentionality, which I shall be using to explicate SAC.
In my understanding of the doctrine of intentionality, I follow, but also expand on, the
construal given by McCulloch (1994: 26–31) and Crane (2013), when he says:
I am using the idea of what is ‘talked about’ and ‘thought about’ in a
very general way, to apply to any thing that is what we might call the
subject-matter of thought or discourse. Recall that I do not understand
such ‘aboutness’ as reference. Reference—the relation in which singular
terms stand to objects, or plural terms stand to pluralities of objects—is one
way in which words can be about things, but it is only one way. Predication,
too, is a way in which words can be about things. When I say that some
pigs swim what I am saying is about swimming just as much as it is about
pigs. ‘All men are mortal’ is about mortality as much as it is about all men.
But it is perfectly natural to think of the sentence as being about all men
too. [ibid.: 39]
The way that Crane uses ‘aboutness’ here captures an important aspect of SAC.19
Predicates as well as singular and plural terms are part of what I shall call our toolbox of
“aboutness apparatuses.” These apparatuses help to determine the content of TBRs (e.g.
sentences, beliefs, judgements), especially those aspects that specify what in the world
the TBRs are about, including both which objects (via referring expressions) and how
things are with those objects (mainly via predicates). McCulloch (1994: 26–31) sums
up this part of the doctrine when he writes, “intentional objects [that is, the objects
of aboutness20] have turned out to be properties such as being pretty and individuals
such as London, sometimes considered as combined in this or that way. The doctrine
of intentionality, on this construal, is the claim that mental acts make reference to such
properties and individuals” (ibid.: 28).21 He goes so far as to say that this doctrine of
intentionality “is one of the glories of analytical philosophy” (ibid.: 30).
An important part of my view is that language can represent in intricate ways and
that the toolbox of language is very rich. The richness of the toolbox, in turn, allows
19However„ I think our accounts differ in other ways which I have no space to discuss. On the point
discussed, Ramsey (1927: 44–45) seems to agree that TBRs can be about multiple things, perhaps also
including properties, when he writes, “a proposition about ‘the fact that aRb’ must be analysed into
(1) the proposition aRb, (2) some further proposition about a, R, b, and other things [. . . ] We are
driven, therefore, to Mr Russell’s conclusion that a judgment has not one object but many, to which the
mental factor is multiply related” (ibid.). Thanks to Sundholm for reminding me of Ramsey’s discussion.
20We shall have much more to say about intentional objects later.
21For more on the step from predicates to properties, though the discussion is not put explicitly in
terms of intentionality, see Martin (1997: 193–194; and 1980: 9).
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us to retain BATT’s modest commitment to metaphysical tolerance, neutrality, and
categorial pluralism concerning the nature of TBRs and the nature of TMKs (see §1.3
and §1.7, respectively). Ceusters and Smith (2015: 2) and Ceusters’ (2012: 70) account
of aboutness, for instance, is congruous with mine on this matter. They claim that what
they call ICEs (Information Content Entities; entities with content and aboutness)
stand in [the] relation of aboutness to some portion of reality rather than just
to some entity [where] the domain of the aboutness relation [. . . ] include[s]
inter alia universals [. . . ], relations [. . . ], other ICEs [. . . ], and configura-
tions [which highlights that the domain of aboutness includes] not only [. . . ]
Barack Obama but also [. . . ] his role of being President of the USA and
[. . . ] the USA itself. [Ceusters and Smith 2015: 2; their emphases; I’ve left
out some of their explications.]
This notion, that what ICEs are about are “portions of reality,” underlines my point that
on a modest account of TT, TBRs should not just be about entities but how things are
with entities and what I called a “variety of modes of being ” (§1.2.2). Clearly on the
most prominent accounts that I have discussed so far, including Crane’s, and Smith and
Ceusters’, aboutness is understood in an inclusive, categorially pluralist way.
I now focus on two more ways that illustrate how varied and rich the toolbox of about-
ness apparatuses is on my account of aboutness. Some predicates are not what we might
call “existence-entailing”22 and some are. For instance, plausibly, predicates made up of
adjectives such as ‘potential’, ‘putative’, ‘hypothetical’, ‘mythological’, and ‘imaginary’
are not existence-entailing; this is why one speaks the truth when one says that the hy-
pothetical object Vulcan does not exist but that the hypothetical and confirmed-to-exist
object Neptune does exist. Knowing which expressions are referential and existence-
entailing and which ones are not is an important part of mastering the vocabulary of a
language and is important for non-philosophical contexts as much as for philosophical
contexts. If Alfred tells little Erik that the Kraken is a mythological, imaginary creature
invented to frighten children when they think of the sea, then Erik would be making a
mistake if, trusting that Alfred is telling the truth, he were to think, as a result, that
the Kraken exists. Specifically, he misunderstands what Alfred is saying, what he is
talking about. He does not understand yet that ‘mythological, imaginary creature’ is
not existence-entailing. And knowing this is essential for Erik’s understanding of what
Alfred is talking about here. Unless Erik comes to understand which terms are existence-
entailing and which are not, Erik will not understand either what is said or what is being
talked about. The best SEM-TAC must reflect the various, intricate uses of languages.23
And, the best account of TT must respect and accommodate this.
22Priest (2005: 64) and Crane (2013: 61ff) think that many properties are existence-entailing while
many others are not. Examples of existence-entailing properties would be: being material, being located
in space and time, etc.
23Echoing Wittgenstein (1953: especially §§11–17 and 23), language is not just richly varied in terms
of the tools there are to do other things than refer, describe, or talk about the world, but it is richly
varied in terms of the tools it has to talk about the world.
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Further, the best semantic account must also incorporate a sensitivity to how context
affects aboutness. For example, surface grammar and the normal use of words might
mislead us in cases where understanding the context of use is essential to understanding
what is talked about. Consider another example, discussed by Bigelow (1996: 39):
If you say that Othello loves Desdemona, in a sense which does not require
the existence of Othello, then what is said is really not something about
Othello at all, but about something else, perhaps we are just saying some-
thing about Shakespeare’s play (whatever that is) or about Shakespeare and
what he said. [ibid.]
In this case, we are using names in apparently standard ways to talk in an existence-
entailing way about things (here, Othello and Desdemona), but in fact the TBRs are
used to talk about completely different things (here, Shakespeare’s play). In this case,
plausibly, we are using these names in a different context, to talk indirectly about works
of fiction rather than about people. Knowing the context in which the TBR is used
is sometimes essential for knowing what it is about. The best SEM-TAC must also be
sensitive to how context affects aboutness.
2.4.2.2 SAC and Derivative Aboutness
After criticising an inadequate, metaphysically extravagant account of aboutness, I shall
properly introduce SAC. Recall
T1: This table exists.
The natural semantic account of the aboutness of T1 is that T1 is about the particular
table that I am drawing the reader’s attention to. An alternative account of what it is
about, let’s call it the fundamentalist account, FUND-AC, might claim that TBRs such
as T1 are about some fundamental constituents of reality. Trope-fundamentalists, for
instance, might claim that when they speak about a particular table, they are talking
about the tropes out of which things such as tables are bundled. So, rather than speaking
about the particular table, they are speaking about tropes. Trope-fundamentalists (or
fundamentalists of other kinds as well) generally are not eliminativists about ordinary,
medium-sized dry goods such as tables. Rather, they think that such things do exist; they
just do not exist fundamentally. Instead, they exist derivatively on what is fundamental,
by for instance being related to what is fundamental through different grounding relations
or constitution relations.24 They might hold a theory of aboutness where T1 is about
what is fundamental. I shall argue that this is not satisfactory.
24See (Paul 2010 and forthcoming) for a metaphysics where tropes or PAPs are what are fundamental,
and objects such as tables are to be understood as bundles of PAPs. Some take bundling to be a
primitive relation, called ‘compresence’ (Campbell 1990: 130–133), understood as co-location in space-
time (Schaffer 2001: 250), or ‘concurrence’ (Bacon 1995: 20). Paul rejects compresence, arguing that
such accounts cannot distinguish between objects with the same location such as electrons and other
microentities (2010: 1). She (2010; and forthcoming: 35–36) opts for a “Mereological Bundle Theory,”
where bundles are mereological fusions. Objects are created by mereologically fusing PAPs which have
spatio-temporal location (also understood in terms of PAPs). I mention such theories merely to display
the variety of such relations.
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First, FUND-AC brings into an account of aboutness metaphysical commitments con-
cerning fundamental metaphysics which are clearly too much to demand of a general
semantic theory. Any good SEM-TAC is a general theory concerning a common linguistic
phenomenon that involves all kinds of truth-relevant language, and not just fundamental
language. The fact that there is no non-controversial account of fundamentality should
make a semanticist and even a fundamentalist skeptical of trying to give an account of
what ordinary TBRs such as T1 are about. Of course the question ‘What is fundamen-
tal?’ may be a serious and important question, even though it is one that philosophers
are still trying to answer. We might, in the end, find the answer to the question ‘What
are tables fundamentally?’. But, the question ‘What are TBRs about?’ can be answered
independently of the other question. That the right semantic account of aboutness is
beholden to the right metaphysical theory of fundamentality seems implausible. My
claim is that the aboutness question can be answered without appeal to fundamentalia
or to any other level of reality than the relevant level, in this case the level of tables.
Second, if what we are talking about, when we use TBRs such as T1, are fundamental-
PAPs-bundled-table-wise and not tables, then our languages lose the resources to make
claims about how tables and tropes are related in terms of the fundamental relations
(e.g. mereological bundling). We need to be able to talk about ordinary-medium-sized
dry goods to be able to talk about how they are related to trope-bundles. And to claim
that all TBRs are about what is fundamental is to claim that we are unable to talk
about what is not fundamental, and also about how what is not fundamental is related
to what is fundamental. I shall argue for this further in §5 (especially §5.4.2), where
I argue against the Fundamentalist version of TT. But it should be clear that the right
semantic account of what truths and TBRs are about cannot claim that what we talk
about is only what is fundamental, and that we are never talking about tables (assuming
that tables are not fundamental entities).
Thus, to avoid such theories of aboutness, we need a more restricted notion of
aboutness, which captures slightly better what we might mean when we say that truths
are about what the best semantic account says they are about.
To do this, I want to make a distinction between what the TBR in question is strictly
and fully about, and what the TBR is derivatively about, given the truth of further TBRs
about the world not mentioned in the TBR in question. For example, T1 is strictly about
a particular table, while it might derivatively be about the tropes which it consists in
fundamentally, assuming trope-fundamentalism about tables. However, there is nothing
in T1 that tells us anything about what the table consists in fundamentally or non-
fundamentally,25 nor does it tell us anything about any tropes. These are instances of
what Quine calls collateral information,26 that is, information that is perhaps important
25Let us say that some philosophers are right and the particles that the table consists of are not
fundamental. Whatever we say about a table does not necessarily tell us anything either about what it
fundamentally consists of nor about the various non-fundamental particles or parts that it consists of.
26See (Quine 1960: §2, especially pp. 137f).
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as background information which helps us to understand the TBR in question, but that
is not the information conveyed in the TBR itself.27 The information about tropes and
about fundamentality only comes with further information not contained in the TBR in
question.
To generalise, we might say, then, that what a TBR is strictly and fully about is cap-
tured by the information that the TBR conveys irrespective of its collateral information.
And to avoid such metaphysically loaded and hence semantically implausible accounts
of what truths in general are about, we might re-formulate the aboutness condition (AC)
relevant for TT as one that the fundamentalist clearly rejects, what I shall call the strict
and full aboutness condition of truthmaking (SAC):28
(SAC): truths are made true by the parts of reality which they are strictly and fully
about.29
SAC is the version AC of TAAT which, I think, minimally captures what we need for a
plausible and useful account of TT. I shall now briefly make clear what strictness and
fullness amount to.
2.4.2.3 Strictness
Strictness restricts what the TBR is about to just those entities and how things are with
those entities that are specified by the various aboutness apparatuses, which in turn help
make the TBR about them. It excludes any further entities to which they might be
related, and excludes any other properties or relations that the entities described might
instantiate other than the ones mentioned. For example, the TBR ‘the table is black’
is strictly about the table and that it is black, and not strictly about any of the table’s
constituent parts or its shape. As I made clear in the previous sections, specifying exactly
what the TBRs are strictly about is not always straightforward. But, I think that it is safe
to say that what the best SEM-TAC says any given TBR is strictly about corresponds to
important features of the context in which the TBR is used to be strictly about certain
parts of the world, rather than others. For instance, a competent user of aboutness
apparatuses in English may use an English-language TBR such as ‘the bank is empty’
to be strictly about the lack of people in the bank in whose lobby he is standing, while
another competent user might use the same TBR to be about the lack of gold bars in
the safe of the bank which he is robbing. Neither the normal client who is visiting the
bank during his lunch break, nor the unlucky bank robber, are talking about fundamental
27The TBRs Quine discusses are sentences, but what he says about sentences, I think, transfers over
to all TBRs. See §1.3 for my stance on TBRs.
28Adding to §2.4.2, ‘SAC’ will be used to refer to the condition as well as to the notion and account.
29One might add ‘minimally’ or ‘at least’ after ‘made true’, because one should not completely rule
out the fact that truths can be made true (non-minimally) by the portions of reality of which the
minimal TMKs, which the truths are strictly about, are part. But any non-minimal TMKs are only
TMKs derivatively or indirectly because they have the minimal TMKs as parts.
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particles of any sort. Also, in some cases and in some contexts, the surface structure
of the TBR might also not transparently reveal what the TBR is strictly about. For
instance, when Jack tells Sally that he has left his children in the lurch by opting to go
to the pub instead of helping them with their homework, he is not talking about a place
the lurch, in which he has left them. As a competent speaker of English, Sally would
be able to understand what Jack is strictly talking about, even though they both would
most likely need to use collateral information to give a speaker of English unfamiliar with
that phrase an understanding of what Jack is strictly talking about.30
My strictness constraint is similar to Yablo’s proportionality requirement on about-
ness (2014: 75–76). In explaining this requirement, he writes:
[TMKs] should on the one hand not incorporate irrelevant extras, in whose
absence we’d still have a guarantee of truth. What makes it true that there
are dogs? Proportionality favors the fact that Sparky is a dog over the fact
that Sparky is a black-and-white cockapoo; the extra detail is unneeded.
(ibid.: 75)
My strictness requirement yields the result, and captures the intuition, that not just is
it unneeded, but it is not strictly relevant that Sparky is a black-and-white cockapoo.
What is relevant is that there are dogs. And Sparky is a TMK only in virtue of his being
one of the dogs that exist. See also (ibid.: 13–14) for a discussion of other examples
relevant to this. In particular, his example called Confirmation (ibid.: 13) makes clear
that my understanding of strict aboutness as a requirement on the relation between
truth and TMKs has a parallel in Confirmation Theory. Gemes (1990; 1998), Grimes
(1990), Hempel (1960), and Moretti (2006), who Yablo cites, discuss the problem called
“tacking by disjunction” (Yablo 2014: 13). Take the TBR ‘all ravens are black’. The
TBR is confirmed by its true consequences. But, some true consequences better confirm
it than others. For example, ‘this raven is black’ better confirms the TBR than ‘this
raven is black or the sky is pink or Sally loves sauerkraut’. Similarly, the TBR is not
strictly about any of the things tacked on as a disjunct (in the latter), while it is strictly
about this raven, as well as all other ravens. Though, as we’ll see in my next point, it is
not fully about this raven; it is fully about all ravens.
2.4.2.4 Fullness (and Partiality)
Fullness indicates that what the TBR is about is everything, including all the entities
and how things are with those entities, that the aboutness apparatuses make the TBR
about, and not just any single thing mentioned or described. For example, the TBR ‘the
table is black’ is fully about both the table and that it is black and not just the table or
blackness-in-general or even its blackness. It may be partially about these latter things,
30In Appendix §A4.2, I discuss the lurch example in more depth.
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but not fully (or wholly) about them. The TBR ‘all ravens are black’ is strictly about
each and every raven but it is also fully about all of them, and their being black.
As with strict aboutness, sometimes it is not straightforward to give an account of
what exactly a TBR is fully about. For instance, how partial and strict aboutness and
further non-aboutness apparatuses, perhaps such as truth-functional connectives, affect
full aboutness, can be complicated. A fully developed theory of these matters cannot
be given in this dissertation. However, with regard to partial aboutness, I am inclined to
claim that TBRs are partially about the various things (and how things are with those
things) that the various aboutness apparatuses, that make up the TBR, refer to.31 For
instance, that the table is black refers to a specific table. So, it is partially about that
table. Yablo (2014: 14) talks in terms of TBRs being wholly true, which I think is related
to my notion of fully about. Take the conjunction ‘the table is black and the table is
round’. This truth is made true in part by the table’s being black, and in part by the
table’s being round. As Yablo puts it “True parts confer partial truth on their wholes”
(ibid.). As should be clear, the true parts confer partial truth on their wholes, because
the whole TBR is in part about what the parts are about. But, for the whole to be
true, all the TBR-parts, that it is a conjunction of, need to be true. And, for the TBR
to be wholly true, all the various things it is wholly or fully about, via the aboutness
apparatuses and TBR-parts out of which it is composed, need to make it true.
In the case of disjunctions, I think the right account formulated in these terms
should say that the disjunction is fully about each of its disjuncts. Thus, the TMKs
for any of the disjuncts will make true the whole TBR, which is constructed out of the
disjuncts and the disjunction connective. Although such TBRs are strictly about many
more things than each of the things it is fully about, the TBR can be made true by any
of the disjuncts, each of which it is fully about. Fine (2015b) discusses the TMKs of
disjunctions in a similar way, when he discusses what he calls “the notion of being partly
about” (ibid.: 3; see also 1).
2.4.2.5 SAC is Not Unique Aboutness
I shall now make explicit that strictness and fullness together help us see that TBRs are
not often about unique TMKs.32 Take the normal existential TBR:
T2: There are giraffes.
This TBR is about giraffes. There are many giraffes. So the TBR is clearly not about a
unique thing. Rather, it seems to be about a plurality of things. Although the notion of
31Merely because doing otherwise can make the sentence constructions rather awkward, I sometimes
speak loosely, saying that one can refer to properties, as well as to objects. (See §2.4.2.1 for why this
would be loose-talk.) Also, I talk about the aboutness apparatuses referring. Perhaps this is shorthand
for them being used to refer rather than themselves referring. I am agnostic about these issues.
32I address Schaffer’s worry about TAAT’s apparent commitment to “unique aboutness” (2008a: 306).
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aboutness might be hard to apply here, more plausibly, it is strictly and fully about each
giraffe.
This is also consistent with what most TT-ists think. All TT-ists, even modest
ones, can be in agreement with Armstrong (2004: 16–17) when he says that what marks
TT as an improvement over the correspondence theory is that it allows that there can
be multiple TMKs for truths: the relation is many-many, not one-one.33 They should
also agree with Bigelow, who says, “The Truthmaker axiom should not be construed as
requiring a unique truthmaker for each truth” (1988: 130). And clearly, the same holds
for any view concerning the aboutness of TBRs; particular TBRs can be about many
different entities (and how things are with them). The TMKs, as he says, “may be several
things, perhaps even an infinite plurality, or it may be just a single thing” (ibid.: 136).
Further, on the basis of non-uniqueness, Bigelow recommends we phrase the axiom
thus, “Whenever something is true, there must be some thing or things whose existence
entails that truth [. . . ] to allow for non-unique and plural truthmakers” (ibid.: 130).
Ignoring the talk about existence entailing truth,34 we may make a parallel rephrasing
and take truths to be sometimes about one thing and sometimes about many things,
and sometimes about many different ways these things are and sometimes about unique
ways these things are, which in turn each or together can make true the truths that are
about them.35 In sum, it is unclear that a one-to-one restriction on TBRs and TMKs is
at all plausible, and it seems clear that other TT-ists would agree with me.
2.4.2.6 Not All TBRs are About the-World-as-a-Whole
To illuminate some further features of SAC, I shall now respond to what Schaffer writes
in the following passage,
In general, it seems to me that all truths are about the world, inter alia. In
this vein, recall Bosanquet’s theory of judgement: “The ultimate subject of
the perceptive judgement is the real world as a whole” [Bosanquet 1911: 78].
Consider a given subject-predicate judgement of the surface form ‘s is P ’.
On Bosanquet’s theory the deep form of this judgement is ‘Reality is such
that s is P ’. I disagree with Bosanquet’s radical claim that Reality is the
only possible thing a judgement can be about, but I would accept the more
reasonable claim that Reality is always at least one of the things a given
judgement is about. [2008a: 306]
33He writes: “What has been the bane of the correspondence theory, at least in recent philosophy, is
the idea that the correspondence between true propositions and the reality in virtue of which they are true
is a one-one correspondence. [. . . ] But there is a middle way [. . . ] We can accept a correspondence
theory, but in a form where it is recognized that the relation between true propositions and their
correspondents is regularly many-many. Indeed even if we restrict ourselves to minimal truthmakers,
I do not think that we ever get a one-one case.” [ibid.]
34It will become clear in §4 why I say this.
35For example, recalling §2.4.2.4, the different TMKs which a disjunction is fully about each make
true the disjunction, while the different TMKs a conjunction is fully about can only together make true
the conjunction.
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I agree that in some sense the judgement ‘s is P ’ is about so-called “Reality” and the
world, but unless it says anything about the-world-as-a-whole explicitly or if it is part
of the meaning of the sentence, it’s clearly not about the-world-as-a-whole, as Schaffer
approvingly cites of Bosanquet. Their understanding of “the ultimate subject” and the
“deep form” is not plausible. It is true that T2 (‘there are giraffes’) is about the world in
some sense, and in particular in an indirect or derivative sense, but this sense is clearly
unimportant and reveals why we need to focus on SAC.
Giraffes are clearly part of the-world-as-a-whole. But they are also part of all-habitats-
that-giraffes-are-part-of and they are part of the-earth-as-a-whole. But this does not
mean that when I say “There are giraffes”, I am also talking about all habitats that
giraffes are part of or about the-earth-as-a-whole or about our solar system, or whatever
else giraffes are part of. If one thinks that mereology is unrestricted, then one also thinks
that giraffes are part of the mereologically composite entity constituted by all the giraffes
in the world, my left earlobe, Tony Blair’s chin, and all the penguins in Africa. Clearly,
we are talking about “Reality” when we talk about giraffes. But we are clearly talking
only about the parts of reality that are the giraffe-parts-of-the-world, that is, the giraffes.
And there is a clear sense that all of these other things are merely things that we are
talking at best indirectly about when we are talking about giraffes. Even what we are
talking indirectly about varies considerably from context to context, and we cannot just
be talking about all of the things that giraffes are parts of when we talk about giraffes.
When we use T2, what we are most clearly talking about is best specified by what
SAC says we are talking about, that is, those things that we are minimally, but strictly
and fully, talking about. Specifically, we are talking about giraffes, whatever they may
be and whatever they may be part of. The facts about where giraffes live, and even such
facts as the fact that they are part of the-world-as-a-whole, are further facts concerning
and involving giraffes, but which require different TBRs to talk directly, that is, strictly
and fully, about. Of course, there is a great variety of senses of aboutness. In some
sense T2 is about the-world-as-a-whole being such that there are giraffes. But this is
loose talk about aboutness. And this is exactly what is ruled out, when I talk about
“strict and full” aboutness. SAC is a perfectly intelligible, intuitive, and semantically
rigorous sense of aboutness. Thus, Schaffer and Bosanquet’s intuition that judgements
about trees are “deeply” or “ultimately” about the-world-as-a-whole, does not challenge
SAC as the understanding of aboutness that is appropriate for TT.
2.4.2.7 More on the the Aboutness Apparatuses of SAC: On the Aboutness
of Sentential Vehicles
Responding to Schaffer’s “second main worry” (2008a: 306) for TAATs will help us distin-
guish SAC from notions of aboutness that are not relevant for TT. The worry concerns
his puzzlement about how propositions rather than sentences are about anything. He
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writes, “Different sentential vehicles place different subjects in the driver’s seat. With
sentences one need only look to the denotation of the subject term. Truthmaking is
beside the point” (2010a: 316). Explaining the problem in more detail, he writes,
[P]rima facie one might expect aboutness judgements to concern sentences,
since these have such things as topics and grammatical subjects. Propo-
sitions—especially if conceived of as mere sets of worlds—seem the wrong
sorts of things to bear aboutness. Here is an argument that aboutness intu-
itions target sentences rather than propositions. First consider the sentence
‘It is John who kissed Mary’. This seems to be about John. But now consider
‘It is Mary who was kissed by John’. This seems to be about Mary. Or at
the very least, the first example seems primarily about John, and the second
mainly about Mary. There is some difference in aboutness. But quite plau-
sibly both sentences express exactly the same proposition. Hence aboutness
cannot purely be a matter of the proposition, or there could be no aboutness
difference between the two examples. Rather I would suggest that aboutness
intuitions are tied to sentential vehicles. [Schaffer 2008a: 306–307]
He adds: “Of course [the TT-ist] might reply that the sentential vehicle differences only
concern aboutness in the topic sense, not the entity sense. Again, it would be nice to
know how to tell” (ibid.). To explain the distinction between the topic and the entity
sense of aboutness, he writes:
Merricks [who presents the version of TAAT that he addresses] offers no
further account of aboutness, but draws a distinction [2007: 32–33] between
(i) a sense of aboutness—call it the topic sense—on which <there are no
hobbits> is about hobbits, and (ii) a sense of aboutness—call it the entity
sense—on which <there are no hobbits> is not about hobbits since there
are none. The entity sense is the relevant sense for truthmaking [according
to the TT-ist], since it concerns what there is. [ibid.]36
My response is that the aboutness involved in truthmaking is clearly not aboutness in
the topic sense—if indeed according to the topic sense ‘It is John who kissed Mary’ is
about John and not Mary.
First, I want to make some general points which will help us pinpoint which of the
various senses of aboutness is the most relevant for truth. As discussed in §2.4.2.1,
our toolbox of aboutness apparatuses is rich and varied. For example, TBRs use both
referential expressions and predicate expressions to fix what the TBR is strictly and fully
about.37 The topic sense of aboutness as understood by linguists who talk about sen-
tential topic, which is the sense that Schaffer and Merricks are talking about, is far more
restricted and does not utilise the rich variety of tools available. Rather, it is common to
36Schaffer raises similar worries about the aboutness of propositions vs sentences in relation to TT
in (2010a: 315–7), but his focus there is in defending his view that the whole cosmos is the only TMK,
which is not what I want to focus on.
37Recall Crane (2013: 39). Hawthorne and Manley (2012: 3) discuss the aboutness involved in “a
genuinely referential expression of natural language” (ibid.). Our sense of aboutness is broader than,
but also contains, this genuinely referential sense of aboutness.
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understand sentential topic, as Brown and Yule write, as “a constituent in the structure of
sentences (or the deep structure analysis, at least)” (1983: 70; my emphasis). What they
say reflects the now standard distinction made by Hockett (1958: 201) between topic and
comment, where topics coincide with grammatical subjects and comments with predi-
cates.38 Restricting aboutness to the topic sense in this way is clearly unsatisfactory,
for TBRs can be used to talk about much more than just a TBR’s grammatical subject.
However, as pointed out by Lyons (1968: 335) among others,39 this understanding of
the distinction between topic and comment ties it too closely to syntactic notions.40
Instead, the topic is the “subject of discourse [which] is described as that element which
is given in the general situation or in some explicit question to which the speaker is
replying; and the comment [is described] as that part of the utterance which adds some-
thing new (and thus communicates information to the hearer)” (Lyons 1968: 335). In
fact, Halliday (1967: 200 and 205), from whom Lyons gets this explication, wants to do
away with the topic/comment distinction altogether and replace it with the given/new
distinction. However, even with this improved understanding of topic, it is clear that
the truth-relevant understanding of aboutness must be broader than the topic sense of
aboutness, since what is relevant to truth is not just what the subject of discourse is,
but whether what is said of the subject of discourse is how things are with the subject of
discourse. Thus, what Hockett (ibid.) calls ‘comment’, what Halliday (ibid.) and Lyons
(ibid.) call ‘new’, are also included in the semantically rigorous and truth-relevant sense
of aboutness that we are concerned with. Both the elements in the topic/comment and
the given/new distinctions are part of SAC. Further, SAC is preferable to what Merricks
calls the entity sense of aboutness. For it is broader and incorporates the fact that it is
relevant to the truth of any TBR that we often not only talk about entities, but also,
how things are with entities. So, SAC is not the same as either the topic or the entity
sense of aboutness. And, out of these three, it is clearly also the more truth-relevant
sense of aboutness.
Second, what Schaffer suggests when he says that aboutness intuitions are tied
to sentential vehicles is related to what I have said so far. Sentences are commonly
construed as the basic linguistic “vehicles” we use to express thoughts and propositions
and hence to carry meaning. The sentences
T3: It is John who kissed Mary.
38See for instance Dahl (1969) and Benečová et al. (1973), where topic is treated in this way
throughout. As Lyons (1978: 335) describes it, Hockett’s is the “now widely accepted terminology”
(ibid.) that captures a distinction that Sapir famously makes between “something to talk about and
something [. . . ] said about this subject of discourse” (1921: 126).
39Halliday (1967: 205) for instance uses this reason to avoid talk of topic and comment altogether.
40To be fair to Hockett, in his original discussion, which is the source of the use of the terms, he
says, “In English and the familiar languages of Europe, topics are usually also subjects and comments
are predicates” (1958: 201; my emphases). So, according to him, the tie to the syntactic notions of
subject and predicate is not that close. For this tie is neither claimed to be universal (since he only
mentions its presence in European languages) nor constant (since it is only usual).
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T4: It is Mary who was kissed by John.
express the same proposition and have the same meaning. But, Schaffer (2008a: 306–307)
claims that they are about different things, the first one is primarily about John and the
second is primarily about Mary. It is a familiar fact that we are able to use different
phrases and ways of saying things to say exactly the same thing. T3 is in the active
voice and T4 is in the passive voice. Here there are also differences in word-order. These
may help us to focus our attention on different things and in this way change what it is
we are talking about, to shift and set the main topic of our discussion (in the first case
the topic might be John and in the second, Mary).
But, as Schaffer should admit, many of these devices to vary what is called the
“focus” of the sentence do not carry implications for meaning and for the propositions
involved. They are instances of aboutness in this, non-relevant “topical” sense. Just
because I change the word-order and put a sentence in the passive or in the active or if
I make certain words bold or in italics, or any of the other many wonderful devices we
can use to change and vary the emphases of sentences, this does not mean that there
are consequences for meaning or aboutness in the relevant TT-sense.
Of course, these tools to create what are called “focus effects” can radically vary
content in a sense relevant for other purposes. For instance, take the question ‘Why did
the dog bury the bone?’. With different focus effects, the content of this question can
radically vary even though the same words are used. ‘Why did the dog bury (rather
than, say, chew) the bone?’ has a different content from ‘Why did the dog bury the
bone (rather than the toy)?’. If we remove the parentheses, we are left with the same
words, but with different questions that have radically different contents.41
I think that this kind of focus has radical consequences for the appropriateness or
relevance of certain explanations but not for the relevance of TMKs. If one answers the
question when the questioner puts a focus effect on ‘bury’ by saying, ‘The dog buried
the bone because the dog is frustrated that she cannot chew it, having lost all of her
teeth in an operation last month’, then one will be giving an appropriate and relevant
answer to the question. If instead the answer that is given is, ‘The dog buried the
bone because she chewed up all of her toys into tiny pieces’, then one will have given
an inappropriate answer to the version of the question that emphasises ‘bury’, but one
41See (Felka 2014: 263ff) and (Hofweber 2005: 210ff) for extensive philosophical discussion on con-
temporary linguistic thought regarding how focus effects are used for purposes of emphasis and stress
in linguistic constructions. Hofweber, interestingly for our purposes, points out how syntactic structures
can be used for focus effects and can be misinterpreted as having consequences for what kind of things
we are talking about. He (ibid.: 211) discusses how words such as ‘four’ in constructions such as ‘the
number of moons of Jupiter is four’ can be misread as singular terms, when in fact ‘four’ is a “determiner
and placing it in an unusual position [. . . ] has a focus effect as a result” (ibid.). Focus effects are not
changes of aboutness, but can be misread to have consequences for aboutness. This is yet another
illustration of why getting a grip of the right SEM-TAC (which includes knowing how it contrasts with
other linguistic phenomena such as focus effects) is so important. I thank Felka (August 2015) for
conversations on the relation between FOCUS in her sense and TT. I also thank an anonymous referee
from MIND for clarifying this even more.
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will be giving an appropriate answer to the question that emphasises ‘the bone’. The
change in meaning is a change in a different type of relevance than what SAC requires.
By contrast, the TMKs for ‘the dog buried the bone’ wherever we put the focus, will
be the same; the TMK is the dog’s having buried the bone. Putting a focus effect on
any of the terms in the TBR produces shifts in focus, content, and relevance. However,
as should be clear, these shifts will not be shifts in the relevant sort of aboutness that
concerns us.
Consider another example: an extended conversation. We might stop the con-
versation and ask, ‘What is this conversation about?’. The answer might be the EU
referendum debate. This might be what the conversation is about overall, that is, the
topic of the conversation. But this would be a different notion of about than the notion
we are asking about when we ask what any individual TBR in the conversation is about.
Not all TBRs in a conversation are about the general topic of conversation, in the SAC
sense of ‘about’ which we might also call the direct notion. As there are many different
notions of aboutness, we must be careful to use the right one.
What we are concerned with for truth is not the aboutness relevant to what we are
focusing on when we are, say, uttering the same TBRs in different ways or putting a
focus effect on different terms. Rather, we are concerned with how what is said fixes
how we are describing the world to be. We describe the world (and its parts) to be
some ways and not others. And these descriptions commit us to the world (or whatever
parts of the world we are talking about) being the way it is described. The relevant
aboutness is fixed using aboutness apparatuses which include our tools of reference and
predication. And, this aboutness is clearly a property of both propositions and sentences,
and of any other TBR. It is this sense of aboutness that is relevant to TT and is part
of SAC. So, Schaffer’s worry that only sentences have aboutness and not propositions
rests on a misunderstanding of the sense of aboutness that is relevant for truth.
2.5 Some of the Basic Commitments of TAAT: Non-
Identity, Asymmetry
Now that I have clarified SAC as the sense of aboutness that is relevant for TAAT,
I shall present some of the more general commitments of TAAT. Also, henceforth, when
I speak about a TBR being about anything, I normally use the SAC sense.
What are the commitments of TAAT and the consequences of SAC for TAAT? This
depends on what the aboutness relation (A-REL)42 is and how it relates to T-REL.
42I shall assume that being about is a plural relation. However, Lewis (1988: 161–164) distinguishes
between a cellular and the relational model of subject matter, which is obviously closely tied to and
helps illuminate aboutness. Yablo (2014) tries to preserve Lewis’s account, but seems to prefer the
relational account when he writes, “A subject matter [. . . ] is a system of differences, a pattern of cross-
world variations” (ibid.: 21). He also defines subject matter as a “dissimilarity relation” (ibid.: 41; my
emphasis). See (Fine 2015c: 18–21) for further discussion. Especially since I hold a relations-come-easy
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It is important to point out first that T-REL is not A-REL; they are not the same
relation. We might state this thus:
The Non-Identity of T-REL and A-REL: T-REL is not identical to A-REL.
Instead T-REL and A-REL are converse relations. In particular, they are complementing
asymmetric relations that go in different directions. TBRs are about TMKs while TMKs
are not about TBRs (except when the TMKs in question are TBRs and are about other
TBRs; example below). There is an asymmetry between TBRs and TMKs in terms of
the A-REL. But this asymmetry goes from TBR to TMKs. One might describe it thus;
the arrow represents directionality :
The Asymmetry of A-REL: (TBR →A-RELTMK) & not-(TMK →A-RELTBR)
As we know, the asymmetry of T-REL goes in the opposition direction:
The Asymmetry of T-REL: (TMK →T-RELTBR) & not-(TBR →T-RELTMK)
Generally, TMKs make true TBRs but TBRs do not make true TMKs. Of course some
TMKs are TBRs. For instance take the following TBR:
T5: There is at least one TBR.
If T5 exists, then it also makes itself true. And since there are plenty of other TBRs,
they also make T5 true. (In this case, there is an overdetermination of truthmaking.)
So, some TBRs can make true TBRs. But generally this is not the case. No TBR can
make true T1 (recall, T1 is the TBR ‘This table exists.’). Only something involving
tables can make true T1. Some TMKs are truth-apt, but there are many TMKs, such
as tables, which are not TBRs and are not truth-apt. TMKs are not generally about
anything.43 But all TBRs are about something. A-REL is generally asymmetric in the
same way that T-REL is generally asymmetric: they are normally asymmetric.44 As with
T-REL, there are exceptional cases where A-REL is symmetric. Consider T6 and T7:
view of relations (§1.2.2), it should be clear that being about is best described as a relation.
43In addition to linguistic TBRs, we might include some non-linguistic or prelinguistic behaviour as
TBRs and as having aboutness. See (Martin 2008: 93–110) who draws many parallels between linguistic
and non-linguistic behaviour in such a way as to make a case for protolinguistic or prelinguistic semantics.
He also argues (ibid.: 111–128) that directedness and selectivity, which are marks of intentionality, are
“found in the dispositionality of any natural property [. . . ] found along with [representational] use in
any dispositional system whatever: psychological or nonpsychological” (ibid.: 111). Further, one might
understand Martin’s theory of reciprocal disposition partners (2008: 3) as a way of rejecting A-REL’s
asymmetry. However, a couple of examples will illustrate why intentionality and aboutness are generally
asymmetric, even if we accept Martin’s nonlinguistic and nonpsychological intentionality or Dretske’s
“naturalize intentionality” (1994: 471). Even if a map is about a terrain, a terrain is never about a
map. Even if a tree’s rings are, in some sense, about its age, its age is not about the rings. There
are candidates for non-linguistic, non-psychological things with intentionality; but they clearly exhibit
the relevant kind of asymmetry. So, to generalise: even if some non-linguistic, non-psychological X is
about Y, Y is rarely, if ever, about X. This retains our general asymmetry.
44What these examples illustrate is that both relations are strictly speaking non-symmetric, though
generally or normally asymmetric since cases such as T5 are special cases. So, I’ll keep saying that they
are generally asymmetric.
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T6: This TBR is about T7.
T7: This TBR is about T6.
Here, T6 and T7 seem to be in part about each other. Thus, when T6 and T7 are both
true, then we have a case where something, T6, is related to something else, T7, with
the arrow going in the direction from T6 to T7, while T7 is related to the first thing T6
in the other direction with an arrow going from T7 to T6. But, these are anomalies. We
can set aside these anomalous cases for both A-REL and T-REL because the asymmetry
holds generally, for all other cases. Thus, it is plausible that the Asymmetry of A-REL
and the Asymmetry of T-REL are true.
2.6 Some Basic Commitments of TAAT: The Prob-
lem of Intentionality and the Explanation of Fal-
sity and Truth as the Failure and Satisfaction of
Aboutness (Respectively)
A-REL and T-REL also complement each other in a deeper way. According to TAAT,
when some TBR is about some particular TMKs, then that TBR is made true when
those TMKs have being. Of course, on the standard understanding of A-REL, a TBR
can be about some TMK, even if the TMK does not exist (or have being). A-REL does
not seem to require the existence of the entity which it is about. A TBR, or some term
which helps constitute a TBR, can be about things which do not exist. According to
Crane (2001: 23), this is “undeniable” (ibid.) and a “manifest fact” (ibid.). Consider:
T8: Pegasus exists.
T8 is about Pegasus. So there seems to be an A-REL between T8 and Pegasus. But
Pegasus does not exist. For T8 to be true, according to TAAT, the TMK, namely
Pegasus, would have to exist. But since Pegasus does not exist, there is no TMK for
T8. So, T8 is false. There seems to be a disanalogy here between A-REL and T-REL.
However, a complication arises from this supposed disanalogy. Specifically, it is also an
undeniable fact about relations that no relation can exist without its relata existing.45
By analogy, if Jon is shorter than Wendy, then the relation shorter than exists or holds
45See Crane (2001: 23–28), who thinks this is also undeniable. To illustrate, he discusses statements
such as ‘there are lots of things which do not exist: for example Pegasus’ (ibid.: 24). One of the ways
to hold such a view about, say, Pegasus is to make a distinction between what’s real and what exists.
Pegasus, in this case, is real, but does not exist. Relations relate real things, but not necessarily things
that exist. As will be clear, even though I distinguish between what’s real (has being) and what exists
(§1.2.2), I don’t use ‘real’ in this way. I agree, rather, with Russell when he says: “Logic, I should
maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world
just as truly as zoology, though with its more abstract and general features” (Russell 1993: 47).
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between Jon and Wendy. And for this to be the case, Jon and Wendy need to exist.
Thus, T8 cannot be about Pegasus if the thing that it is about does not exist. But,
Pegasus does not exist! What gives?
Broadly, this is what Crane (2001: 22ff) calls “the problem of intentionality” (P-INT).
The problem is that there is a conflict between these three claims:46
C1: All TBRs are related to the things they are about.
C2: Relations entail the existence of their relata.
C3: Some TBRs are about things which do not exist.
The question is: How can C3 be true, given C1 and C2? C3 is clearly true given TBRs
such as T8. Since C2 and C3 are plausibly undeniable truths, the way to resolve P-NEG
is to reject C1.
To do this, I now introduce the notion of an intentional object.47 These are just the
schematic objects of attention; the things thought about. Such things are not restricted
to objects in the ordinary sense (ibid.: 16);48 they are objects in the broader sense that
they can be objects, particulars, properties, events, states, processes, etc. So, unlike
the ordinary, substantial sense of ‘object’, according to Crane (ibid.: 15), the schematic,
intentional objects of attention clearly do not need to have anything in common with
each other, except that they are objects of thought. (Recall §1.7, TAAT’s compatibility
with TMK-pluralism would be a virtue of the account.)
Importantly, they are not what Searle calls “shadowy intermediaries” (1983: 17). They
are just the entities that the TBRs are about. They are not further “representation in
our heads” or “ideas in our minds” (Crane ibid.: 16) which we need to be thinking about
when we are thinking about other entities such as tables. There is no reason to think
that one is thinking about some idea to be thinking about a table ([ibid.], though the
existence of such ideas might be part of the story about how intentional states such as
TBRs can be about tables and other things [ibid.: 28–33]). Sometimes our TBRs are
about ideas and representations, sometimes they are about tables. Thus, the intentional
objects are just those objects that the TBRs are about.
46This is adapted from (Crane 2001: 23), though he focuses on thoughts rather than TBRs-in-general.
He considers “thoughts [as] relations between thinkers and the things they are about” (ibid.). P-INT
concerns all intentional states, such as singular thoughts, hopes, desires, and beliefs. My topic concerns
the relations between TBRs and TMKs. So, I restrict my discussion to them without any substantial
loss of relevant content.
47I follow (Crane ibid.: 13ff). The history of this notion traces back at least to the medieval period.
More recently, Husserl uses it throughout his writings and theory of intentionality. Although there are
differences in our uses of the notion, we seem to agree when Husserl writes, “It is a serious error to
draw a real distinction between [. . . ] “intentional” objects, on the one hand, and “transcendental”,
“actual” objects, which may correspond to them, on the other. [. . . ] The intentional object of a
presentation is the same as its actual object, and, when appropriate, as its external object. [. . . ] The
transcendent object would not be the object of this presentation, if it was not its intentional object”
(Husserl 1970: 595–596); see (McIntyre and Smith 1982: 5).
48Searle (1983: 18) discusses ‘ordinary objects’ in this context.
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Crane (ibid.: 15, 17) tries to explain how intentional objects are not “shadowy interme-
diaries” by drawing a parallel between the schematic idea of object and the grammatical
idea.49 He illustrates this with the example of transitive verbs such as ‘kicked’, ‘played’,
or ‘called’. They take objects. (For example, ‘Ernest kicked the ball ’, ‘Emily played the
piano’, and ‘Emily called Ernest’ each have a direct object.) We understand this when
we learn grammar. But, we do not need to have a substantial conception of object to
understand this. Crane writes, “All we need to know is that the object is something
which plays a certain role in the sentence” (ibid.: 15). Analogously, when our TBRs
(and thoughts, desires, etc.) are about things, those things are intentional objects which
merely play a certain role in our truth-apt constructions (or thoughts) but do not have
substantial natures; they are not objects in the ordinary, substantial sense. Just as we
have a good grasp of objects in the grammatical sense (illustrated by our linguistic mas-
tery and understanding of the examples above), we have a good grasp of objects in the
schematic sense of (intentional) objects of concern.50
This strategy lets us accept C3: some TBRs are about things that do not exist, or in
other words “there are intentional objects which do not exist” (ibid.: 22 and 25). When
we answer ‘Pegasus’ when we are asked what T8 is about, we are talking about Pegasus,
the intentional object of T8. But we are not, in this case, referring to anything, since
“Pegasus [is] nothing” (ibid.: 25). Now consider T9:
T9: Zeus exists.
According to Crane, “neither Zeus nor Pegasus exists; both Zeus and Pegasus are noth-
ing” (ibid.), but what distinguishes T8 and T9 from each other as intentional states
(thoughts or TBRs) is the fact that T8 is about the intentional object Pegasus while T9
is about the intentional object Zeus. According to Crane, this allows one to accept both
C2 and C3 as undeniable, while rejecting C1. The way I think that we should understand
Crane, then, is to see him as denying that all TBRs are related (or “involve relations”
[Crane ibid.: 26]) to the things they are about. Sometimes the things they are about do
not exist and are not real, as with T8 and T9. In these cases, the TBRs have intentional
objects which they are about, but they are not related to any existing, real intentional
objects. This is not to posit some shadowy entity, and this is not to deny either C2 or
C3. It is just to deny C1: that all TBRs are related to the things they are about.
A consequence of this is that aboutness is not always a relation. Sometimes TBRs
are not related to the things they are about. “But,” as Crane states, “to say this is not to
49Unlike Anscombe (1965: especially 161), however, he does not think that intentional objects are
grammatical objects or that the idea of an intentional object is a purely grammatical one. This is just
a helpful analogy.
50See Gorman (2006: 137–138) who is skeptical of the substantial-schematic distinction applying to
intentional objects. However, his skepticism is rooted in the fact that Crane does not explain further
“how [his] understanding [of] intentional objects [. . . ] permits intentional states to have non-existing
objects” (ibid.: 138). My discussion of satisfaction (below) implicitly addresses this worry. Gorman
also introduces what he calls “satisfaction-conditions” (ibid.: 140) to address this worry, albeit slightly
differently than I do.
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say that no thoughts [and no TBRs] involve relations to real existing things; it is just to
say that not all of them do” (ibid.: 26). Often our thoughts and TBRs are about things
that exist, such as Barack Obama or this very sentence. In such cases, the TBRs are
related to the things they are about. In other cases, the intentional objects that they are
about are not real, do not exist, and do not have being in the sense that I discussed in
§1.2.2. This is consistent with the relations-come-easy view of relations (§1.4) too, since
it should be clear that relations cannot come so easy that there are relations between
things that do not exist, or that there are relations between things that exist and things
that do not. Sometimes TBRs stand in A-REL to their intentional objects, that is, when
they are real; sometimes TBRs do not stand in A-REL to their intentional objects.
One way to understand this more clearly is by using an important notion: the notion
of aboutness-satisfaction51 or aboutness-success.52 I think that we can understand the
existence or presence of the relation between TBR and TMK as a satisfaction (or success)
of aboutness. In the cases where the intentional objects of the TBRs exist and are real,
the TBRs are related to the things they are about. Here, there is a satisfaction of the
aboutness of these TBRs. If none of the putative intentional objects of the TBR in fact
exist and are real, then the TBRs are not related to those putative objects. In this case,
there is no satisfaction of aboutness. Searle, who also employs the notion of satisfaction,
would say that in that case, the TBRs are not about anything at all, even though they
might seem to be about something (see [1983: 17]). For our purposes, it is enough to
think that TBRs can be about their intentional objects even if those objects do not
exist, but when what they are about exists, then the TBRs are satisfied (or successful)
in regard to their aboutness. Aboutness-satisfaction marks the presence of an A-REL.
One should understand T-REL in the same way. When the intentional objects of the
TBR exist and are real and the TBR is about ways that these objects really are, then
there is not just an A-REL going in the direction from the TBR to the TMK, but there
is a T-REL going in the direction from the TMK to the TBR.
To make the connection between T-REL and A-REL via aboutness-satisfaction clearer,
it’s useful to contrast it with what I’ll call partial aboutness-satisfaction. It is an impor-
tant detail that a TBR is often not just about real and existing objects, but also about
(putatively) real ways these objects are (how things are with the object). A TBR which
is about an existing and real object can also be false of that object in some way. But,
in so far as it is also about how things really are with the object, the TBR is at least
51Searle (1983: 17) introduces the notion of satisfaction in a similar context. According to Searle,
intentional states (or TBRs) can have propositional or representational content or meaning, which can
fix what the TBRs can be about. But unless the entities exist and are real, the TBR is not satisfied.
He writes, “[I]f there is no object that satisfies the propositional or the representative content, then
the speech act and the Intentional state [and the TBR] cannot be satisfied” (ibid.). My understanding
of aboutness-satisfaction does not commit us to the existence of propositional content which needs
to be satisfied for there to be aboutness. Aboutness and aboutness-satisfaction do not depend on
propositional content or sense, or other related notions.
52Ceusters and Smith explain, “ ‘being about’ is a success verb” (2015: 3).
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partially true of that object. For instance, ‘Donald is a small duck’ is false but partially
true in that he’s a duck, albeit a decidedly large one. In §2.4.2.4, I explained that partial
aboutness is not satisfactory for T-REL and argued that fullness in regard to aboutness
is important for T-REL; in the example, for the TBR to be true, Donald must be a small
duck, not just either a duck or small. Here, we can make clear that what we need is not
partial aboutness-satisfaction but (strict and full) aboutness-satisfaction.
The parallel between T-REL and A-REL extends to cases where there is no about-
ness-satisfaction, or to put it another way, there is a failure of aboutness-satisfaction.
When there is no relation, and the TBR in question is not about anything real or existing,
while at the same time it is committed to the existence and reality of some thing, then
the TBR is, strictly speaking, false.53 The TBR is neither satisfied in terms of aboutness
nor is it satisfied in terms of truthmaking.54
Now that we have introduced the notions of aboutness-satisfaction and -failure, and
tied them to truth and truthmaking, we can formulate an understanding of truth and
falsity in TAAT-ist terms. Falsehood on the TAAT is the non-satisfaction or failure of
strict and full aboutness:
FALSEHOOD-SAC (F-SAC): A TBR which positively describes things to be a certain
way is false iff the TBR fails to be strictly and fully about anything that exists or
is real.55
53In fictional contexts things get complicated. Although it is clear that T8 and T9 are false, what
might one say about a TBR which states that Sherlock Holmes smokes pipes, not electronic cigarettes?
One might say that on the TMK-analysis, all TBRs about fictions are false since Sherlock Holmes does
not and has never existed. But the right answer, I propose, really depends on what the right SEM-TAC
of TBRs about fictions is, and it also depends on the nature of fictional entities. For instance, fictional
TBRs might best be understood as talk about texts and what so and so author wrote, rather than
about a certain sort of entity which we might call fictional entities, such as fictional people.
54I take aboutness-satisfaction and truthmaking -satisfaction to go hand-in-hand. For, remember,
on my account of T-REL, it is a dual or complementing relation to A-REL; they are complementing
asymmetric relations which go in opposite directions. However, I take it that sub-sentential aboutness
present at the level of words indicates that truthmaking and aboutness come apart at the sub-sentential
level. Instead, they are complementing at the sentential level. Where there is aboutness-satisfaction
at the sentential level, there is truthmaking-satisfaction as well. Sentential-level aboutness, however,
should not be taken to be a separate kind of aboutness. My neutrality about TMKs (§1.7) makes me
agnostic about whether there must be A-RELs and T-RELs at the sentential level that are not reducible
to the relations at the sub-sentential level. For instance, the sentential level A-RELs and T-RELs
might be plural relations, composed of sub-sentential A-RELs and T-RELs. See Dodd (2002a: 74
and 75; 2007: 398) for a discussion of what he calls “sub-sentential language/world relations” (ibid.).
Dodd (2002a: 78–81) argues that these sub-sentential-level relations make it that we do not need to posit
any sentential-level entities to play the TMK-role. Although I remain agnostic about this, I think that
the duality of T-REL and A-REL is strengthened by this consideration. For sentential-level aboutness
can easily be understood in terms of sub-sentential-level aboutness. We can easily understand ‘the table
is round’ being about the table and how things are with the table, specifically its being round. The
best SEM-TAC might not take the TBR to be about some sentence-level complex entity the table’s
being round over and above what it is about at the sub-sentential-level, the table and how things are
with the table. As I shall make explicit in my discussion in §4.1.2, this further underpins my insistence
that my account of truthmaking is modest, as there is no requirement that there are facts or SOAs
understood as complex entities that need to play the TMK-role; whatever our TBRs are strictly and
fully about will play this role, whether or not these are entities, or, more modestly, entities and how
things are with the entities. See Lewis (1992: 218) and Dodd (2002a: 74).
55The reason why I put things this way will become clear in the next section where I distinguish
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What the TBR is about, when what it is about exists and is real, is (or are) its TMK(s).
Conversely, if instead of failure there is aboutness-satisfaction, then there is truth:
TRUTH-SAC (TR-SAC): a TBR is true if it is about things that exist and are real,
and it is about how things actually are with those things.56
2.6.1 Crane vs Searle on The Problem of Intentionality
To end my discussion of P-INT, I want to point out that Searle (1983) draws importantly
different consequences from this talk of aboutness-satisfaction, specifically in his answer
to P-INT. After introducing satisfaction (quoted above), Searle adds,
In such cases, just as there is no “referred-to object” of the speech act, so
there is no “Intentional object” of the Intentional state: if nothing satisfies
the referential portion of the representative content then the Intentional
state does not have an Intentional object. [1983: 17]
Clearly this Representationalist strategy, as I’ll call it, differs from the Cranean strategy.
Representationalists would accept C1 and, instead, would reject C3; that is, they reject
the claim that some TBRs are about things which do not exist. If Pegasus does not
exist, then there is no “referred-to object,” no intentional object, and T8 is not about
Pegasus or anything else.57
However, this Representationalist understanding of intentionality and aboutness as
requiring satisfaction is problematic. The whole point, as I understand it, of talking
about intentional objects is to be able to point out that Pegasus is the intentional object
of TBRs such as ‘John thought about Pegasus’. John is clearly thinking about something;
but the thing he is thinking about happens not to exist. The Representationalist clearly
thinks that the aboutness of any thought or TBR depends on the satisfaction of the
referential portion of the representative content, and hence the existence of the A-REL.
Crane also points out the infelicity of the Representationalist use of ‘intentional’, with
two objections. First, if one uses such terms as ‘intentional object’ and ‘intentional state’
as Searle does (above), then, as Crane says, “I would have said, with Searle, that all
between positive and negative truths (and falsehoods). F-SAC concerns only what are called “positive
falsehoods” and not negative falsehoods. More on these later.
56In §2.6.2, I explain why TR-AC should not be expressed by a bi-conditional.
57Ceusters and Smith (2015) are also Representationalists and capture the core of the view well when
they say: “an ICE must in every case be about some portion of reality, where the aboutness in question
must always be veridical, so that ‘being about’ is a success verb” (ibid.: 3). They contrast ICEs with
representations, which “in contrast, [are] required merely to intend to be about something, and this
intention might fail (as when a child draws what she thinks of as a unicorn)” (ibid.). On their taxonomy,
T8 would be both a “Non-referring representational unit (NRU): an RU [representational unit] which,
for whatever reason, fails to be about anything” (ibid.: 4; and 2010: 4) and a “Recognized non-referring
representational unit (RNRU): an NRU which was once intended and believed to be about something,
but which, as a result of advances in knowledge, is no longer believed to be so” (ibid.). It is an NRU
(their example is ‘Vulcan’), because we now know that whoever used it in the past and intended it to
be about something was in error, since there is no portion of reality containing Pegasus (or Vulcan).
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intentional objects exist, but that some intentional states have no intentional objects”
(2001: 22). But, as he points out, “I would have been at a loss to say what makes
this latter class of states [i.e. intentional states concerning things which do not exist]
intentional ” (ibid.). If a state lacks an intentional object, surely this rules out that that
state is intentional. Second, Crane thinks that his strategy allows us to understand why
T8 and T9 are about different things, even though neither of those things exist, while
Searle’s strategy cannot.
The first is a minor point. In response, Representationalists will just say that we
must distinguish between states which are putatively or apparently intentional from ones
which are intentional, by having intentional objects. Ceusters and Smith would say that
we must distinguish between representations which are merely intended but fail to be
about portions of reality (NRUs; [2015: 3]) and those that are successfully about portions
of reality (ICEs). Searle will just reject that there is any sense in which intentional states
which do not have intentional objects are intentional. They fail to be intentional, and
hence were only putative, not real, cases of intentional states.
In regard to the second objection, they would also give a story about how T8 and
T9 differ in representational content, and not aboutness – exactly how they could do
this is not our concern, however. If we follow Searle, then all cases of aboutness concern
A-RELs between TBRs and intentional objects (TMKs), which must exist (or else they
would not be intentional objects). If we follow Crane, then some cases of aboutness do
not involve A-RELs between TBRs and TMKs. Some cases merely involve TBRs and
their intentional objects. Others involve TBRs, their intentional objects, and relations to
these intentional objects, which must then also exist and be real. Whether we understand
aboutness in Representationalist or Cranean terms, there is clearly still a strong and useful
parallel between A-REL and T-REL.
2.6.2 Cranean vs Representationalist Terminology: Broad and
Narrow Aboutness
On the Cranean, broad account there is TBR-aboutness both when there is a rela-
tion, and when there is no relation, between the TBR and the intentional objects it is
about. On the Representationalist, narrow account, there is only aboutness when there
is satisfaction in terms of aboutness, or, in Searle’s terms, where there is an intentional
object. The latter contrasts representations that have aboutness (ICEs [Ceusters and
Smith 2015: 3]) with representations that one can “intend to be about something” (ibid.),
but because the intention isn’t satisfied, it isn’t actually about anything. The broad,
Cranean sense of aboutness doesn’t need to introduce representations; instead, it utilises
a broadly schematic sense of ‘intentional object’. It also captures the intuitions that we
can talk about things that do not exist, and that there is a difference in aboutness when
we talk about different non-existent beings such as unicorns rather than Greek gods.
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Henceforth, because the Cranean way of talking about intentional objects is the more
natural way of speaking, I shall normally speak this way. Generally, it won’t matter which
terms I employ. If there is aboutness-satisfaction, then the TBRs are about something.
This is common to both accounts. But, I might sometimes use Representationalist terms,
on which if there is a failure of aboutness, I would say that the TBRs are not about
anything. I’ll make it explicit when I do. If the reader is not comfortable when I slip into
Representiationalist terms, then read what I say in Crane’s terms, with, I think, no loss of
relevant content (and vice versa if the reader prefers Representationalism). For instance,
many of my discussions concern the ontological status of TMKs, and on both Represen-
tationalism, but especially Craneanism, intentional-objects-qua-intentional-object have
no ontological status or substance of any kind. All that my account requires is that there
is a relation of aboutness between TBRs and TMKs when the TMKs make the TBRs
true, and that it figures in the right account of truthmaking. Both the broad and the
narrow sense of aboutness yield the right result in this regard.
However, the broad sense of aboutness is generally preferred. In §3, I use the dis-
tinctions and machinery that I have introduced so far, and especially this broad sense, to
sketch a strategy for addressing TT’s central problem, the problem of negative truths.
Although I won’t argue for this here, it is preferable also in regard to preserving meta-
physical modesty (see Appendix §A4.3).
2.7 SAC and Dependence: A Broadly Externalist View
of Content
TBRs are broadly construed as contentful, truth-apt entities, and they are under certain
circumstances related by T-REL to TMKs. But, one might ask, how are contents related
to TMKs and potential TMKs?
Since TBRs are about their intentional objects, understood as their potential TMKs
and their real, existing TMKs when they are true, one might think that this makes
TBRs not only depend-for-their-truth on TMKs but also depend-for-their-content on
potential TMKs. We might call this the “truthmaker account of content”. Since TMKs
are plausibly, and often, external objects such as tables and planets, what seems to come
out of this and SAC is a broadly externalist view of content.
However, Gorman (2006: 142) points out that because intentional objects are some-
times non-existing objects, we cannot give an externalist account of intentional states
about them. One might raise a similar worry that many TBRs are about non-external
things such as ideas and thoughts.
In response, it is enough for an account of content to be externalist and not inter-
nalist that some contents are individuated externally; even Gorman (ibid.: 138) agrees.
Many TBRs are about real, existing, presumably external beings that are not ideas and
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thoughts, but are, rather, such things as tables and tigers. So, some contents are in-
dividuated externally. Therefore, the TMK-account of content is externalist, or at least
broadly, rather than purely, externalist.
This broad externalism, however, depends on tables and tigers not being ideas and
thoughts. Even though this may turn out to be right, this metaphysical issue is not
something that the best semantic theory of aboutness needs to engage with.
The TMK-account is also broadly externalist in a slightly different sense concerning
TBRs about non-existing and mental entities. For instance, when one understands
the aboutness of the TBR ‘Margot is the intentional object of Annie’s thought’, one
understands that the TBR depends for its truth not on the existence of Margot, but on
the existence of Annie’s thought about Margot. Annie’s thought must exist and that
thought must have Margot as its intentional object for this TBR to be true. Even though
such thoughts are internal to thinkers, they are external to the TBRs about them.58
Now, let’s say that Annie does not have and never had that thought. How can the
TBR’s content be individuated by what it’s about, if what it’s about has never existed?
The answer is that the TBR is still about Annie’s thought, even though it never
existed. The thought doesn’t and has never existed, but it is still the intentional object
of the TBR. And if Annie were to have that thought, with Margot as its intentional
object, then the aboutness would be satisfied and it would be the TBR’s TMK. The
TBR’s content is fixed by its potential TMK, its intentional object, whether or not it
exists. This is broadly externalist in a more modest sense than before.
We can now answer one lingering question concerning my claim that A-REL and
T-REL are dual relations (§2.3) with complementary asymmetries (§2.5): how does this
square with the TD-requirement that TBRs depend for their truth on TMKs?
The broad externalism of SAC makes things very congenial to TD. TBRs must be
strictly and fully about their TMKs. Thus, the TMKs are what the TBRs are about.
But, the TMKs are (generally) not about the TBRs which are about them. A-REL’s
asymmetry, indeed, goes from TBR to TMK (see §2.5). But, as we saw here, despite
this asymmetry, the contents of TBRs also depend on TMKs, which are broadly external
to them. The asymmetry of A-REL, which goes in an opposite direction from T-REL’s
asymmetry, thus, doesn’t even affect the general dependence of content on TMKs.
There is no reason to think that it affects the general dependence-for-truth either. In
fact, we can say both that TBRs depend for their truth, and that their contents depend,
on TMKs and potential TMKs.59 SAC states that TMKs are what make true TBRs
by being what the TBRs are strictly and fully about. As we saw in §2.5, TMKs do
not generally depend on their TBRs in the relevant way. So, SAC can accommodate
the asymmetry central to TD, that TBRs depend for their truth on TMKs (and not the
other way around).
58Of course, this is setting aside reflexive thoughts.
59In Appendix 2, I discuss a small potential worry this might raise.
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2.8 The Motivation for Aboutness and the Relevance
Objection to Necessitation
Now that I have introduced the main features of SAC, I shall discuss the main motivation
for preferring it over its most popular rival, T-NEC. Recall (§2.3) what Smith (1999: 279)
calls the “relevance constraint”. It is usually introduced to TT in one of two main
ways: either (1) in T-ET versions, by constraining classical ET or replacing it with
RELEVANT-ET, or (2) in T-NEC versions, as an addition to NEC.60 I already discussed
ET.61 So, I’ll focus on NEC, which I articulate thus:
NECESSITATION (NEC): TBR p is made true by TMK x iff in all possible worlds
where p exists and x exists, p is true.62
The constraint is motivated by
The Relevance Objection to Necessitation: NEC lets too much that is obviously
irrelevant for a TBR’s truth count as its TMKs.
This general objection is raised by two separate RELEVANCE PROBLEMS: the problem
of necessary truths (P-ONT) and the problem of trivial or malignant TMKs (P-OMT).63
With these, in this section, I argue that NEC is not sufficient for TT. In §2.9, I reject
T-NEC altogether, and argue that NEC is not necessary for TT either. SAC is not a
mere addition to T-NEC, but a better rival account.
2.8.1 The Problem of Necessary Truths
Consider
T13: 2+2=4.
60Armstrong (2004: 11) and Jackson (1994: 27ff), to whom both Armstrong (2004: 11–12) and Restall
(1996: 334–335) attribute this view before articulating it in more depth than Jackson does, make room
for a third way: to restrict the scope of the entailment principle to contingent truths or “purely contingent
truths” (Armstrong 2004: 11–12), which are truths with no necessary truth in any part of the content or
“at any level of analysis” (ibid.). This is not strictly speaking relevant entailment, which is a rejection of
classical entailment, since it is merely a restriction on classical entailment (see [Armstrong 2004: 12]).
However, even this third way falls under (1) as it is a version of T-ET. See also (Lopez de Sa 2009: 423).
61See §2.3 and (Merricks 2007: 23). In §1.3, I eliminate T-ET from our discussion for other reasons.
62This is what Merricks (2007: 7) articulates as conditional necessitarianism. I take this to be the
metaphysically more neutral and hence more plausible account of NEC. The stronger metaphysical
account states that “for all x and all p, x is a truthmaker for p only if x ’s mere existence is metaphysically
sufficient for p’s truth” (Merricks ibid.: 5). Armstrong (2003: 12; 2004: 6–7), Fine (1982: 69), Fox
(1987: 189), Molnar (2000: 84), Smith (1999: 276) are just a few of the TT-ists who defend and utilise
the stronger metaphysical version of NEC. Merricks (2007: 5) states that although such an account is
now “truthmaker orthodoxy” (ibid.), historical TT-ists such as Russell (1985: 96–7) would reject such
a strong metaphysical account based on his views on modality. As should be clear, I sympathise with
a rejection of the stronger metaphysical account, but as we’ll see, I also reject the weaker conditional
account as it is still too metaphysically immodest.
63Others also discuss P-ONT, such as (Merricks 2007.: 22ff) and (Lewis 2001a: 604), and P-OMT,
such as (Merricks ibid.: 28ff) and (Smith 1999: 278). See especially Merricks (ibid.: §2).
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According to NEC, T13 would be made true by everything and anything, because it
is true in all possible worlds, and thus, for any x, NEC (if x exists, then p is true) is
satisfied. T13 is true in every possible world where Merricks’s left ear exists. So, his left
ear necessitates and would make true that, and every other, necessary truth. It seems
that according to NEC, necessary truths have what we might call trivial TMKs which
are obviously irrelevant to their truth. NEC seems to overgenerate TMKs for necessary
truths. So, it is insufficient to account for T-REL. In response, T-NEC-ists can try to
restrict the scope of T-NEC somehow. For instance, they might reject TMK-Maximalism
and say that only contingent truths have TMKs. But without a principled reason for
restricting TT in this manner, this strategy would be ad hoc. The challenge for TT is:
either reject T-NEC or restrict its scope in some non-ad -hoc manner.
2.8.2 The Problem of Malignant TMKs
According to NEC, for any TBR p, the fact that p is true necessitates and would thus
make true p, because every world in which the two exist is a world in which p is true.
However, this is obviously problematic. The fact that p is true exists because p is true,
and not the other way around. This fact would be a malignant and irrelevant TMK. It
should not serve as a TMK for p even if p is true in every possible world that it exists.
So, either NEC needs to be rejected altogether, or, if possible, it should be amended to
capture how things should be with T-REL in such examples.64
Further, it seems that the best explanation for what has gone wrong for NEC here is
that the fact that p is true, though necessarily connected with p’s truth, is not what p
is about. Since they are not related in the right way, the former cannot be the latter’s
TMK. In these and similar cases, the appropriate NEC-conditions are fulfilled, but T-REL
is clearly not present. Therefore, NEC should be rejected, since it is clearly not sufficient
for capturing T-REL. Further, since the best explanation of what has gone wrong is
based on clear and strong intuitions as to what the TBRs are about, there is a strong
case that perhaps aboutness is more important for T-REL than NEC.65
2.8.3 Adding the Aboutness Requirement to NEC?
P-ONT and P-OMT are two of the main problems for NEC that also help motivate the
addition of the relevance or aboutness requirement of truthmaking. Both problems are
motivated by the fact that we think that trivial truthmakers are irrelevant to the truths
64Merricks (2007: 31–32) has some more interesting examples of the same form.
65Smith (1999: 278–279) presents a very interesting and similar case to argue that aboutness is
necessary for TT. However, his case concerns what he calls “malignant necessitators,” such as God’s
willing that John kiss Mary necessitating the truth of ‘John kisses Mary’. Smith rightly points out that
“God’s act is not a truthmaker for this judgment” (ibid.: 279). It is thus false that T-REL is nothing
more than NEC. What goes wrong is best explained by aboutness reasons.
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in question. In the first, we think that not every thing that exists should count as TMKs
for necessary truths, because they are irrelevant for their truth. For the second, we see
that even if the proposed TMKs are tied in some necessary way to the TBRs, the TMKs
must be relevant in the right way. T13 is not about Merrick’s left ear, and T13 is also
not about the fact that the TBR T13 is true.
Merricks (2007: §2.2–2.3), who also discusses these or similar problems, thinks that
adding aboutness to NEC allows one to rule out such unwanted, irrelevant TMKs. Mer-
ricks argues that NEC “is not sufficient for making true” (ibid.: 30). He draws the
consequence from these examples that “Truthmaker [i.e. T-REL] requires a truth to be
appropriately about its truthmaker” (ibid.: 34). This latter is surely a good consequence
to draw from the insufficiency of NEC for T-REL. But he goes further. Based on his
discussion of similar cases and other things about the tie between NEC and T-REL which
he argued for previously (which I won’t go into), Merricks writes:
We should conclude that making true involves aboutness. But we should
also stand by the previous chapter’s point that making true implies (condi-
tional) necessitation. For even if there were nothing more to making true
than a proposition’s being related to that which makes it true by aboutness,
making true would still imply necessitation. This is because that to which a
proposition stands in the aboutness relation thereby necessitates that propo-
sition. At least, I lose my (admittedly somewhat shaky) grip on aboutness
if I add that that which a truth is relevantly about need not (even condi-
tionally) necessitate that truth. So I shall assume that Truthmaker implies
not only that truths are about their respective truthmakers but also that
truthmakers necessitate their respective truths. [ibid.: 34]
Thus, the account of TT that results from considering the RELEVANCE PROBLEMS
is one where aboutness is added to save T-NEC, taking centre stage, as a necessary
condition alongside NEC.66 Both aboutness and NEC are taken to be necessary (though
not separately sufficient) conditions to capture T-REL.67 T-REL is NEC plus A-REL.
However, SAC, as I have presented it so far, does not commit itself to NEC. In fact,
I think that the Relevance Objection clearly undermines NEC and gives us strong reasons
in favour of SAC, not merely to save NEC, but to supersede NEC, as its more modest
rival. In §2.9 (and §4.1.1), I argue for accepting SAC and rejecting NEC altogether.
2.9 Accepting SAC & Rejecting NEC
It is already clear, from P-ONT and P-OMT, that NEC is not sufficient for T-REL. To
reject NEC altogether, I shall now argue for the more controversial claim that NEC is not
necessary for T-REL. I first explain the significance of NEC being a necessary connection
66Let’s ignore the fact that Merricks’s discussion, in the end, rejects the account of TT he presents.
67I assume that he thinks that they are jointly sufficient, but he does not make this explicit.
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between distinct entities. I then present my argument against NEC being necessary for
T-REL and address two potential worries.
If x makes true p, then, according to NEC, if p exists and x exists, then p is true.
There is a necessary connection between (at least) two distinct existences or objects,
p and x (in this case, the TBR and its TMK or TMKs) — even though p and x are
distinct entities, p is necessarily a certain way, that is, true, if both p and x exist.68 Thus,
there is a necessary connection between them that is guaranteed to be the case merely
by their existing.
Humeans balk at the suggestion that there might be such connections and are, on
this basis, normally fundamentally opposed to truthmaking. The main reason for this is
that there cannot be a guarantee that there are such necessary connections that hold
for all time and in all possible worlds, especially for entities external to us, and which
we presumably can only come to know via sense impressions. That there is such a
connection, which holds across all time and possible worlds between external entities
(both TMKs and TBRs are normally external entities), is something that we should
at the very least only accept with very strong evidence. To think otherwise is to be
immodestly credulous about metaphysically dubious relations.
However, with SAC, we can reject the inclination merely to add the aboutness con-
dition to NEC. For SAC can block the need for NEC as a general characterisation
of T-REL. SAC does not need to accept the to-the-Humean-unsavoury and generally
immodest idea that there are necessary connections between distinct objects.
According to SAC, x only makes p true if p is strictly and fully about x. But, its
being strictly and fully about x is a contingent matter. For the same TBRs can be about
different TMKs at different times.69 For example, consider the TBR ‘the painting that
I am working on represents the death of John the Baptist’. At time t1, this will be
true, but once I’ve finished that painting and moved on, at time t2, to a painting of the
patience-in-suffering of Job, the TBR will be false. For what I am strictly talking about
at t2 would be another painting, not one depicting the death of John the Baptist.
Remember, it is an open option what the nature of TBRs is (see §1.3). No account
of TBRs is essential to SAC, but SAC accommodates BATT’s TBR-pluralism. And
importantly, aboutness-change is widespread amongst TBRs. For instance, it is obviously
clear that what sentences are about can change over time; this is a well-known fact about
language change.70 As David (2005: 158–159) explains, this is also the case for token
68I follow Cameron’s (2008a: 24ff) illuminating understanding of necessary connections here.
69In Appendix 3, I give sameness and exact similarity criteria for TBRs in terms of TMKs at a time
that accommodates this.
70Language change in general is a widely studied phenomenon in linguistics. I am mainly concerned
with the local level where aboutness can change over short periods of time for particular speakers. How-
ever, the prevalence of the phenomenon of language change at all levels, including between language-
families, is relevant to and lends support to the points I make on this matter throughout my dissertation.
This phenomenon has been closely studied since at least the 18th century (see [Anderson 1973: 8]; see
also [ibid.: 7ff] for a quick historical survery of both synchronic and diachronic considerations in histor-
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beliefs. Recall, in §1.3, I explained that David [2005: 156] argues on this basis that
Armstrong’s naturalism should lead Armstrong himself to reject T-NEC despite being
the arch-T-NEC-ist. So, even if p is strictly and fully about x at some point in time,
it might not be strictly and fully about x at some other time. Even though x makes p
true at time t, x might not make p true at time t2 because at time t2 p might not be
strictly and fully about x. The contingency over time also makes clear that there is a
general contingency between TMKs and TBRs which stretches across possible worlds.
So, p can exist and x can exist in some possible world, and p not be true in that possible
world. For, in the context of that world, p is not strictly and fully about x. Thus, we
can accept SAC and reject NEC. SAC preserves the asymmetric dependence relation
between truths and TMKs, by focusing on what TBRs are strictly and fully about, but
it can get rid of any unsavoury necessitation relations between them.
2.9.1 Responses to Possible Objections
There are several possible objections that I want to respond to now. The first is a worry
that perhaps I am trading illegitimately here on an unclarity about TBRs. One might
object that although what I say is true of sentences and token beliefs, the real or primary
TBRs are propositions. And, propositions cannot change what they are about. For they
are essentially tied in some way to what they are about.
My response is that, as I already pointed out in §1.3, we must remain pluralists
about TBRs as much as possible and that pluralism is a virtue of my account. The view
that propositions are the only real or primary TBRs is distinctly anti-pluralist. Pluralism
about TBRs is not an unclarity about TBRs. The unclarity-about-TBRs objection, to
have any force, raises an epistemic point. Perhaps we do not know which are the real or
primary TBRs. But, then, one cannot rely on features of sentences and token beliefs to
reject NEC. This is because NEC holds between propositions and what they are about.
There are several ways that I can respond. First, pluralism rejects that anything,
including propositions, are the primary or the only real TBRs. As long as there are some
TBRs that are not necessarily connected to TMKs, then NEC is not a necessary condition
for T-REL. Despite my independent worries about propositions (which even Armstrong
should share [David 2005: 158–159]), let us allow for the sake of argument that there
are such things as propositions. Then there would indeed be necessary connections
between TBRs and TMKs. However, second, it is also part of my pluralism that there
are other kinds of TBRs, such as sentences and token beliefs. What sentences and
token beliefs are about can vary from context to context. Further, they are about these
ical linguistics, which as a study “is not limited to the study of the history of one or several related
languages, but rather, it inquires into the nature of [language] change itself” [ibid.: 2]). (Anderson
1973) is a book-length treatment of the varieties of language change, of which semantic change is the
most relevant for us (see [ibid.: 26f and 78ff]).
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different things in different contexts independently of expressing propositions, because
their having aboutness is compatible with there being no such thing as propositions. For
instance, one can make a sentence be about different things in different contexts by
stipulation. The meanings of words in languages are flexible enough to allow for this.
English words such as ‘cola’ or ‘water’ or ‘vitamin’ can be about an array of different
substances, and which substances we are talking about in a given context can vary
considerably from when we use these words in other contexts.71 These differences in
aboutness do not have anything to do with propositions but have everything to do with
the environment and the use of the words in different contexts. Even if sentences and
token beliefs express propositions, changes in what the sentences and beliefs are about,
and changes in what TMKs make them true, happen independently of the propositions
they express. Once this is understood, it becomes clear that sentences and token beliefs,
etc., are not essentially or necessarily connected with any TMKs. So, given pluralism,
one is able to reject NEC as essential for T-REL. Of course, if the only real TBRs
are propositions, then there would always be necessary connections between TBRs and
TMKs, but this is something that the aboutness account, at the very least, can be
agnostic about, or, as I hope to have made persuasive, can reject with modest confidence.
However, there is another worry which one can raise to argue that SAC might not be
able to reject necessary connections altogether. One might try to block SAC’s rejection
of necessary connections between distinct existents by claiming that the only TBRs
that are not necessarily connected to TMKs are those not involving rigid designators.
Any TBRs which involve rigid designators remain necessarily connected to what they
rigidly designate. For example, the TBR ‘Socrates or Plato exists’ and Socrates remain
necessarily connected, though they are distinct things; whenever the TBR and Socrates
both exist, Socrates makes the TBR true. Thus, one might argue, if I want to reject
necessary connections I would have to find something stronger than SAC.72
I think this objection shows that SAC cannot reject necessary connections altogether,
but it can reject T-NEC by denying that NEC is necessary for TT.
TBRs are necessarily connected to certain entities by containing rigid designators
such as names, which after an initial baptism will, in the world of the baptism, refer to
the baptised entities and their counterparts in all possible worlds, that is, necessarily. So,
there is a good case to be made that any TBR such as ‘Socrates exists’, which refers to
Socrates in all possible worlds (at least from the perspective of worlds where ‘Socrates’
is a name for Socrates), is always going to be strictly and fully about, and, when true,
made true by, Socrates.
However, even if we allow this, it is not at all clear that other, non-existential TBRs
such as ‘Some Greek philosophers are bald’, ‘I am working on a painting of John’, or
71Of ‘vitamin’ Jackson, for instance, writes, “The concept of a vitamin is a significant one in the
science of nutrition but it is not true that ‘vitamin’ refers to a unified explanatory kind or kinds”
(2010: x). This seems to me a good example.
72I thank an anonymous referee at MIND for raising this objection.
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even ‘Socrates is bald’ can be interpreted in the same way as ‘Socrates exists’. The point
I made earlier about the case involving the painting of John still holds and applies also
to the cases involving these bald, Greek philosophers. At different times and at different
worlds, the TBRs can be and are often strictly and fully about different paintings and
different Greek philosophers. Even if TBRs such as ‘Socrates is bald’ are about the
same things (and their counterparts) in all possible worlds in virtue of having a rigid
designator, it is clear that these other TBRs are, at different times, in different possible
worlds, as well as in different contexts, often strictly and fully about different entities
and different ways those entities are. A predicate such as ‘. . . is bald’ is not a name
and is not about the same property in all possible worlds. Predicates notoriously shift
their aboutness in different contexts, including at different times.73 Thus, even if we
agree that rigid designators retain necessary connections between distinct entities and
that some TBRs (such as ‘Socrates or Plato exists’) are necessarily connected to their
TMKs in a T-NEC way, SAC does give TAAT the resources to reject the claim that
NEC is necessary for TT. For most TBRs will not be connected to TMKs by necessary
connections. Given these arguments and the RELEVANCE PROBLEMS of the previous
section, we can now conclude that NEC is neither necessary nor sufficient for TT. So,
SAC gives TAAT the resources to abandon NEC.
To be clear, rejecting NEC is not rejecting TT. Mellor (2003: 214–215), for instance,
also rejects T-NEC, by considering general truths and even familiar truths. Others, such
as Heil (2000: 63–64), Briggs (2012),74 Schaffer (2010a: 311),75 Parsons (1999: 328ff),76
73Just to be clear, one might object that predicates are names for ways things can be, and refer to
features or aspects of things. For instance, one might say that the English predicate ‘. . . is a horse’
refers, in all possible worlds and contexts, to a way things can be or property being a horse. In response,
I think one can remain agnostic about whether or not predicates name or refer to properties; and this is
compatible with the modesty I espouse. My preferred way of looking at things includes ways things can
be and properties as part of what predicates are about. So, in different contexts, times, and places,
one is talking in part about the same way things can be when using predicates such as the one-place
predicate ‘. . . is a horse’, namely a way that things can be, being a horse. However, sentences such as
‘Some animals on your farm are horses’ when said to different farmers are about the same way things
are, namely being a horse, but are about different entities who are the same way in this relevant respect.
With other predicates, including the one I used namely ‘. . . is bald’, it is very unclear that one can talk
about any same way things can be when using the predicate in different contexts. Joe’s being bald and
Aaron’s being bald might have very little in common. Most predicates in fact do shift their aboutness.
What entities they are about, and what way or ways things are with those entities, change in different
contexts. I’m sure there are exceptions but these do not affect my argument.
74She replaces NEC with what she calls the “Duplication Principle” (ibid.: 14).
75He also rejects NEC elsewhere. See (2008a: 304) where he argues that we should “ditch necessitation
for real dependence” (ibid.) to help TT avoid similar problems to the ones I raised in §2.8.1–2.8.2.
However, see §5 and especially §5.4.1, where I argue against his substitute for NEC.
76Parsons (ibid.) argues against T-NEC by arguing against Armstrong’s (1997: 115–116) account of
T-REL, which he calls “truthmaker essentialism” (ibid.), but which is normally called NEC. He rejects
NEC thoroughly. In particular, as Cameron (2005: 5) argues, Parsons’s TT-position implies that TT-ists
can abandon NEC even for atomic TBRs. Parsons (1999: 329–330) argues that nominalists can be TT-
ists and that the TMKs for p are just those things which are instrinsically such that p. For instance, the
atomic TBR ‘A is red’ is made true by A. And since A doesn’t have this intrinsic property essentially,
its existence doesn’t necessitate p. So, T-NEC is rejected even for atomic TBRs. This is Parsons’s
(1999: 329–330) position, but see also (Cameron 2005: 5–6) for critical discussion.
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and Cameron (2005: 4–5),77 also advocate truthmaking in the absence of NEC. So, plenty
of other TT-ists would agree that rejecting NEC is not rejecting TT.
In the next few chapters, I shall bring further challenges to the unfortunately meta-
physically substantial versions of TT that have arisen out of thinking of T-REL in terms
of NEC, and other such substantial relations, such as FUNDAMENTALIST GROUNDING
(§5). Rejecting NEC and embracing SAC allows us to accept a much more modest TT.
2.10 Conclusions
In this chapter, I presented my favoured TAAT-ist way of moving beyond BATT in two
novel ways. (1) I fleshed out such an account much more than has previously been done
by other TAAT-ists. And (2), I argued that TAAT is not just an addition to NEC, but
a rival theory to T-NEC. This was the first step towards my defence of TAAT as a
metaphysically modest alternative to rival theories. In the next chapter, I briefly sketch
a way of using TAAT and SAC to modestly address one of the central problems for TT,
namely the problem of negative truths.
77Cameron rejects T-NEC, but doesn’t reject NEC as thoroughly as Parsons. Cameron (2005: 5–6)
critically discusses Parsons’s (1999: 329–330) argument against T-NEC, and argues instead that “al-
though I abandon truthmaker necessitarianism in general, I hold it with respect to atomic propositions,
and cannot accept Parsons’ theory” (Cameron 2005: 5). Cameron rejects T-NEC because he rejects
Truthmaker Maximalism (ibid.: 4–5) and on the basis of counterexamples (ibid.: 5–6). In short, he thinks
that there are plenty of non-atomic TBRs that are “made true by things that fail to necessitate their
truth” (ibid.: 6). But, he (ibid.: 5) argues, contra Parsons, that atomic TBRs are necessitated by their
TMKs. This is because “Consideration of the relation of necessitation lets us identify the truthmakers
for atomic propositions”, but he continues, “and then, given this new data (i.e. what kinds of thing
truthmakers are), we can figure out, hopefully, what the truthmakers are in the more difficult case of
non-atomic propositions. And if necessitation fails in these more difficult cases then so be it” (ibid.: 5).
I hope to have argued that SAC gives us a plausible alternative way of identifying TMKs, without the
need for NEC. So, given that Cameron’s argument against Parsons for keeping NEC for atomic TBRs
rests on his assumption that “we get a grip on this relation [T-REL] only by considering the relation
of [NEC]” (ibid.), I hope that SAC gives a sufficiently plausible alternative way of getting a grip on
T-REL, one that also allows us to abandon NEC altogether.
Chapter 3
Aboutness and Negative Truths: A
Modest Strategy
3.1 TAAT and the Problem of Negative Truths
In this chapter, I use the aboutness-machinery of TAAT-SAC to sketch a modest strategy
for solving the central problem for TT, namely the problem of negative truths (P-NEG).
In §3.2, I present P-NEG and discuss proposed solutions in light of Russell’s debate
with Demos, revealing a central difficulty for addressing the problem. In §3.3, I discuss
Molnar’s (2000) presentation of P-NEG, and explain in what sense I think there is a real
distinction between negative and positive. In §3.4, I present the TAAT-ist strategy for
solving P-NEG. Finally, in §3.5, I reply to some worries.
3.2 The Problem of Negative Truths & Some Diffi-
culties for Addressing It
P-NEG is the problem of how exactly TT can account for true negative claims such as
T14: Pegasus does not exist.
T15: The cat is not on the mat.
Given their committment to an asymmetric dependence between truths and reality,
TT-ists seem beholden to answer the following two questions: “What does the truth
of claims such as T14 and T15 depend on?” and, more specifically, “What are the TMKs
for negative truths?” Neither T14 nor T15 seem to describe a way that the world is, but
rather purport to describe a way the world is not. And since T14 and T15 are both true,
we seem to have a case where there are truths that do not need TMKs. If this reasoning
is correct, the TT-ist seems to be stuck with a dilemma: either reject Truthmaker Maxi-
malism (T-M), which states that all truths require TMKs to make them true,1 or accept
1Many TT-ists believe in T-M. Many non-TT-ists do too. But many non-TT-ists as well as many
77
Chapter 3. Aboutness and Negative Truths: A Modest Strategy 78
“unsavoury” negative facts, such as Pegasus’s non-existence or the cat’s not being on
the mat, into one’s ontology.
This dilemma is very troubling. On the one hand, if one tries to reject T-M, this
rejection cannot be arbitrary or ad hoc. One must have good independent reasons to
restrict the scope of truthmaking. And, in the course of one’s rejection- strategy, one
must not fall into positing unsavoury negative entities of any sort. On the other hand,
philosophers have been very reluctant to accept negative beings (e.g. negative facts or
negative properties) into the right ontology. Russell (1918, 1919), notoriously, accepts
negative facts into his ontology without any hesitation on his part, but admits that there
is “a certain repugnance to negative facts” (1918: 211), to such an extent that when he
argued that there were negative facts, at a lecture in Harvard in 1914, he reports that
“it nearly produced a riot” (ibid.). To explain this, he writes,
There is implanted in the human breast an almost unquenchable desire to
find some way of avoiding the admission that negative facts are as ultimate
as those that are positive. [1919: 287; my emphasis]
Besides Barker and Jago (2012) who have recently tried to argue that negative facts can
be understood positively, there are hardly any contemporary analytic philosophers2 who
TT-ists do not. I reject T-M in this chapter. Milne (2005: 222) rejects T-M on the basis of simple
counterexamples such as ‘This TBR has no TMK’. Rodriguez-Pereyra (2006b: 190–191) defends T-M
against such counterexamples. Asay “adamantly reject[s]” the idea that T-M is a “sine qua non of
[TT]” (2011: 11). Explicit advocates of T-M include Armstrong (2004: 5; among others), Cameron
(2008c: 107–108), and Schaffer (2010a: 309). Molnar (2000: 85) goes so far as to call its rejection
“the way of ontological frivolousness [and] a truly desperate resort” (ibid.). It is interesting to note,
however, that Armstrong, perhaps the most influential TT-ist and T-M-ist, formerly subscribed to a
non-T-M view of TT. His first discussions only considered TMKs for contingent truths (1969: 23;
1989b: 88). TT-skeptics such as Dodd (2007: 393–394) and Merricks (2007: 40–41) think that TT-ists
should be T-M-ists on the grounds that any TMK-principle must concern truth in general, not just
some truths. Dodd describes remaining a TT-ist while rejecting T-M as “a failure of nerve” (ibid.: 394).
Most philosophers who take TT seriously consider negative truths, especially negative existentials, to
be counterexamples to T-M. See (Bigelow 1988: 131), (Cameron 2005: 4), (Fox 1987: 4), (Lewis 1992
and 2001a), (Linsky 1994: §2), (Mellor 2003: 213–214), (Melia 2005: 69), (Mulligan et al. 1984: 315),
(Mumford 2005: 266ff; 2007: 48ff), (Parsons 2005: 167–168; 2006: 601), (Simons 2005: 255–256), and
(Smith 1999: 285). Dodd argues on this basis that TT must be weakened (2002a: 74–75) and inevitably
rejected (2007: 383–396). See also Merricks (ibid.: §3), though he argues that a weakened truth-
supervenes-on-being (TSB) view, specifically a “worldwide local TSB” (ibid.: §4.3, 85), can account for
negative existentials. Oliver (1996) thinks that these issues should be approached optimistically. He
writes, “all of this is work to be done, so the theory of truthmakers is an avenue for future research”
(ibid.: 74). Dodd, however, points out that all this future research and fiddling with the details of TT
(e.g. rejecting or not rejecting T-M) “is pointless” (2002a: 70, fn. 2). My stance is that providing a
metaphysically substantial account of TT is pointless, but TT itself is not pointless, because a more
modest view is at least plausible.
2Of course, there are plenty of other, non-analytic philosophers who have accepted negative be-
ings, including, famously, Meinong (1904a: 83; see [Berto 2013 : 70, and §§5–6] for the varieties of
Meinongianism), and phenomenologists, such as Sartre (1956: 42). Sartre seems to provide a kind of
realist TMK-account of non-being, when he writes, “non-being does not come to things by a nega-
tive judgment; it is the negative judgment, on the contrary, which is conditioned and supported by
non-being” (ibid.). However, McCulloch (1994: 7–8, 35–36) argues that, as a phenomenologist, Sartre
understands ‘real ’ as “phenomenologically real ” (ibid.: 7) or “experientially real” (ibid.: 8), where real
non-beings are understood in terms of what Sartre calls “living possibilities” (Sartre: 1956: 80) or, on
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are willing to accept negative facts, or negative beings of any sort, into their ontology.3
Accepting negative beings into one’s ontology is biting the Russellian bullet.
To understand Russell’s strategy, we need to understand the subtle distinction be-
tween Meinongianism and Russellian negative facts. Russell tries to avoid what is taken
to be an unsavoury Meinongian ontology, in which there are things that do not exist.4
By contrast, his view does not commit us to the existence of things that do not exist
(e.g. Pegasus), but rather commits us to the existence of the fact that some thing does
not exist or the fact that something is not the case.5 Thus, instead of existing nega-
tive things, we have existing negative facts. However, this still makes negativity part of
reality, and thus the taste of unsavouriness remains.
Plenty of others have also tried to find TMKs for negative truths. For example,
Martin posits “absences” (1996: 57),6 which according to him are “non-abstract, [. . . ]
localized states of the world or universe, and therefore, though not things or natural
properties or relations of things, they can serve as [TMKs] for negative existentials”
(ibid.: 57–58). Armstrong posits “totality states of affairs” (2004: 58; 1997: 137–8) where
the-world-as-a-totality is such that there is no cat on the mat.7 Cameron (2008b: 415ff;
McCulloch’s interpretation, “epistemic possibilities” (ibid.: 36) in the “conscious mental life” (ibid.) of
an agent (cf. Hammond et al. 1991: 115). If McCulloch is right, the phenomenologist’s account of
non-being is not the troubling sort we’re concerned with. For, as I would put it, Sartre is talking about
something else when discussing negative TBRs than we are; he’s talking about aspects of the conscious
lives of agents. This further highlights the importance of the right account of what TBRs are about
for an account of their truth and TMKs. Thanks to Frank Chouraqui and Maria van der Schaar for
illuminating conversations about phenomenology.
3See fn. 8 for more details on their account. Jago (2011) presents some formal results about their
theory. Jago (2013b: especially §§4–7) uses their theory to argue that positing negative facts is the best
option for T-M-ists, preferable to Armstrong’s and Martin’s accounts.
4Though, see Read (2012), who thinks that the right response to P-NEG is to adopt another version
of the TMK-principle, which utilises the terminology of Meinong’s Principle of Independence, on which
truth supervenes on so-being rather than on being or on entities. Thus, he advocates the principle
which he calls “Supervenience of Truth on So-Being (ST): Truth supervenes on how things are: there
can be no difference in truth without a difference in how things are” (ibid.: 251; my emphasis). Thus,
as he understands it, truth depends not on what exists, but, rather, on how things are. This is indeed
an attractive view and is not the aspect of Meinongianism that is normally taken to be unsavoury. See
my §1.2 and §4, for the attractiveness of versions of TT in terms of how things are, rather than just
whether things are. See also Yablo’s (2014: §5.7) treatment of negative existentials. He claims not to
be a Meinongian, but he clearly doesn’t think that Meinongianism is as unsavoury as it is normally made
out to be. He writes, “Meinong was wrong, let’s agree. But the idea of nonexistent objects neverthless
available to serve as referents is not absurd in itself. Pegasus doesn’t exist fails to be true only because
this coherent idea is false” (ibid.: 90). Yablo’s treatment is sympathetic to, albeit not fully, Meinongian.
However, his account of the aboutness of empty names yields results, for instance that TBRs such as
‘Pegasus doesn’t exist’ turn out not to be true, which I think we should avoid in our account of the
aboutness and truth of such TBRs.
5See (Russell 1905: 45) for his “chief” (ibid.) objection, which accuses Meinong’s view of non-existent
objects, such as the round square and the present King of France, of breaking the law of contradiction.
In (Russell 1961a), he writes, “The desire to avoid Meinong’s unduly populous realm of being led me
to the theory of descriptions” (ibid.: 17). See (J. F. Smith 1985) for a historical and critical discussion
of The Russell-Meinong Debate.
6See also Kukso (2006).
7Armstrong accepts that his totality state of affairs or “the all state of affairs” (2004: 58) is what
he calls “a ‘no more’ state of affairs” (ibid.) and hence partially negative (ibid.). However, he thinks
that his account is far more economical than Russell’s, since it posits only one negative state of affairs
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2008d: 295) says that the essence of the world itself makes true all negative truths. The
problem with these views is that each of them still posits some sort of negativity in
the world in addition to the positive, though perhaps in a more palatable manner than
Russell or Meinong. To accept this, one must be willing to bite the Russellian bullet and
leave that “unquenchable desire” (1919: 287) unsatisfied.8
Instead, one might attempt to address the dilemma’s first horn by restricting TT’s
scope to a subset of primary truths, such as positive truths. For instance, on the so-called
“moderate view” (Mellor 2012a: 96; see also [Heil 2000]):
[O]nly some truths, the primary truths, have truthmakers, while other truths
and falsehoods are derivable from the primary truths by means of truth-
conditional semantics. [Forrest and Khlentzos 2000: 3]
Similarly, according to the Wittgensteinian version of logical atomism, labeled “optimal-
ism” by Simons (2000: 17) and MacBride (2014: §2.2), “[I]t is only atomic propositions
that represent the existence of states of affairs” (ibid.). On this view, negation ‘¬’ is un-
derstood purely as a truth-functional connective and TBRs with negations are understood
as molecular TBRs, mere negations of atomic TBRs. Negative truths, understood as true
TBRs with negations, get their truth-values, as Mulligan et al. write, “simply in virtue
of the fact that the corresponding positive sentences have no truth-maker” (1984: 315).
Or, as Simons says, they get their “truth by default” (2008: 14; also 2005: 255). On this
account, negative truths do not require TMKs, for they are not atomic truths, all of
which must be positive.
It is an interesting historical fact that by contrast to these philosophers who think
that logical atomism (or something similar) can address P-NEG, Russell (1918: 211ff)
claims that one must posit negative facts for negative truths on the basis of his logical
atomism. His basic point is that there is no way to account for negative truths without
positing negative facts, even on a logically atomistic theory where only atomistic truths
are made true and only atomic facts exist. If Russell is right, then any strategy such
(the one that closes the aggregates) while Russell posits one for every negative truth.
8For why negative facts are so repugnant, see especially Molnar (2000: 76–77, and 84–85), who
argues that everything that there is must exist positively. And since negative facts are not positive,
they are debarred from the realm of being. In direct response, Barker and Jago (2012: 121) claim that
“negative facts exist in just the same sense of ‘existence’ as positive facts (and every other kind of
being). Negative facts are non-mereological wholes just as positive facts are and so have the same
kind of existence. What differs between negative and positive facts is the kind of non-mereological
composition involved” (ibid.: 121). They continue, arguing that negative facts conform to an acceptable
Eleatic principle concerning their causative role, “including their roles in causation, chance-making and
truth-making, and in constituting holes and edges” (ibid.: 117). There is no space to go into their new
theory of negative facts in depth.For further discussion of the causal efficacy of negative entities see
(Goldman 1977), (Schaffer 2004), and (Sorensen 2008). In arguing for the causal nature of perception,
Goldman (1977: 281–282), for instance, argues that we perceive black holes in virtue of the fact that
we perceive the absence of light, which is caused by them. Sorensen also extensively defends the view
that we are constantly causally interacting with absences (such as shadows and such things as black
letters), which he calls “dark things” (ibid.: 29, passim), by directly perceiving them (vindicating the
causal theory of perception). Schaffer (2004: passim) has plenty more examples.
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as the moderate/optimalist view cannot merely assume that negative truths can be
accounted for by primary or atomic truths. Let me explain his reasoning.
Purely as an example, take Mellor’s (2012a: 105) ingenious strategy for accounting
for negative truths. Let’s take it (following Mellor’s notation) that <P> is a primary
TBR and S is its TMK. Mellor (ibid.) explicitly states that ‘<not-P> [which he takes
to be a non-primary TBR] is true if and only if S does not exist’ is acceptable on the
moderate view because <P> and <not-P> must satisfy the laws of non-contradiction
and excluded middle. Negative truths, according to Mellor, are truth-functions of primary
propositions, and can satisfactorily be accounted for by the existence of TMKs for the
primary truths and the laws of logic applied to them to form non-primary propositions.
Russell would argue that this won’t work and is the wrong way to understand nega-
tion and falsehood. Mellor’s strategy is similar to Demos’s (1917), to which Russell is
responding (1918: 211–214). The question Russell presses on Demos is: how should we
interpret ‘not-p’? Russell summarises Demos’s proposal thus, “when we assert ‘not-p’
we are really asserting that there is some proposition q which is true and is incompatible
with p [. . . ] That is [Demos’s] suggested definition:
‘not-p’ means ‘There is a proposition q which is true and is incompatible
with p’.” [Russell 1918: 213]9
Mellor’s appeal to the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle to explain the
non-primary status of negative truths is similar to Demos’s proposal; it seems merely to
re-describe the incompatibility which is central to Demos’s strategy as a law of logic.
Russell responds to Demos in several ways, but the main line of response is to explain
that this strategy, as he writes, “makes incompatibility fundamental and an objective
fact, which is not so very much simpler than allowing negative facts” (ibid.). According
to Russell, if one tries to interpret or define negation, ‘not’, in this way, then one is
reducing it to incompatibility. Unless there is a corresponding primary incompatibility-
fact to which ‘that p is incompatible with q’ corresponds, then we are left with an
unexplained molecular fact, since the fact that p cannot account for the molecular fact
that p is incompatible with q and ‘incompatible’ just means ‘not compatible’.10 Similarly,
appeal to the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle, as Mellor does, cannot do
the job, as the truth of logical laws requires as much explaining as the truth of anything
else. And further, I would add, these laws mention negation, so negation cannot be
explained in terms of them.
Russell’s problem, for atomist strategies and for strategies similar to Demos’s, is one
that everyone in the literature who aims to take the first strategy, of denying T-M,
must address. Specifically, they must explain how to account for negation, and for the
9Demos says, ‘The word “not” is precisely a symbol for this qualifying predicate [i.e. “opposite,” or
“contrary,” or “inconsistent with” (ibid.)], and “not-p” means “opposite, or contrary, of p” ’ (1917: 191).
10Following my discussion in §2.4.2.2, we might say that that p is incompatible with q is collateral
information, information that is not part of the content of ‘that p’.
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truth of negative truths, in such a way as to avoid commitment to negative facts or
incompatibility facts.
Thus, we need to find a strategy to accept TT, whether in the T-M-ist form, which
would posit some sort of non-repugnant TMK, or in the restricted, moderate non-T-M-ist
form, which would explain why some TBRs do not need TMKs for their truth.11
3.3 A Note on Addressing Molnar (2000)
Molnar (2000: 84–85) presents P-NEG with four claims, each independently compelling
for TT-ists:
(M1) The world is everything that exists.
(M2) Everything that exists is positive.
(M3) Some negative claims about the world are true.
(M4) Every true claim about the world is made true by something that exists.
The problem is: (a) given M1–M4, TT-ists are compelled to provide positive TMKs for
negative truths, but (b) non-repugnant, positive TMKs are not forthcoming.
Broadly, the two main problem-solving strategies are: (1) reject one of M1–M4, or
(2) somehow reject Molnar’s picture of the problem altogether. My proposal is that
SAC has the resources to allow us to successfully take strategy (1) by rejecting M4 in a
non-arbitrary, intuitive way.
3.3.1 Cameron and Parsons’s Strategy, and the Real Distinction
between Negatives and Positives
Before I move on, I want to discuss a strategy that rejects Molnar’s picture of the problem
altogether. Cameron (2008b) and Parsons’s (2006) claim not to understand what the
distinction between negative and positive things is; ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ each applies,
at best, only to representations and not to things. Cameron writes,
11Dodd calls these two strategies “the horns of a nasty dilemma” (2007: 386). One might think,
however, that these strategies are not exhaustive, but serve as a good guide to the two best (but still
nasty) potential strategies for the TT-ist. Mumford (2007) tries to take a third way and aims to retain
T-M but to “eliminate” (ibid.: 51ff) negative truths, on the following basis. The best philosophical
account of them is to treat them all as falsehoods, and then to give a theory of falsehoods as not
requiring any metaphysical commitments. His answer, as he admits (ibid.: 67), disrespects the “everyday
conception of truth” (ibid.) while respecting “the metaphysical commitments of truth, as [TT] represents
them” (ibid.). My account aims to respect the everyday conception of truth and the right view of TT
that it entails. The main difference between our strategies is that while he eliminates negative truths
and reduces them to falsehoods, I aim to respect negative truths by maintaining the distinction between
them and equivalent falsehoods, within the framework of a more modest version of TT. In §3.5.2.4,
I argue that my view is more conservative than his.
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[W]hat is ‘negative ontology’? What is it for a thing to be positive or
negative? I have no idea. [. . . ] I don’t believe this is my fault. Being
positive or negative seems to apply, in the first case, to representational
entities such as propositions. [. . . ] Most things are not representations, so
it seems that we can call them ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ in a derivative sense
at best. [2008b: 412–41312]
Parsons (2006: 591–592) claims not to understand what it is for things to be positive,
Just what is it for a chair, a person, or a rock to be positive? I have honestly
no idea. Whatever sense of ‘positive’ is meant here, it must be different from
the unclear, but not totally opaque, sense in which the proposition ‘there are
chairs’ is a ‘positive proposition’. The latter has something to do with the
representational properties of the proposition in question; but a chair does
not represent anything, so it is not positive in that sense. [ibid.]
I sympathise with their strategy. Let’s assume that the distinction is indeed much clearer
as applying to representations, and that negativity and negation are features of repre-
sentations, not of things.
However, even if the distinction does not apply to things, there is an important
sense that is compatible with this, in which there is a real distinction between negative
and positive, where the distinction applies not just to representations but to reality.
For example, there is a real distinction between the sweater I am wearing being yellow
and the sweater I am wearing not being yellow. There is a real difference between the
sweater being some way and its not being that way, even if this is not a difference
between features of things, features which the things have. The sweater not being some
way is not a feature of the sweater. The distinction is not, and was never supposed to
be, between between positive features of things nor between positively existing facts in
the world. For the sweater not being some way is not a positively existing fact. Rather,
the distinction is between things being some way and things not being some way. When
I say that the sweater I am wearing is not yellow, if what I say is to be true, then the
sweater must not be yellow. There is a clear distinction between the sweater’s being
yellow (in which case what I say would be false) and the sweater’s not being yellow,
which is no fact at all.13 This distinction is not merely representational but real. In the
12Cameron (ibid.: 413) critically discusses Molnar’s M2. However, he is best understood as rejecting
not just M2, but the assumptions about negative ontology which lie behind Molnar’s whole way of
setting up the problem. His positive solution is that the world has all its properties essentially. The
world, according to him (ibid.: 415ff), makes true all negative truths. He doesn’t, however, explain
how this solution addresses Molnar’s set-up except to argue that Molnar doesn’t provide “any particular
reason for thinking that negative truths resist truthmaking” (ibid.). This is because he rejects the idea
of a real distinction between negative and positive. According to him, “The only problem worth taking
seriously [. . . ] is the intuitive dissatisfaction with the extant accounts of such truthmakers [for negative
truths]” (ibid.). I try to answer the problem, as construed by both Cameron and Molnar, though I don’t
have space to address Cameron’s positive account directly.
13In the next paragraphs, I explain why the sweater’s not being yellow is no fact at all.
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former case, the sweater really is that way, and, in the latter case, the sweater really is
not that way.14
In response to my claim that the sweater’s not being yellow is not a fact at all, one
might say, “But, as a matter of fact, my sweater is not yellow, but green.” One might
naturally think, on this basis, that the sweater’s not being yellow is a fact, a negative
fact that contrasts with another fact, the positive fact that my sweater is green.
In a loose way of speaking about facts, as true TBRs, this is correct. No one, including
Cameron and Parsons, denies that there is a distinction between negative and positive
TBRs, marked at the very least by the presence or absence of a negation. Negative facts
of the true-TBR sort are not at issue. The problematic, unsavoury sort are negative
facts understood as Russellian complex, structured entities. But, Russellian facts are
complex, structured entities that are constructed out of properties and the objects in
which the properties in question are instantiated. The reason why the sweater’s not
being yellow is no fact at all (as I say above) is that not being yellow is not a property.
Rather, it is a lack of a property; it is nothing at all. Not even Russellian facts can be
constructed out of nothing. So, the sweater’s not being yellow is not a Russellian fact,
that is, a structured, complex entity over and above the sweater and how things are with
the sweater. Yet, as I have argued, the distinction between the sweater’s being yellow
and the sweater’s not being yellow is a real distinction marking real differences not to
do merely with representations (or TBRs) but with reality.
3.4 SAC’s Solution to the Problem of Negative Truths
As Russell implies in his criticism of Demos (Russell 1918: 213), a theory of negative
truths is also a theory of falsehood. In §2.6, we saw that SAC can give us a theory of
falsehood in terms of aboutness-satisfaction failure:
F-SAC: A TBR which positively describes things to be a certain way is false iff the TBR
fails to be strictly and fully about anything that exists or is real.15
14I am using ‘really’ here not in the sense that has become popular from the work of Fine (2001: 25ff)
and Cameron (2008a: 6f; 2010a: 251; 2010b: 8ff) where there is a distinction between really existing and
merely existing, marking out two types or ways of existing. See Hale and Wright (2009: 186) for a
criticism of the distinction. Instead, I use ‘really’ or ‘real’ in the non-technical, everyday sense where it
is contrasted with such adjectives as ‘illusory’ (see [van der Schaar 2011: 409]). There are not two types
of object or ways things can be, the real and the not-real; only when objects are real are they objects,
and only when the ways that they are are real are they those ways. As Austin (1946: 87) explains,
‘real’ is not a determiner and only makes sense in the context in which doubts have been raised or
some hypothetical (or even fictional) context is explored. See (van der Schaar 2011: 410) for a helpful
exposition of this sense of ‘real’ in the context of distinguishing between illusory and real cognitive acts.
Also, she (2011: 398–399) helpfully explains that adjectives such as ‘illusory’ and others such as ‘fake’,
‘mock’, or ‘sham’ are modifying adjectives. Unlike attributive adjectives such as ‘German’, in which
case one can infer ‘Jack has a pistol’ from ‘Jack has a German pistol’, one cannot infer ‘Jack has a
pistol’ from ‘Jack has a sham pistol’.
15Remember, F-SAC concerns positive falsehoods, not negative falsehoods. Negative falsehoods are
made false by what are called falsemakers. For example, ‘there are no dogs’ is false since it is about
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With F-SAC, we get an answer to the problem of intentionality. We can explain the
falsity of T8 (Pegasus exists) and T9 (Zeus exists) in terms of their failure to be about
anything (in the narrow, Representationalist sense of aboutness) or about anything that
exists or is real (in the broad, Cranean sense). T8 and T9 are positive falsehoods. There
are also converse TBRs which are not positive falsehoods but are, rather, negative truths:
T14 (Not-T8): Pegasus does not exist; or equivalently, Not-(Pegasus exists).
T16 (Not-T9): Zeus does not exist; or equivalently, Not-(Zeus exists).
T14 and T16 are negative existentials. By contrast, T15 is a negative truth that we
might call “a negative predicative truth”, since, as it says, the cat is not on the mat.
Recall, what I called the account of truth in terms of aboutness-satisfaction:
TR-SAC: a TBR is true if it is strictly and fully about things that exist and are real
and about how things actually are with those things.
The reason why I did not put this in terms of a bi-conditional is because sometimes truths,
such as T14 and T16, are also not about anything (speaking as a Representationalist) or
not about anything that is real (Cranean), but they are still true. So, one cannot insert
‘only if’ into TR-SAC to make it a bi-conditional, because it is possible for a TBR to
be true, and for it to be the case that what the TBR is about does not exist and is not
real. In short, some truths are negative truths. We can clearly distinguish them from
positive truths on the basis of what they are about. And they are true for other reasons
than that they are related to existing and real beings. Specifically, they are true on the
basis that they are not related to those beings! Let me explain.
In the case of T14 and T16, the TBRs are about things that do not exist and are not
real, but the TBRs are also true. But it would seem that according to F-SAC, if they
do not exist and are not real, then the TBRs should be false. However, T14 and T16,
and T15, are not fully about things that do not exist and are not real. Rather, T14
and T16 are fully about these things not existing. What should make these TBRs true
is not the positive existence or reality of anything at all, and especially not something
negative. Instead, the reason they are true, when they are true, is that what they are
in part about does not exist. In SAC terms, they are strictly and fully about certain
putative entities not existing. In particular, even if T14 is strictly about Pegasus, it is
only partially about Pegasus. It is fully about Pegasus not existing. For T14 and T16
to be true, the things that they are strictly and partially about need to be how they
dogs not existing and there are dogs. Thus, dogs are falsemakers for this TBR. The language of
SAC can help us understand the notion of a falsemaker. Negative TBRs are fully about some entities
not existing (in the case of negative existentials) or some entities not being some way (in the case
of negative predications). However, the entities and how things are with the entities which are being
denied in the negative part of TBR are what the TBR is strictly about. Normally, the entities, and how
things are with the entities, that the negative TBRs are strictly about, but which are denied by their
full aboutness, are the falsemakers for these TBRs.
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are described; in these cases, they should not be any way. That is, there should not be
a relation between the TBRs T14 and T16 on one side, and Pegasus and Zeus on the
other, or else things would not be how they are described to be. For T15 to be true,
what it is strictly and partially about, that is, the cat, should not be some way. It is
strictly and fully about the cat not being some way. To think otherwise, and to think
that what they are about must be positive, is to misunderstand what these TBRs are
strictly and fully about.
The Representationalist would have a hard time expressing this. Strictly speaking,
according to the Representationalist, T8 and T9 are not about anything, and thus their
falsity is explained by their aboutness-failure. However, one cannot merely claim that
T14 and T16 are not about anything in the same way, since they are also true. T14 and
T16 are about some putative entities not existing. If the Representationalist claims that
they are true because T14 and T16 are satisfied in terms of aboutness, this seems to be
committing her, paradoxically, to the (positive) reality of non-existence. Alternatively,
the Representationalist seems forced to say that some TBRs, those which are not about
anything, are nonetheless true. This is counterintuitive and at best awkward.
We can better express ourselves with the Cranean way of understanding aboutness
and intentional objects. T14 and T16 are in part about Pegasus and Zeus (as T8 and T9
are fully about Pegasus and Zeus); Pegasus and Zeus are the intentional objects of T14
and T16 (and T8 and T9). But Pegasus and Zeus do not exist and are not real. They
are just intentional objects, in the schematic sense of being what the TBRs are about.
And sometimes the intentional objects of the TBRs do not exist and are not real. This,
I think, fits neatly with a good semantic account of true negative existentials and other
negative truths. They are in part about things that do not exist and are not real; they
just differ from true positive existentials such as ‘Barack Obama exists’, in that they
are negative existentials and hence claim about those things that they do not exist, or
that they are not real. Surely, nothing positively existing needs to exist for those kinds
of claims to be true. In fact, for those claims to remain true, the things they are about
must remain nothings. I take it that this is consistent with what Mumford (2007) says
when he tries to persuade his readers of the non-existence of negative facts:
A fact [. . . ] is taken to be some kind of existent in the world. [. . . ] But
[. . . ] can it really be a fact in the world that there is no hippopotamus in
the room? This sounds like an absence of a fact, and an absence is nothing
at all. [ibid.: 46]
Even though this might disappoint those, such as Russell or Barker and Jago, who believe
in negative facts and negative entities, there is no need to understand these nothings
as non-existent entities, or any entities or objects in a substantial sense (§2.6). Rather,
they are, in the case of the false TBRs and the negative truths, nothing except the
schematic, intentional objects of our thought, of our attention, and of TBRs. In general,
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intentional objects are not always real, for instance when aboutness is not satisified, nor
do they need to be posited as real existing entities. In fact, especially in the case of
negative existentials, they should not be real, existing entities at all. Under the Cranean
understanding of ‘about’, unlike the Representationalist (as I am calling them), one does
not need to posit the reality of non-existence. Instead, one gets the right result: for their
truth, negative truths require things not to be some way; they do not require things to
be any way, least of all some mysterious negative way.
SAC shows us how to reject T-M (and Molnar’s M4 above) in a way that is not
arbitrary. The right SEM-TAC, if the Cranean framework for thinking about intentionality
is right, requires merely that we make a distinction between cases where the intentional
objects exist and are real, and the cases where they do not exist and are not real. And,
it is clear that we can easily distinguish between positive and negative TBRs in general.
The former are used to claim that some thing exists or is some way, the latter are used
to claim that some thing does not exist or is not some way.
Further, with this strategy we do not need to posit underlying or fundamental in-
compatibility facts, as Demos’s strategy does according to Russell and as many recent
strategies would need to do. For instance, negative truths do not need to be explained in
terms of entailments from primary or atomistic truths (in Mellor’s moderate case) nor by
an ontology of totality facts or essence-facts (in Armstrong and Cameron’s ontological
strategy). With the alternative strategies, we were left with the dilemma of accepting
incompatibility facts or rejecting T-M in a rather arbitrary or unexplained way. The
SAC-strategy gives us the resources not to have to accept incompatibility facts, and to
draw our rejection of T-M along non-arbitrary, aboutness lines. Non-negative, positive
truths are about things that exist and are real, and about how things really are with
those things. Negative truths and falsehoods are about things that do not exist or are
not real, or they are about real and existing things but claim that they are not some
way. It is clear that a negative TBR does not require a negative entity to make it true,
if we are clear about what we are talking about.
3.5 Responses to Potential Objections
I now respond to some potential objections.
3.5.1 Objection 1: Higher-Order Incompatibility?
One might object that my account of falsehood in terms of failure of aboutness-satisfac-
tion, and my account of negative truths being about things not being some way, posit
some sort of higher-level incompatibility fact. This, I think, would be to misunderstand
what it is to fail in terms of aboutness-satisfaction.
Failing is indeed incompatible with succeeding. But this incompatibility is not what
makes anything true (except perhaps TBRs about their incompatibility). When I claim,
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for instance, that in the case of T8, we have a falsehood because of a failure of aboutness-
satisfaction, I am not saying that there is something, a failure, which is incompatible with
a success of aboutness-satisfaction. When we talk about failings or failures of something,
we are saying that something is missing, not that there is a missing. In the same way
that T14 does not require anything to exist (and especially not Pegasus) to be true, but
instead relies on some putative thing (namely Pegasus) not existing, truths about failings
and failures of something do not require anything to exist to be true. Rather, they require
there not to be something. In the case of TBRs about failures of about-satisfaction such
as ‘T8 fails to be about anything that exists’, there must not be a relation between T8
and what it is about. To think that this failure requires some incompatibility fact, or
some further, higher-level negative fact, would be to misunderstand the account and to
misunderstand what TBRs about failures of aboutness-satisfaction (or about failures of
anything) are about.
3.5.2 Objection 2: Does My Account Make Truth and Truth-
making Disunified?
One might worry that the accounts that I gave of truth and falsity, and the subsequent
strategy for responding to P-NEG, make truth and truthmaking disunified in a way that is
both arbitrary and radical. What results, as the objection might go, are different stories
about positive falsehoods, negative truths, and positive truths, with nothing unifying
them. This seems, further, to go against the aims of any account of truth (or falsity)
and of truthmaking. I shall respond to these potential objections in turn.
3.5.2.1 Response 1: My Account is not Arbitrary, but Piecemeal
First, my account is not arbitrary. In fact, I see no good basis for thinking that a theory of
truth must account for all truths in exactly the same way or that a theory of truthmaking
must account for all truths in the same way. A unified theory which does this without
any costs, would perhaps be more attractive than a disunified theory. However, as the
recalcitrance of P-NEG indicates, such a unified theory is not forthcoming.
Any theory which is disunified, of course, must not make arbitrary distinctions. My
approach is piecemeal 16 and allows us to make non-arbitrary distinctions, based on
what I take to be plausible grounds, and in a plausible, intuitive way, consisting broadly
of two steps:
(Step One): look closely at what the words in a TBR mean, and how they contribute
to its meaning and what it is about, and
(Step Two): only on the basis of what the TBR says about how things are should we
accept an account of what makes it true.
16 In (Schipper 2016), I also sketch the importance of a contextualist and piecemeal approach to
philosophical, as well as social and political, questions more generally.
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If what the TBR says and is about does not make any claims or demands on what exists,
and/or how things are with what exists, then it seems perfectly reasonable that things
do not need to be any way, and, in fact, things should not be the way they are described
not to be for those TBRs to be true.
Thus, it seems perfectly reasonable that there are no TMKs for those truths. As we
have seen, positive and negative claims clearly differ in what they say about how things
are or how things are not. It is, therefore, to be expected, that their truth and falsity
should also differ according to what they say about how things are and are not. Not
only does what makes them true, when they are true, differ depending on what they are
about, but whether or not they are made true, or should be made true, by anything at
all can differ depending on what they are about. This can be approached in a piecemeal
manner by looking closely at what the TBRs are about.
3.5.2.2 Response 2: My Strategy is not Radical, but Conservative
Second, my strategy is not radical, either. This piecemeal or contextual approach to
whether or not TBRs require TMKs is much more modest and conservative, and hence
less radical, than a unified approach that makes the bolder and more extravagant claim
that all truths are true in exactly the same way and that all truths must be made true
in exactly the same way. The latter approach tries to fit all truths into the same mould
and must explain, despite difficulties and despite appearances to the contrary, how this
is the case. P-NEG, as I see it, is one of those major difficulties that make it appear that
truth is disunified. The more radical approach is one that explains that the appearances
are faulty. The more modest, and less radical, approach is one that accepts that the
appearances are correct, but explains how TT can accommodate the appearances.
3.5.2.3 Truth is a Success Term
Further, ‘truth’ is a success term. The property being true is what one might call a
“success-property ”. In this way, one might think of truth as similar to other success
terms and properties, such as those involved in the winning of games. Just as there
is no unity with regard to winning games, there is no reason to think that truth and
truthmaking should have any unity either. It is highly contextual and depends from game
to game what the criteria are for winning any particular game. Even within games, there
are sometimes many different ways that one can win. For instance, one can win at chess
either by putting one’s opponent in a checkmate position or by putting one’s opponent
in an impossibly difficult position, not quite checkmate, but one which makes her forfeit
the game. Also in backgammon, one can win in different ways. Most standardly one
wins by getting one’s pieces off the board before one’s opponent. But one can also win
if one’s opponent “drops the stakes”, that is, resigns after one has doubled the stakes of
the game. In some games, there are no ways to win at all, such as with games that have
no criteria for winning (for example, continuous play games such as the game of LIFE or
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non-competitive Frisbee; they have rules for game-play but no rules for winning). Also,
some card games are such that one can win by winning all the chips or tokens in play
while others are such that one wins by losing all one’s chips or tokens. In the same
way as the rules for successfully winning may vary greatly from game to game, it seems
that the rules for a TBR to succeed at being true might also vary greatly from TBR to
TBR. And it seems perfectly modest and plausible to think that the criteria for truth
vary according to what the TBRs are strictly and fully about. Such disunity is far from
radical and seems plausibly commonplace.
3.5.2.4 My Strategy Lets Us Conserve Classical Logic
My proposal is also less radical than other proposals in other ways. Let me briefly
illustrate this with a comparison. Mumford (2007) rejects Molnar’s M3 on the basis
of giving a “philosophical account” (ibid.: 53) of negative truths in terms of equivalent
falsehoods, reducing the former to the corresponding instances of the latter. For example,
the “correct philosophical account” (ibid.) of ‘It is not raining’, when true, is nothing
more than that ‘It is raining’ is false. So, he rejects the claim that some negative
truths about the world are true by “eliminating all negative truths” (ibid.: 51). Mumford
(ibid.: §7, 57–58) admits, however, that this solution requires us to revise classical logic,
or at least to “reinterpret certain claims in the light of the new equivalences” (ibid.: 57).
In particular, he thinks that all that we need to do is to understand the law of excluded
middle (LEM) in terms of bivalence (BIV). The law is:
LEM: ∀p (p ∨ ¬p)
If understood in the following way, we are committed to the possibility of negative truths:
LEM*: ∀p (true<p> ∨ true<¬p>)
This is not acceptable to a view that attempts to eliminate negative truths. Mumford
claims he has a principled reason for understanding LEM in terms of BIV, which is:
BIV: ∀p (true<p> ∨ false<p>)
However, this seems to me to be a rather radical interpretation, since LEM and BIV
are not the same principle and should be understood independently, even if they are
equivalent. First, whatever the merits of classical logic, understanding LEM in terms
of BIV rules out being able to even express other logics which are not bivalent, but
which accept LEM. Second, it is radical because my new, rival strategy will allow us to
understand LEM in terms of LEM*, rather than BIV. Mumford (ibid.: 58) argues that
his interpretation will be able to account for TBRs about the future better than LEM*.
Consider the TBR
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P1: There will be a sea battle tomorrow.
Let’s say that P1 is neither true nor not true now. According to Mumford, if one
accepts LEM*, then “when [one] thought ¬t[rue]<p>, then [one] would have to accept
t[rue]<¬p>” (ibid.). The problem according to him is that there is no TMK for <p>
nor one for <¬p>. His suggestion is to understand LEM as BIV, on which ¬true<p> is
understood as false<p>, which, according to him, doesn’t require a TMK. My strategy
allows us to avoid the problem he raises for accepting the equivalence of ¬true<p> with
true<¬p>, remaining conservative by not having to radically reinterpret LEM as BIV.
It does not matter that <¬p> does not have a TMK according to my account, because
<¬p> is not a positive claim, and hence does not need one; in fact, one will realise that
it should not have a TMK, if one understands what it is about. Thus, my account is
at least less radical than Mumford’s and allows us to interpret laws such as LEM in the
standard way.
3.5.2.5 Knowing Which Terms are Truth-entailing is Essential to Understand-
ing What the TBRs are Fully About
There is also another reason why it is not radical. The distinction between negative
truths and positive truths is not the only distinction that can be made on the basis
of aboutness and being careful about what exactly TBRs are strictly and fully about.
Consider
T17: Pegasus is a mythological animal.
and
T17*: Vulcan is a hypothetical planet.
Both T17 and T17* are true. However, neither Pegasus nor Vulcan exist. As I discussed
in §2.4.2.1, some predicates such as ‘. . . is material’, ‘. . . is an animal’, and ‘. . . is a planet’
are existence-entailing and others such as ‘. . . is mythological’, ‘. . . is a mythological
animal’, and ‘. . . is a hypothetical planet’ are not. We understand this on the basis
of thinking about what kinds of predicates these are, what they mean and are about.
Understanding that these predicates are not existence-entailing, and understanding what
they say about the things that they are used to talk about, is essential for understanding
that these kinds of claims, while positive, also do not require TMKs.
Thus, understanding what we are strictly and fully talking about, also helps us to
understand which positive truths require TMKs, and which do not require TMKs, not
just that negative truths do not require TMKs. This, I think, is a perfectly reasonable
way of understanding the connection between what these kinds of truths are about and
whether they require TMKs. Negative truths use the negation connective, ‘it is not the
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case that φ’, and can be understood in a similar, non-existence-entailing way. Thus,
my strategy and proposal for addressing negative truths is just as non-radical as my
strategy for understanding other TBRs, constructed out of such predicates, which are
not existence-entailing. For TBRs that are not existence-entailing, such as negative
truths, it would be unreasonable to require that they are made true by things that exist.
That would be to misunderstand what they are about.
3.5.3 Objection 3: Does My Understanding of TT Reject Every-
thing the TT-ist Holds Dear?
The third objection is that understanding TT in this piecemeal and disunified way rejects
everything that TT-ists hold dear. The worry might be that my account is no longer a
version of TT, if I allow that so many truths, all negative truths and even some positive
truths, do not have TMKs.
My response is that a modest version of TT, which respects what we say and what
we are talking about when using TBRs, is a more plausible version of TT, whose main
aim is to elucidate and say true things about the relation between truths and reality. If it
turns out that many truths do not have a relation to reality, and in fact, given what they
say and are about, require there not to be a relation with reality, then the version of TT
which identifies and captures this is a better version of TT than the alternatives, which
claim that there is a relation when there is not. My version of TT identifies and can
help us identify when there is indeed a relation between truths and reality, and modestly
and correctly, refuses to claim that there is such a relation when there should not be.
The way that my version does this is by telling us to look closely at what our TBRs are
strictly and fully about. And, we are clearly still TT-ists, because we claim that there
is a large subset of truths that require there to be TMKs for them to be true, even
though there are many TBRs which do not require TMKs to make them true. Happily,
we restrict the need for TMKs and reject Maximalism in a non-arbitrary way.
3.6 Conclusion
Finally, it should be clear that we are able to avoid positing any sort of ontologically
repugnant things that must exist to make negative claims true. For it would be to
misunderstand what these negative truths are about, to misunderstand the concept
intentional objects, to think otherwise.
In conclusion, the version of TT, which respects and incorporates strict and full
aboutness, can give us a strategy for addressing the problem of negative truths in a




4.1 Introduction: SAC and Ontological Modesty Con-
cerning TMKs
In this chapter, I explain in what way SAC can give us an ontologically modest account of
TMKs. The very viability of this account challenges metaphysically substantial accounts
of TT, as it makes such metaphysical substantiality unnecessary for the purposes of
TT. SAC demands that TT emphasise the semantics of aboutness. In §4.1.1, I say
more about how this leads us to reject as extravagant the orthodox emphasis on the
metaphysics of necessitation (or any other supposedly substantial relation). In §4.1.2,
SAC’s ontological modesty in more detail. And, in §4.2, I shall give an example of a
debate, when properly understood, where this modesty is clearly exhibited. Specifically,
linguistic evidence supports the claim that categorial distinctions can be drawn between
states and events; however, I shall argue that the linguistic evidence does not support a
distinction in kinds of entities but, at best, supports a distinction in how things are with
entities.1 It is the task of §§5–8 to make the kind of metaphysical modesty sketched in
this chapter convincing in traditional debates associated with TT.
4.1.1 More on the Immodesty of T-NEC
As we have seen, according to SAC, the TMKs for truths that need them are just those
things and how things are with those things that the best semantic account says that
they are about (§2.4). Also, we have seen that SAC allows us to reject T-NEC (§2.9).
I want to explain briefly why this has the consequence that we can remain neutral as
to whether we should reify, or give ontologically full accounts of, such entities as states
1In Appendix 5, I raise a potential, nominalist objection to my account. Despite its claim to
ontological modesty, so the objection goes, SAC is still open to the charge of “word magic”. I argue
that when we understand this charge properly, not only is my account immune to it, but it can help
us see more clearly in what way my account is modest and in what way other accounts are immodest.
However, what I present in this chapter is sufficient for getting a good grip of what metaphysical
modesty consists in. The appendix merely brings added support and clarity.
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of affairs (SOAs), objects, events, properties (construed either as universals, tropes,
instantiations, or whatever), processes, and states. Normally, TT has been offered as an
argument for the existence of entities such as SOAs, understood as existent things such
as objects. Armstrong (1997: 113–9), for instance, offers what he calls the “truthmaker
argument” for the existence of SOAs. As I explained in §1.7, these are not just objects,
properties, the latter’s instantiation in the former, but these are thought to be structured
complexes of objects, properties, and the property’s instantiation in the object.
This argument goes as follows. Consider
T10: Some triangles are equiangular.
The existence of some triangles does not guarantee that T10 is true, because there could
be triangles without any of them being equiangular. The existence of equiangularity is
also not enough to guarantee the truth of T10, as there could be equiangularity without
any triangles being equiangular. The TT-ist then argues that there must be something
that exists that makes true T10 (since it’s true), but what is it? What is often offered
as an answer is the fact or SOA which is a structured, complex of objects (triangles)
and equiangularity; it is the structured, complex SOA some triangles being equiangular.
If such a complex entity exists, then the truth of T10 is guaranteed.
This TMK-argument relies on a metaphysically substantial assumption about T-REL.
According to this assumption there must exist some object or entity, which by its very
existence can necessitate the truth of T10, making T10 true in all possible worlds where
T10 and the entity exist. This assumption is NEC. And accepting NEC introduces
into our ontology not just objects and properties but structured, complex entities which
must play the TMK-role. However, NEC is ontologically immodest not just in positing
necessary connections for which we have no empirical basis (see §2.9). Claiming that
T-REL is a form of NEC is also ontologically immodest because of the consequences it
has for the kinds of things that must inhabit our ontology, specifically, that we seem to
be forced into postulating SOAs. The postulation of SOAs seems to be based not on
empirical data or metaphysical reasoning concerning, say, the possibility of instantiation.
Rather, it is based purely on a priori reflection on a property (truth) of linguistic entities
(TBRs) and the intuition, which (only) some of us have, that the relation between
TBRs and reality must be metaphysically substantial. My claim is that SAC can give
us a clear enough account of T-REL, even if we drop NEC. If there is no need to posit
a metaphysically substantial relation, then modesty demands that we should not do so.
Can SAC give us an ontologically more modest alternative to this NEC-story about TT?
4.1.2 SAC’s Ontological Modesty
With TBRs and the aboutness-apparatuses out of which they are constructed, we are
able to talk and think about a great variety of entities and also a great variety of ways
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that these entities can be. Given this, SAC demands not just that there is a plurality
of things but a plurality of ways things are. However such a plurality is metaphysically
innocuous. My reason for thinking this is best captured by Lewis when he explains that
Bigelow’s slogan “Truth is supervenient on being”2 (Bigelow 1988: 132–33 and 158–159)
should be understood, as Lewis says, as “constru[ing] ‘being’ broadly: it covers not only
whether things are, but also how they are” (Lewis 1992: 218, see also 216). Similarly,
Bigelow writes, “On this view [the second-order quantification view], the claim that
there is a somehow that certain things are should not commit us to saying that there
is some further thing which is this ‘somehow’ that they are. The second-order ‘there is
somehow . . . ’ does not entail the first-order ‘there is something . . . ” ’ (1988: 159). If
we understand ‘somehow’ as relating to properties, Bigelow’s point seems to be that to
understand second-order quantification properly, we must understand that quantifying
over properties (or somehows) does not mean that we are claiming that properties exist;
to think otherwise is to conflate properties with things which are indeed claimed to exist
when we use first-order quantification. Nothing about SAC requires us to reify the ways
that things can exist and interpret such ways of existing as separate or further things or
entities over and above the entities which are some way. Dodd makes the same point,
in the context of considering the TBR the ball is red at time t, when he says,
For there would seem to be a possible world [where the TBR is false] which
contains the same existents as the actual world but in which the ball in
question is not red at t. The difference between these two worlds lies, not in
what exists, but in how things stand with what exists. In the actual world
the ball instantiates redness at t, in the imagined possible world it does not.
Period. The truth of <The ball is red at t> is not, it seems, determined
by the existence of some entity (viz. a state of affairs or trope [PAP]); it
would seem to be true because some entity (viz. the ball) has the property
in question at t. [2002a: 74]
What Lewis and Dodd are saying is that no new or separate entity needs to exist for the
truth to be true. The difference between the world where the TBR ‘the ball is red at time
t’ is true and the world where it is false, is not a matter of what things exist, but rather
a matter of, as Dodd says, “how things stand ” (ibid.) with what exists. Dodd’s target
2I take it that this is just a variant of TD that truth is dependent on reality. Some think that
supervenience is not asymmetric. See, for instance, Bennett and McLaughlin (2014: §3.2) who argue
that supervenience is sometimes symmetric and sometimes asymmetric, so in general it’s non-symmetric.
In general, however, I think Bigelow and Lewis mean to understand the supervenience involved here
as asymmetric or at least as asymmetric as T-REL needs to be (see my §1.2 and §1.3.3 for discussion
of T-REL and TD’s general asymmetry and the exceptions I mention). Also, see (Merricks 2007: §4),
(Rodriguez-Pereyra 2005: 18–19) who argue that the supervenience thesis doesn’t capture the TD-
requirement that truth depends asymmetrically on being because truths supervene symmetrically on
each other. Also, see (Horgan 1993: §8) who argues that supervenience cannot capture what is called
ontological dependence. However, against Horgan, TD, as should be clear from my discussion, is
neutral about whether the right asymmetric dependence is ontological or non-ontological. It is clearly
not ontological if what is meant by ‘ontological’ is that truths depend only on what exists rather than
on how what truths are about exists. That my account rejects such an ontological reading of TD
should be clear from the discussion in this section.
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is TT-ists who think that TMKs must be entities. This target view forces the TT-ist to
introduce complex entities composed out of objects and properties. SAC presents the
TT-ist with a more modest option of understanding TMKs as entities and how things
are with those entities, without introducing such complex entities.
SAC gives the TT-ist a way of embracing this insight from Dodd and Lewis.3 This
comes down to what the best semantic account of aboutness says that TBRs are about
and hence what parts of reality the account says are their TMKs. For instance, as
I argued in §2.4.2.5, the best SEM-TAC does not require that there is a unique thing or
entity that any particular TBR is about. Why then should we demand that the TBR is
about some unique and single TMK: the SOA the ball’s being red at time t? If we reject
unique aboutness as I did there and embrace SAC, then it seems perfectly adequate and
open to the TT-ist to say that the TMKs are the object the ball and how things are
with the ball at time t, all of which are how things are with the reality that the TBR is
about. There is no reason to reify how things are as a SOA or even as a PAP. Such a
reification would be a step too far.
In fact, the best semantic account of aboutness might require only that we posit what
Dodd calls “sub-sentential language/world relations” (2002a: 74 and 75)4 and their relata.
Whether or not it requires more is a question that is up for debate.5 Though the research
3Throughout my discussion of SAC I shall be following and siding with Dodd’s insights here, and using
them to make clear the consequences I think SAC has for TT, in particular in providing a metaphysically
modest account of TT. However, I think that Dodd may be reading what Lewis says a bit charitably
here. Yablo (1996) presents a sustained attack on semantic grounds against Lewis’s modal realism,
specifically his so-called “paraphrase argument” for our belief in the existence of possible worlds (modal
realism). Lewis writes, “Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could
have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence [. . . ] says that there
exist many entities of a certain description, to wit ‘ways things could have been’ [. . . ] I believe
permissable paraphrases of what I believe; [. . . ] I therefore believe in the existence of entities that
might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’ ” (Lewis 1973: 84).
Yablo (ibid.: 259f, §4) makes a good case for explaining way-talk as how-talk; he expresses this later
by saying things such as “ ‘How things are’ makes sense as the translation of ‘the way things are,’ ”
(ibid.: 265) and “ ‘the way that such and such’ translates into ‘how such and such’ ” (ibid.: 266). As
Yablo sees things, and this is what’s most important for our purposes, part of the problem with Lewis’s
paraphrase argument for modal realism is that he seems to understand reference to ways as objectual
or entitative quantification (ibid.: 267) over ways, allowing Lewis to see no issue with quantifying over
worlds. Yablo explores the possibility of dropping the assumption that all quantifiers are entitative or
objectual (ibid.: 267), with “nonobjectual quantifiers [being] not ontologically commital” (ibid.: 268).
He opts for understanding apparent quantification over ways and hows as objectual quantification over
the answers to how questions, instead of non-objectually (ibid.). I shall follow Yablo and speak as if
ways and hows are indeed interchangeable and intertranslateable without losing or gaining any meaning
or commitment, that is, not moving beyond what the hows commit us to. Thus, I shall assume that
we can nonobjectually quantify over them in an ontologically non-commital way (the details of which
I articulate as we go deeper into my discussion). But, in short, I think Yablo’s analysis and criticism
of Lewis is on the right track. Even though Lewis (1998: 30) criticises Armstrong’s T-NEC and TT,
his move to objectually and entitatively quantify over ways leads him not just to modal realism, but to
embrace TT and to try to articulate his own, metaphysically substantial version of TT in Lewis (2001a)
and (2003) in terms of counterparts (see fn. 9 below for more on Lewis’s TT).
4Dodd also calls them “sub-sentential thought/world relations” (2007: 398).
5See for instance, (Dodd 2002a: 78–81) where he argues that given such sub-sentential lan-
guage/world relations one need not posit any entity or “that there must exist some thing ” (ibid.: 79) to
account for any truths but rather that truth supervenes or depends on “how things are” (ibid.: 79). This
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on this is still somewhat underdeveloped (as I pointed out in §2.3), it is most likely, as
I shall try to explain in the rest of the section, that the best account does not require
us to posit anything more than the things that one is talking about and for those things
to be how they are described to be. As I pointed out in §1.2.2, a dependence on how
things really are is not a dependence on the existence of some further entity how things
are, but, rather, a dependence on the being or reality of how things are. This, it seems,
does not require more than these sub-sentential language/world relations. It is important
that this is emphasised. Read (2000) claims that “the Fox/Bigelow idea [is] that truth
supervenes on how things are—that truthmakers entail that true propositions are true”
(ibid.: 78). But, as Dodd points out when commenting on what Read says, “it should be
obvious that the theses which Read treats as equivalent are, in fact, a harmless platitude
and a controversial metaphysical thesis respectively” (Dodd 2002a: 74).6 Dodd’s point,
as I shall read it in a spirit of non-skepticism,7 is that the claim that truth supervenes
(or in my terms depends8) on how things are, should not be thought to entail or be
equivalent to the claim that a TMK, such as a SOA, entails or necessitates that true
TBRs are true. My claim is that TAAT clearly remains neutral as to whether some
unique truthmaking entity such as a SOA needs to exist, and in fact allows the TT-ist a
way out of thinking this. All it requires is that whatever the TBR is about, and let us call
all those aspects of reality the TMKs (truthmakers; rather than the truthmaker), exist
is an important insight. Dodd is stating that given the existence of the sub-sentential language/world
relations there is no need to posit a SOA (as Armstrong does) to account for the relevant truths.
6Again, I follow Dodd (2002a: 74–75) who makes a similar point about Parsons (1999)’s “truthmaker
essentialism,” the thesis that “every truth has a truthmaker, which is essentially that truth’s truthmaker ”
(1999: 328) and what he calls the “truthmaker principle” that “every true sentence’s truth supervenes on
the nature of some thing” (ibid.: 327). Talking in terms of ‘essentially that truth’s truthmaker ’, in my
mind, is akin to the metaphysical move that I hope that SAC avoids. Dodd points out that Parsons’s
so-called “truthmaker principle” “fails to speak to the intuition driving philosophers such as Armstrong,
Bigelow, and Simons [that] the existence of a truthmaker α guarantees that p [which is] what they
mean by saying that α makes <p> true. What Parsons calls ‘truthmaker essentialism’ is central to the
truthmaker principle itself” (Dodd 2002a: 75). I think that what Dodd says is completely right about
Parsons. I think further, however, that Parsons’s talk about “the nature of some thing” which is part
of Parsons’s so-called “platitudinous thesis” (ibid.), that is, his truthmaker principle, already brings in
too many commitments to the nature of TMKs and what reality must be like to make true TBRs.
Why claim that some unique thing with a specific nature and essence must exist to guarantee truths?
SAC avoids such commitments. Also, Dodd is right that ‘truthmaker essentialism’ neither captures nor
speaks to what Armstrong, Bigelow, Simons and the other TT-ists want. What I am doing is providing
a re-reading of TT, which rejects all the metaphysical baggage of these previous TT-ists, while still
capturing everything we would want out of an account that captures what the relation between truths
and reality is. My account explicitly not just fails to speak to their intuitions (as Parsons’s account
does, unintentionally), but rejects many of those intuitions altogether.
7Of course, I am well aware of the fact that Dodd is a TT-skeptic. So, it would perhaps be more
correct, if I were propounding his actual views, to interpret Dodd as thinking that Read’s claim is
platitudinous because talk of the how things are or the way things are is more or less equivalent to
talk of truth. I explicitly do not want to engage directly with skeptical interpretations however. As
I stated in §0.2, I am using skeptical challenges to try to build a more modest version of TT. So, with
the assumption of non-skepticism, I shall read these challenges as challenges to immodesty. Further,
I avoid TT-skepticism and this perhaps more correct skeptical reading of Dodd, in my assumption of the
relations-come-easy view of relations (§1.4), on which there are relations underlying even equivalences.
8See fn. 2 (this chapter) on the issue of capturing the dependence in TD in terms of supervenience.
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and are the way they are described and talked about. But the general point is that there
is no good reason for TT to make metaphysical commitments beyond those stipulated
by the best SEM-TAC, and it is exceedingly likely that, if there are any metaphysical
commitments, they are minimal and modest.
Another way of summing up the metaphysical neutralism of TAAT and SAC is again
clearly stated in Lewis (1992) and Dodd (2002a). Dodd writes,
As Lewis himself notes (1992: 218), it can only be an over-reaction to move
from the thought that truths are about things to the truthmaker principle.
Counterfactuals [and other TBRs] need grounds, but it remains obscure why
they need ontological grounds in Armstrong’s sense (Armstrong [1991: 190]).
[Dodd 2002a: 77]
This, I think sums up the spirit of my proposal well. However, what Dodd and Lewis
clearly mean by the ‘truthmaker principle’ is the claim that the TMKs must, by their
very existence, guarantee or necessitate the truth of the TBRs.9 This is clearly what
is meant by Armstrong, Bigelow, and others. But, as I hope to have pointed out, SAC
can lead to an understanding of TT that is free from strong metaphysical commitments.
All we need is that the entities that the TBRs are about exist and are how they are
described to be, as long as the TBRs are TBRs which make positive claims about
the way the world is. This claim is compatible with the various strong metaphysical
versions of TT. But, importantly, it does not entail any of them. This is because
it is completely compatible with accounts that say nothing about the ontological and
metaphysical nature of what the TBRs are about. It is far from obvious that the best
SEM-TAC has to say anything about the ontological grounds (in Armstrong’s sense or
any sense) of truths. For example, consider a claim such as T2: ‘there are giraffes’ or
another claim such as ‘the table is black’. SAC merely requires that giraffes, the entities
that T2 is about, indeed exist, and it merely requires that what the second claim is
strictly and fully about, what it says about how reality is, exists and is the way it is
9It is interesting to note that in Lewis (2001a and 2003), Lewis seems to adopt what he calls the
‘truthmaker principle’, accepting a version of T-NEC. In particular, in Lewis (2003), he seems to try to
give a nominalist-friendly account of these necessitating TMKs for predicative truths without accepting
Armstrong’s SOAs, by using the notion of an object-qua-property. An object-qua-property is the modal
perspective of that object and all its counterparts in worlds where the object and its counterparts have
that property. Such objects-qua-property necessitate TBRs such as that object has that property. This
is indeed ingenious, but if SAC is right, we can capture the truth platitudes that are part of BATT
without even having to give such metaphysical grounds. In my view, what this, the fact that Lewis can
provide such an ingenious nominalist-friendly account of necessitating TMKs, shows is that not even
T-NEC requires us to take a full-blown metaphysically full and substantial view of the nature of TMKs.
As the great variety of accounts of the nature of TMKs shows to me, the TMK principle, as envisioned
by T-NEC-ists, does not entail the existence of either SOAs, PAPs, Lewis’s objects-qua-property, or
any other specific metaphysically substantial account of TMKs. Even if in one set of worlds it is the
case that SOAs exist and that no non-transferable PAPs exist, it is possible that some TBR which is
made true by some SOAs in those worlds is made true by non-transferable PAPs in other worlds, where
there are no SOAs but where there are, instead, PAPs. It is perfectly conceivable to me that one world
is a world of SOAs while other worlds are worlds of non-transferable PAPs. If that’s true, I do not see
how any of these ontologies are entailed by the truth of any TBR. I apply this kind of argument again
below.
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described to be. For either of these claims to be true, if SAC is adequate for TT, there
is no need to say anything more about the nature of giraffes, the nature of tables, or
the nature of blackness, and there is definitely no need to require the existence of some
unique, metaphysically substantial, but also, to many, mysterious, entity, the SOA the
table’s being black.
Here’s another argument for the claim that SAC is metaphysically much more modest
than these stronger metaphysical versions of TT. SAC is compatible with the metaphys-
ical worldviews such versions espouse without entailing any of them and hence without
favouring any of them. Let us conceive of some possible worlds wm, wm+1, to wn where
there are only SOAs in those worlds and also conceive of other possible worlds wn+1 to
wp where there are only PAPs. I can clearly and distinctly conceive of each world. When
Jonny says, “I think. I exist.”, both of these TBRs are true if Jonny and his counterparts
utter them in worlds wm to wp. In these cases, because there is nothing in those worlds
but SOAs and PAPs, their TMKs will be either of these. But, what they are about
is exactly the same in those worlds: the first TBR is about Jonny and how things are
with Jonny, that is, that he’s thinking; the second TBR is about Jonny and his existing.
Whatever the deep story of the ontological nature or category of the TMKs in the dif-
ferent worlds, the TMKs are the same-qua-TMKs-for-these-TBRs. In worlds wm to wn
the TMKs happen to be SOAs and in worlds wn+1 to wp the TMKs happen to be PAPs.
Nothing about the truth of the TBRs nor SAC entails that TMKs can only be one or
the other or that they must be either. Such neutrality is at the heart of metaphysical
modesty. So, SAC is metaphysically modest in ways that other accounts are not.
I have not argued that SOAs do not exist. One may argue for or against the existence
of SOAs (or PAPs) on independent grounds. But, that is not my concern. I have merely
argued that SOAs and PAPs are not necessary for truth. I have objected against the
TMK-argument for their existence. According to my modest view, the TMKs are just
whatever the TBRs are strictly and fully about. Thus, unless a commitment to such
metaphysical matters is essential to the best SEM-TAC—and in no way does this seem
to be the case—one can remain neutral as to whether TMKs are SOAs or PAPs or
whatever else of metaphysical substance.
4.2 An Illustration of the Importance of Getting Right
What We Are Talking About: States vs Events
The aim of this section is to provide an illustration of metaphysical modesty and about-
ness in action, highlighting the importance of the right, modest semantic views of what
TBRs are about. I argue, in particular, that semantic differences between TBRs used
to talk about states and events can mark differences of category between states and
events, but that to draw ontological conclusions about what there is, on this basis, is
metaphysically extravagant.
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To do this, I shall present and discuss two arguments that have been used to argue
for a categorial distinction between states and events on the basis of the semantic
features of TBRs used to talk about them. Both arguments are meant to lay out the
distinction between them by marking out the differences in how they fill time. The
arguments require us to take a closer look at the phenomena of verb aspect and the
semantics of aspect generally. By looking at the aspect of the verbs that characterise
the different phenomena, one is able to mark out the differences in the temporal shape
between states and events.10 By looking at this difference, I shall illustrate how merely
looking at the semantic aspects of the TBRs can help us identify important features that
events possess and states lack. Further, the presence of these features has been used by
philosophers to support the view that events meet, and states fail to meet, what are called
the requirements of particularity.11 However, I shall not focus my discussion on this.12
Instead, because the particularity argument hinges on evidence to do with nominalisation
and the fact that events are meant to be countable in a particular way, while states are
not countable, I shall critically evaluate these features of the argument. I shall indicate
that one should understand the syntactic and semantic features as marking a difference
in what we are talking about: states versus events. However, I shall argue that the
evidence is inconclusive as to whether the categorial difference in what we are talking
about marks a categorial difference in ontology with regard to the kinds of entities there
are. The crucial point is that there is no semantic reason to indicate that there is a
difference in what there is rather than merely a difference in how things are.
From the differences in syntactical and semantic categorisations which I shall present
in what follows, Marcus (2009) and Steward (1997)13 both draw the conclusion that
these are not “just a by-product of grammar” (Steward ibid.: 95) but that there are
corresponding distinctions in categorial ontology.14 In particular, their central argumen-
tative move is to point out that one must not change the subject matter when talking
about states by slipping into talking about events. In other words, to get their ontolog-
ical argument off the ground, they rely on our intuitions about what the syntactic and
semantic features of TBRs tell us about what the TBRs we use are about.
10Comrie (1976: 2–6) helpfully discusses how aspect and tense are “concerned with time in very
different ways” (ibid.: 5). Tense is a deictic category, locating situations in time, usually with reference
to the present. Aspect concerns “the internal temporal constituency of the one situation” (ibid.). The
differences in temporal shape of states and events are differences in their internal temporal constituency.
11This kind of argumentative strategy is articulated by Galton (1984), Marcus (2009: 216–218),
Mourelatos (1978), Parsons (1990: §3), and Steward (1997: 35–40, 115). I shall argue that they, and
especially Marcus, must be careful not to overblow the metaphysical significance of their conclusions.
12My MPhil dissertation, (Schipper 2009), of which the following discussion is an adaptation, explored
the consequences for particularity in depth. That is not my intended focus here.
13They do not stand alone; in a canonical paper, Gendler-Szabo (2004: §1) argues that “how the
recognition that progressive sentences do not entail their perfective correlates made it clear that such
a semantic analysis must presuppose a richer ontology than that of classical tense logic” (ibid.: 31).
This is the “imperfective paradox,” which I discuss below. Gendler-Szabo uses it to enrich his ontology;
merely quantifying over possible worlds or events, as he argues (ibid.: §2), is not satisfactory.
14Steward thinks that denying this would be “unduly dismissive of the importance of grammatical
distinctions for ontology” (ibid.).
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In what follows, I argue that their moves rest on an unwarranted understanding of TT.
All that TT requires, if we accept SAC, rather than T-NEC and other metaphysically
substantial accounts of TT, is that there is a difference in how things are and not a
difference in what things there are. For instance, consider the state John’s being happy
and the event John’s crossing the street. Neither the state nor the event involving John
exist. The thing that exists in these cases is John. The states and events are just how
things are with John (and perhaps other things too, such as the street, since John is
crossing the street); in the former, he is happy; in the latter, he is doing something, that
is, crossing the street. Of course, TBRs which are not strictly and fully about the same
thing require differences in reality to make them true. Steward and Marcus are clearly
right that the syntax and semantics mark a difference in what the TBRs are about, but
this difference can be understood as a difference in being in the sense that there is a
difference in how things are, rather than in what there is. To make this further step
would be to accept NEC, which is, as I have argued, neither necessary nor sufficient for
TT (§2.8–2.9).
4.2.1 The Argument from Aspectual Markers
Mourelatos (1978: 418–419), in an attempt to update Kenny (1963: §8), who empha-
sises the presence of the continuous tense of verbs to event-predication, emphasises the
consequences this has for the phenomenon of temporal shape of events.15 In the case
of English sentences, the continuous tense of verbs is what Steward calls an “aspec-
tual marker” (Steward 1997: 84), a grammatical or syntactic feature which marks out
what kind of aspect the predication has. Specifically, the presence of the continuous
form indicates that the aspect of the predication is imperfective (or what is also called
progressive).16 And, the absence of the continuous form indicates a perfective aspect.
Some TBRs exhibit a proper distinction between perfective and imperfective verb-aspect;
others do not. It has been suggested that the presence of this distinction reveals some-
thing important about how the entities that these TBRs are about fill time (Steward
1997: 77), that is, have a distinct temporal shape (ibid.: 97–101; Marcus 2009: 218–221).
One part of the distinction is that a verb-predicate with perfective aspect has a sense of
completion, while a verb-predicate with imperfective aspect does not. Consider:
T18: Margot told me something.
T19: Margot was telling me something.
Both are perfectly good TBR-constructions that make sense. However, there is a crucial
difference between their syntactic structure. In T18, the verb-predicate is not in the
continuous form and thereby has what is commonly called a “perfective aspect.” In T19,
the verb-predicate is in the continuous form and thereby has an imperfective aspect.
15My terminology and usage are standard. See Steward (1997).
16See (Gendler-Szabo 2004) on the relation between the progressive and the imperfective.
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Moreover, the indicated event in T18 can be viewed or considered as a whole in its
entirety from our perspective in the present. T18 indicates completion: that is, there
was a telling that has finished. By contrast, T19 indicates that something was in the
process of happening: the telling was on-going but may have been interrupted or stopped
before being completed. And because of this, T19 does not entail T18.17
Both T18 and T19 are sentences about events.18 This is indicated by the use of the
event-verb ‘to tell’. When we consider other event-verbs, such as ‘to walk’, ‘to show’, ‘to
fill’, we can easily construct TBRs where the verbs are in either the perfect or imperfect
tense: ‘Joe walked across the street’ or ‘Joe was walking across the street’; and ‘James
showed me the way’ or ‘James was showing me the way’; and ‘Jane filled the cup’ or
‘Jane was filling the cup’. All this seems to indicate that the perfective/imperfective
distinction arises in the case of events, and that they are thereby the kinds of things
that can begin and finish, or remain unfinished. These are the features of the temporal
shape of events and show how they fill time.
By contrast to how things are with events, when we look at states, and the cor-
responding TBRs about states, the perfective/imperfective distinction does not arise.
Consider parallel TBRs in the case of states:
T20: Ed believed that Corbyn is a socialist.
T21: Ed was believing that Corbyn is a socialist.19
In this case, despite its oddity, T21 entails T20. Whenever T21 is true, T20 is true.
Whenever anyone S was believing X, then S also believed that X.20 TBRs in the continu-
17Gendler-Szabo (2004: 32) calls this the imperfective paradox.
18Some might argue that TBRs such as T19 do not pick out an event, but rather something of a
completely different category, namely a process, or following the Vendler-Kenny categories (see [Vendler
1957: 148ff] and [Kenny 1963: §8]), an activity. Whether T19 picks out events or processes, the point
is that the temporal shape of events are a particular way, and this is highlighted here in the distinction
between the perfect and imperfect aspects that are available to verbs such as ‘to tell’. The verb ‘to
tell’ is indeed used to pick out both events and processes, but it is clear when we are using the verb to
pick out an on-going, and perhaps yet incomplete, process rather than a completed event. In §4.2.1.1,
I discuss complications this raises for the overall distinction between states and events, making clearer
the distinction between processes and events too. I think that it is important to assume that there is
no categorial difference between events and processes, for the sake of clarity, and specifically to make
clear the semantic distinction between state- and event-verbs. For otherwise the distinction between
states and events based on the imperfective paradox, which the philosophers I discuss make, loses its
plausibility altogether. Just to take an example, Parsons (1985: 21) explicitly ignores the process-event
distinction in his discussion of states versus events, arguing only later that processes should be analysable
in terms of events (ibid.: §9). So, I’ll mainly just talk about TBRs such as T19 as if they pick out and
are about processes understood also as events. But, as I shall point out later, it is probably best not
to consider processes to be events, but rather as sometimes parts of events.
19I want to note that, in the example Marcus (2009: 219) uses, he talks about belief, which is clearly a
mental state. However, I think the argument he provides, which is similar to mine, will have difficulties
running the same reasoning on other mental states such as hoping and fearing. For instance, ‘Ed was
fearing that Corbyn is a socialist’ behaves differently from T21. I consider this kind of case briefly below
and I think the general aboutness point, which I shall make clear, helps to explain what is going on in
these cases.
20Talking about degrees of belief wouldn’t make the entailment invalid and wouldn’t make these two
come apart. There is no sense in which someone can be believing something to degree X and not
believe it to degree X.
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ous form such as T21, when they contain stative-verbs do not have the same implications
as sentences such as T19, which contain event-verbs. While T18 and T19 are distinct in
the way they capture the different temporal aspects of events, the different grammatical
constructions of T20 and T21 do not capture any differences in the temporal aspects of
states. It seems, then, that the perfective/imperfective distinction does not arise with
state-TBRs.
One way to understand what is going on with the syntactic and semantic features
of such expressions is that they indicate important differences in the way states and
events, as categorially distinct entities, themselves fill time. This is the way favoured by
Marcus (2009: 219–222).21 On his understanding, an event is the kind of entity that has
temporal parts, as it is not wholly present in each of its time intervals. Also, an event
clearly begins and ends, meaning that there is a clear sense in which an event can be said
to start to occur, be in a process of occurring, and then finish or come to completion.
Unlike events, it does not seem as if states are the kinds of entities that have temporal
parts, since they seem to be wholly present at each interval, a feature commonly called
homogeneity,22 and because of this, they do not have a beginning or an end.
Here is a potential counterexample. Consider a vase that is sitting on a table. This,
if anything, is a state of the table and the vase. One might naturally think that such
a state does have a beginning (and an end) in the sense that it begins when the vase
is placed on the table and ends when it is taken off the table. Further, it is on this
basis that we can make a distinction between the state and the objects of which it is
a state, that is, the objects which are involved in the state as its objects. In this case,
the objects are the vase and the table. They are distinct from the state, for they do not
begin and end with the state. So, the state and the objects must be distinct.
However, although states seem to have a beginning and end in this sense, this is
not the relevant sense of ‘beginning’ and ‘end’. Instead, the idea that generates the
distinction is that the state the vase’s sitting on the table is something that does not
have a beginning or an end in the sense of having a start and having a point of completion
because it is wholly present at each interval that it obtains.
The beginning and end that is involved with states, in this sense, is different from
that involved with events. Events begin at some time interval, and, unlike states, are not
wholly present in any later interval until its end, in the sense of completion, is reached.
States constitute a different mode of being, because they are said to be wholly present
at each interval and do not have to reach any end, in the sense of completion, to do so.
Both the states that Ed and the vase are in are states that Ed and the vase are in wholly
(and not in some incomplete sense), at each moment that Ed is believing what he does
and the vase is sitting on the table. By contrast, if Ed crossed the street, he will not
21However, as I shall indicate at the end of this section, there is another, more modest way of
understanding what is going on with the syntactic and semantic features of such expressions
22This is the common name for this feature especially in the linguistics literature; see (Galton 2006: 5)
for a discussion of processes as homogeneous and events as lacking homogeneity in this sense.
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have crossed the street at every moment in which he is crossing the street. Only when
he reaches the end will he have crossed the street. Thus, the event requires completion.
And since the end of a state does not require or involve completion, states and events
end in a different manner.23
To make this distinction clearer let us now consider how states and events differ in
the way that they fill time during specific intervals. Let us say Ed believed that Corbyn
is a socialist, throughout some time-interval i.24 There does not seem to be any other
correct description than that at any time during i, it will be true that Ed believed what
he did. Events work differently. Let’s say that Margot told me that Jeremy came to
the store yesterday during some time interval i2. It would not be true until the end of
i2 that she told me what she did. Before the end of i2, Margot will have been in the
process of telling me that Jeremy came to the store yesterday, but she will not yet have
completed telling me this until the end of i2. Only when she completes this process of
telling at the end of i2 will she have told me that Jeremy came to the store yesterday.
Although the specific event of Margot telling me something may be divided into phases,
these different phases would not be the same type of events as the original, completed
event. At different intervals within i2, Margot will be in the process of telling me what
she will have told me by the end of i2. But each of these intervals contain, as a whole,
other completed events, such as Margot’s saying the word ‘Jeremy’ or the word ‘came’.
These are other events which happen also to be phases which constitute the process of
Margot’s telling me that Jeremy came to the store yesterday. But, only at i2 will she
have completed this longer event.
One way to describe the distinction between events and states in terms of the way
that they each fill time is that events take time, while states persist through a time.25
Galton (1984: 24) explains that this shows that states are what he calls “dissective”,
which means that “any stretch of time in which a particular state obtains can be broken
23I shall discuss potential counterexamples to this point at the end of this section.
24I think that this is compatible with i being so short that it is instantaneous. I do not see a problem
with instantaneous beliefs.
25Cresswell (1986: 371–375; passim), using the notion of a sub-interval, makes a similar point in
drawing his distinction between objects and states on the one hand and events on the other. He,
however, attributes the difference to the fact that state and object TBRs have what he calls “subinterval”
properties, which means that if the TBR is true at interval i, then it is true at every subinterval of i.
This amounts to the same point as I am making. However, he draws the further conclusion that
‘exists’ applies to entities which have the subinterval property, and ‘occurs,’ rather than ‘exists,’ applies
to entities which lack the property. In effect, states and objects exist, while events occur. One can
understand predicates such as ‘exists’ in the case of objects, ‘obtains’ in the case of states, and ‘occurs’
in the case of events, all as what Moltmann (2010: §1) calls ‘existence predicates’. She argues that the
right account of existence predicates in natural language, and especially in English, reveals a notion
of existence that divides into at least three different modes of being, reflecting the three existence
predicates: “exist, occur (or related predicates such as happen or take place), and obtain” (ibid.: 1–2).
This is one way of talking about these modes of being. I am more sympathetic to Cresswell, who keeps
a distinction between these so-called “existence-predicates”. As I pointed out in §1.2.2, modes of being
are not all entities. Considering ‘obtains’ and ‘occurs’, which are verbs describing other modes of being,
to be existence-predicates, carries with it the assumption that these other modes of being are entities.
This assumption, as I shall argue, is problematic.
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down into sub-stretches in each of which that state obtains” (ibid.: 24). By contrast, as
Galton (ibid.) explains, events are “unitary”, which means that “even though a particular
occurrence of some event may be divided into phases, these phases are not of the
same type as the original event” (ibid.).26 This distinction between states and events
highlights the reasons why we can say that T21 does entail T20, and why T19 does
not entail T18. Specifically, it is right to say that ‘Ed was believing that Corbyn is a
socialist’ implies ‘Ed believed that Corbyn is a socialist’, because there isn’t a way of
subdividing the intervals in which a state obtains such that it does not obtain in each of
the subintervals. Changing the tense (or forcing a change in tense) of the state-TBRs
does not capture any difference in the temporal aspects of the state nor in regard to
how the state relates to time.
4.2.1.1 Objection 1: Counterexamples Concerning Unspecified Event De-
scriptions: Processes vs Events
The distinction made between states and events so far is clear enough. However, let’s
consider some counterexamples.
First, consider what looks like a pair of event ascriptions: ‘the ball expanded’ and
‘the ball was expanding’. Nothing can be in the process of expanding without having
expanded at least a tiny bit. So, it seems to me that ‘the ball was expanding’ entails ‘the
ball expanded’, even if the expansion was only tiny. The TBR ‘the ball was expanding’
has a different meaning from the TBRs ‘the ball was preparing to expand’ or ‘the ball
was about to expand’, neither of which entail ‘the ball expanded’.
Second, consider what we might call short-term, or processual, event descriptions
such as ‘the ball is moving’. Whenever the ball is moving or has started moving, the
ball will have moved too. So, there is a similar entailment between ‘the ball is moving’
and ‘the ball moved’. In these cases, the event-verbs ‘to expand’ and ‘to move’ seem to
behave like state-verbs, at least if the entailment from the imperfective to the perfective
aspect is characteristic of state-verbs. Further, in neither case must there have been
any time between the starting of the expanding, or moving, and the completion of the
expanding, or moving, for the ball to have expanded, or moved. Merely by expanding,
or moving, will the ball have completed some expansion, or movement. The ball will
have expanded, or moved, at every moment in which it is expanding, or moving. Thus,
some events, like states, will be wholly present at every moment in which it is occurring.
These examples seem to collapse the distinction between states and events, at least in
the way I marked the distinction above.
To understand these counterexamples properly, we need to consider the distinction
between processes, events,27 and states. First, the TBRs ‘the ball is expanding’ and
26Marcus (2009: 218–219) emphasises this way of drawing the distinction.
27Galton (2006: 5) emphasises the significance of the distinction between events and processes.
I briefly mentioned this distinction in fn. 18 above.
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‘the ball is moving’ are indeed event-descriptions since they use event-verbs. However,
they do not describe fully-formed events, but, rather, on-going, perhaps yet incomplete,
processes.28 As I explained a few paragraphs ago, these on-going processes are consti-
tuted by events. That is in part why descriptions of the processes entail descriptions of
these events. However, these process-constituting events are what we might call phases
of a larger event, the completion of which is marked by the end of some more specific
process. The unspecified ‘the ball was moving’ entails the unspecified ‘the ball moved’,
but the more specific ‘the ball was moving from one end of the pitch to the other’ does
not entail ‘the ball moved from one end of the pitch to the other’.29 What I think this
discussion points to is a further distinction within the category of events. Unspecified
processual event-descriptions might entail unspecified events, as ‘the ball was moving’
entails ‘the ball moved, at least somewhat’. But, the kinds of event-descriptions, which
the philosophers I am discussing seem to be solely concerned with, are just specified
event-descriptions. There is, then, a clear distinction between state-descriptions and
such event-descriptions in terms of whether or not descriptions with imperfective aspect
entail descriptions with perfective aspect. However, as the counterexamples presented
here illustrate, one can make a distinction on the same grounds between unspecified and
specified event-descriptions, and, hence, within the category of event itself.
However, these distinctions are marked at the level of descriptions, not at the level
of entities. These features of event-descriptions, as yet, do not have conclusive con-
sequences for an ontology of events—as entities distinct from other entities such as
objects. Some philosophers think that events are coarse-grained entities; see for exam-
ple Quine (1985: 167f), who individuates events according to spatiotemporal coexten-
siveness,30 and Davidson (1969: 179f), who individuates them according to their causal
role. They would need to explain how an unspecified event, for instance the ball’s hav-
ing moved, and a specified event, the ball’s having moved from one end of the pitch
to the other, can be the same entity, despite the differences in event-descriptions that
I have pointed out here. This, however, cannot be decided or explained at the level
of description, but would need to be explained at the level of metaphysics and would
include considerations to do with causation and spatiotemporal identity. So, drawing
the conclusion that there is a distinction in kinds of entity, based solely on the linguistic
distinctions presented, is premature at best. A fine-grained event theorist, such as Kim
28Aristotle (1984a:Metaphysics IX.6) distinguishes between activities that are engaged in for their
own sake, and activities that are directed at some end. Aristotle’s test for distinguishing between these
two is to ask, “At any time during a period in which someone is Xing, is it also true that they have
Xed?” (see [Gill 1993: 365], [Graham 1980: 117–130], [Lear 1988: 105], and [Parsons 1990: 183]). Thus,
the distinction between the processes and events in the examples I am discussing here goes as far back
as Aristotle. See (Gill 1993) for an extended argument for why this distinction shouldn’t be thought of
as a metaphysical distinction.
29See the previous footnote on Aristotle for another way of understanding the unspecified/specified
distinction in terms of engaged-in-for-its-own-sake vs directed-at-some-end.
30 See also Lemmon (1967: 98–99).
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(1966: 321ff; and 1976: 34ff),31 will have to explain in what sense some unspecified event
and some specified event, despite being distinct entities (on their account), are both the
same kind of entity, despite the differences, which I have discussed, that occur in their
descriptions. This will most likely involve a story about the nature of the properties
associated with events, rather than further data to do with event-predications.32 In fact,
this metaphysical story will have to be convincing despite the linguistic data presented.
My pluralism and neutralism, by contrast, allows me to take these descriptions to
mark merely linguistic or semantic distinctions (or at least to leave this option open),
rather than ontological distinctions as the philosophers I have just mentioned take them
to be. This, in turn, lets me avoid having to consider the difficult (and to some,
unsolvable) ontological issues to do with event individuation and identity.33 One can
be pluralist about the various ways that the ball is, was, and can be without having to
take any of these ways as entities in their own right. Although this pluralism indicates
that these are differences in reality,34 the linguistic evidence doesn’t seem to mark a
difference in ontology, that is, in the kinds of entities there are. Thus, there is no need
to distinguish such ways of being from the ball (as object) and from other ways the ball
is, at least not in terms of distinctions in ontological, rather than linguistic, categories.
4.2.1.2 Objection 2: Can States be in the Process of Finishing?
Now I want to discuss another objection, which is most relevant to our purposes and
reveals an important part of a successful TAAT-strategy, to what I have said so far and
which engages with the examples used to make the distinctions. The objection is that
it seems that we can, very well and meaningfully, understand T21 in such a way that it
contains reference to a state which is in the process of finishing.
However, taking the phrase ‘was believing’ to indicate that the state is in the process
of finishing and taking ‘believed’ to indicate a finishing of belief, such that T21 does not
entail T20, will actually change what we are talking about, and uses the term ‘belief’
in a different way than if we would take it to refer to a state.35 One may sensibly
talk about someone having believed something. But this is consistent with the use of
‘beliefs’ to talk about states. It does not involve anything having finished doing anything
or completing anything since a belief-state is not the kind of thing that finishes or comes
31Kim considers events to be property-exemplifications.
32Kim (1976: 33), for instance, briefly explores the idea that events are changes and states are
“unchanges” (ibid.). Taking this suggestion on board, one might try to develop a theory of static-
properties and change-properties to metaphysically underpin the distinction. Kim (ibid.) quickly gives
up on this idea however, given the fact that there are many hard cases for classification, such as having
a throbbing pain in the right elbow. See also (Steward 1997: 72–74).
33Gill (1993), for instance, also criticises Mourelatos and argues that “the differences between pro-
cesses and events [on the basis of linguistic issues] cannot provide the basis for an ontological subcate-
gorization of occurrences” (ibid.: 366).
34More on this later, especially in §7, though, the notion of reality, or being, that I am working with
was already introduced §1.2.2.
35The stative-use of ‘belief’ is the ordinary English usage of such words. See Marcus (2009: 216).
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to completion. Margot will not have finished or completed her believing at any point of
her having the belief. Once she believes something, she continues to believe it until she
changes her beliefs.36 The fact that we can interpret the stative verb-phrases in such
a way as to indicate that the belief actually finishes merely indicates that we can use
these phrases in a different way than the ordinary way in which we use them, that is,
to talk about states, which do not finish in the relevant sense. If we adopt this other
interpretation and take the verb-predications to tell us something different about the
way these entities fill time, what we’re doing is changing talk about states to talk about
something else, and in this case, events. When we say that Ed has believed that Corbyn
is a socialist, to indicate that he believed and has finished believing this, we are not
talking anymore about the state of belief that Ed was in, but rather about something
else, an event in his mental life, such as perhaps the interval in which there was a change
in belief. This does not show that believing is an event rather than a state, but rather
that we can use stative-terms such as ‘believing’ to conform to talk about events.37
Marcus (2009: 29) aptly describes this move as “changing the subject” (ibid.). It
seems then that ‘believing’, taken as a stative-verb has characteristics importantly dif-
ferent from others that are event-verbs. The distinction between perfective and imper-
fective verb-aspect holds in the case of event-predication but not in state-predication.
So, states do not fill time in the same way that events do. In a discussion of states, if
one were to start using the grammatical behaviour which indicates that one is talking
about events, what one is clearly doing is just changing the subject. But what is the
significance of this?
4.2.1.3 Don’t Change the Subject Matter!
Marcus (2009: 216) suggests that using ‘belief’ and other such nouns such as ‘depression’
or ‘desire’ to talk about states is the ordinary English usage of such words. I agree with
this, but as I shall discuss in this and the next section, Marcus thinks that one can draw
ontological conclusions from the categorial distinctions that we made in the preceding
sections and from the fact that state-and-event talk is entrenched in ordinary usage.
I do not think that the ordinary usage of these words should have any direct bearing
on ontological conclusions about whether the category of state is fundamental or not.
In particular, even though it is true that such terms are used to talk about states in
the way set out, and that states have the features identified in the discussion, it is not
clear yet that a distinction is being made in terms of ontological category, that is, a
distinction in kinds of entity. The different features of the event-verbs and state-verbs
36Of course, neither her having this belief nor her changing her beliefs need be conscious. Much like
other things we hold dear as important parts of ourselves, such as one’s weight, one can gain and shed
beliefs without being aware of what’s happening to one’s (implicit) worldview.
37Conversely, the distinction between unspecified and specified events that I introduced in the previous
section, perhaps, marks a way to use what are normally thought of as event-verbs to talk about states.
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indicate a difference in what we can talk about. But, this may not be any more than a
difference in “how things stand with what exists” (Dodd 2002a: 74).
Marcus’s point about entrenchment indicates that we use such terms to refer to states
ordinarily. The move made above of forcing belief-talk to follow the logic of event-talk
amounts to changing the subject. To use terms such as ‘belief’ to refer to events would
be to use them to talk about something different than, though perhaps also similar to,
what we normally talk about. Marcus writes, “changing the subject amounts to changing
the semantics of belief-talk so as to make it conform to the model of event-talk. But this
doesn’t show that beliefs are events, only that we can use the term ‘belief’ to pick out
events” (2009: 219).38 This is an important point. One must make sure not to change
the subject and not change the semantics and logic of the subject matter. This is at the
heart of my insistence that aboutness and knowing what we are talking about is central
to the right theory of what makes TBRs true. When we use TBRs about states and
when we use TBRs about events, there is an important difference in how the world is
that makes true these different TBRs with categorially different semantic features.
4.2.1.4 Changing the Subject is Not Talking About a Different Entity
However, it is a large jump from thinking that we are talking about states and events
understood as the intentional objects39 that we are talking about when we use certain
state-verbs and event-verbs in a TBR to thinking that the TBR as a whole refers to or
is about an existing entity, the state or event. What is important is that we can still talk
about how things are with what exists without committing ourselves to the existence of
how things are with what exists. As is indicated by the discussion so far, we can even
distinguish between different ways that how things are with what exists can fill time.
States seem to persist through time, while events take time. However, this may also
just be a way describing and talking about how things are with the subject. When Ed
believed that Corbyn is a socialist throughout time interval i, he will have believed this
throughout every subinterval of time within i. We can talk about this feature of the
subject. And, indeed, this feature concerning him is different from the subject itself or
its existing. We are talking about how he existed, not just about him or that he exists.
However, this does not mean that there is a state of him, understood as a separate entity,
existing throughout this period which has these features throughout this period. Ed and
how things are with him is all that the best semantic account of what T20 and T21 are
about requires in terms of TMKs for these TBRs. Similarly, in the case of event-talk,
T18 and T19 merely require the intentional worldly satisfaction of T18 and T19 for them
to be true. And all this requires is that Margot exists and for things concerning Margot
to be how they are described to be. This means that Margot’s telling me something is
38Marcus doesn’t seem to have anyone in particular in mind here when he makes this point, except
perhaps the hypothetical theorist who might try to put belief talk into event talk.
39Recall my discussion in §2.6, I am understanding ‘intentional object’ in the Cranean sense.
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indeed importantly different from Margot having told me something because how things
are with Margot is different in each case. The latter entails that she told me what she
was telling me, while the former does not. This is because, unfortunately, Margot might
not finish telling me what she is telling me (for instance, because of a tragic accident
where she is hit by a car while she is speaking or because of something trivial such as her
changing the subject mid-sentence, hence not completing what she was trying to say).40
These semantic and syntactic differences and the consequences they have for the
categorisation of how things can be for someone or something, and also for the gen-
eral linguistic categorisations we can make about event- and state-verbs, is indeed very
important. I think that the best way to understand them is as a difference in TMKs
and truthmaking. However, this does not require us to go the step further and claim
that there are consequences for ontological categories pertaining to what exists. This
would only be warranted by the kind of T-NEC move that also reified SOAs, a move that
Lewis calls an “over-reaction to something right and important and under-appreciated.
What’s right, roughly speaking, is that truths must have things as their subject matter.”
(1992: 218). However, even Lewis, it seems to me, misspeaks. Truths not only have
things as their subject matter, but also how things are with those things. And this latter
must not be thought of as an additional thing.
Marcus is right to think that we’re changing the subject matter when we’re analysing
state-verbs (such as ‘believes’) with an event-semantics. But to think that states and
events must exist as the TMKs for such truths, is an unwarranted over-reaction most
likely spurred on by an acceptance of the wrong kind of TT. At best, the metaphysical
status of the different categories that we’re talking about is left underdetermined by the
semantics.
Of course, perhaps there are further features of the semantics that have been left
out of our discussion. But when considering the aspectual shape alone and what reality
must be like for these TBRs to be true, at best the metaphysical status of the things
we are talking about is left undetermined by the commitments of the world being the
way it is talked about in the TBRs. This is also perfectly consistent with the truth of
the TBRs depending on reality, and not the other way around (preserving asymmetric
dependence). My version of TT will have the consequence that there is some worldly
difference concerning the TMKs of state- and event-talk, but the difference is much
less metaphysically weighty than other theorists extravagantly claim them to be. Impor-
tantly, what TAAT-SAC allows us to do is to remain neutral as to whether the semantic
differences that are clearly marked out by the semantic features of certain verbs (and
we might extend this point to other expressions as well) has any consequences for what
things exist, that is, metaphysical/ontological consequences.41 It seems that the se-
40It has been suggested to me that this is perhaps a Quinean point.
41Marcus for instance makes a further distinction between states and events based on further linguistic
evidence from (Galton 1984: 24). However, even Galton (ibid.), many of whose points about verb-
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mantic features do mark out a difference in how things are. States and events seem to
constitute, at the very least, different kinds of ways things can be.42 However, there is
no reason, at least on linguistic grounds (and if Dodd [1999] is right, for many other
grounds as well) to think of them as anything more substantial, such as SOAs.
4.2.2 The Argument from Countability & Nominalisation
A final feature of the semantics and syntax that I want to consider concerns the semantics
of nominalisation. This is meant to mark out an ontological contrast between events and
states, which is supposed to reveal a difference in countability. This contrast is drawn by
Marcus (2009: 227) and Steward (1997: 89). They take the contrast from Mourelatos,
who introduced the concept of a “nominalization transcription” (1978.: 426) to try to
argue that the distinction between mass- and count-nouns runs deeper than just the role
it can play in categorising predications.43 Consider for example the TBR:
T22: Margot walks to Russell Square.
The use of the verb in T22 indicates an event rather than a state. T22 can be standardly
nominalised as:
T23: There is a walking to Russell Square by Margot.
In the case of this event–nominalisation, the presence of the indefinite article ‘a’ before
‘walking’ is supposed to indicate that the correct analysis of T23 is that there is an
existential quantifier ranging over a countable governing it.44 It thus makes complete
sense to say ‘Margot walked to Russell Square more than six times in her life’, which can
aspect Marcus relies upon in our discussion, would reject Marcus and others’s use of his points to
draw significant ontological conclusions. He thinks that the distinction between states and events is “a
distinction between two different ways we have of describing [what goes on]” rather than a “distinction
inherent in what goes on” (ibid.). Marcus (2009: 231–232) argues that “Galton misunderstands the
significance of his own work” (ibid.: 218). More recently, Galton (2012: 35) states, in a later discussion
explicitly about the ontology of these matters, that he regards processes as abstract patterns of behavior,
and states and events as concrete realisations of such abstract patterns. Patterns, typically, are nothing
over and above the things they are patterns of. Instead, they are how what they are patterns of are
presented in space and time. If he’s right, there is no need to reify patterns; no need to reify them as
abstractions or as concrete realisations of them. The key to presenting such a theory is, as he writes,
that the “theory presented here is consistent with recent theorising about processes in ontology and
computer science while being sensitive to insights from the work of philosophers and linguistics over
the years” (ibid.: 35). It is not just on the basis of linguistic data, and, hence, not just on the basis of
what we can know from looking at the TBRs and the semantics that we can know what the nature of
such things are. In this case, it needs to be consistent with the best ontological arguments, including
Dodd’s “problem of instantiation” (1999: 331f) (see §1.7 above).
42As I said, Galton (2012: 35ff) has his own non-substantive theory. On the theory that I am sug-
gesting, one might think of them as different modes of being in the sense of being answers to how
things are with the individuals and objects involved.
43This more modest, linguistic claim concerning merely categorising predications is made by Leech
(1969: 134–137) in the context of the distinction between states and events. His book provides much
of the linguistic data on which the philosophers I mention build many of their claims.
44See (Steward 1997: 89–91).
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be nominalised as ‘There were more than six walkings of Margot to Russell Square in
her life’. Because events are countables, the event–nominalisations are count-quantified,
and the event–predications are easily redescribed in this manner. This seems to hold
in general for event–nominalisations. It seems to make complete sense, for example,
when we say ‘There was a running’ or ‘There was an explosion’ or ‘There were twenty
reachings.’
State-nominalisations, Mourelatos (1978: 428–429) argues, are different. Consider:
T24: Ed loves Justine.
Take its nominalisation:
T25: There is love for Justine from Ed.45
In this case, there is no indefinite article. This seems to indicate that there is no
quantifier ranging over countable particulars in this case. Now consider the alternative
nominalization:
T26: There is a loving for Justine by Ed.
Or another nominalisation of the same sort of TBR (analogous to the event–nominalisation
above):
T27: There are six lovings for Justine by Ed.
It seems less awkward to say:
T28: There was much loving of Justine by Ed.
According to Marcus (2009: 277), following Mourelatos (1978), we do not say T26 and
T27, but we do say T28. In the same way, when we consider ordinary stuffs such as
water or gold we would not be able to quantify over countables, but rather we would
need to mass-quantify. For example, it makes sense to say ‘There was water in the
lake’ or ‘There was a lot of water in the lake,’ but we would not say ‘There was a
water in the lake’ or ‘There were 100,000 waters in the lake.’46 This is evidence for the
fact that state–nominalisations are, like stuff–nominalisations, mass-quantified and not
count-quantified. By exploring Mourelatos’s strategy of nominalisation transcriptions,
we can see that there is a fundamental difference between event–nominalisations and
state–nominalisations in terms of which kind of quantifier is appropriate.
45Alternative nominalisations can also be: ‘Justine’s loving of Ed’, or ‘the loving of Ed by Justine’.
46A minor point I need to make here is that Marcus (ibid.: 218ff) and Steward (ibid.: 114) attempt
to argue on the basis of all this linguistic evidence that states are not particulars. Even if they are right
to think this about the non-particularity of states, it is important to keep in mind that the similarities
between states and mass-quantifiable stuff stops there. Quantities of stuff, such as water, are most
plausibly particulars; though they are not individuals. Thanks to E. J. Lowe for emphasising this point
to me in conversation. If Lowe is right, this also puts in doubt the conclusion that we should think of
states as non-particulars on this basis.
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Marcus (2009: 228) suggests that a plausible explanation for this is that events are
countable entities while states are not; Steward also explicitly argues on this basis that
states are states of affairs or facts, as “essentially structured entities” (ibid.: 114). Ac-
cording to Marcus (ibid.), to accept T26 and T27, is not to talk about states but rather
to change the examples in these cases to events. Talking about events and talking about
states in each case is not fixed by the verb or predicate one uses, such as ‘love’ or ‘hate’,
but rather is fixed by how the predicates and verbs are used. For different kinds of
nominalisation indicate different ways they can be quantified, and importantly indicate
totally different categories, or modes of being (more on this later).
However, Steward (1997: 119–120), who applies this point to questions to do with
the nature of mental states, considers an objection to the idea that states are not
countable and that state–nominalisations are not count-quantifiable. The objection is
that some of the paradigm examples of mental states, beliefs, desires, and pains, seem
to be count-quantifiable. For example, it is very natural to say that Jonny has a pain
in the gut, and paraphrase this as ‘There is a pain in the gut of Jonny.’ However, as
Marcus would suggest, when we start talking about beliefs, desires, and states, or any
of the usually stative-nouns as count-quantifiable, we are merely changing the subject,
or in presently relevant terms, we are talking about different things. Steward makes
this suggestion explicitly as well (ibid.: 120) when she says that there is an ambiguity in
the noun ‘state’, where we can read it in the mass or the count sense.47 When we are
talking about count-quantifiable states of pain or desire, it seems that we are merely
talking about certain occurrences or episodes of pain and desire, which we could count.
For instance, ‘Jonny had five pains in his stomach this morning’ is intelligible. But,
when we consider what the TMKs are for such a TBR, the best candidates would be
the various occurrences of pain that he had in his stomach this morning. But then the
pains described would now better be understood as events, rather than states. We are
talking about something different, or as some might say a different category of thing.
Whether to give this category of thing that we are talking about an ontological reading
or a modest reading is what is at issue here.
The occurrences of the pain in his stomach, as the arguments so far for the nature of
events have indicated, would have a start and a finish, a spatio-temporal location, and
thus be countable. Although Steward leaves open the possibility that such problematic
cases may indicate that there are countable states, she also suggests that the senses in
which such problematic cases allow for a count-quantifiable interpretation just indicate
that the candidate states that we are talking about should not be counted as states
at all.48 Whatever reading we give things it seems most plausible then that what has
47This is, as she (ibid.) puts it as well, the familiar sense in which we can talk about the distinction
between type and token states.
48See (Steward ibid.: 120–133) for extensive argumentation that the notion of a token state is very
problematic and should be rejected. (Marcus 2009) is an extended argument for this claim. What I
have said here in this paragraph is my explanation of why there is a significant change of subject matter.
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happened is a mere changing of subject, a change of what the TBRs are about, and
hence a change in their relevant TMKs. However, what consequences we must draw or
can plausibly draw for the nature of TMKs is what we need to decide. The ontologists
seem to think that the change of subject indicates that there must be a substantial
change in the kind of entity we are talking about rather than something more modest.
To perhaps make this change of subject matter counterargument to the objection
Steward discusses more persuasive, we can see that a similar argument can be leveled
against those who would change the usage and semantic-talk of the stuff that I compared
states to earlier: stuff such as water or cheese. We could meaningfully say, using the
mass-nouns ‘water’ and ‘cheese’:
T29: There are three different waters in my glass; I just mixed tap water with Evian
and Volvic water.
T30: There are four cheeses in the refrigerator; a Brie, an Old Gouda, a Parmesan, and
a Brazilian Minas.
However, when we do this, we are clearly not talking anymore about stuff. We are not
counting three waters or four cheeses, as three and four particular stuffs. Instead, we are
counting three kinds of water, four kinds of cheese or perhaps four blocks of cheese; we
are talking about kinds and objects, which are count-quantified, and not stuffs, which
are mass-quantified. Although there seems to be an ambiguity in meaning, since we can
use terms such as ‘water’ or ‘cheese’ in various ways, there seems to be a clear way of
using these stuff-terms in which clearly different ways of being are represented and talked
about. When we use ‘water’ as a term to represent the stuff water, then the question
‘How many?’ does not apply. Rather, we ask, ‘How much?’ So, the ambiguities between
the mass-noun uses and the count-noun uses of stuff are not merely grammatical, but
actually refer to (or are about) different ways things are.49 This indicates a strong
connection between the very subtle features of TBR which indicate a radical difference
in aboutness, and, hence, a radical difference in the kinds of TMKs that different TBRs
can be about and be made true by.
However, this is compatible with being completely agnostic about what is the right
ontological theory of the TMKs which make these TBRs true and which they are strictly
and fully about. In particular, there seems no reason to take the different kinds of
quantification (mass- versus count-quantification) as indicating that there are entities in
the metaphysically substantial sense that I’ve been avoiding; clearly there are differences
in entities involved in the TMKs, but they are not differences in which things exist, but
in how what exists exists.
It seems that we can use general terms, such as ‘stuff’ and ‘states’, as count nouns,
perhaps pragmatically, and to refer to the species or varieties of how things can be in the
world individually. So for example, ‘cheese’ can be used to say, ‘We have eaten a lot of
49There is no need to claim that they are different things over and above the ways things are.
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cheese’ and it can be used to say, ‘The cheeses of France are various and go exquisitely
with wine.’50 In this case, as I have pointed out, we use this term ambiguously, sometimes
to talk about one kind of way things can be and sometimes to talk about another way
things can be. I think that this point holds for states as well as for stuff. Psychologists
may, at some point in time, be able to map out all the varieties of different kinds of
depression, and, perhaps, be able to mark out all the different kinds of mental states that
persons can have. If this is so, we would be able to count all the different depressions
and all the different mental states. There may be 227 different mental states and ten
different kinds of depression. But, as indicated, what we are counting are the different
kinds of mental states and states of depression. We are not counting particular entities
(mistakenly construing mental states or depressions as particular countable events or
objects). Rather, on these uses of ‘state’ and ‘stuff’ as countable terms, we are ranging
over varieties or kinds of states and stuff, which are neither events, states, or stuff
themselves, but are nevertheless countable. Thus again, we have changed the subject
from states to kinds of states.
But, even though we might be able to make various distinctions based on linguistic
evidence between kinds of states versus states, kinds of stuff versus stuff, states versus
events, none of these distinctions indicate any distinctions in anything ontologically
significant or metaphysically substantial. There is no reason to think, based on the
linguistic evidence presented by the various arguments I have presented, that they are
further metaphysically substantial entities that need to play the TMK-role. Rather,
we can construe them fundamentally or metaphysically in all sorts of different ways,
for instance as merely aspects of things, being-in-the-wider sense of containing how
things are with entities. At the very least, there is no good reason to assume that we
can know, merely on the basis of the semantics of TBRs, whether what we are talking
about is ontologically substantial.51 It seems much more likely that questions concerning
the fundamental metaphysical nature of whatever we are talking about will be decided,
if at all, by metaphysical argumentation rather than argumentation based on TT and
language.
4.3 Conclusions: Part One
So far, in Part One, I have presented and argued for my favoured aboutness-based
version of TT. In §1, I presented the basic assumptions of TT, arguing that BATT is
compatible with many of the most important ToTs, and is compatible with pluralism and
metaphysical neutralism concerning the nature of TBRs and TMKs. In §2, I presented
some of the central features of TAAT, the version of TT which I favour. I presented SAC,
50Chappell (1970–71: 62) also clearly highlights this point.
51In addition, Dodd (1999), as I’ve pointed out several times, gives us strong metaphysically salient
reasons for rejecting SOAs and all of these presumably complex entities as entities in their own right.
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my version of the best SEM-TAC, informed by the doctrine or theory of intentionality
(§2.4–2.7). I also argued that SAC can help us reject NEC as a necessary (§2.8) and
sufficient (§2.9) feature of TT. I also argued that TAAT can respond to one of the
most serious problems that TT faces, namely P-NEG (§3). In this chapter, I introduced
the notion of metaphysical modesty in more depth. I then illustrated how one can see
the linguistically-based debate concerning the distinction between different ontological
categories in a metaphysically modest way.
4.4 Brief Sketch of the Plan for the Next Four Chap-
ters
In the next four chapters, I shall put TAAT to task by addressing some of the most
important in-house debates concerning TT. In §5, I argue that a rival fundamentalist
account of TT is metaphysically immodest, on the basis of aboutness reasons and on
the basis of structural reasons to do with BATT. In §6, I give a modest reinterpretation
of how to catch cheaters. In §7, I present a view called Modest Realism. In §8, I argue











A popular assumption made about TT is that T-REL is a species of grounding. Arm-
strong, for instance, repeatedly speaks of a TMK being an entity which acts as a truth’s
“ontological ground” (1978: 150; 1989a: 9; 1989b: 89, 96, 107; 1989c: 56, 89; 1991: 190;
1997: 43, 115, 116). He writes, “The truthmaker is whatever it is in the world that
makes a truth true. Gustav Bergmann and his followers have used the phrase ‘ontologi-
cal ground’ and have had the same thing in mind. The idea is an old one” (1997: 13).
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: 25ff) argues that the asymmetry of T-REL is best explained
by understanding that true TBRs require ontological grounds.1 He further states that for
a TBR’s truth to be grounded in reality, the ontological grounds which do the grounding
must be an entity (ibid.: §7).2 One way of understanding these kinds of statements
and the approach they encapsulate is that the TT-enterprise is just the enterprise of
discovering ontological grounds for truths.
Inspired by this kind of ontologically substantial stance towards T-REL, recent philoso-
phers have been trying to develop a version of TT which construes it as a species of
grounding and in doing so ties it closely to the notion of fundamentality. In fact some of
these fundamentalists, as I shall call them, assume that the notion of fundamentality is
intelligible in part by citing truthmaking as a central example. This strand of discussion,
I shall argue, is mistaken in its assumptions. As I have argued, truthmaking should be
understood much more modestly than has usually been thought. In this chapter, I shall
argue for something much less “heretical” than Daly (2005: 103) when he says that the
phrases such as ‘ontological ground of truth’ “sounds deep and impressive, but perhaps
they are only turns of phrase—empty metaphors without explanatory content” (ibid.),
1See (Hornsby 2005), which I briefly discuss in fn. 3 in §1, for an extended criticism of Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s (2005) account.
2See my §4.1.2 against this kind of view, where I discuss Lewis (1992: 218) and Dodd (2002a: 77),
who criticise this type of view, and argue that the grounds of truth should not be ontological grounds,
and hence truths should not be grounded in entities, but rather in “how things stand with what exists”
(Dodd 2002a: 74).
119
Chapter 5. Truthmaking and Fundamentality: Rejecting TT-Fundamentalism 120
but still as revisionary: TT does not make fundamentality more intelligible and T-REL
does not relate truths with anything more fundamental (unless what is fundamental is
what the TBRs in question are about). I shall argue that TMKs should be conceived of
as neither specifically always fundamental nor derivative entities of reality.3
The structure of this chapter is as follows. First, in §5.2, I present what I call the
Schafferian Grounding Project, on which grounding is taken to be the main metaphysi-
cal relation and on which T-REL is understood as a G-REL (a grounding relation), and
I introduce my main target in this chapter, what I call TRUTHMAKER FUNDAMEN-
TALISM (TF). Second, in §5.3, I shall present two versions of TF that are distinguished
along structural lines. I raise three general objections to both of these versions of TF:
(1) structural objections: TF violates basic principles of BATT; G-REL and T-REL are
structurally different; (2) on at least one understanding of fundamentality, TF leads to
paradox; (3) TF rests on the unwarranted presupposition that TBRs are categorically less
fundamental than TMKs. I shall conclude, on the basis of its unwarranted assumptions
and its internal incoherence, that TF is implausible as an account of TT. I then focus
on two proposed accounts, Schaffer’s and Heil’s, and raise objections to their versions of
TF. Throughout my discussion I contrast TF with TAAT and round off my comparison
in favour of TAAT in §5.5 as the aboutness objection to TF.
5.2 Truthmakers and Fundamentality
It is worthwhile to be clear from the start that my target is not everyone who puts
truthmaking in terms of grounding and not everyone who claims that truthmaking is a
species of grounding. For instance, although I introduced this chapter by mentioning
them and they put truthmaking in terms of grounding and TMKs in terms of grounds,
neither Rodriguez-Pereyra (especially 2005, and 2015) nor Armstrong (especially 1997)
are my targets here.4 A charitable interpretation of the general claim to which they
might be said to subscribe is that the truth of a TBR is grounded in its TMKs, or the
existence of its TMKs, as they would normally put it. They can be interpreted to think
that grounding is a species of necessitation and to use ‘grounding’ and ‘dependence’
interchangeably. I already rejected NEC (§2.8–2.9).5
My target here are those views which restrict TMKs to those entities which are
fundamental and which make true TBRs (understood as non-fundamental). Schaffer
(2010: 319; among others), the main TF-ist, explicitly articulates the position in ex-
3One can and should replace talk about TMKs as entities with talk about TMKs as entities and
how things are with the entities, which is consistent with my view (as sketched in §4.1). However, I’ll
talk mainly about entities in this chapter merely for the sake of brevity and because the Truthmaker
Fundamentalist almost invariably puts her thesis in terms of fundamental entities.
4(Schnieder 2006: 30) and (Liggins 2012: 269) are others who seem to think that T-REL is a case
of grounding but are not TF-ists, and hence not my target.
5So does Schaffer (2008a: 309–310; 2008b: 10–17). He rejects NEC for TGro, his version of TF.
I reject both NEC and TF for SAC.
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actly this way. He writes, “[T]ruthmakers need to be restricted to fundamental entities
[. . . and. . . ] I take the core of truthmaking theory to be the idea that truth is a deriva-
tive aspect of reality, and thus needs grounding (ibid.). Thus, my target is not all
grounding versions of TT, but those versions which use the machinery of fundamentality
to articulate TT and to articulate the TT-relevant notion of dependence. This is the
metaphysically substantial version of TT that I abbreviate as TF. I shall argue in this
chapter that this way of understanding truthmaking is flawed; it misunderstands the
nature of the T-REL and it misunderstands what TMKs are. I shall argue further that
the relation which relates TBRs to the TMKs they are about and according to which the
latter endows the former with a property, being true, is very unlike the relation which,
for example, relates a set of fundamental things with a derivative object by grounding
it. T-REL is neither a G-REL of this sort nor are TMKs fundamental.
5.2.1 Some Background: Truthmaking, Dependence, and Schaf-
fer’s Grounding Project
As I have already argued in §1.2–1.2.5, BATT minimally requires TD, T-REL, R-TMK,
R-ROT, R-TBR, and is compatible with a pluralism concerning TMKs (§1.7), TBRs
(§1.3) and their natures. TF is a rival to SAC. Therefore, it gives a rival account of how
best to understand T-REL and to go beyond BATT. Modesty requires that any account
which tries to go beyond BATT must be compatible with its basic assumptions, or must
give good reasons for rejecting or restricting the basic assumptions and the pluralism
which is at their heart. Generally, my focus in rejecting TF as a worthy alternative
account to SAC is based on (1) the inadequacy of G-REL in capturing the appropriate
asymmetry of T-REL, and (2) that the restrictions it puts on pluralism are not properly
motivated. Before I proceed, I present some further background on how the TF-project
fits in the overall TT-discussion.
As I mentioned in §1.2.2, the dependence in TD is normally taken to be a metaphys-
ical relation; this is part of the orthodoxy I reject. But, as we saw throughout §1, the
level of metaphysical substantiality can vary from version to version. T-NEC’s account of
T-REL as NEC is a metaphysically substantial account. TF is an even more metaphysi-
cally substantial account than T-NEC, for with G-REL there are even more metaphysical
assumptions about TBRs and TMKs and about T-REL than with NEC.6 G-REL is nor-
6Schaffer (2010a) is explicit about this when he writes about his version of TT: “as to the truth-
making relation, I here impose some heavyweight metaphysical assumptions [. . . ] I work within a
neo-Aristotelian framework, which posits substances and posteriors related by ontological dependence
[. . . ] truth is grounded in the substances. Truth is dependent. Truth is not a basic constituent of real-
ity, and like all dependent abstractions, truth must be made from the fundament” (ibid.: 309–310; my
adaptations but his emphases). In articulating his assumption that T-REL is what he calls “truthground-
ing” (ibid.: 310), he even proudly proclaims that it is “a twice-heavy assumption [first] for invoking the
neo-Aristotelian framework and [second] for explicating truthmaking within this framework as truth-
grounding” (ibid.; my emphasis).
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mally taken to be a special type of dependence relation: the type of dependence that
relates non-fundamental or sometimes called “derivative” entities, relations, properties,
etc., with fundamental entities, relations, properties, etc. Fine (2012: especially 39–40)
for instance takes G-REL to be variegated rather than unitary; there are many different
grounding relations and ‘G-REL’ refers to “some kind of “disjunction” of the special re-
lations” (ibid.: 40). But, he thinks that those who think that it is unitary7 have merely
singled out a dependence relation that is particularly relevant to metaphysics. What is
of most interest to us now are those accounts of grounding which take grounding to be
a metaphysical relation. On these accounts, metaphysical grounding is normally taken
to be a special kind of metaphysical dependence.
Against the norm, The Grounding Project (GP), which I take to be Schaffer’s (2008a,
2008b, 2009, etc.) project, as I understand it, tries to understand all dependence relations
as different species of the overall genus: grounding. They are all grounding relations.
And grounding is supposed to be a primitive, unanalysable relation. Schaffer writes:
Grounding should rather be taken as primitive, as per the neo-Aristotelian
approach (c.f. [sic] Fine 2001: 1). Grounding is an unanalyzable but needed
notion—it is the primitive structuring conception of metaphysics. It is the
notion the physicalist needs to explicate such plausible claims as “the funda-
mental properties and facts are physical and everything else obtains in virtue
of them” (Loewer 2001: 39). It is the notion the truthmaker theorist needs
to explicate such plausible claims as: “Must there not be something about
the world that makes it to be the case, that serves as an ontological ground,
for this truth?” (Armstrong 1997: 115; c.f. [sic] Schaffer [2010a]). [Schaffer
2009: 364–5]
But because grounding is a primitive and unanalysable notion, grounding theorists who
follow especially Schaffer (2009), have assumed that the notion of grounding and funda-
mentality is intelligible in most part only by citing examples and via an intuitive grasp of
the concepts. In the recent literature on fundamentality, especially in the writings of such
philosophers as Barnes (2012: 876), TT is sometimes assumed to be one of the best ways
to understand fundamentality and a paradigmatic example of grounding. Barnes writes
that “fundamentality can be cashed out in terms of truthmakers” (ibid.). Other examples
usually cited to illustrate the intuitiveness of fundamentality and grounding are Socrates
and the singleton set {Socrates}, the mind-body relation, the relation between moral
and natural properties, etc.; see (Schaffer 2009: 375). Thus, we have the Schafferian
GP of subsuming truthmaking into this general theory of grounding and fundamentality.
We can sum up this metaphysically substantial view of truthmaking as follows:
TF: T-REL is a species of grounding which links TBRs understood as derivative, non-
fundamental entities to TMKs understood as non-derivative, fundamental entities.
7See Rosen (2010), Schaffer (2009), and Audi (2012b), who Fine (2012: 37ff) cites and discusses.
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5.3 Varieties of Fundamentalist Structure: Hierarchi-
cal and Two-tier Fundamentalism
The basic idea behind TF is that T-REL is a species of G-REL, that is, the relation
that relates fundamental entities with derivative entities.8 TT develops TD, the basic
intuition that truth depends, at least in some important way, on reality. According to
TF, T-REL is a species of a technical sense of grounding as applied to truth and reality,
where truth is what is derivative, reality is what is fundamental, and T-REL is the G-REL
which grounds truths in reality.
There are many different versions of fundamentalism. Along structural lines, we can
distinguish between two main forms:
(1) levels (or hierarchical) fundamentalism; and
(2) two-tier fundamentalism.
5.3.1 Levels or Hierarchical Fundamentalism
Levels fundamentalism is the view that there are various levels of reality, that some of
these levels are more fundamental than others, and that there is one level that is the
most fundamental.9 Basically, the idea is that there is a hierarchy of levels and that
derivativeness and fundamentality can come in degrees; some levels and the entities on
those levels are more fundamental and thus also less derivative than others. The Schaf-
ferian GP-ist10 captures this view by talking about its key structural features, features he
thinks are essential to grounding, as opposed to dependence in general. Schaffer writes,
Grounding is an asymmetric, irreflexive, transitive relation. It thus induces a
partial ordering, whose minimal elements are the fundamental entities (the
ground of being, that on which all else depends). [2008b: 17]
He continues the same line of thought elsewhere, saying, “It thus induces a partial
ordering over the entities (the great chain of being), with foundations (the substances,
8One might interpret Barnes and others differently, perhaps as saying that fundamentality implies
something about truthmaking, rather than that it is part of fundamentalism that truthmaking is a
version of fundamentality. The way that I interpret the fundamentalist project and what I am arguing
against is the claim that truthmaking is a species of grounding which relates fundamental entities with
non-fundamental entities. This is a stronger claim than the claim that we can learn something about
the T-REL from understanding what fundamentality and grounding are. I assume, however, that the
stronger claim is what the fundamentalist wants to defend. The view that I defend is that truthmaking
is not a species of grounding (as understood by GP). This is compatible with the idea that we can learn
something about truthmaking in its contrast to grounding, which is an aim of this chapter.
9Cf. Cameron (2008e: 13), who argues that it is possible that “dependence never bottoms out in
fundamentality” (ibid.). However, he adds, “We have reason to think that our world is not like that”
(ibid.). Also, interestingly, Schaffer (2003: 498ff) rejects this fundamentalist picture on which there is a
fundamental level. Schaffer’s move towards fundamentalism, articulating a hierarchy with a fundamental
level, starts most explicitly with (2009: §3, 373ff), and continues as TF in (2010a: 311ff; among others).
10See especially (Schaffer 2008a: 307–316, 2008b: 17–19, 2009:passim).
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the foundation post for the great chain of being)” (2009: 376). He adds that grounding
has the same structural features as, and is “exactly like[,] the classical mereological
relation of having as a proper part [. . . ] whose ordering provably is well-founded (in fact
it provably has a unique foundation, the whole universe)” (ibid.). What these structural
features mean for the relation is that for some entities x, y, and z if x grounds y, then
y cannot ground x (asymmetry), x cannot be identical to y (irreflexivity), and if y
grounds z, then x grounds z (transitivity).11 What makes the levels-version distinctive
is that it interprets the transitivity feature of the grounding relation in such a way that
the fundamental grounds the derivative in a hierarchical way. The particular way the
relation is transitive allows for a structured hierarchy, with an absolute fundamental level
which serves as the foundation for all the other levels, which in turn are derivative and
vary in degrees of relative derivativeness and relative fundamentality.
5.3.2 Two-tier Fundamentalism
Two-tier fundamentalism holds that fundamentality does not come in degrees. Some-
thing is either fundamental or it is derivative. Barnes (2012) follows Schaffer in his
explication of the structural features of the grounding relation but interprets the transi-
tivity feature in a slightly different way. She writes,
Being derivative, in this characterization, is irreflexive, asymmetric, and tran-
sitive (but only trivially so, since you never get chains of derivativeness).
Derivative entities are derivative only on fundamental entities, never on other
derivative entities. [ibid.: 877]
The difference between the two views is clear enough.12 As I see it, we can put the
difference thus: fundamentality (or its opposite, derivativeness) comes in degrees on all
hierarchical versions of fundamentality, but both fundamentality and derivativeness are
absolute on the two-tier view. On the hierarchical view, there is an absolutely fundamen-
tal level, but it is one of many levels with a degree of fundamentality or derivativeness.
On one way to think about it, fundamentalia are absolute and derivativeness comes in
degrees, where some levels of derivativeness are further from the fundamental level than
others. Alternative versions might have fundamentality as coming in degrees. On the
11This account of grounding follows Schaffer (2009: §3, among others) and Barnes (2012: 877–878,
892–894), though their views diverge in important ways (see §5.3.2). Cf. Jenkins (2011: passim) rejects
this picture of the structure of grounding and dependence, and argues that grounding is not irreflexive
but quasi-reflexive (ibid.: 268–269, 274–275). Her argument is interesting because it shows how the
irreflexivity of grounding yields an incompatibility between dependence claims and identity claims. For
example, some philosophers claim that the mental depends on the physical, but also claim that they
are identical. The irreflexivity of a relation means that an entity cannot be related to itself by that
irreflexive relation. If grounding is irreflexive, then the mental and the physical cannot be identical if
one grounds the other. In this case, the mental/physical entity would ground itself. I agree with the
consensus that the grounding relation, if there is such a relation, is irreflexive. The result that I take
Jenkins’s paper to supply is the thought that if X depends on Y, X cannot be identical to Y, rather
than her conclusion, that dependence is not irreflexive.
12See (Barnes ibid.: 878) for a diagram which makes the difference even clearer.
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two-tier view, neither derivativeness nor fundamentality come in degrees; they are both
absolute features; something is either fundamental or it is derivative. Some of the differ-
ences I mark out here might just be differences in ways of speaking about derivative and
fundamental levels, where ‘degrees of derivativeness’ and ‘degrees of fundamentality’
pick out the same thing. Nonetheless, there are possible accounts where the differences
are real.
Despite these distinct versions of fundamentalism, the general picture as applied to
truthmaking is the same on both accounts: the TMKs are supposedly the fundamen-
tal entities, truths are derivative, and the relation which relates them is a species of
grounding. Whether or not two-tier or hierarchical fundamentalism is the right view of
fundamentality, TT is ill-suited as a species of fundamentality, and in particularT-REL
is not an instance of G-REL on either of these pictures. I shall explain why in turn.
5.3.3 Against Hierarchical TF
First, it is hard to make sense of the idea that T-REL yields a hierarchy of levels.
Although this seems to me false as well, let’s say that talk of levels is appropriate for
T-REL.13 T-REL can be construed as a two-tier or two-level relation which relates truths
at one level with TMKs at another. Even on the assumption that one of these levels is
more fundamental, where would the hierarchy lie? Even if we all generally agree that
there is a hierarchy of fundamental or derivative entities, the hierarchy at either the
level of truths or the level of TMKs would not have anything to do with the T-REL.
The hierarchy and differences in levels of fundamentality amongst real-world-TMKs does
not derive from their status as TMKs but rather from their G-RELs. Let’s assume that
T-REL is a G-REL. The G-RELs that relate TMKs with other TMKs (for example, the
table and its fundamental parts), and not to truths or TBRs, could not be the T-REL
since TMKs do not truthmake anything other than TBRs.14 It is clear then that T-REL
would be a special type of G-REL, very different from other G-RELs.
Any hierarchy (or differences) in levels of fundamentality amongst truths most plau-
sibly has to do with the G-RELs amongst their TMKs and has nothing to do with the
fact that these truths are related to their TMKs by T-REL. It is hard to see how there
is any sense in which there is a hierarchy amongst truths that is not derivative on the
hierarchy amongst their TMKs. So, if there is any hierarchy at all, most plausibly it
would be a hierarchy amongst TMKs. In fact, I see no reason to think that their status
as TBRs or truths, and their being in T-REL with TMKs, has any effect on any possible
hierarchy amongst the truths. The same goes with hierarchies amongst the TMKs, the
real world entities (and how things are with those entities) which can play the TMK-role.
13Talk of levels may be completely inappropriate for T-REL, as I suggest in §5.3.9.
14See Barnes’s (2012: 876–877) discussion of truthmaking as an example of what I take to be an
infelicitous use of the locution ‘to truthmake’, which misses the point I am making here.
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These might be related to other TMKs with G-RELs (e.g. constitution or essential de-
pendence), but I see no way that their status as TMKs or their being in T-REL with
TBRs has any effect on any fundamentality/derivativeness hierarchy. Whatever hierar-
chy there is amongst them derives from issues orthogonal to their being in a T-REL with
anything.15
Let’s say that some entities which are TMKs are more fundamental than others. The
fact that one entity is more fundamental than another doesn’t seem to have anything
to do with whether they make any truths true or not, and their relative fundamentality
doesn’t have any effect on their being TMKs or not. Let’s say that atomists are correct
and microscopic atomic entities are the most fundamental entities and that all macro-
scopic entities, which are ultimately composed out of the atomic entities, are derivative
and are more derivative depending on how similar they are to the atomic entities. Let’s
say that on this picture both the chair, which is a medium-sized macroscopic entity, and
the atoms out of which the chair is composed are separately TMKs for the TBR ‘the
chair exists’.16 The chair seems to be a TMK for the TBR ‘the chair exists’ whether or
not it is fundamental. Even though both are TMKs for the TBR, the hierarchy amongst
the two sets of TMKs has no bearing on their status as TMKs. There doesn’t seem
to be any good reason to think that either TMK is a better TMK than the other. If
anything, the chair, the less fundamental entity, seems better suited as a TMK than the
atoms for the truth ‘the chair exists’ since the statement is strictly speaking not about
atoms but about the chair, which happens to be made out of atoms. But, whether or
not one level is better suited as a TMK, the hierarchical relations that the two TMKs
have in terms of their relative fundamentality doesn’t translate into a hierarchy amongst
TMKs, as TMKs.
In fact, if we leave aside aboutness for the moment, one might ask a further question
about the relevance of the fundamentality hierarchies for truthmaking. According to
the fundamentalist atomist the atoms are more fundamental than the chairs which they
compose. As I have pointed out, it is not clear that the atoms are better candidates
than the chair for being the TMKs for the claim that the chair exists. But, we can
ask the same question concerning the claim that the atoms exist. The fundamentalist
somehow also needs to explain why one cannot say that the chair itself makes true the
claim that the atoms out of which it is composed exist. So long as the atoms are atoms
in the chair, it isn’t clear that the fundamentalist has a good explanation of why the
atoms are better candidates than the chair to be the TMKs for the claim that those
atoms exist. Even if we assume, for the sake of argument, that atoms are fundamental,
it is very unclear why their status as fundamental entities make them better candidates
for truthmaking.
However, if we think about truthmaking in terms of, or at least as having a close
15My argument in §5.3.4 strengthens my skepticism that T-REL has any effect on such hierarchies.
16I assume this, because, remember, I am exploring the plausibility of a multi-layered hierarchy here.
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link with, aboutness, it is clear why the chair is ruled out as the TMK for the claim that
those atoms exist: the claim is not about the chair which those atoms compose, but it is
specifically about the atoms. On this alternative account, the atoms are not the TMKs
for that claim because they are what is fundamental, but because they are what the claim
is about. The main point here is that it isn’t clear, without further explanation from
the fundamentalist, why the fundamental hierarchy amongst the entities (understood
independently of their role as TMKs) has any bearing on which candidate TMKs are
better suited as truthmakers for the specific claims that they are supposed to make true
(though we might better understand17 why fundamental entities are good realitymakers,
together with G-RELs, of derivative entities).
Perhaps the atomist, as a hierarchical fundamentalist, thinks that T-REL is a species
of grounding where only the absolute fundamental level can serve as TMKs. This would
mean however, that the hierarchical fundamentalist doesn’t think that the hierarchical
structure of fundamentality is appropriate for truthmaking. Instead, T-REL, as the
hierarchical fundamentalist would then have to concede, is a two-tier relation. And that
has its own problems as I’ll now explain.
5.3.4 Against Two-tier TF 1: Aboutness as More Modest
Before going into the other problems for two-tier TF, I want to explain how this view can
address the problem I raised for hierarchical TF. Barnes (2012) clearly states the two-tier
TF-ist position when she writes, “For any derivative entity x, ‘x exists’ is true but made
true, not by x, but by some collection of fundamental entities y1. . . yn” (ibid.: 877).
A consequence of this is that no tables, assuming that they are derivative and not
fundamental, make true TBRs such as ‘tables exists’. What makes such TBRs true
are fundamentalia. In her discussion she considers a theory on which only tropes are
fundamental, so I’ll use that example for now.
An initial problem with this view is that, assuming that tables exist and are part of our
ontology albeit as non-fundamental entities, there does not seem to be any good reason
to rule out tables as TMKs. It should be clear that we can rule out eliminativists from
our discussion. We are considering what the TMKs are for TBRs such as ‘tables exist’.
An eliminativist about tables should say that such TBRs are false anyway. If tables do
not exist, then TBRs such as ‘tables exist’ should not be true on any reasonable theory.18
Given that tables exist and are presumably not fundamental, the TF-ist would have to
explain why being non-fundamental rules them out as TMKs. Many TT-ists allow that
TBRs have multiple TMKs (see §1.5); in fact this is the central characteristic feature of
17I only claim that the general idea might be better understandable. As the essays on “reality-making”
in Jago (2016) attest, how exactly we should understand the reality-making of derivative entities by
fundamental entities is a complicated matter, without anything close to a consensus.
18I briefly discuss such less-than-reasonable, though influential, theories in §5.3.5, and more exten-
sively in §6.
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TT which Armstrong thinks marks it out as a different theory from (and an improvement
on) CT. Even if the TF-ist is right that fundamentalia make TBRs true, if TBRs can
have multiple TMKs, then it seems tenuous to say that TBRs about derivative entities
cannot have the derivative entities they are about as one of its multiple TMKs. This is
clear especially because a virtue of TAAT is that with A-REL we already have an intuitive
and semantically respectable link between TBRs and the world. Thus, thinking of T-REL
as complementing A-REL is comparatively modest. By contrast to thinking of T-REL
in terms of A-REL, thinking of T-REL in terms of G-REL has no precedent in semantic
theory. In fact, it seems much more natural to think that the table is the TMK for the
TBR ‘this table exists’. The TBR is about a particular table and not about tropes or
subatomic particles or any other supposedly fundamental entities. Tables are plausibly
related to their constituent fundamentalia via the relation of constitution, which is most
plausibly a sort of G-REL. If indeed the constituent fundamentalia are TMKs for the
same TBRs, it seems more natural to think that this is in virtue of the fact that they
are what happen to constitute the table. This makes it that if the fundamentalia play a
role in truthmaking at all, this is derivative from the G-RELs between the fundamentalia
and the TMKs that the TBRs are about.19 Whatever role, if any, fundamentalia play, if
non-fundamentals count as TMKs at all, then TF is false. Given the intuitive appeal of
this alternative story making tables more natural and plausible TMKs, we would need
strong reasons to deny that this is the right story.
5.3.5 Reply & Response: Deflationary vs Inflationist Fundamen-
tality
At this point, the TF-ist might reply that there is an interpretation of AC (§2.2) where
TF can accommodate the intuitiveness of TMKs being what TBRs are about. They
might claim that when they speak about a particular table, they are talking about
something that consists in fundamentalia, and that in this sense, they are speaking
about fundamentalia.
We can see what is wrong with this move when we recall my discussion of derivative
aboutness in §2.4.2.2. Just to recap, on my account, the fundamental story contains
what Quine calls collateral information, that is, mere background information that is not
the information conveyed in the TBR itself. The information about fundamentalia and
about fundamentality only comes with further TBRs, which are strictly and fully about
what is fundamental. What a TBR is strictly and fully about is captured by the TBR’s
non-collateral information. The TBR is not about any further entities (and how they
are) to which they might be related, and is not about any other properties or relations
that the entities described might instantiate other than the ones explicitly discussed in
the TBR. The full content of the TBR has no information about fundamentalia or
19See my discussion of derivative aboutness in §2.4.2.2.
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fundamental relations. At best, the TBRs are only derivatively about the fundamentalia
which ground the TMKs which the TBRs are strictly and fully about.
Barnes, who I mentioned at the beginning of this section, might be able to reply
to my objection here. Her overall position might be a version of what Solodkoff and
Woodward (2013: 566ff) call “deflationary” fundamentality (D-FUND), on which one is
concerned with contrasting descriptions of reality, which consists only of fundamentalia.20
For D-FUND-ists, reality is such that there are no tables. ‘Tables exist’ is true, but the
only ontology that’s out there to make it true is fundamental ontology (in the above
description, tropes-ontology) since the derivative objects (the tables) don’t really exist.
So, when I say that the table seems to be a TMK for ‘the table exists’, the D-FUND-ist
would flatly deny this, since given her ontology there are no tables to make the TBR
true. Instead, fundamentalia are the best candidates for truthmaking since they are the
only candidates.21
This contrasts with a radically distinct picture that Solodkoff and Woodward (ibid.)
call “inflationist” fundamentality (I-FUND), of which the main philosophers I discuss in
this chapter such as Schaffer are proponents.22 I-FUND-ists think that reality includes
both fundamental and derivative entities, and are not concerned with ordering descrip-
tions, but rather with ordering reality. On this view, tables exist but are derivative
entities, not just objects of derivative descriptions. The I-FUND-ist cannot just flatly
deny that the table seems to be not only a perfectly good but a better, more natural,
candidate–TMK for TBRs such as ‘the table exists’. Given her ontology, there are tables,
but they do not make true TBRs about them; only fundamental reality makes true any
and all truths. Against the background of what I have argued in this section, it seems
clear that SAC is a more modest, and hence more preferable, account to TF.
As should be clear from my position that TT-ists should not build into TT any
metaphysical commitments (this becomes even clearer in §6, on cheaters), I have no issue
on TT-grounds with D-FUND-ists. I hereby restrict my discussion of TF to I-FUND, not
D-FUND.
5.3.6 Against Two-tier TF 2: The Falsity Paradox of TF
Even though T-REL is more plausibly a two-tier relation which relates entities at two
levels (the level of TMKs and the level of the TBRs) rather than hierarchically, I shall
argue, in the next sections, that it does not have a two-tier structure either.
First, if we follow my reasoning, on at least one plausible understanding of what
distinguishes the fundamentalists’ two levels (the fundamental level and the derivative
20This view is most explicitly defended by Williams (2010: 103ff; 2012: 169ff), but also by Cameron
(2010a: 249ff), Melia (2005: 67ff), Sider (2012: 348 and §8; and 2013: 241ff).
21For instance, Cameron (2010b: 16ff) argues that fundamentalia or what he calls “real existents
[what really exists] are the truthmakers for the true sentences of English” (ibid.: 16).
22Barnes herself is explicitly neutral about I-FUND and D-FUND (2012: 879). So, I don’t attribute
either view to her.
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level), applying their structure to T-REL leads to an unsettling paradox. Schaffer claims
that the ontologically prior foundations, the entities at the fundamental level, are “the
basic, ungrounded entities” (2014: §3.1.2).23 He even defines the notions of “fundamental
entity” and “derivative entity” in terms of whether or not the entities are grounded; he
provides these definitions (2009: 373):
Fundamental: x is fundamental =df nothing grounds x.
Derivative: x is derivative =df something grounds x.
Thus, on this criterion, something is fundamental iff it is not grounded by anything. A
consequence of this is that if something is ungrounded, then it is fundamental.
On this very standard account, TBRs which are not grounded in reality would be
fundamental. But, presumably, TBRs which are not grounded in reality are falsehoods.
According to the TF-ist, falsehoods just are TBRs which are ungrounded, while truths
are TBRs which are grounded in reality. But, on Schaffer’s definition of fundamentality,
something which is ungrounded is more fundamental than something which is grounded.
This would yield the counterintuitive and paradoxical result that falsehoods are more
fundamental than truths. It is an unattractive account of fundamentality which has the
consequence that falsehoods are more fundamental than truths. So, at least on one
account of fundamentality, TF leads to an unsettling paradox.
One potential response might be that a TF-ist should not claim that falsehoods are
ungrounded. Rather, a much more sensible position might be that truths are grounded
in their TMKs, whilst falsehoods are also grounded in reality, perhaps a totality fact or
the absence of their TMKs.24 However, this response is unsatisfactory. The response,
which is a standard extension of the normal metaphysically substantial account of TT, is
faced with accounting for not just negative truths but falsehoods in terms of positively
existing absences or mysterious totality facts. Recall §3.2 for the standard P-NEG.
But the problem goes even deeper. Not only would they have to claim that absences,
negative facts, or totality facts (and hence also incompatibility facts) exist as the standard
metaphysically extravagant accounts of TT would, but the TF-ist would have to claim
that they exist fundamentally. T-NEC-ists have a hard enough time convincing skeptics
to accept absences and negative facts; no one would accept such entities as fundamental.
Another potential response would be to deny that T-REL is a species of G-REL of the
same sort as the G-REL in play when chairs are grounded by the atoms out of which they
are composed (or in Schaffer’s metaphysics, the G-REL in play when chairs are grounded
in the-world-as-a-whole25). If G-REL and T-REL are different relations, then the fact
23Another example is Bennett (2011: 27) who explicitly states that by ‘fundamental’ she means
‘ungrounded’. She requires this sense of ‘fundamental’ to generate the particular puzzles she discusses.
24I owe consideration of this suggestion to helpful comments made by an anonymous referee atMIND.
25See (Schaffer 2010b: 65) for an extended defence of “priority monism”, which is “the doctrine that
the cosmos is the one and only basic actual concrete object, prior to any of its proper parts” (ibid.).
This doctrine is contrasted with views such as “existence monism” (Horgan and Potrč 2008, 2012),
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that a falsehood is not made true by reality would not have the consequence that it is
in any way more fundamental than any truths. However, this result is incompatible with
TF, which requires that T-REL is a species of G-REL no different than other G-RELs.
Another response to this argument could be that there are other criteria for funda-
mentality which would block the paradoxical result. One could claim that the argument
rests too much on the criterion that what is ungrounded is fundamental. Schaffer (2013),
for instance, uses another criterion to capture what it is for something to be fundamen-
tal. Discussing what he calls “Leibnizian Substance,” he explores and uses the notion
of ‘substance’, which he defines thus: “Something is a substance if and only if it is a
fundamental and integrated thing” (ibid.: 68).26 He explains that the notion of Leib-
nizian substance connects the notion of substance with the notion of fundamental law,
adding that “a substance must evolve by the fundamental laws, by which I mean that
a substance must be such that plugging its state at any given time into the fundamen-
tal laws correctly predicts its actual behaviour” (ibid.: 68–9).27 Thus, someone following
Schaffer’s usage here might try to argue that to be fundamental is to evolve by the
fundamental laws.
It is difficult to see, however, how this criterion of fundamentality can help the
TF-ist. Presumably, falsehoods would not be fundamental on this account because they
are not subject to the fundamental laws—blocking the move I made in the argument.
This criterion of fundamentality, however, does not help us understand why truths are
grounded while falsehoods are not. TBRs are presumably not the kinds of things which
evolve under the fundamental laws generally. For example, it does not really make sense
to say that TBRs evolve at all. One might say that a sentence evolves because its
meaning and aboutness might change over time. However, (1) it would not make sense
to say that other TBRs such as propositions evolve or change at all. And (2), the type
of change involved here doesn’t seem to be the type of change involved with evolution
according to the fundamental laws. At best what is involved in such cases is evolution
which is the strictly stronger view that the-world-as-a-whole, the cosmos, is the only concrete object
— it is stronger because existence monism entails priority monism but not vice-versa.
26By ‘integrated’ he means what some call a “substantial unity.” He quotes Aristotle to help clarify
what this means: “that which is compounded out of something so that the whole is one – not like
a heap, but like a syllable” (1984a: 1644). Something has a substantial unity or is integrated if it
is a simple, and thus is not composed of anything, or if it is composed of parts in such a way that
the parts compose a whole new object, in the vein of van Inwagen’s (1990: 20, 31) so-called “Special
Composition Question.” Van Inwagen’s answer (ibid.: §12), just to present an illustrative example, is
that several objects [x, y, z ] compose another object r if the objects jointly constitute a life, that is, a
living organism.
27Although I explore how one might respond to my arguments by exploring this definition, I want to
remark that I think these are interesting claims outside of the context of this discussion. If we thought
that the fundamental laws are physical laws, then presumably everything which evolves and is subject
to the physical laws will have evolved with the fundamental laws and hence would be fundamental (as
long as it is also integrated). Since everything that exists presumably evolved with the fundamental
laws, everything is fundamental (as long as it is also an integrated unity). It is clear that many things
are integrated unities. Thus, even if we concede to van Inwagen and accept his answer to the Special
Composition Question, then everything that is simple or alive is fundamental.
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according to social laws concerning linguistic communities. One might think that the
criterion helps to explain what TMKs can be on their account, that is, the TF-ist seems
to require that TMKs are entities which evolve by fundamental laws. However, I do
not see any reason to make such a restriction on TMKs. For one, it goes no way
into elucidating how T-REL at all has a structure similar to other G-RELs. In fact,
this criterion of fundamentality helps to show that we might just be talking about very
different relations. This criterion might help to explain what entities are fundamental, but
it neither explains how fundamental entities are related to non-fundamental entities, nor
does it explain how either of them are related to TBRs. This account of fundamentality
in fact does not use any notion of grounding at all in elucidating what a substance is or
what is fundamental. At best, the alternative criterion is completely orthogonal to the
issues that we are considering now.
The main point I want to draw from this discussion is this. If the TF-ist wants
to put T-REL in terms of fundamentality, she cannot just subsume truthmaking under
the fundamentalist flag and explain that T-REL is just a primitive, unanalysable species
of grounding, as Barnes, Schaffer, and other fundamentalists seem to want to do when
listing their favourite instances of grounding. That would be ad hoc. Given the variety of
accounts of grounding and fundamentality, she would need to go some way in explaining
how it is at all similar, especially given the differences that I have pointed out up until
now. One cannot just assume that T-REL is a species of G-REL.
5.3.7 Against Two-tier TF 3: Intentionality and Fundamentality
Second, even though T-REL is more plausibly a two-tier relation, it doesn’t seem ap-
propriate to call either truths or TMKs more fundamental than each other. Truths are
just TBRs (sentences, propositions, statements, etc.) which are true. Assuming that all
TBRs need to exist to be either true or false, it doesn’t seem appropriate to say that
they are any less fundamental than the TMKs which make them true. Just because they
are linguistic or mental entities does not provide any a priori or even empirical reason
why they should be ruled out as fundamental. In short, if anything is fundamental, why
not TBRs?
In fact, the assumption that TBRs are any less fundamental than any other entity,
such as, say, atoms or Leibnizian monads or the Spinozan world-as-a-whole, opens up
a whole set of problems which I think no one in this debate has adequately dealt with.
TBRs, by virtue of being about things, have intentionality. How anything has semantic
properties such as being about something (e.g. turtles), as famously stated by Fodor,
“proves permanently recalcitrant to integration in the natural order” (1984: 232).28 In-
deed, there is no agreed upon or convincing reduction available of the intentional to any
other order. Chalmers (2012: 274–279) calls the problem of grounding intentionality one
28I do not use this quotation as evidence for, but rather as an expression of, my skepticism.
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of the “hard cases” (ibid.: 261).29 For instance, he diagnoses Kripke’s version of Wittgen-
stein’s rule-following argument (Kripke 1982) as turning on the idea that no reductive
analysis of intentionality can be given in non-intentional terms (Chalmers ibid.: 275).
Chalmers also considers the idea that “physical and phenomenal information underde-
termines belief [that is, intentional] content” (ibid.).30 Thus, on pain of misconstruing
this hard case as an easy problem, it seems that one cannot merely assume that the
intentional is reducible to any other order. The question of whether intentionality is fun-
damental is of course an interesting and important topic, itself suitable for book-length
treatment.
In general, one cannot merely assume that the intentional is not fundamental, nor
reducible to any other order. For there is nothing odd about intentionality that makes
it important or urgent that we find some way to reduce it, or make it non-fundamental.
Fodor, for instance, is raising a problem for physicalists who are also intentional realists.
Physicalism is the view that all the fundamental features of the world are physical. As
a physicalist, one must give a physicalist explanation of intentionality, a feature of the
world that classically has been taken to be non-physical and by some, including the
philosopher who re-introduced the notion to philosophy, Brentano (1874: 88–89), as the
mark of the mental.31 One can do this, for instance, by explaining how intentionality is
a feature of physical states, making it plausible to think that the intentionality of mental
states or linguistic entities can be understood as being physical as well.32 In either case,
the intentional realist might very well be correct and intentionality might be a sui generis
feature of the world that is not grounded in the physical or any other realm. Instead,
as the intentional realist might claim, intentionality is the mark of the mental, as an
independent realm or level of reality. On the other side, the naturalist or physicalist
29In particular, it is a hard case for Chalmer’s (ibid.) fundamentalist project, which aims to construct
a theory of the world based on fundamental truths, from which all other truths are derivable, a priori.
30Famously, he argues that the phenomenal is not reducible to the physical (or otherwise fundamen-
tal). See (Chalmers and Jackson 2001: 315ff), (Chalmers 1996), (Jackson 1994, 1998). They argue that
reductive explanations of the phenomenal fail. However, see (Snowdon 2010) for an extended critique
of the notion that experience can be characterised as being something that it is like for someone to
undergo. If Snowdon is right and experience cannot be characterised in this way, then there is no point
in trying to reduce this feature of experience to anything else. The what-it-is-like-ness of experience is
not the same as the intentionality of experience (understood as the way experience relates to the rest
of the world), which is my concern here.
31See (Brentano 1874: 88ff) and (Chisholm 1957: §12); Chisholm argues that Brentano’s thesis is
correct on the basis that intentional vocabulary cannot be reduced to non-intentional vocabulary. Crane
famously calls this “Brentano’s Thesis” (2001: vii).
32See (Martin 2008: especially 150f) for an account like this, on which intentionality is a perfectly
natural phenomenon exhibited in anything with dispositionality. For example, sugar’s disposition to
dissolve in water is in some ways about the potential manifestations that occur when water and sugar
are put in the right situation where the disposition can be manifested. Or see (Dretske 1980, 1981, 1995)
for an information-theoretic proposal which argues that anything that carries any sort of information has
some degree of intentionality. In short, some system S carries information about B if there is a nomic
relation between S ’s being A and the instantiation of B. For example, fire carries information about
smoke, because something’s being on fire is nomically related to the instantiation of smoke. Both these
models are attempts to “naturalize” intentionality. Whether or not the intentionality of such things as
beliefs or statements can be accounted for in these ways is an open question. And that is my point.
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might be correct and intentionality might actually just be part of the physical world. In
both cases, intentional entities could be fundamental and part of the ultimate furniture
of the world.
Indeed the fact that it has proved so recalcitrant to integration might be because
it is fundamental and cannot be accounted for in other terms. Of course, the recent
enthusiasm for grounding is in part motivated by the idea that non-reducible realms can
be argued to be non-fundamental. For instance, a non-reductive physicalist can argue
that the mental is not reducible to the physical but is grounded in the physical. But,
recent enthusiasm for grounding has not produced any successful attempts to ground
intentionality in the non-intentional or in anything else. One might want to be an anti-
realist about the intentional and explain away the appearance of intentionality altogether
or one might want to explain how intentional entities such as TBRs, true or false, are not
fundamental. Whatever strategy one takes to deny that intentionality is fundamental,
the issue is far from settled. So, one cannot just assume, as the TF-ist seems to, that
neither intentionality, nor intentional states, are fundamental.
5.3.8 Against Two-tier TF 4: Problematic Examples
Finally, another more specific problem is that there are plenty of problematic examples,
which undermine the assumption that TMKs are more fundamental than truths or TBRs.
Specifically, there are cases which immediately suggest that T-REL can be reflexive while
G-REL is clearly irreflexive in those cases. For example, some truths such as ‘This TBR
exists’ are about themselves.33 In such cases, neither the TBR nor the TMK can be more
fundamental than the other because they are identical.34
One might object that the problem with these kinds of cases is the same as or
analogous to other classical problems with reflexive TBRs. For example, liar TBRs such
as ‘This TBR is false’ seem to lead to paradox. A standard response is to prohibit such
self-reference as yielding ill-formed TBRs.35 However, this response does not work in the
kind of case that I present. The problem that I raise does not just rely on some general
trickiness inherent to all reflexive TBRs, which would be resolved by the same solutions
as to the Liar. Unlike the liar-TBR, ‘This TBR exists’ is clearly a perfectly well-formed
TBR. Of course, it is true and makes itself true as soon as it exists. Because of this,
such TBRs might be trivial. But, unlike the liar-TBRs, this kind of reflexive TBR makes
33Interestingly, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015: §5) also discusses reflexivity in a similar context. However,
he (ibid.: 11–12) argues that G-REL is in general not irreflexive because (1) T-REL is a species of
G-REL and (2) on the basis of similar cases, T-REL is clearly irreflexive. I obviously do not accept
this argument because I deny that T-REL is a species of G-REL. I follow Fine (2010: 100), Raven
(2013: 193–194), Schaffer (2009: 364), Audi (2012a: 102; 2012b: 691–692), and Rosen (2010: 115–116)
who all argue that G-REL is irreflexive.
34See my §1.2.1–1.2.2 and §2.5 for reasons why I think cases such as this do not threaten the general
asymmetry of T-REL.
35See Fumerton (2002: 14) for discussion.
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perfect sense and doesn’t lead to paradox.
There are also other example TBRs which illustrate that there does not seem to be
any prima facie reason for thinking that TMKs are more fundamental than truths or
TBRs. Take for example, the truth ‘You, the reader of this sentence, exist’. This truth
does not seem less fundamental than the person, you, whom the truth is about and who
makes the truth true. Let’s say that you are more fundamental than the TBR. Even
then, it is clear that this has little to do with T-REL. It would not be because you make
the TBR true that you are more fundamental than the TBR. For instance, it is not
a consequence of TD, the intuition that TBRs depends on reality for their truth, that
you would be more fundamental. For TD is compatible with non-grounding accounts of
dependence. Rather, your relative fundamentality would most plausibly have to do with
some more general fundamentality facts concerning humans and how linguistic entities
are social constructs which ontologically depend in some relevant way on communities
of language-users, such as humans. TD is very unlikely to be the relevant notion of
dependence.
Although there may be more ways that the TF-ist could respond to these cases, they
at least add to the challenges that I have presented for them.
5.3.9 General Moral of this Discussion: Varieties of Dependence
The general moral of this discussion is that even though dependence seems to be a right
way to understand the relation between truth and reality, and there is something correct
about the claim that truths depend for their truth on reality, G-REL and fundamentality
do not seem to be helpful notions here. There are plenty of other ways that things
can depend on each other. For instance, married couples are mutually interdependent,36
children depend on their parents to lead healthy and happy lives. The dependency in these
cases is not asymmetric, and hence not a species of grounding. The metaphysical notion
of fundamentality and grounding seems completely inappropriate here. Even though the
dependence between truths and TMKs is generally asymmetric in some important sense,
there is no reason to think that TMKs are in general or ever any more fundamental
than TBRs, even if the latter depend on the former for their truth. The dependency
intuition that truths depend on reality, which ignited the literature on truthmaking, can
be accounted for in other ways than by grounding or fundamentality, namely in terms of
aboutness, as I have tried to make convincing in the last few chapters.
Lastly, as a consequence of the discussion of these past sections, one might become
skeptical about whether talk of levels is at all appropriate for TT. Although there is a
dependence relation between truths and TMKs, as I have argued, neither seems to be
more fundamental than the other. TBRs which are related to their TMKs by T-REL
36See Thompson (2016: 47ff) for an extended discussion of interdependence and three arguments in
defence of theories of grounding based on what she calls “metaphysical interdependence” (ibid.).
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depend-for-their-truth on these TMKs. But, this does not put them at any other level
than the TMKs. By analogy, just because the moon depends-for-its-visibility on the sun
and its position in relation to perceivers, this fact does not make the moon any less
fundamental or any more derivative, or put it on any other sort of level than either the
sun, us perceivers, or our positions. My suggestion is that talk of levels is completely
inappropriate, whether hierarchical or two-tier.
5.4 Specific Accounts of TF
I have now provided some general criticisms of the TF-ist approach, on structural
grounds, on grounds to do with the internal incoherence and the paradoxicality of cer-
tain important versions of TF, on grounds to do with intentionality, and by explaining
why SAC is more attractively modest. Now, I want to briefly discuss two main specific
versions of TF. I’ll start with Schaffer’s account.
5.4.1 Specific Accounts 1: The Case of Schaffer’s TGro and the
Modest Usefulness of Truthmaking
Schaffer generalises his view of TT with what he calls TruthGrounding (TGro):
TGro: (∀p)( ∀w) (if p is true at w then (∃x) (x is fundamental at w & x grounds the
truth of p at w)). (∃X s) (every one of the X s is fundamental, and the X s are a
total ground for the truth of p at w). [2008a: 311]
TGro is clearly a version of TF since it captures both (1) the idea that x, the TMK,
grounds the truth of p; and (2) that everything that is an x and hence everything that
is a TMK must be fundamental (and not derivative). Schaffer also puts it more simply:
TGro[*]: (∀p) (∀w) (if p is true at w, then p’s truth at w is grounded in the fundamental
features of w). [2008b: 10]
TGro is Schaffer’s way of formulating T-REL explicitly in terms of G-REL and in terms
of fundamentals. The relevant difference for us between TGro and TGro* is just that
TGro explicitly quantifies over truth-grounds or TMKs and goes beyond BATT by saying
more about the quantified X s, specifically, that they are the total ground for the truth
of p at w.
It is clear from TGro and TGro* that Schaffer thinks that TMKs need to be fun-
damental and that only fundamental entities constitute the total grounds for the truth
of TBRs. Thus any argument that presents examples of TMKs which are not funda-
mental or are not the total grounds for the truth of some p at w would constitute a
counterexample to his account.
Prima facie, TGro, as an account of T-REL, is clearly incompatible with SAC. On
no (popular) account are artefacts such as tables fundamental. But the TBR ‘the table
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is black’ is strictly and fully about a table, and its being black. According to SAC, the
table’s being black is its TMK. According to TGro, since the TBR is true at w, whatever
the TMK x is, it must be fundamental at w and a total ground of the TBR at w. Thus,
whatever is the TMK for this TBR according to TGro it is not the table’s being black.
So, TGro and SAC yield different results. Thus, TGro is clearly incompatible with SAC.
A consequence of this is either that SAC or that TGro is not essential to TT. I have
been arguing the first and continue to argue the latter.
So far, my examples of fundamentality assumed that smaller things are more fun-
damental than bigger things. Perhaps the opposite understanding of fundamentality,
though more radical, might fare better. Schaffer has such a radical view of what is fun-
damental. He doesn’t think that there are fundamental Xs. Rather, the-world-as-a-whole
is what makes true all truths, and is the one, single fundamental X.37 His view is called
priority monism. Its central claim is that the-world-as-a-whole is the only fundamental
entity, and that everything else, including entities such as you or I, neither of whom
consist in the entire universe-or-world-as-a-whole, is derivative of the-world-as-a-whole.
This view, in part, is a consequence of both his account of grounding and his account
of what can constitute a total ground for something. There is no need to dispute these
claims concerning what is fundamental here. But, I’ll briefly raise a relevant prima facie
problem with thinking that the-world-as-a-whole is the only TMK for all truths.
Understanding that a truth is related to TMKs by T-REL, as I understand these
notions, is supposed to be (at least somewhat) useful.38 However, if there is but one
all-encompassing TMK which makes true all and every truth, TT loses its usefulness.
the-world-as-a-whole would make true TBRs as diverse as ‘The winner of the 100 metre
men’s singles race at the 2012 London Olympics was Jamaican’, ‘Vasco da Gama’s
fleet landed in Kappadu, India on May 20, 1498’, and ‘Carbon atoms in graphene are
arranged in a hexagonal pattern’. All three of these TBRs are true, but that is about
all that they have in common. It seems quite clear that it is not useful to explain that
the-world-as-a-whole makes true each of these truths, other than to emphasise that the-
world-as-a-whole is the only thing that’s fundamental and that all truths are grounded in
the-world-as-a-whole. Since TT-ists want the notion of truthmaking to be more useful
than just to support Schaffer’s overall metaphysics of fundamentality, they should reject
TGro as capturing T-REL.
The Schafferian has a reply. She might say that she can explain more precisely how
the-world-as-a-whole makes true each of the TBRs listed above in such a way as to make
it clear that whatever usefulness conditions there are, they can be fulfilled. Specifically,
the-world-as-a-whole contains different entities such as the recent winner of the 100
metre men’s singles race and the structure of carbon atoms. Each of these entities is
37See (Schaffer 2010a and 2010b).
38As I argue in the rest of the chapters in this dissertation, it is only modestly useful, but that’s useful
enough to make my point here.
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part of the-world-as-a-whole. But, it is the-world-as-a-whole’s having such-and-such a
property or containing such-and-such derivative entities that grounds such truths as da
Gama’s fleet arriving in India. Importantly, the world does not have this property and
these entities contained within it because da Gama landed; rather, da Gama landed
because the world has the property and these entities. To address the usefulness worry,
the Schafferian will cite very specific facts about the properties of the world, and thereby
try to match the informativeness of citing specific properties about smaller entities.
Thus, it is in virtue of the fact that the-world-as-a-whole is the way it is, and not that
things are the way that they are with da Gama, that the truths are true.
This response however is inadequate and does not solve the problem of the usefulness
of truthmaking. The Schafferian will deny that it is in virtue of da Gama’s fleet having
arrived in India on a certain day that the-world-as-a-whole is the TMK for the TBR
above. But why aren’t the apparently derivative properties and entities of the-world-as-
a-whole the TMKs rather than the-world-as-a-whole? Even if the Schafferian is right and
the-world-as-a-whole grounds those derivative facts, the-world-as-a-whole seems to be
deriving its status-as-a-TMK from the more specific properties and entities concerning da
Gama. The Schafferian TF-ist would reject the idea that those more specific properties
and smaller entities are the TMK(s) solely because they are derivative. But this seems
wrong, because even if they are derivative entities, the apparently more fundamental
entity, that is, the-world-as-a-whole, derives its TMK-status from it. Opting for the
less fundamental but more specific TMKs, for example the ones involving da Gama
rather than the-world-as-a-whole in this case, as the main TMKs, seems to be a better
motivated option. The far simpler option is to adopt SAC. SAC explicitly captures
why da Gama, his fleet, and the relevant properties of these things, are the primary
TMKs for TBRs about them, rather than the other entities such as the-world-as-a-whole
which contains these entities and has the same properties. The TBRs are strictly and
fully about those more specific and smaller entities, and not strictly and fully about
the perhaps more fundamental entities, the-world-as-a-whole which contains these more
specific and smaller entities. Even if Schaffer is right about which entities are more
fundamental, it seems simpler to think that the-world-as-a-whole derives its TMK-status
from its specific properties and the perhaps more derivative entities contained within it.
Holding on to TGro despite this problem is biting a bullet that is clearly too hard.
So, Schaffer’s version of TF, based on what he takes to be fundamental, namely the-
world-as-a-whole, poses no serious threat to SAC.
5.4.2 Specific Accounts 2: Heil’s Moderate TT as TF
Heil’s version of TT, which also emphasises fundamentality, is somewhat less radical
than Schaffer’s because he is not a priority monist. As I already explained in §3.2, Heil
(2000) is taken to be a TT-moderate, who like Mellor (2012a), rejects T-M, restricting
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the TMK-principle to only require TMKs for truths that are not complete truth functions
of other TBRs (Mellor 2012a: 96). Despite this moderation, his view of T-REL itself is
a version of TF. To make this clear, let’s start with a quote from Heil (2003):
I am inclined to think that ‘this is a statue’ can be, and often is, literally true.
What makes it true is a complex, dynamic arrangement of particles [. . . ] We
cannot hope to paraphrase, translate, or replace talk of statues with talk of
such collections. Even so, it seems clear that, with few exceptions, objects
like statues that populate our everyday surroundings owe their existence to
arrangements of more ultimate constituents. [2003: 53–54]
There are a few revealing elements to this quotation. First, Heil is not an error theorist
concerning talk that does not directly concern what he might call the “ultimate con-
stituents” of reality—he does not deny that TBRs such as ‘this is a statue’ are literally
true. Second, he is not a reductionist about such TBRs either. Talk of tables is not
reducible, in any way, to talk of ultimate reality. As he puts it, “we cannot hope to para-
phrase, translate, or replace talk of statues with talk of such collections” (ibid.). These
strategies are strategies of reduction, which according to Heil (ibid.) all fail because they
are linguistic strategies. The more important, pseudo-reductionist, strategy is what he
takes to be the hard-hitting, real world strategy of truthmaking. Which brings us to the
third, and most important, element: Heil thinks that truthmaking does the work that
perhaps one had hoped reductionism would do. Talk of non-ultimate reality is made true
by ultimate reality, and this is, as we can gather from the paragraph above, at least in
part because things such as tables and statues owe their existence to “arrangements of
more ultimate constituents” (ibid.). With truthmaking, the talk concerning tables and
chairs can be (1) literally true, while (2) being immune to any linguistic reduction, but
still not inflating our ontology with non-ultimate entities, since (3) the talk is made true
only by ultimate constituents.
Heil is one of the standard-bearers of the so-called reality-first, not language-first,
approach to inquiry.39 And, TF is one of its main standards, that is, one of the main tools
that he uses in this reality-first approach.40 Heil (2012: 191ff) argues that ontology is the
study of TMKs and not just the study of all that exists, what someone following Quine
(1948) would call understanding the “ontological commitments” of our best theories of
the world. He writes:
39In short, the language-first approach assumes that language is a guide to knowledge of reality, while
reality-first assumes that there is a way of accessing reality directly and not via language. This debate
is rich and complicated. I am sympathetic to the reality-first approach because I think that we can
gain knowledge of the world more directly than via language by for instance perceiving it. However,
I disagree with the reality-first approach because I think that it is obvious that language is indeed a guide
to reality; it is where our information and knowledge about the world, passed down from generation to
generation, is encoded. The genealogy of words, philology, and understanding ordinary usage, although
not the only guides to reality, as the ordinary language philosophers might think (though, I think this
is a popular misconception of their position), are definitely very fruitful sources of information and
knowledge. It seems to me that completely doing away with ordinary language is a mistake.
40This approach originates in work by Martin and Heil (especially, 1999), which announces the end
of the linguistic turn (they call it Linguisticism [ibid.: 36]) in philosophy.
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Ontology enters only when you turn your attention to the nature of the
truthmakers. Knowing what truths you accept is one thing; knowing what
it is about the universe in virtue of which those truths are true is another
matter altogether. [ibid.: 192]
Specifically, knowing what it is about the universe in virtue of which those truths are
true is, according to Heil, getting at “the deep story” about the “nature of truthmakers”
(ibid.: 192–193), and “[f]or that you must turn to science [and] [t]he deep story eventually
brings in fundamental physics” (ibid.). Thus, to turn to an example that Heil uses, even
though we can “ ‘quantify over’ trees [and] [i]t is most unlikely that we could analyze
away talk of trees, or translate claims about trees into the language of fundamental
physics” (ibid.: 191–2), TBRs about trees (and all our ordinary TBRs) are made true,
if true, by fundamental physics. As Heil indicates, he thinks that trees, tomatoes, and
the things in ordinary talk exist. However, since they are not fundamental, they are not
TMKs and are not the subject of ontology; he writes: “Talk of the existence of tomatoes
is ontologically innocent when your aim is to get clear on the truths, when your interest
is in tomatoes. But when you engage in ontology, when your goal is to get clear on the
fundamental truthmakers, it is ill advised” (ibid.: 194).
Heil is right that talk of the existence of tomatoes is ontologically innocent, as
I think it should be, and that when one engages in ontology and one’s aim is to get
clear on the fundamental TMKs, it is ill-advised to talk of the existence of tomatoes.
But, according to my metaphysically modest account, this is because talking about
tomatoes is ontologically innocent in the sense that we are not committing ourselves to
a metaphysically substantial account of what the nature of tomatoes is. We can speak
freely about tomatoes and the existence of tomatoes without committing ourselves to
anything about fundamental reality or to fundamental TMKs, which I would be very
open to concede exist. Tomatoes can be TMKs. They just don’t need to be fundamental
TMKs.
5.4.2.1 Problem 1: Fundamental Physics Does Not Rule Out Non-Funda-
mentals as TMKs Nor as Part of the Story of Ontology
One of the central problems with Heil’s view is that, as with Schaffer’s view above, it
is unclear why he thinks that truths about tomatoes, trees, and their properties are not
made true by tomatoes, trees, and their properties. Heil agrees that these ordinary things
exist, albeit as not fully-formed substances and properties, but rather as what he, fol-
lowing Campbell (1990), calls “quasi -substances” or “quasi -properties” (Heil 2012: 30).
Here he is clearly making a distinction between what exists and what is ontologically not
innocent: the fundamentals. But he has a peculiar take on this enterprise; he thinks that
discovering what is fundamental is the role of fundamental physics. My question is then:
where does ontology and metaphysics come in? Let’s say that fundamental physics is
in fact where the “deep story” of the universe, and all its constituent parts, is to be
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found. There is no clear indication from Heil why the deep story, which according to him
includes talk about tomato-shaped arrangements of particles, gives us the right story
about the TMKs. All he gives us is an insistence that ontology is about fundamentals.
What he’s doing, however, is either conflating certain important notions which I think
need to be kept separate, or just presenting an unjustifiably narrow view of the field of
ontology.
According to his story, all we get when we say that ‘the tomato is red’ is true in virtue
of the tomato being red is the non-fundamental story about quasi-substances. According
to him, the story that fundamental physics can provide is the story of the nature of the
TMKs. However, the story about the ordinary TMKs that make ordinary truths true is
not the story of what the various aspects of the nature of those TMKs are. That is
another story altogether. Truths about tomatoes are made true by tomatoes, whatever
their nature is and whatever the deep story about them turns out to be.41 Of course
tomatoes need to have the natures that they have to be the TMKs for truths about
them. And obviously the story of their nature, which may well be given by fundamental
physics (though this is also somewhat controversial as tomatoes are fruits, and fruits are
not normally taken to be part of fundamental physics), is interesting and illuminating.
But (1) it seems somewhat improbable that truthmaking provides such a story. For
it is, rather, the investigation of the extremely varied relations between ordinary things
and other things to which they are related, for example by essential dependence or
supervenience, which provides that metaphysically substantial story. These are all further
facts about the TMKs that can be articulated by other truths and hence can be made
41One might wonder, “What if we are dealing with kinds that disappear upon close inspection?
What implications does this have for how seriously we should take ordinary talk, for instance, about
tomatoes?” My general response to this is that we should take ordinary talk seriously in so far as it
takes its commitments to how things are in reality seriously. (I say more on this in §6 and §7, in my
discussions of cheaters and realism, respectively. See especially §6.5.) If what is meant by ‘kinds that
disappear upon close inspection’ is that these kinds do not exist (and that we happen only to know
this upon close inspection), then our attempts to speak truly and positively about them cannot be
satisfied or succeed. Of course, there can be satisfaction in terms of truth and aboutness, if we are
speaking negatively about them, for instance, by claiming that they do not exist (see §3). If what is
meant is that they exist but that they disappear upon close inspection, perhaps, because they are not
fundamentalia, then we can say true positive things about them even if they do disappear. In that
sense, we should take talk about them seriously. Truths about tomatoes are made true by tomatoes,
as long as tomatoes are real, and even if they are not fundamental. Further, TBRs such as ‘There are
no hobbits’ is about hobbits in the sense relevant to TT (though, such TBRs are also about hobbits
in senses not relevant to TT; see §2.4.1 and §2.4.2.7). One might wonder what that sense is. To
find out, see especially §2.4. The answer, in short, is that the TBR is, in part, strictly about hobbits
(see §2.4.2.3). But, the TBR is fully about there not being any hobbits. Since hobbits don’t exist,
and there are no hobbits, the TBR is true. There is the appropriate kind of satisfaction in this case,
even though (and appropriately) there is nothing, no TMKs, to satisfy the TBR either in terms of
truth or aboutness (see §3.4). By contrast, ‘There are hobbits’ is false because there is no appropriate
aboutness-satisfaction. This contrasts with TBRs about tomatoes because, presumably, tomatoes do
exist (even if they disappear upon close inspection, in the sense that they are not fundamental). TBRs
such as ‘Tomatoes exist’ are true and made true by tomatoes. TBRs such as ‘Tomatoes do not exist’
are false. Thanks to my internal examiner for pressing me on this in her report, and for giving me the
opportunity to address these issues, both of which she raised directly in regard to this sentence.
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true by other features of reality, such as for instance the facts (if there are any) involving
the metaphysical relations that ordinary objects such as tomatoes have with other objects
such as quarks and muons.
And (2), even if it is true that fundamental physics, or whatever turns out to be
the “fundamental” science, gives us the deep story of the world, it is very doubtful
that the story put in the language of fundamental physics (or whatever other funda-
mental science) will give us the full story of the world.42 In particular, it is doubtful
that it will give the full story which adequately describes the ontologically important
features of the world, such as the relations essential dependence, modal dependence,
constitution, supervenience, and instantiation. These relations relate what we might call
fundamental entities with non-fundamental entities, and fundamental modes of being
with non-fundamental modes of being (as well as relating fundamentalia with other
fundamentalia and non-fundamentalia with other non-fundamentalia). Even if funda-
mentalists are right that such a distinction between entities can be made,43 the very fact
that those philosophically and ontologically important relations relate both fundamental
entities and non-fundamental entities means that non-fundamental entities must be an
important part of the story of ontology and metaphysics.
5.4.2.2 Problem 2: What Grounds TBRs About Grounding?
The preceding worry is related to the worry raised by Bliss and Trogdon (2014: §7). Bliss
and Trogdon ask “What, if anything, grounds the facts about what grounds what?”
(ibid.). Let’s say it is true that facts concerning the July 2015 London Tube workers’
labour strike are grounded in the more fundamental facts concerning the workers’ refusal
to work, facts concerning their acting on their interests to have better control over their
working hours, facts concerning how the trains are (namely, standing still), etc. Let’s
call the more fundamental facts WORKERS, the less fundamental facts STRIKES, and
the fact that STRIKES is grounded in WORKERS: GROUNDS. The question is: what
grounds GROUNDS?
There is a clear analogy with my criticism of Heil here. If Heil thinks that TBRs
concerning non-fundamentals is made true by fundamentals, what makes true TBRs
concerning how fundamentals are related to non-fundamentals? Presumably, according
to Heil’s TF, the TMK for GROUNDS must be something that’s fundamental and thereby
42See (Chalmers 2012) for an extensive discussion, but see especially (ibid.: §6) where he discusses
the so-called “hard cases” (ibid.: 259–311) including the hard case of intentionality (ibid.: 274ff).
43See (Wilson 2014) for arguments against the very notion of grounding. Her overall argument is
that grounding does no real work in illuminating metaphysical dependence and that ultimately there is
no need for it. If what she argues is right, then I think one can conclude that there is no real distinction
between grounded and ungrounded entities, that is, there are no distinct fundamental entities. See also
(Sider 2012: especially §8) which argues that grounding-theoretic proposals cannot provide an account
of the correct and full fundamental description of the world without mentioning non-fundamentals.
Also, see (Daly 2012: 81ff) who thinks that grounding is incoherent and that we cannot coherently
understand the notion of grounding.
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doesn’t include STRIKES.44 But then it also doesn’t include the G-REL relating STRIKES
to WORKERS. And it cannot be just WORKERS which ground GROUNDS because no
facts contained in WORKERS can tell us and explain anything about how WORKERS
is related to STRIKES or anything else non-fundamental. Grounding is supposed to be
somewhat informative and explanatory.45 But this option seems unable to account for
GROUNDS informatively.46
Another option would be to say that GROUNDS is grounded in a fundamental fact
which as Bliss and Trogdon describe it “speaks directly to the connection between
[WORKERS] and [STRIKES]” (ibid.). This strategy47 might go something like this: it is
in the nature of being a strike that if WORKERS, then STRIKES is grounded in WORK-
ERS, and this fact about the nature of STRIKES (call it ESSENCE) in conjunction with
WORKERS grounds GROUNDS.
In response, Bliss and Trogdon (ibid.: §5) raise the worry that it is unclear what
grounds ESSENCE. They concede, however, that the conjunction of ESSENCE and
WORKERS can ground GROUNDS without involving STRIKES. It is unclear to me that
this is the case however, for surely ESSENCE, which is just a fact about the nature of
STRIKES, involves STRIKES somehow. It is, overall, very problematic how TBRs about
what grounds what can be made true by anything purely fundamental, let alone be
grounded in anything purely fundamental. If this is already a problem for TBRs about
grounding relations, it is even clearer that there are still more problems for TBRs about
how fundamentals are related to non-fundamentals with non-grounding relations, such
as instantiation or similarity. This is, I think, a deep worry for any account of TF, and
not just Heil’s specific account.
5.4.2.3 Problem 3: Fundamental Physics Doesn’t Capture Metaphysical Re-
lations
Also, remember that Heil’s specific account holds that the ultimate story, the story of
TMKs, is to be given by the ultimate story given by fundamental physics. However, it is
no part of the story of fundamental physics to account for metaphysical relations. Modal
notions such as supervenience and essential dependence, plausibly, are not part of the
44This is analogous to the general worry raised for grounding theorists. Presumably, all grounding-
theorists believe that the correct fundamental description of the world won’t mention or be about
STRIKES (let’s assume that WORKERS are fundamental facts), and that all facts concerning STRIKES
are grounded in facts not concerning STRIKES but concerning fundamental things (e.g. WORKERS).
If one thinks that GROUNDS is ungrounded, then there is a fact concerning STRIKES which is not
grounded in anything. This is clearly problematic for the grounding theorist (see [Sider 2012: §8], and
[deRosset 2013] for further discussion of this point from [Bliss and Trogdon ibid.]).
45See (Bliss and Trogdon 2014: §4) for a discussion of why grounding involves a distinctive form of
explanation.
46Though see (deRosset 2013) for an attempt to resolve this explanatory problem for explaining
GROUNDS solely in terms of WORKERS, in the context of the overall grounding project.
47This is the strategy taken by (Fine 2012) and (Rosen 2010) in the context of the general grounding
debate.
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language of fundamental physics, but are rather part of the important but separate study
of metaphysics and ontology. Heil is therefore wrong to equate the study of ontology
with the study of TMKs only conceived of as fundamental relations or entities. Thus, it
seems that Heil’s notion of truthmaking as a fundamentalist enterprise is grounded in an
inadequate and uncomprehensive notion of ontology and does not clearly set out a co-
herent notion of truthmaking which captures the idea that truths are made true in virtue
of the world as it is described. Since the entities, relations, properties, etc., posited by
fundamental physics surely cannot properly account for or ground metaphysical relations
and facts concerning, for instance, relations such as grounding, this story of the TMKs
won’t be able to give the TMK-story for a whole swathe of truths that surely need to
be accounted for somehow by TT.48
Overall, without endorsing something like TAAT, I do not see how one can properly
make sense of the importance of philosophy, and in particular of ontology and the philos-
ophy of language to guide us in understanding the world. TAAT allows that the truths
of ontology and the truths of philosophy of language (and other parts of philosophy)
are made true by what these truths are about. TF requires that they are made true by
fundamental reality, but many of these truths, and the things they are about, do not
have a clear relation to anything in fundamental reality, especially not if fundamental
reality is construed as that which is described by fundamental physics. By conflating
T-REL with G-REL or construing it as a relation that relates truths only with what is
fundamental, there is a danger of making philosophy, and especially the fields of ontology
and metaphysics, both important branches of philosophy, too narrow to be useful.
5.5 The Aboutness Objection against TF
Throughout this chapter, I presented many objections both for general characterisations
of TF and for specific versions of TF. These objections all either rest on the plausibility
or intuitive appeal of TAAT or raise worries for TF that are easily solved by TAAT.
Now, I shall sum up my problems for TF as the Aboutness Objection. The crux of the
objection is that TF-ists seem to be denying a truism about truth and about its relation
to reality: that things must be the way they are said to be for what is said to be true.
When we are talking about the world, we are sometimes talking about fundamental
things and sometimes we are not (e.g. sometimes we are using the language of funda-
mental physics and sometimes we are not). But what makes true what we say has to be
what we are talking about, not other things to which what we are talking about might be
related. Understanding these further relations is an important part of the contribution
to knowledge that ontology makes,49 but those relations are importantly not the subject
48Of course, one can reject metaphysics and metaphysical truths altogether, but this is not an option
for Heil or any TF-ist.
49In the previous chapter I was not denying that ontology and metaphysics are important areas of
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matter of TT. The subject matter of TT is the relation that usually relates semantic
entities to non-semantic entities, while those ontological relations usually relate non-
semantic entities with other non-semantic entities. Against an anti-realist who wields an
epistemic conception of TMKs, we might say analogously that it is important to keep
apart what we are talking about when we are talking about non-epistemic features of
the world and the epistemic facts that might be related to those non-epistemic features,
such as our evidence for them.50 This is important when we try to use TT to help us un-
derstand the world more fully. It is of central importance not to conflate distinct notions,
on pain of causing confusion and impeding the pursuit of truth and misunderstanding
its role in philosophical and scientific inquiry.
5.6 SAC vs TF: On Cheater Catching
In §2.4.2.52.4.2.7, I discussed several of Schaffer’s (2008a and 2010a) objections against
TAAT. The final objection that Schaffer (2008a: 314–316) raises to TAAT is basically
that TGro can do better at catching cheaters. This is clearly not the case when we
see that what Schaffer means by catching cheaters is what we might call the “weak
sense of cheater catching” (WEAK-CC), which I shall elaborate on extensively in the
next chapter. According to WEAK-CC, all or most of the cheater catching work is done
at the level of debating what the right ontology is, what is dubious, or in Schaffer’s case,
what is and what isn’t fundamental. This is a weaker sense of cheater catching because,
in fact, as Cameron (2008c: 115–116) among others has argued, it only pinpoints the
sense of cheater catching in which TT plays a subsidiary role — it catches cheaters only
with the help of further theories concerning the right ontology.51 A stronger sense of
cheater catching (STRONG-CC) would allow TT-ists to catch cheaters without the help
of additional commitments about what is in the right (or relevant) ontology. Schaffer in
effect admits that TGro is restricted to the weaker sense when he writes:
Notice that TGro only catches cheaters in cooperation with a theory of
fundamentality. TGro cannot do it alone. TGro only says that all truths
must be grounded in what is fundamental, but it does not itself say what
is fundamental (it takes no stand on Humeanism, for instance). So if there
were, for instance, fundamental dispositional facts, then the Rylean would
emerge innocent. What is ruled out are not dubious ontologies per se, but
dubious packages of views about what is true plus views about what is
fundamental. [ibid.: 314]
TGro’s cheater catching power is clear: with a theory of fundamentality and with TGro,
philosophy and areas of knowledge. I was merely arguing that it is important for the TT-ist to have a
metaphysically modest theory of TT.
50In Appendix 5, I discuss this issue for anti-realism in more depth.
51MacBride (2014: §3.1) in fact argues that TT must be rejected and is undermotivated on the basis
that all the real work of cheater catching (which is supposed to be one of the main motivations for TT)
is done at the level of discussing what the right ontology is for independent, non-truthmaker reasons
and not by any truthmaker principle.
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Schaffer would be able to catch out lots of cheaters by looking at the potential TMKs
for truths and alert the anti-cheater police that we have yet another TMK that is not
fundamental. But as is clear from his remarks above, TGro cannot catch any cheaters
on its own, or as I would add, TGro cannot catch any cheaters on its own unless it
somehow also includes an aboutness requirement.
SAC can do a better job at catching cheaters, because it does not require any views
about what is fundamental or what is in the right ontology. It catches out cheaters,
for instance, who do not accept the TMK-commitments of what they say, or who claim
that there are truths when they reject the view that those truths are about anything
real. In fact, without having to bring in any further views about what constitutes the
right ontology or what are dubious entities, and without appealing to or having any
view about what is fundamental, we can conclude that advocates of TGro and TF are
cheaters in the STRONG sense that I have been describing. This is because the TF-ists
misunderstand the role of truth and truthmaking in that they do not accept that what
truths are about is what must make them true; they neglect their TMK-commitments
by focusing purely on what’s fundamental.
I end on a constructive suggestion. Drop the idea that TGro (or any similar articu-
lation of T-REL in terms of fundamentalist grounding) articulates truthmaking or that
T-REL is a species of G-REL, and drop the idea that TGro helps us account for what
in virtue of which truths are true. TGro-plus-fundamentality constitutes an attractive
way to catch cheaters of a different sort: ones that get the grounding relations between
TMKs wrong. They should drop talking about truth and truthmaking and stick to talking
about grounding and fundamentality, which I’m sure is a perfectly clear and useful way
of articulating certain important relations between entities in the world. I would suggest,
however, that they use locutions such as ‘x grounds y’ to describe their findings, without
requiring that the fact that x grounds y is a fundamental constituent of reality for such
locutions to be true.52 Sometimes we talk about grounding and fundamentality, and
sometimes we don’t. And an adequate notion of truth and truthmaking should be able
to capture that. If grounding and fundamentality encroaches upon and subsumes TT,
as I have argued, nothing but confusion arises. So, we should reject TF and accept that
whatever else may be true about T-REL, TBRs are true as long as things are the way
they are described to be.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
I hope to have persuasively argued in this chapter that T-REL is not best understood as
a species of (fundamentalist) grounding and that T-REL does not always relate funda-
mental with non-fundamental entities. Rather, the better way to understand T-REL is
as the relation that relates TBRs, when they are true (and when they are positive), to
52See §5.4.2.2 above.
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the entities (and the ways those entities are) which they are strictly and fully about.
My rejection of TF (and T-NEC before) constitutes a strong case that any meta-
physically substantial account of TT does not fulfill the more modest aims of TT, viz. to
capture the relation between truths and reality in a coherent and modest way.
I think that my preferred account, TAAT in terms of SAC, paves the way for such a
modest account. The aim of the rest of the dissertation is to argue in three relatively
short chapters that SAC can give us a more modest understanding of cheater catching
(§6), of the kind of (modest) realism attached to TT (§7), and of everyday inquiry (§8).
Chapter 5. Truthmaking and Fundamentality: Rejecting TT-Fundamentalism 148
Chapter 6
Truthmaking and Cheater Catching
Deflated
6.1 Introduction: TT’s Cheater Catching Power
Cheater catching (CC-ing) has come to be understood as the activity of identifying
and undermining theories underpinned by what Sider, who first employed the language
of “cheating” (2001: 37–41), calls “dubious ontologies” (ibid.: 36). Sider writes, “The
point of the truth-maker principle and the principle that truth supervenes on being[1]
is to rule out dubious ontologies” (ibid.: 40). This view about the task or application
of TT2 has many subscribers and some think that the whole point of TT is to set up
a framework to catch cheaters. Merricks (2007), who rejects TT on the basis of its
ultimate failure in this regard, writes, “Catching cheaters is a principal motivation for
Truthmaker” (ibid: 36). Liggins usefully lists a few of these dubious ontological theories,
the supposed cheaters: “[Truthmaker principles] also provide arguments against phenom-
enalism, Ryleanism about dispositions, Rylean behaviourism, operationalism, presentism,
and other philosophical theories” (2008: 177).
I argue that CC-ing as it is normally understood by the immodest TT-ists cannot
motivate TT, because it merely begs the question against the views, the unsavoury
cheater theories ( CHEATERS), it aims to undermine. To argue against any of the
theories which Liggins lists and which TT has famously been used to undermine via CC-
ing, TT-ists implicitly assume a metaphysical view which is incompatible with the views
they are undermining. In each case, this additional metaphysics is not part of TT, but
1As I mentioned before, the thesis that truth supervenes on being, which was first articulated by
Bigelow (1988: 132) and further developed and defended by Lewis (2003), is generally accepted to be a
version of TT. My favoured view is best understood as a variant, though I reject talk of supervenience
for talk of dependence in this context for concerns to do with asymmetry. See §4.1.2, where I have
my most extensive discussion of supervenience theses. Remember, my view is that truth depends not
just on what things are, but how things are with what things are. Since the cheaters mainly talk about
entities, I shall present and discuss their views in this way, but keep in mind my alternative, favoured
understanding of these matters.
2I prefer to use the terms ‘application’, ‘use’, or ‘task’ rather than ‘motivation’. That TT can be
put to some use in itself does not give TT any support. I aim to stay neutral about whether its uses
motivate TT, since otherwise I would need to address the TT-skeptic. Instead, I argue that the right
view of the tasks of TT should be much more modest than they have been claimed to be by TT-ists.
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is rather metaphysical baggage which the TT-ists bring to TT to do the metaphysical
work they think it does. A dilemma arises. On the one hand, TT’s CC-ing power is
question-begging. On the other, if a TT-ist concedes this to the skeptic, TT becomes
undermotivated.
The root of the problem is an underlying commitment of the normal understanding of
TT and CC-ing to metaphysical immodesty. To salvage TT, I suggest that we completely
deflate and overhaul the enterprise of CC-ing by eliminating metaphysical theses from
TT, making TT metaphysically much more modest. A metaphysically modest version of
TT, such as TAAT (see §4), can articulate the real, but very much limited CC-ing work
that TT can be put to in this regard. Further, I make a distinction between WEAK-CC
and STRONG-CC, explaining that the motivation for TT can only lie in STRONG-CC,
that it must catch cheaters by itself and not with the aid of additional metaphysical
theories.3 As a result, TT is not out to catch spurious metaphysical theories, but to
catch immodest semantic theories, of which there are, generally, two main types:
(1) EXTRAVAGANT CHEATERS: CHEATERS who build too many metaphysical com-
mitments into semantics;
(2) SHY CHEATERS: CHEATERS who do not accept the modest commitments re-
quired of TT; minimally, if one’s theory accepts TBRs as true, then what the
TBRs are about must be how things are in the world and how they are described
to be.
I end this chapter by considering an objection and reflecting on the relation between
Maximalism (T-M) and CC-ing.
6.2 Is the Charge of CC-ing Against Theory X Merely
Begging the Question Against Theory X?
Beebee and Dodd raise powerful worries against the motivation for TT when they write:
Suppose that some formulation of [TT] does indeed succeed in capturing
realist intuitions. The question arises, how can [TT] now legitimately be put
to use in an argument for realism (about a particular domain) and against
anti-realism? If [TT] itself enshrines a commitment to realism, then presum-
ably the appropriate anti-realist reaction to such an argument is simply to
deny whatever [TMK] principle is being used as a premise in that argument.
If a given [TMK] principle is to pull its weight in arguments against anti-
realism, then we had better have reasons, independently of our commitment
to realism for believing that the principle is true. We wonder whether such
reasons are to be had. [2005a: 16]
3I repeat, whether this gives TT sufficient motivation to address the skeptic is not my concern.
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I think that this argument can be read as a powerful, general argument also against
TT’s CC-ing power.4 In effect, any attempt by the TT-ist to catch supposed cheaters,
for example anti-realists who deny the reality of entities of a certain domain, will be
question-begging: when confronted with the charge that she is cheating, the anti-realist
can just deny that the TMK-principle that the realist wields is the right TMK-principle.
If the realist has no independent reasons for thinking that the version of the TMK-
principle that she wields is the right one, then she is clearly begging the question against
the anti-realist.
For instance, the anti-presentist’s use of the CC-argument illustrates the point I want
to draw from Beebee and Dodd’s argument.5 An anti-presentist6, who denies that only
present entities exist simpliciter, relies on the rule that truths, including truths about the
past and the future, need to be made true by entities which exist simpliciter. However,
without even having to deny BATT or TT at all, the presentist can just deny that truths
need to be made true by entities which exist simpliciter. She can just reply that truths
about the future or the past are made true by the things that will exist in the future and
did exist in the past, but don’t exist simpliciter. Or even better, they can reply that such
truths merely need to be made true by how things are in the future or the past when
they happen or happened. This does not require there to be any things from the past
or the future which presently exist simpliciter. They nonetheless can play the modest
TMK-role.
Merricks (2007: 36) discusses the Lucretian presentist7 and Sider (2001: 36–37) dis-
cusses Bigelow (1996: especially 46ff) both of whom reply to the anti-presentist TMK-
challenge by claiming that there presently exist SOAs such as the SOA the universe
being such that the Trojans were conquered and the SOA the universe being such that
Caesar was stabbed to death. These present SOAs are meant to make true corresponding
TBRs about the past, such as ‘The Trojans were conquered’ and ‘Caesar was stabbed
4I shall address the more general point concerning realism/anti-realism in §7.
5Liggins reads Beebee and Dodd’s (2005a: 16) argument similarly as I do. However, he offers an
argument against Beebee and Dodd’s (ibid.) argument, the general gist of which I shall address and
defend against Liggins in my discussion below. Liggins (see especially [2008: 183–185]) thinks that
Beebee and Dodd conflate different notions of “realism” in their discussion; specifically, according to
him, they conflate what he calls “physical object realism” with “commonsense realism” (see [ibid.: 184]
for the distinction). For this reason, he claims that the TT-ists’ arguments “do not beg the question”
(ibid.), despite Beebee and Dodd’s implication that they do. As we shall see, I argue in this chapter
that TT-ists do beg the question. And, I argue in the next chapter that TT-ists should be modest
realists, which is similar to Liggins’s “commonsense realist.” However, I disagree with his statement
that TT-ists are commonsense realists. Instead I argue that they should be commonsense realists in
his sense. In this way, Beebee and Dodd’s charge, which both Liggins and I sum up as saying that the
TT-ist is begging the question, indeed does hold against most TT-ists, who are neither commonsense
realists (in Liggins’s terminology) nor modest realists (in mine; see the next chapter).
6See for instance Sider (2001: 11–52) who argues against presentism, in particular the presentism of
Bigelow (1996: 35–52). See Keller (2004: 85–102, especially 93–102) who argues against three types of
what he calls “truthmaker-preserving presentism” (ibid.: 96).
7See (Lucretius 1994: 21) and (Merricks 2007: 36). Bigelow (1996: 44–47) discusses Lucretius’s
presentism, a modification of which (see [ibid.: 46]) constitutes his own theory.
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to death’ respectively. Such SOAs would presumably meet the challenge raised by the
anti-presentist TT-ist.
However, Sider (2001: 39–40) thinks that this response is a paradigm case of CHEAT-
ERS positing brute tensed facts. Also Merricks explains that TT “will be unable to catch
cheaters unless it keeps these properties from playing a role in truthmaking, [. . . and. . . ]
is of interest [. . . ] largely because it threatens to rule out this or that philosophical
theory” (2007: 36). Thus, Merricks argues that not only should TT-ists insist that an
ontological basis needs to be given for truths, but that certain ontological positions or
theories need to already be ruled out as part of TT. He goes on to say:
Let Truthmaker [i.e. TT] say that truthmakers cannot be constituted by
‘suspicious properties’. Moreover, let a fully articulated Truthmaker tell us
which properties really are suspicious. Now we can resist suspect attempts
to accommodate Truthmaker. For example, we can block the above defence
of (2) by deeming to be suspicious the property of being such that, had she
[i.e. Queen Elizabeth] been born 400 years ago in Japan, she would have
been a samurai warrior. [ibid.: 36]
What Merricks is arguing here is that it should be part of TT that it contains a rejection
of suspicious properties. Thus, once TT is fully articulated, we can reject all suspicious
properties. His main arguments throughout his book consist in showing how such an
account of the dependence of truth on reality is not possible, that it cannot rule out
various suspicious properties, and that thereby, TT is not successful and under motivated.
However, without getting into further details about Merricks’s discussion, I want to
present a general problem from the discussion. I think that it is precisely this aspect
of Merricks’s understanding of TT and the CC-ing role it needs to play which has led
theorists astray as to how TT can catch cheaters. Demanding that TT-ists give a full
metaphysically substantial account of the nature of TMKs is not just a mistake, but
makes TT open to the charge of being unmotivated and being put to obviously question-
begging purposes. I think that it is plausible to say that this interpretation of CC-ing
has caused a lot of undue skepticism about the motivation and plausibility of TT.
On Merricks’s construal of TT, the TT-ist is clearly just begging the question when
she uses her principle in the way Merricks describes it against certain anti-realist or
eliminativist views such as presentism, phenomenalism, and behaviourism. However,
Merricks’s criticism of TT on this basis is not a straw man argument. This is because
his story is the natural reading of what traditional TT-ists themselves say, and it is the
most common reading of CC-ing and the role of TT in ontological debates. For example,
see Bigelow’s famous statement:
I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet I have
never really succeeded. Without some such axiom, I find I have no adequate
anchor to hold me from drifting onto the shoals of some sort of pragmatism
or idealism. And that is altogether uncongenial to me; I am a congenital
realist about almost everything. [1988: 123]
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One naturally reads what Bigelow says here as drawing a strong link between being realist
(about a domain) and being a TT-ist (concerning that domain). In fact, he seems to
imply that for one to be a realist, one must be (or at least one should be inclined to be,
from birth or otherwise) a TT-ist.
Martin, also one of the very earliest TT-ists,8 is the one who famously used TT
in arguments against phenomenalism (see Armstrong 2004: 1–2) and Ryleanism about
dispositions (see his [1994: 18–19]), and against Dummettian anti-realism (see [1984]).
Martin’s original charge, however, was not meant to be knock-down against such views,
but merely an attempt for those theories to own up to the task of providing an account
of TMKs when such theorists as Ryle, in the philosophical climate of their time, had no
inclination to do so. Seen in the light of Martin’s original worry, CC-ing is not presenting
a knock-down argument, but a demand for what he later called ontological seriousness,
which read charitably is little more than a demand for further explanation.9
It seems to me that TT-ists have taken inspiration from statements from early
TT-ists such as Bigelow and Martin and have built into TT a commitment to substantial
metaphysical theses. This jump to substantive metaphysics is what Lewis (1992: 217)
has called a clear “over-reaction” to what are undoubtedly flaws in theories (such as
Ryleanism and phenomenalism) as they were presented at the time.10 For example,
Sider (2001: 11–52) seems to use the principle as support for his realism about the fu-
ture and the past. However, as I argued in §1.6, pragmatists can be TT-ists. It is clear
that even radical forms of idealism are compatible with TT.11 Such theories are compat-
ible with BATT. A pragmatist version of TT might hold that TBRs are made true by
what is expedient to the subject. An idealist version of TT might hold that TBRs are
made true by ideas. Going beyond BATT merely by infusing into TT extra metaphysical
commitments, and then accusing those who do not go beyond BATT in the same way as
8See his (1984) but also before; Armstrong (2004: 1) and Heil (2003: 61) trace Martin’s influence
and defence of TT to the late 1950s.
9See (Heil and Martin 1999: 34ff). For instance, they criticise Linguisticism, on which “talk of
states of mind [. . . ] is replaced by talk of mental attributions; talk of properties is replaced by talk of
predicates” (ibid.: 36), for “diverting attention and postponing the hard [ontological] questions” (ibid.).
Although I sympathise with Martin, I deny that the hard questions should be answered by giving a
theory of TMKs. Thinking otherwise postpones the hard ontological work further. Compare (ibid.: 35).
10For Martin, the target Rylean is Ryle (1949) and the target phenomenalist is usually Ayer (1954a),
who clearly worked in a time when philosophers did not see the need for further explanation, let alone
explanations of any metaphysical substance. Also, even Heil and Martin emphasise that they “do not
claim that every form of antirealism is defective. [. . . ] Our suggestion is that much can be learned by
pressing antirealists to make their ontology explicit. The strategy forces discussion back down to earth”
(1999: 35–36). They clearly do not deny that different forms of antirealism can give an account of TT
or TMKs. Their aim is to force antirealists to stop neglecting the need to do so.
11See also Dodd (2002a: 83–84) and Daly (2005: 95–97) who make similar points concerning the
compatibility of TT and idealism. MacBride, who calls Gustav Bergmann the “grandfather of the
contemporary truth-maker movement” (2014: §3.1), presents a noteworthy quotation from Bergmann
making a similar point again: “the truth of S must be grounded ontologically. On this first move
idealists and realists agree” (1961: 229). Fumerton (2002: 5–6) points out that TT and alethic realism
are compatible with “radical metaphysical idealism” (ibid.: 6). Fumerton (2013: 200) also points out
that even Berkeley (1713) was “a robust realist” about truth while holding the view that “the only truth
makers for Berkeley were facts about minds and ideas” (ibid.).
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cheaters, is obviously question-begging, against the pragmatist, idealist, or anyone else.
CC-ing, understood in the metaphysically substantial way, has no bite at all.
The upshot of this discussion is that it is now unclear what a plausible notion of CC-
ing is. If CC-ing is to motivate TT or any version of TT, at the very least, it must be
clear about what kind of theory it is catching as cheating and explain how such theories
are cheating in a non-question-begging way.
6.3 Eliminating Metaphysical Theory From TT
My argument against CC-ing, as understood by both TT-ists and TT-skeptics, is basi-
cally that the charge of CC-ing wielded by most TT-ists is faced with a dilemma. They
infuse TT with substantial metaphysical commitments that have no place in TT. The
first horn is that without a good, independent reason to adopt the metaphysically sub-
stantial version, the TT-ist is begging the question against the view they are charging
with cheating. The second horn is that with a good, independent reason to adopt the
metaphysically substantial version, TT loses its cheater-catching power because what
does the real work is the reason to adopt the metaphysically substantial commitment,
not any commitment to TT.
I see no way out of the dilemma except to completely revise and overhaul the
enterprise of CC-ing. Before I do this, I want to point out, in this section, that other
critics and even at least one TT-ist seems to agree with my diagnosis, though they differ
in what they think is the appropriate reaction. TT is a perfectly respectable theory that
posits a certain relation between truth and reality. It needs a clean bill of health, and
this can, in my view, only be accomplished by eliminating the metaphysically substantial
elements of the contemporary versions of TT.
The point that we can draw from the way that I presented Merricks’s discussion of
the Lucretian presentist is that TT cannot catch the presentist as a cheater unless he
builds into TT metaphysical commitments as to what is ontologically spurious and what
is not. Merricks is not alone in arguing against TT by undermining its CC-ing power.
For instance, MacBride writes,
The demand for truth-makers doesn’t help “catch cheaters” at all. [. . . ]
Whatever we find lacking in theories that posit such items [e.g. brute facts
about unobservables, dispositions, the future, or the past], it isn’t that they
fail to provide truth-makers, because they do [provide TMKs]. [2014: §3.1]
Here MacBride is clearly subscribing to my criticism of CC-ing. Both the phenomenalist
and the non-phenomenalist can be TT-ists. He goes further, however, and makes a
different point, on the basis of which he tries to undermine TT itself:
Of course if we are already committed to the need for truth makers then we
will likely conceive of the demand for them as, e.g., drawing the phenome-
nalist out into the open to reveal the unfitness of their explanatory posits.
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But unless we already have independent reasons for recognising the demand
for truth makers, catching cheaters cannot provide a motivation for positing
them. [ibid.]
Essentially, MacBride is arguing in this passage12 that it is not TT that catches cheaters,
but other commitments concerning what counts as a sound or fit explanation of what
exists. He cites Horwich in this regard, who writes:
[A]gain it is perfectly possible to formulate these criticisms without any
truth-making rhetoric. To the hard-line behaviourist one can point out that
his hard line has been crossed. In response to the liberal, one can claim that
dispositional facts cannot be explanatorily fundamental. As before, it’s not
so clear that this is right; but what is clear is that, if it is right, it stems
from our view of constitutive explanation. Truth-maker theory merely offers
a dressed-up way of putting the point. [2009: 197]
For Horwich and MacBride following him, TT doesn’t catch cheaters; the need for
a savoury explanation of why certain kinds of truths are true is what does the main
critical work. I think that this is exactly right on the conventional way of understanding
CC-ing. They are right to explain that CC-ing in these cases is done purely at the
level of explanation, not at the level of TT’s demand for TMKs. However, I think that
MacBride’s argument in the passage above against TT rests on the same mistake as
Merricks’s argument. As I hope to have made clear so far, the traditional understanding
of TT as CC-ing rests on the mistake that CHEATERS are unsavoury metaphysical theses
or unsavoury explanatory accounts of phenomena. The TT-arguments against such views
are question-begging.
However, I think that the right view of TT is not as a substantial metaphysical
or substantial explanatory thesis. A TT-ist qua TT-ist should not rely on arguments
independent of TT to argue on the basis of TT that some putative TMK for some
TBR is unsavoury or explanatorily unfit. Arguments from metaphysics and ontology
concerning what is savoury and what is not can be kept separate from TT. One might
call philosophers who wield such arguments the unsavoury metaphysics police.
TT-ists, by contrast, can only catch cheaters who don’t see any need for positing
TMKs at all13 (we called them the SHY CHEATERS in §6.1), or those cheaters who posit
too much metaphysics into their TMKs (the IMMODEST CHEATERS). One might call
the TT-ist-cheater-catchers the unsavoury semantics police.
12Actually, I write here what I take to be the right charitable reading of what he says. The last
sentence of the paragraph I quote from MacBride seems to imply that once you have an independent
reason for positing TMKs and hence ruling out certain ontologies and explanations, catching cheaters
becomes a motivation. I am reading him to say the opposite—that catching cheaters is no longer a
motivation for TT because independent reasons do the real work. From what he says in the rest of the
passage, he obviously means the latter.
13Remember, I’m understanding TMKs broadly in a sense of being as how things are, not just whether
things are; see §4.1.
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Of course, MacBride is right that CC-ing cannot motivate TT. TT must be made
plausible against the TT-skeptic for, as he says, independent reasons to CC-ing. But,
once we establish these independent reasons (which, remember, is not the aim of this
dissertation) we have a clear task for the TT-ist: catch out those theories which posit
no TMKs for (positive) truths about how things are with things and hence have a faulty
semantics. These are the CHEATERS. Any TT-ist who goes beyond this is begging the
question against the metaphysical views that they wish to undermine. Hard metaphysical
work cannot be replaced by what is essentially a semantic theory with no substantial
metaphysical consequences. TT-ists who infuse metaphysical substance into TT and
use this against other theories, calling this “CC-ing,” present reasoning and motivation
for TT, which, as Schaffer wrongly called Merricks’s AC strategy, is a real “poisoned
pawn” (2008a: 304).
In response, one might consider Cameron (2008c). He makes a similar point to the
one MacBride and Horwich are making about what does the CC-ing work, but unlike
the TT-skeptics and unlike the TT-revisionists such as I am, he does not think that TT
should be rejected on this basis. He clearly agrees that it is not TT but rather other
prior commitments concerning what should count as a non-dubious ontological theory
that does most of the work of CC-ing. He writes:
I agree that the truthmaker principle on its own won’t rule out these dubious
ontologies. But neither will the principle that delimits the kinds of things it is
acceptable to believe in: you’re not going to be able to object to the presen-
tist that her ontological commitments are unacceptable if she simply denies
that she has any ontological commitments. I see both principles as working
in tandem, to catch the dubious ontologists in a pincer movement. We need
a principle that forces them to accept that, say, <there were dinosaurs> is
ontologically committing—that is the truthmaker principle—and we need a
principle that restricts what those ontological commitments can be. Neither
principle will force them away from the position on its own, but together
they will. [. . . ] So the truthmaker principle does indeed do serious work
in the battle against dubious ontologies such as presentism, phenomenalism
and Rylean behaviourism. It just doesn’t do it on its own; but that shouldn’t
count against it. And so, insofar as we have the intuition that this is good
work to be done—insofar as we have the intuition that there is something in
common wrong with these three positions—this should count as justification
for the truthmaker principle. [ibid.: 115–116; my emphases]
Let’s clarify Cameron’s stance here. In response to the TT-skeptic and TT-revisionist,
Cameron’s move is two-fold: (1) he claims that TT forces the dubious ontologists to
accept that certain TBRs are ontologically committing, playing one part of a “pincer
movement,” the other part being the ontological theory that rules out the dubious ontol-
ogy; and (2) he claims that TT is justified because “we have the intuition that there is
something in common wrong with these [. . . ] positions” (ibid.) and however small the
role that TT plays in undermining these theories, it does help to undermine them. What
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Cameron argues here is that TT cannot do the work of CC-ing on its own. In other
words, there is no motivation to think that presentism and behaviourism are wrong sim-
ply because of TT. We cannot undermine the theories just by claiming that the theories
have to face up to their ontological commitments.14 Rather, other commitments about
what counts as not just suspicious but dubious theories do the work of undermining the
theories once they are forced to develop their ontological picture. So, to catch cheaters,
we also need a story about what counts as an acceptable ontological commitment.
However, and here is the reason why he thinks that CC justifies and motivates TT:
TT is a necessary part of the pincer movement because the ontological work of showing
why some views have unsavoury ontological commitments is not sufficient since the
CHEATER can deny that her theory has any ontological commitments. TT’s role has
to do with what MacBride describes as “drawing the [CHEATER] out into the open to
reveal the unfitness of their explanatory [and ontological] posits” [2014: §3.1] by forcing
the cheater to give an account of her ontological commitments.
Cameron underestimates the problem that he has presented. Why should TT come
into play at all in undermining these theories? As we saw, the presentist can accept
TT and will happily give an account of the TMKs for the truths about the past and
the future which she accepts. If the TMKs that the presentist posits are spurious or
metaphysically unacceptable, surely this will be decided on independent metaphysical
grounds, not on TT grounds. Similarly, the behaviourist can just accept TT and will
merely posit dispositions (brute or otherwise) to make true the behavioural conditionals
with which she paraphrases mental-talk. Neither the behaviourist nor the presentist is
forced to account for truths which would otherwise remain ungrounded. If the TMKs
she provides are inadequate and unsavoury, this can only be established with reasons
independent to TT. They are not inadequate or unsavoury qua TMKs or from the
TT-perspective. It is important to remember that presentism, phenomenalism, and any
plausible form of behaviourism are metaphysical theses.15 Thus, they must present an
account of the metaphysics of time (qua presentist), of everything including-ordinary-
objects (qua phenomenalist), and of mental entities (qua behaviourist), respectively. To
undermine such theories one must engage in serious metaphysical debate. If a version of
presentism, or phenomenalism, or behaviourism, happens also to present their theory in
a way that reveals faulty semantics and make claims for which they see no need to posit
TMKs, that’s when the TT-police come in and catch them out. But the important point
is that it is not essential to any of these theories that they have such a faulty semantics.
The metaphysical theories themselves are not CHEATERS and are not susceptible to any
pincer movement. Metaphysical theories must be undermined on metaphysical grounds.
It is confused to think that TT can help do this important metaphysical work. It is only
14This part is in tune with what, as I pointed out in §6.2, Martin, one of the founding fathers of TT
and from whose work the original arguments that are now called CC-ing stem, thinks is at the heart of
his criticism of theories along TT-lines. Again, see Heil and Martin (1999: 34ff).
15This is what Heil and Martin (1999: 34ff) strongly press too.
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necessary for catching out theories who do not face up to their ontological commit-
ments. To think that these metaphysical theories traditionally branded as CHEATERS
are CHEATERS on TT-grounds is to confuse semantics for metaphysics. Such metaphys-
ically immodest and extravagant versions of TT, which cause this confusion, are the real
poisoned pawns.
If TT is going to be at all motivated by CC-ing, then the enterprise of CC-ing must
be re-imagined and TT must eliminate its association with and commitment to any
particular substantial metaphysical theory.
6.4 WEAK-CC and STRONG-CC
As I have argued in the previous section, although Horwich, MacBride, and Cameron
are right that TT cannot catch metaphysically substantial cheaters, their own criticisms
of TT assume a false though currently very popular view of TT and the role of TT in
CC-ing. The mistaken view of TT, which all of the critics and also defenders of TT
seem to hold, is that TT is a metaphysical or ontological theory. The correct view, as
I have sketched it so far is that TT is (1) merely a theory about the relation between
truths and the reality they are about and is (2) a theory that is pluralist (§1.7) but in
a metaphysically modest way (§4). As I am re-imagining it, TT is not an ontological
theory, but rather a semantic theory. In this section, I give further support for my modest
stance towards TT by sketching and contrasting two kinds of cheater arguments.
Of course, when coupled with good reasons to think that some theories are dubious
or bad or unmotivated, one can use TT to develop an argument against such views
(as we have done, for instance, against SOAs16 in §4). I shall set up such a candidate
structure of argument and then pinpoint what my problems are with it before setting up
an argument with a more direct structure. To read Cameron (2008c: 115f) charitably,
the argument based on the so-called “pincer movement” might go something like this:
Cheater Argument 1:
(Premise 1) Theory Y : Theory Y claims that p, where p is some positive TBR.
(Premise 2) Truthmaker : If Theory Y claims that p, then Theory Y is committed to
the TMKs of p.
(Premise 3) Dubious Ontology : The TMKs that would make true p according to
Theory Y are dubious.
(Premise 4) No Dubious Entity Principle: If a theory is committed to dubious
TMKs, then it is false.
(Conclusion) Theory Y is false.
16Remember, ‘SOAs’ abbreviates ‘states of affairs’.
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I think that this is a perfectly reasonable argument using TMK-principles. Of course,
as I illustrated above, the behaviourist and the presentist would deny premise 3 when
this argument is wielded by the anti-behaviourist or the anti-presentist. In short, this is
where the work lies when one wants to establish the substantial metaphysical conclusions
TT-ists usually want to establish concerning dubious ontologies. But, overall, it is a
perfectly reasonable and usable argument-structure.
However, by adding a view about what counts as a good explanation (as MacBride
and Horwich do) or what counts as a dubious ontology (as Cameron and Merricks do),
one is merely getting into another debate, a debate that TT doesn’t need to get involved
with. According to TT, as I see it, we must accept the commitments of our theories,
and perhaps agree on them. After that, we need to figure out which of those theories
are in fact true. As Alston poignantly states,
Just as we must not confuse the question of what virtue is with the ques-
tion what virtues there are, as Socrates liked to remind us, we must not
confuse the question of what truth is with the question what truths there
are. [1996: 80; his emphases][17]
Similarly, TT can only give us a theory of the relation between truths and reality, not a
theory of which TBRs are in fact true. It can tell us what we are committed to when
we are committed to certain truths, but, generally, it does not tell us which theories are
true.
Alston’s comment above suggests an important additional thought: If TT determines
the TMK-commitments of a given theory, how do we then determine whether the TBRs
are true? Once we get the story of our TMK-commitments right (by figuring out what
we’re talking about), we appeal to evidence and further considerations to discover what
is true, to discover whether things are the way they are described to be. Someone who is
simply wrong about the right ontology is not cheating. She is just mistaken about what
is true. For example, if phenomenalism is false because it posits a dubious ontology,
then the phenomenalist is just mistaken about ontology and not necessarily cheating.
Another way is to determine a priori that the entities one is committed to cannot
exist (and that things cannot be the way they are described). But it is a fundamental
mistake to think that TT is an ontological theory giving ontologists powerful tools
to catch cheaters with a priori reasoning alone. Their mistake is their metaphysical
immodesty. And it is this which makes them vulnerable to the criticism of TT-skeptics
such as Merricks, MacBride, and Horwich.18 I agree with these TT-skeptics that TT-ists
should be caught out for building too many ontological assumptions, including about
17Yablo (2014: 45) and Fine (2015c: 12–13) make a parallel point when they profess to hold on to
what Fine calls the neutrality requirement. See my §7.6 for further discussion of the limits of neutrality,
and Appendix 6 for in-depth discussion of Alston and this quotation.
18As well as plenty of others, for example (Beebee and Dodd 2005a: 15–16). See also Liggins who
argues that “[TMK] principles are useless for catching cheaters” (2008: 192).
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what is dubious and what is not, into their view and for claiming that this is part of the
right version of TT.19
Rather the a priori work TT does lies elsewhere, and can be drawn from just the basic,
platitudinous insight that truths require the world to be the way it is described, especially
when it is supplemented with the semantic details described by my favoured account
TAAT. Unlike the heavy-weight substantial metaphysical detail that some TT-ists try
to build into TT, the right semantic detail is clearly an appropriate part of any version
of TT. This is because TT is essentially the enterprise of accounting for the relation
between truth and reality. This requires neither a substantial account of the nature of
truth, nor a substantial account of the nature of reality.20
Overall, this generates a demand from anyone who uses truthmaking as a premise
in their argument to own up to their TMK-commitments and, if there are any, their
ontological commitments. And, this is something that a good version of TT can be
used to do on its own and independently of any further ontological baggage. The
ontological baggage contains claims beyond identifying one’s TMK-commitments; it
makes claims about which ontological claims are true and false. The right, semantic
view of CC-ing is a demand of any theory, whether it is ontological or scientific, that
it own up to its TMK-commitments; and this is something that can and should be
demanded as long as the theory makes factual claims about the world. Thus, it can
catch out cheaters by showing that a given theory is flouting its TMK-commitments
or drawing unwarranted ontological conclusions from a faulty view about the relation
between TBRs and reality. We extensively discussed this latter kind of (EXTRAVAGANT)
CHEATER when we discussed those ontologists who claim to make substantial ontological
distinctions between ontological categories, those who posit structured SOAs merely on
the basis of linguistic evidence (see §4.2).21
I shall call the understanding of truthmaking’s role in CC-ing represented by Cheater
Argument 1: the Weak Cheater View (WEAK). On WEAK, TT can only catch cheaters
with the help of a lot of ontological machinery. I have argued that this kind of CC-ing
cannot motivate TT. I have been defending and trying to articulate a more modest,
but more robustly effective view, which I shall call the Strong Cheater View (STRONG).
STRONG is the view that TT can indeed catch cheaters independently of additional
ontological commitments. STRONG works by demanding that theories accept that the
world is the way it is described in their theories: that there are TMKs (understood
19This is one of the points that Merricks (2007: 36) makes which I emphasised in §6.2: that a full
TT is also a full ontological theory. This, as I am pointing out and re-emphasising here, is the problem.
20Recall my discussions in §1.4–1.6, where I argued for the compatibility of TT with deflationary and
neutralist accounts, as well as anti-realist and pragmatist accounts, of the nature of truth, and, in §1.7
and §4.1, of the nature of reality.
21These examples, and the ones in the next section, are sufficient. But, in Appendix 4, I discuss
further examples. In particular, I discuss the charge of word magic, which, when understood in the light
of SAC, I suggest makes the real task of CC-ing even clearer and more powerful.
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metaphysically modestly; see §4) for every positive claim of the theory (see §3).22
Thus, STRONG comes in a different form from WEAK (as it is displayed in Cheater
Argument 1). The proper TMK-argument against cheaters might go:
Cheater Argument 2:
(Premise 1) Truthmaker : If Theory Y claims that p, where p is a positive TBR, then
Theory Y is committed to there being TMKs for p;
(Premise 2) Theory Y claims that p.
(Conclusion 1) Theory Y is committed to there being TMKs for p.
(Premise 3) Theory Y denies commitment (either explicitly or implicitly) to there being
any TMKs for p.
(Premise 4) Cheater Identification Principle: Any theory that (either explicitly or
implicitly) denies commitment to there being TMKs that make true any of its
(positive) claims is cheating.
(Conclusion 2) Theory Y is cheating.
In short, cheaters are those theorists who either implicitly or explicitly deny Truthmaker
(premise 1) and CIP (premise 4) by accepting the following:
CHEATER-TRUTH (CHEATER): There are TBRs which are true even if the world
is not the way it is described by those TBRs.
We can now see that SHY (from §6.1) is a form of CHEATER.23 SHY CHEATERS do
not own up to the minimum commitments that their theories must accept. EXTRAVA-
GANT CHEATERS are also CHEATERS of another sort. They build into TT too much
question-begging metaphysical baggage, and claim that WEAK-CC arguments are actu-
ally the work of TT. Both are cheaters. I have already presented good examples of
EXTRAVAGANT CHEATERS (in §4.2 and §4.3). In the next chapter, my Modest Realism
will help us understand who the SHY CHEATERS are. In the next section, I shall try to
help us identify CHEATER semantic strategies generally by contrasting CHEATERS with
non-realist views which do not cheat, such as error theories and fictionalist theories.
6.5 Distinguishing the Cheater from the Error Theo-
rist and Fictionalist
Cheating is not a matter of making ontologically dubious claims, but rather it is a
matter of having the wrong semantics, the wrong view of how language relates to reality
22I shall speak loosely sometimes and say that STRONG catches cheaters, while if I was articulating
this more precisely, I would say that TT-ists who accept STRONG catch cheaters.
23I have intentionally made the abbreviation ‘CHEATER’ stand for both the above claim and when
used personally as the abbreviation for those theorists who implicitly or explicitly accept the claim.
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especially in terms of truth. By implicitly (or explicitly) ignoring the demands of the basic
account of truthmaking (BATT), one will be cheating. To help us see who these cheaters
are, I shall (in this section) distinguish the CHEATER from others who are not cheating,
namely the error theorist and the normal fictionalist. Let’s restrict our discussion mainly
to TBRs about ordinary objects and cases that involve discourse about those things which
are part of our ordinary worldview, such as persons, animals, tables, chairs, institutions,
acts of killing, acts of cheating, and states of mind.
There are many positions in philosophy which draw conclusions about the nature of
such discourse and the nature of the entities referred to in that discourse. For example,
error theorists about ordinary discourse would claim that all ordinary discourse is just
plain false and that we are in error when we claim that discourse concerning ordinary
objects is true. This is compatible with TT. An error theorist can think that what it is
for a TBR to be true is that what the TBR is about needs to exist (and be the way things
really are). The error theorist just thinks that none of the entities exist and that we are
in error when we claim that such discourse says anything true. Although I think (on
independent grounds) that error theorists are mistaken about ordinary entities, they are
not cheating as they accept the consequences on their world-view for accepting modest
TT. They shirk commitment to ordinary entities and are convinced that they do not
exist for independent reasons. But, they do this by accepting that any TBRs that are
committed to such entities are false, and by claiming that we are in error for thinking
otherwise.
Of course, the falsity and error of such TBRs do not always make the error theorist
want to drop talk about the domain in question. For example, Mackie (1977), though an
error theorist about morality, doesn’t think that this is a good reason for dropping talk
about morality.24 This kind of error-theoretic view usually leads to a view called fiction-
alism. Field (1980, 1989), for example, is a fictionalist about mathematics.25 He thinks
that even though mathematical TBRs are false, one should not drop talk about mathe-
matical objects because of its usefulness. In fact, his error theory and his fictionalism is
motivated by a realist conception of truth at the heart of TT. Field argues and accepts
that the truth of mathematics demands the existence of mathematical objects.26 But
24See especially (1977: 233–234) where he discusses the doctrine of natural law as a potentially “useful
fiction” and (1977: 239) where he diagnoses the objectification of moral values and obligations as “not
only a natural but also a useful fiction” (ibid.).
25See also (Melia 2000: 457), (Balaguer 1998: §5), and (Yablo 2000: 211ff, 2001: 74ff, 2002: 225–230).
26See Field (1980: vi–vii) where he relies on this point in his summary of his main, and most fa-
mous, anti-indispensability argument for his fictionalist, error theory. In (1989: 228–230), he is agnostic
about the issue of whether CT or the disquotational notion of truth has any bearing on his attack on
mathematical realism, but mainly in regard to whether or not these theories of truth require mind-and-
language-independent entities. The realist conception of truth, as I understand it, pervades his defence
of mathematical fictionalism and his attack on mathematical realism. He makes this clear, for instance,
when he writes that “anyone who adopts an attitude of literal belief towards mathematical theories
taken at face value is a mathematical realist. For a mathematical theory, taken at face value, is a
theory that is primarily about some postulated realm of mathematical entities: numbers, or functions,
or sets or whatever (or some combination, like numbers and sets together). You can’t consistently
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the entities one would have to posit or accept into one’s theory if mathematical TBRs
are true, conflict with physicalism since they are abstract entities and do not participate
in the world’s physical, causal order. Hence, according to Field, a staunch physicalist,
they are ontologically unacceptable.27 Thus, on the basis of his acceptance of realism
concerning truth and the ontological consequences that it demands, he advocates an
error-theoretical view of mathematics where TBRs such as ‘7 is prime’ are false.
Instead of rejecting mathematical talk altogether, this leads him to a revisionary
account of the practice of mathematics where the utility and importance of mathematical
theories do not lie in their truth, but rather in what he calls their conservativeness,28
the characteristic of mathematical theories which makes making derivations easier than
if they were made using true or ontologically more respectable premises. Mathematical
talk, even if it is all in error and systematically false, can be used because it is useful.
Hence, we accept the fiction of mathematical talk for its many virtues; these virtues just
happen not to involve truth. As Kalderon emphasises,
‘Acceptance’ is a technical term and is explicitly stipulated to be neutral as
to whether acceptance is belief in the content of the accepted sentence or
is some other attitude. [2005a: 2]
So, Field accepts mathematical TBRs because of non–truth–involving norms, but be-
cause he is a realist concerning truth, he thus thinks that we should not believe that
mathematical statements are true.29
Similarly, a fictionalist about ordinary discourse would claim that we are engaging in a
kind of fictionalising. Fictionalists who follow Walton (1990) claim that we are engaging
in a kind of make-believe when we talk about such entities. All of these entities are
merely fictitious. Truth, according to the fictionalist, is not a matter of whether there
are such entities, whether such entities exist in the real world, but rather, it is a matter
believe the theory without believing in the entities it postulates” (1989: 2; my emphases). As he admits
in (2001: §8; reprint of [1994]), there is some discrepancy between his earlier work on mathematical
fictionalism and this later discussion of vagueness, where he discusses the extent to which what he calls
“factually defective discourse” (2001: vii) can be given a deflationary account of truth.
27This is of course, a simplified version of his overall argument structure, but I think it captures
its core. See (1991: 231) for at least one place where he raises the causal interaction problem for
mathematical realists (specifically of the Platonist sort).
28See (Field 1989: 4). In discussing the relation between truth and conservativeness, Field writes that
conservativeness is not a “weaker goal” (ibid.: 59) than truth, but a “different goal” (ibid.), and one
that is “quite independent” (ibid.: 62) from truth. See his (ibid.: 61–65) argument for details of why
conservativeness, not truth, explains the utility and lack of error in proofs using mathematical theory.
29Kalderon (2005a: 6), following (Burgess 1983), calls Field a “revolutionary fictionalist.” This is
because Field thinks that we should revise our mathematical practice accordingly, since normal current
practice involves taking mathematical statements as important because they are true representations of
the world. Kalderon (ibid.) contrasts the revolutionary fictionalist with the “hermeneutic fictionalist.”
As an instance of the latter, Kalderon cites van Fraassen’s (1980) constructive empiricism concerning
scientific practice. Instead of aiming to revise the practice of scientists, as Field wants to revise the
practice of mathematicians, van Fraassen thinks that he is accurately describing scientific practice as it
is practiced. Yablo (2001: 74-84 and 2002: 225–230) also presents a form of hermeneutic fictionalism.
In both kinds of fictionalism, there is an underlying assumption that even though their claims are strictly
speaking false, working with or accepting their claims as if they were true, accepting them fictionally,
is a very useful practice.
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of whether other conditions are satisfied. For example, it might be a matter of whether
one can correctly say that such entities (fictionally) exist in a specific fictional world
that we are pretending to exist or whether it is consistent with what is said about other
entities which we are pretending to exist. Consider T1: ‘This table exists’. T1 would
count as true as long as there is that table in the (supposed) fictional world of ordinary
discourse just as ‘Elves exist’ counts as true in the fictional world that Tolkien writes
about in his books.
Such views are not cheaters, however, because what fictionalists (of the sort I am
considering) mean with ‘true’ in these cases is obviously not the same as what realists
about truth mean when applying ‘true’ to relevant cases. But, a fictionalist, such as
Field, does not stretch the notion of truth to include fictional truth, and can still be
a realist about truth. Fictionalists who employ talk of fictional truth may be using
truth-like norms when talking about their fictional worlds. When talking about ordinary
objects, a fictionalist about such objects might use the language of truth. However, they
would be using the language of truth to signify other virtues. For instance, talk of truth
in such contexts might take the place of talking directly about the practical utility of
accepting that there is a chair that one is sitting on, even if one believes that there are
no such things as chairs, and one is just engaging in a kind of make-believe. Fictionalists
might even model a notion of fictional truth on (literal) truth,30 even using the apparatus
of truthmaking to flesh out a similar, but distinct notion.31 Even if a fictionalist uses
the language of truth, as is obvious from the very label they call themselves by, they do
30According to Currie (2010: 74–75), fictional truth is “what is so according to the narrative” (ibid.: 75)
or “the world of the story” (ibid.), and what is literally true of the story is just those aspects of the world
of the story which are also part of or match with “the real world” (ibid.). Similarly, Friend (2016) thinks
that what is fictionally true is “what is the case according to the story” (ibid.: 3). However, according
to her, just because a TBR is fictionally true, this doesn’t mean that it is not also true in the normal
sense because of what she calls “the Reality Assumption [. . . ] that everything that is (really) true is
also fictionally the case, unless excluded by the work” (ibid.: 1). But presumably, what is literally true,
including those aspects of the fiction which are not excluded by the work, is what is true according to
reality. These accounts, I think, model fictional truth on (literal) truth because they work in the same
way, that is, both fictional and literal truth depend on how things are in some world. The difference is
just that the former depends on how things are in the world of the story, while the latter depends on
how things are in the real world.
31Fictionalists often use the language of truthmaking to describe the fictional activities and practices
that people engage in. For example, Walton (2013: 1) claims that in fictional contexts of make-believe or
in a relevant pretense, there are real world TMKs for TBRs about make-believe things. These are what
he calls “props,” which are, as he explains, “real world objects or states of affairs that make propositions
true in the make-believe world, i.e. “fictional” ” (ibid., my emphases). (He discusses prop-oriented make-
believe in more detail in [Walton 1993: 39ff and 2000: 92ff]). For instance, ‘Jonny is carrying a gun’ is
made true in the make-believe world by Jonny’s carrying a branch (in this case it is the prop) in the
non-make-believe, real world. In this case, Jonny’s carrying a branch does not literally make true ‘Jonny
is carrying a gun’ but it fictionally makes that TBR true. (This example is from [Eklund 2015: §2.4],
who also uses the language of truthmaking in his description.) To make this clearer, Walton makes
a useful distinction between propositions being “fictional” and being “true,” where “[t]o be fictional
is to be (as we say) true-in-a-fictional-world, the world of a game of make-believe” (2015: 176) and
where “[f]eatures of props are understood to make propositions fictional, to generate fictional truths”
(ibid.: 176; my emphasis). Eklund describes Walton’s view as taking such propositions as “pretend-true”
(2015: §4.6). Truth is understood normally, but interestingly, being fictional is kept clearly distinct from,
but is understood on the model of, literal truth.
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not claim that what they take to be fictionally true is literally true. Or rather, this is
what a fictionalist who takes truth seriously should think.32
Thus fictionalists and error theorists do not cheat if they accept that if a TBR is true
the world needs to be the way it is described. However, as I’ve stated earlier, cheaters, in
the case of ordinary discourse, are those who believe that TBRs about ordinary entities
are true while at the same time believing that there are no TMKs for these TBRs. There
is a complication in this discussion, however. The tricky part about TBRs of ordinary
discourse is that they are often vague and indeterminate. It is unclear whether vagueness
and indeterminacy can be a feature of the world.33 Must we then be error theorists or
fictionalists about all ordinary discourse? I shall stay neutral about this.
One point that I can make, however, is that TAAT has some resources to deal
with this issue. In effect, TAAT will claim that for TBRs of ordinary discourse to be
true, we are merely committed to what we are talking about in the ordinary TBRs
to have being. In effect, TAAT would just require us to figure out what the best
SEM-TAC says they are about, and then go from there. Linguistic indeterminacy and
vagueness is rampant in ordinary discourse (as opposed to scientific discourse). But,
clearly the best semantic account of what we are talking about would not commit us
to the existence of indeterminate entities such as Russell’s ambiguous man (1905: 41),
Anscombe’s “man of no particular height” (1965: 161), or the average family in the
TBR ‘the average family has 2.1 children’. The best SEM-TAC is not a simple or naive
referential theory which takes the surface grammar of our talk at face value (see §2.4.1).
For example, Russell talks about the ambiguous man merely to motivate his own deeper
analysis and general theory of denoting of apparent talk about such men. When we
seem to be talking about indeterminate entities, we must be talking about something
else. I cannot give a full semantics of ordinary discourse here. However, it is safe to say
that our best semantic account of what ordinary discourse is about will yield a much
more sophisticated and plausible account of the TMKs of ordinary discourse than what
we are at first consideration committed to. In effect, the best semantic account of what
ordinary discourse is about will yield a much more plausible, though modest, account of
the ontology and being which underlies such discourse.
32It would be a very interesting project to see how close other forms of fictionalism come to cheating.
For example, other forms of fictionalism might not be as conservative or prone to accept an error theory
as Field is. Others still may not be willing to make what seems like a sharp distinction between being
fictional and being true, as Walton (see previous footnote for references) seems to. However, this
interesting project needs to be left for another time.
33Despite the fact that most would balk at the idea that there is vagueness in the world, some
philosophers aim to defend such a contentious view. For example, see (Lowe 1998: 64ff) where he
discusses five different objections against the more simple argument against vague objects presented by
Evans (1978), and where he argues that Evans’s argument is invalid. See also (Lowe 1994) where he
introduces considerations to do with Quantum Indeterminacy to argue that vague identity is possible.
See also (van Inwagen 1990: 244ff) for another argument against vague objects.
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6.5.1 Motivating TT by Understanding CC-ing Semantically
For the sake of clarifying what exactly the CHEATER theorist is up to, let us pretend that
the best semantic account of ordinary discourse yields that we must take its apparent
ontology at face-value. Cheater theorists would be the theorists who do not accept
that their talk of ordinary entities is true in the sense that it is merely fictionally true.34
Instead, they try to take truth seriously by claiming that talk about ordinary entities is
literally true35 even though their truth does not commit us to the TMKs of ordinary
discourse. Like the error theorist and the normal fictionalist,36 CHEATERS are nihilists
about ordinary entities since they believe that there are no such entities and no way
these entities are. However, unlike the error theorist and the normal fictionalist, they
accept that positive claims made about ordinary entities, including positive existential
claims, can be true and frequently are true despite the fact that there are no ordinary
entities. Thus, they either explicitly or implicitly endorse a combination of two views:
(1) Nihilism about some discourse X, that is, the view that entities of domain X are
not real or do not exist; and (2) Truth in that discourse. A great part of the appeal of
34See fn. 31 above on Walton’s distinction between being fictionally true and being literally true.
35I am making the same background concessions here when talking about literal truth as I shall in
my discussion of lurches and creeps (see Appendix 4, §A4.3). In the way I understand it, literal truth
cuts through any sort of allegorical or metaphorical transmutation of standard usage into non-standard
usage. Talk about creeps, though it perhaps has a different emotional impact or emphasis than talk
of discomfort or unease, can have the same TMK-conditions and truth-conditions as talk of discomfort
and unease. Literal truth depends on what we’re strictly and fully talking about.
36I say “normal” here because there are also fictionalists who believe that fictionalism about a given
discourse does not require one to be either a nihilist or an anti-realist of any sort about that discourse.
In fact, they think that fictionalism and realism are compatible. However, such views are controversial,
and I would say, a contradiction in terms (at least according to my understanding of what it is to be
a fictionalist). Obviously one can be realist about certain entities that one talks about in fictional
discourse. For example, one can talk about Napoleon in a historical fiction such as War and Peace,
and be a realist about Napoleon. But, one is not thereby being a fictionalist about Napoleon; one is
merely including him in one’s fiction. It seems to me that it is plainly false that one can be a fictionalist
about something while believing that that thing exists and is real. Fictionalists, as I understand them
and I take them to be normally understood, merely accept statements for the sake of convenience,
usefulness, for aesthetic reasons, etc. Acceptance has different norms than the norms of belief, which
are truth-norms. I can imagine one who might hold both realism, that is, believe in entities of some
domain of inquiry, and call oneself a fictionalist because what guides one’s scientific practice within
the relevant domain of inquiry X would be the norms of acceptance rather than the norms of truth.
However, the label ‘fictionalism’ seems to me a misnomer in such cases. Of course, there are ways to
try to defend a kind of fictional realism by for instance developing an ontology of fictional characters or
fictional objects as the objects of reference and quantification of fictional TBRs. See Everett (2005) for
a critical discussion of such views and further references. Also, see for instance Jay (2011) for a recent
defence of what he calls “realistic fictionalism” in the case of morals. There is another view defended
by Cameron (2012) and others called fictional realism. This view is realist about the entities-in-fiction
that were created, or, as I would say, imagined or conjured up for the sake of a story, by novelists.
For instance, Rakhmetov is a fictional character in a book by Nikolai Chernyshevsky (1989). Cameron
argues that such fictional characters are real — they exist as abstract entities grounded in what one
might call “acts of interpretation” (ibid.: 195), which he interestingly claims to be the “truth makers
for claims concerning fictional beings” (ibid.). Cameron not only presents an interesting metaphysics
of fictional entities but, in a similar manner to Walton (see fn. 31 above), uses the tools and language
of truthmaking to flesh out his nominalist, realist ontology of fictional entities. However, such realistic
fictionalists are neither fictionalist in the relevant sense (e.g. in the sense of Field and others), nor are
they cheaters.
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TT’s conception of truth comes from the fact that such a combination of views seems
obviously wrong to hold.
Thus, if we understand CHEATING and CC-ing in this way, TT can be motivated by
the task of CC-ing. The metaphysically substantial views of CC-ing merely present a
poisoned pawn which the TT-skeptic can use to undermine the CC-ing power of TT. But
as I’ve argued, the metaphysically substantial understanding of TT and CC-ing leaves all
the CC-ing to the separate task of discovering what is and what is not metaphysically
dubious. However, when we understand CC-ing in this metaphysically modest, semantic
way, then there is indeed a good, intuitive motivation for TT: CHEATERS are those who
have a bad view of the semantics and the relation between truths and reality.
We now have a way of identifying the CHEATER and know how to use the Cheater
Identification Principle (§6.4) in an argument by distinguishing the CHEATER from the
error theorist and the fictionalist about a certain domain of discourse. And perhaps
more importantly, we have a better, more modest way of understanding how CC-ing can
motivate TT.
6.6 Does CC-ing require one to be a Truthmaker
Maximalist?
T-M is the view that all truths require TMKs. Any supposed cheater claims that
there are certain truths that are not true in virtue of anything in the world. However,
instead of branding them as cheating one might respond by saying that they are just
rejecting T-M. To put the point differently, if T-M is false, then the supposed cheater
is potentially able to reply that there is no motivation to think they are doing anything
wrong when claiming that certain truths do not require TMKs; they have just identified
some of the exceptions. This would count as a possible objection to the CC-ing power
of truthmaking.
There are quite a few TT-ists who reject T-M. See §3.2 for a list. These TT-ists
are what Mellor calls “moderate” TT-ists; such philosophers do not think that there is
anything about truths in general that requires there to be TMKs.37 And as I argued in
37Mellor similarly writes:
But then why not take a theory of truthmakers to be a theory of truth itself: why not
admit that truthmaker theory is really a correspondence theory of truth under another
name? The reason is that a theory of truthmakers that is also a theory of truth will have
to give all truths truthmakers; and this begs the question against moderate truthmaking
by assuming that every truth is made true by something other than its entailment by
another truth. [2009: 277]
As I argued in §3, negative truths do not require TMKs. So, I also reject T-M. Futhermore, just as other
“moderates,” I think that TAAT also has the resources to give a satisfying aboutness-based account of
TMKs for conjunctive truths and disjunctive truths (see §2.4.2.4). On my account these truths have
TMKs; the TMKs are just what the TBRs are about. On Mellor’s account, no TMKs need to be given
since for instance A&B is molecular and is made true by the atomic truths with which it is related by
entailment, namely A and B. On my account, the TMKs come out roughly to be the same in most of
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§3, TAAT, my favoured version of TT, can address P-NEG and reject T-M in a non-
arbitrary way. According to those of us who reject T-M, if cheaters are to be caught,
it must be because there is something special about the truths in question that they
require TMKs even though the theories in question do not provide them. I shall argue
in this section that CC-ing does not require one to be a T-M-ist.
6.6.1 CC-ing does not require one to be a T-M-ist: The TAAT
Response
T-M does not need to be true for the TT-ist to argue against cheaters; T-M just makes
the CC-ing task more straightforward. TAAT allows the TT-ist to adopt what one might
call a piecemeal or particularist approach to CC-ing, which addresses each theory on a
case-by-case basis rather than by invoking T-M. Against each cheater theory, we can
argue for the need for TMKs by stating some semantic grounds for why the particular
claims that the accused cheater takes to be true in fact need TMKs. Or the TT-ist
can attempt to undermine any special reasons that the cheater theory might give for
thinking that those particular truths do not need TMKs. Thus, to catch the cheater,
we need either an argument for why all truths need TMKs (an argument for T-M) or an
argument why certain sorts of truths need TMKs. The latter kind of argument might
vary in many ways depending on the truths and cases in question. But, we might be
able to say something more general if we ask ourselves: “What kinds of truths require
TMKs?”
As I made clear in §3, I think that the obvious requirement is that if a TBR is about
something in the world and makes or implicitly contains a positive claim about the world,
that something in the world must be the case for the truth to be true. Some truths
might not be about anything’s existing. For example, negative truths are not strictly
and fully about anything that exists. They claim that something doesn’t exist. If they
are not about anything that exists,38 then it is perfectly reasonable to think that they
are not made true by anything either. For instance, if one is a mathematical fictionalist
or if one is not a modal realist, then one might think that TBRs about mathematics or
about possible worlds are not about any things that exist but that they are truth-apt
and sometimes true (in some sense) nevertheless. Apparent talk about mathematics or
these cases. Also, just to be sure, Mellor thinks that a relation between some TBRs and non-TBRs is
essential to TT, even on his moderate version. He writes, “This thesis, that no true proposition owes
its truth to anything nonpropositional, is incompatible with the whole idea of truthmaking: that true
propositions generally owe their truth to something else” (2009: 274).
38Remember, I am not using the Representationalist terminology of ‘about’ here. The Cranean
terminology, which I adopt, captures the intuitive idea that we can talk about things which do not
exist. When we say positive things about them, the TBRs are false. When we say negative things
about them, the TBRs are sometimes true. In neither case is there any commitment to their existing.
See §2.6.
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possible worlds might just be convenient ways for us to talk,39 heuristic devices,40 or
useful fictions.41 In such cases, one might use the vocabulary of truth to express other
virtues and thus accept such talk for the purpose of usefulness and convenience.
However, I think that such acceptance for the sake of other virtues such as conve-
nience or usefulness does not amount to acceptance for the sake of truth. If a non-
maximalist thinks that positive TBRs about nothing (as talk concerning possible worlds
might be if the modal anti-realist is right) are still somehow true, then there is a sig-
nificant amount of explaining to do. Such a non-maximalist would have to explain why
these are special exceptions to the TMK-rule by explaining in what sense the TBRs are
true if they are not really about anything at all, or not about any thing that exists (let
alone how things are with such a thing). And, further, one would have to explain the
very strong illusion of being positively about certain things, such as numbers or possible
worlds.42 The usual route for someone who thinks that one is engaging in a useful fiction
is to deny the truth of the subject matter. This is because there is a strong case to
be made that each of these TBRs is about what we seem to be talking about (e.g.
mathematical objects). If this is the case, then it seems obvious that the TBR’s truth
has something to do with whether or not what it is about, that is, what it claims to be
the case, holds. Thus, we might formulate a restricted maximalist claim thus:
Restricted-Maximalism (Tm-X): All positive TBRs are true iff they are made true by
something (in the world), as long as they are about something (in the world).43
Tm-X is substantially different from T-M, since it is clear that there are plenty of truths
that are not positively about anything, such as negative truths. This formulation makes
39Most philosophers who use the idiom of possible worlds to articulate modal claims tend to take
this line and are not, as Lewis (1986) is, modal realists.
40Van Fraassen’s (1980: 61ff) constructive empiricism argues for a kind of heuristic fictionalism con-
cerning science, where we should accept scientific theories even if they fall short of truth because of
some other non-truth-involving virtues such as empirical adequacy or usefulness.
41Field (1980, 1989) defends what Kalderon (2005a: 6) calls “revolutionary fictionalism” about mathe-
matics. See Rosen (1990) who introduced fictionalism about modality as fictionalist talk about possible
worlds. Rosen thinks that by being a modal fictionalist, or “deflationist” (ibid.: 330) as he calls it, one
can retain the utility of talking in terms of possible worlds as an “innocent façon de parler ” (ibid.) while
flaunting a commitment to possible worlds, giving the modal realist “an incredulous stare” (ibid.: 329).
42Although I do not have space to discuss their views in detail, Horgan and his various collaborators
(with Barnard [2006], and with Potrč [2006, 2008, 2012]) are examples of ones who subscribe to a
cheater semantics. Horgan and Potrč (2008: 20ff) go some way to explicate this by explaining that the
kind of widespread error that unreflective common-sense makes is one that, according to them, “people
are particularly apt to make given the normal workings of their cognitive apparatus” (ibid.) and are
instances of what they call “competence-based performance errors” (ibid.). They discuss cases such
as the Müller-Lyer illusion to make a distinction between how things look to us and how things really
are. I cannot explore this further since this would require me to explore details about the connection
between evidence, especially perceptual and linguistic evidence, further and more deeply than I have
room for. Also, I don’t have to explore this now because my point here concerns the potential illusion
that TBRs are about something, which is one that I do address and which is a more general type of
potential illusion than the ones that Horgan et al. discuss.
43This formulation is meant to exclude positive TBRs which use non-existence-entailing expressions
such as ‘mythological’ and hence do not need to be made true by existing things in the world.
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explicit the intuitive idea central to TAAT that most TBRs are at least about something
in the world.
Cheater theories are then those theories which claim that certain truths are true and
about something in the world, but also claim that nothing makes them true and that they
are not true in virtue of anything in the world (including what the truths are about). To
defend against the cheater argument an accused cheater would have to say what about
those truths makes them special in such a way that they are both about something in
the world and that nothing in the world makes them true. Or they would have to explain
away the illusion of the truth being about something which should exist and be the way
it’s described.
6.6.2 CHEATERS Reject Tm-X Arbitrarily
The central problem is that the responses they are left with are not very attractive. First,
it seems like a contradiction both to think that a TBR ‘p’ is about something in the
world, q, but also to think that nothing makes ‘p’ true or that ‘p’ is not true in virtue of
anything. If ‘p’ is about something, and hence claims that the world is some way, then
it is natural to think that at least something needs to be the case for the TBR to be
true. There would have to be something very special about such TBRs to make their
denial of truthmaking at all plausible or convincing. Without a good, convincing reason
for why they are special, the rejection of Tm-X which would allow these TBRs to be
true without TMKs seems merely arbitrary.
6.6.3 CHEATERS Posit a Problematic Sort of Brute Truth
Second, if nothing makes the relevant TBRs true, then they would be brute truths. Many
theories take some truths to be brute. For instance, a physical theory that explains why
potassium explodes in water might take the fundamental laws of nature to be brute.
However, the brute truths of such theories are not brute in the same way that cheater-
claims are brute. The cheater’s brute truths are brute in the sense that they are positively
about something but nothing makes them true. The statements of the fundamental
laws of nature are not brute in this sense. They are positively about something, the
fundamental laws of nature, and they are true if the laws of nature are the way they are
described. Truths about the fundamental laws of nature are normally taken to be brute
in the sense that there are no other laws which explain them; they are fundamental laws.
Let’s briefly discuss an example to get a grip of such non-cheater brute truths. It is
a plausible meta-theoretical principle that the more explanatory power a theory has, the
stronger or better it is. A theory is better and has more explanatory power than another
theory if it explains more (has more explanatory scope) and leaves less unexplained (has
less brute posits). For example, if one theory explains the same things as another theory
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but posits only two fundamental laws rather than the other theory’s four, then the first,
ontologically less committal theory is preferable. This is because there is no evidence that
the extra elements in the stronger theory are actually required for the best explanation.
Because the first theory posits less elements and explains precisely the same things as
the other theory, it is explanatorily more powerful.44
The problem with cheater theories, by contrast with theories which do not flout the
demands of Tm-X, is that they do not just posit brute truths as theoretical posits, as
theories about fundamental physics do, they posit completely mysterious truths, which
are at the same time about the world but which do not depend on the world for their
truth. These two claims seem inconsistent. Unlike the theorist who posits fundamental
laws and can explain their bruteness by claiming that the world is just that way, the
cheater has no recourse to even such a meagre explanation.
6.6.4 CHEATERS Cannot Appeal to the Vacuousness of their
TBRs
Third, the cheater might try to take another strategy to explain away the illusion of the
truth in question being about something real. The cheater might try to argue that the
TBRs in question are in fact vacuous despite the illusion of being non-vacuous.
However, this is not a good strategy. For the sake of argument, let us assume that
vacuous TBRs can be truth-apt and even true. Even if vacuous entities can be truth-apt,
surely there is no point in arguing that one’s theory contains vacuous claims (even if
they are somehow true). Normally, one would try to explain away the illusion of non-
vacuousness when one is criticising a theory by arguing that despite the fact that its
claims are apparently about the world (let alone something interesting or substantial or
significant about the world), the claims in fact are not about anything. But, this would
be a poor strategy for someone to take in response to the cheater argument. It is almost
just as bad, if not worse, to be revealed to be saying nothing than it is to be caught
out in the pretense, or in an earnest but unsuccessful attempt, at saying something.
Of course, one’s aim in positing truths which are vacuous, or are not about anything,
might be aesthetic rather than descriptive, for example, one might be happy to indulge
in fantasies or absurdities and take them to be true.45 But, that is not what a serious
44Effingham (2013: §2) puts explanatory power in terms of the balance of brute truths and explanatory
scope.
45Carroll’s (1871) Jabberwocky poem is a good example of non-descriptive, but clever, nonsense
aimed at eliciting an experience out of the reader rather than describing and being about anything
in particular. Baier (1967: 520f) discusses six types of nonsense, of which the final two “vocabulary
nonsense” (ibid.: 521) and pure gibberish (ibid.) are excellent taxonomies for the kinds of expressions
I have in mind. With regard to pure gibberish, Baier writes that such nonsense is “part of some language,
to the minimal extent of sharing its alphabet with that language” (ibid.). Humpty Dumpty may take
what he says to be true, but neither he nor anyone else might have a clue as to what he’s talking
about. See (Parsons 1994: 67–73) for a discussion of what she calls the “semiotic catastrophe” of the
Jabberwocky poem.
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theory about the world should be doing.
6.7 Conclusions of this Chapter
What I have argued for in this chapter is that catching cheaters is a matter of catching
out theories about the world which either implicitly or explicitly claim that truth is not a
matter of the world being the way it is described by the truth. I argued first (§6.1–6.2)
that other ways of framing the CC-ing power of TT relegate the role that TT plays in
catching out these cheaters, or what they call dubious ontologies, to a mere supporting
and minor one. I then argued (§6.3–6.4) that there is a conception of CC-ing, which
I called STRONG (as opposed to the WEAK, minor one), which shows that CC-ing
should focus on semantics rather than metaphysics. Second (§6.5), I made clearer what
cheater theories are by contrasting them with error theories and fictionalist theories.
Third (§6.6), I presented a potential general challenge to STRONG: if not all truths
require TMKs, then why should the truths that the supposed cheater accepts into her
theory? I argued that this consideration is not successful in undermining the power of
TT to catch cheaters, especially when we understand TT as TAAT and that we need to
address the need for TMKs in a piecemeal manner.
Chapter 7
Truthmaking and Reality: The
Retreat to Modest Realism
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I shall argue that TT-ists must retreat to a point of relative modesty in
regard to the extent of the influence that TT can have on debates concerning realism and
anti-realism. TT’s task is not, as some have thought, to articulate realism (in general),
to reject anti-realism, or to do anything of much metaphysical substance. Rather, I shall
argue that TT-ists must retreat from the claim that TT can be necessarily tied to a
substantial form of realism to a much more modest claim, that perhaps the best a TT-ist
of realist leanings can get is that TT is tied to a very modest version of realism, which
I call Modest Realism (M-REAL). There are many views that go by the names ‘realism’
and ‘anti-realism’. So, the main task of this chapter is to narrow down what this modest
version of realism is.
7.2 Realism and TT
I shall start with a few quotes, first from Armstrong:
To demand truthmakers for particular truths is to accept a realist theory for
those truths. There is something that exists in reality, independent of the
proposition in question, which makes the truth true. [2004: 5]
Second, from Bigelow again:
I have sometimes tried to stop believing in the Truthmaker axiom. Yet
I have never succeeded. Without some such axiom, I find I have no adequate
anchor to hold me from drifting onto the shoals of some sort of pragmatism
or idealism. And that is altogether uncongenial to me; I am a congenital
realist about almost everything, as long as it is compatible with some sort
of naturalism or physicalism, loosely construed. [1988: 123]
Both of these quotations claim that there is a close connection between TT and realism.
This is the stance of the early, metaphysically immodest TT-ists. Armstrong thinks
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that demanding that there are TMKs for TBRs is just demanding that one should be
ontologically realist about the TMKs for the TBR. Bigelow says that he cannot shake
off his belief in TT, because doing so would lead him astray, away from realism. This
implies that he thinks that being a TT-ist is necessary for being a realist. It seems that
Armstrong and Bigelow would agree with Heil when he says that TT “is a central tenet
of realism” (2003: 61).
It is relevant to note, however, that none of these philosophers explains in any
satisfactory detail what the realism that TT is so intimately connected to amounts to.
Realism is a varied school; many distinct doctrines go by the name ‘realism’. Is there
a particular form of realism that TT-ists are committed to? How do we spell out the
relevant notion of realism? Is there an alternative, more modest form of realism which
is compatible with a more modest version of TT? These are the central questions which
I aim to address in what follows.
7.2.1 A Defective Account I: Armstrong, Independence, and
Defective Categorisation
Armstrong (above) mentions that the TMKs are independent of the TBR in question.
In other places he claims that we can define realism thus, “We may then define realism
about a truth of a particular true proposition as the contention that its truth is determined
by something that lies outside that proposition” (2003: 12). He calls the plausibility of
this claim “the charter” of TT (ibid.). Further, Armstrong is a T-M-ist; he believes that
every truth has a TMK (2004: 5). So, he is a global realist concerning every domain of
discourse in which there are true or false TBRs.
However, Armstrong’s explanation of realism in terms of independence and truth’s
“determination by something that lies outside that proposition” (2003: 12) is a poor
articulation of realism. I argue in the next paragraphs that Armstrong’s definition is
too weak to capture what realism amounts to. Here, I want to raise another quick
worry with Armstrong’s talk of what lies “outside” propositions. On some conceptions of
propositions, let’s call the following a Russellian conception of propositions, one might
take objects such as you or I to be elements within or inside propositions about you or I.
If the Russellian is correct and what makes propositions true is the reality they are about,
then truths are not always determined by things that lie outside of the proposition. Such
Russellians are presumably also realists about the TMKs of the propositions, even if the
TMKs can be understood as within propositions. Without further explication of what
the right theory of propositions are and what talk of being inside or outside propositions
amounts to, Armstrong’s criterion here seems too strong.
There are of course many views that go by the names ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’, but
some views are clearly realist or anti-realist. If one’s understanding of how to articulate
realism yields the result that any of these clearly anti-realist views turn out realist, then
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one’s way of articulating realism clearly suffers from what Asay, exactly on this point,
has called a “categorization defect” (2012: 377).
First, Asay (2012: 377) uses the case of error theories and fictionalist theories to
illustrate his point about categorisation defects. I’ll present his argument here, respond
to it, and expand on it. As I argued in §6.5, error and fictionalist theories are central
cases of non-cheaters. However, they are typically understood as anti-realist views since
they hold that the claims of a certain domain are systematically false. However, if one
is also a T-M-ist as Armstrong is, then, on the error theorist’s account, the negation of
the TBRs which are positively about the entities of these domains must have TMKs.
For instance, if one is a mathematical error theorist and an Armstrongian TT-ist, one
must accept that the claim that there are no numbers must have a TMK. And, on
Armstrong’s account of realism, all TMKs are real entities existing independently and
outside of the propositions they make true. So, the error theorist turns out to be a
realist. This is the wrong result. Thus, Asay (ibid.) argues, in this regard, Armstrong’s
definition suffers from a categorisation defect.
However, there is a problem with this argument. Armstrong will reply that the error
theorist concerning talk about numbers can be a realist in regard to the negation of
mathematical claims about numbers, but will not be realist about positive claims about
numbers. What Asay’s argument seems to show is that we need to relativise being
realist to a domain, rather than that Armstrong’s argument suffers from a categorisation
defect. When relativised to the domain of positive mathematical claims, it seems that
the error theorist remains an anti-realist or non-realist, even on Armstrong’s view.
Unfortunately, the categorisation defect remains. An error theorist is indeed non-
realist or anti-realist about the domain of positive claims about numbers; hence the
widespread error. However, the error theorist takes there to be widespread error on the
basis that (1) “truth is determined by something that lies outside [those] proposition[s]”
(Armstrong 2003: 12), and (2) there is nothing outside of those propositions which can
determine the truth of the propositions. So, the error theorist argues,1 such positive
propositions are systematically false. But (1) above is what Armstrong takes to be the
definition of realism. Let’s say, to be charitable to Armstrong against Asay’s objection,
that this definition provides a definition not of realism tout court but one that must be
relativised to a domain. Even then, it seems that the error theorist we are concerned
with will think truths about mathematical claims are determined by something that lies
outside those claims. Consider, for example, ‘Kempe’s proof of the Four Colour Theorem
is invalid’. This is indeed a truth about a mathematical claim, namely that Kempe’s
proof is invalid. Supposedly, even an error theorist must accept that this is true, and as
a result must have outside TMKs. The same goes for the negative truths we discussed
earlier. Hence, the error theorist about mathematics turns out to be a realist about
1This is, in broad, simplified outline, the argumentation strategy I attributed to Field (1980, 1989)
in §6.5.
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mathematics (even though she thinks that all positive mathematical claims are false).
This is indeed the wrong result. It seems that Armstrong’s definition does suffer from a
categorisation defect as Asay claims.
Second, as I pointed out in §1.7, various views which have traditionally been called
anti-realist such as idealism and pragmatism, are compatible with BATT. Both of these
versions of TT would claim that the TMKs are independent of and outside of the
TBRs which they make true. For idealists, the TMKs are ideas such as the idea-that-
constitutes-the-table, and for the pragmatist the TMKs might be the expediency of
the TBRs for specific individuals. Both of these kinds of TMKs are outside of and
independent of the TBRs. Generally, an anti-realist about a certain domain (or even a
global anti-realist) can adhere to the principle that truths are made true by something
in the world.2 Such an anti-realist would say that something, in some sense independent
of the TBR, will make it true. She might say, for instance, that the TMKs are the
right evidential basis for the TBR. Thus, anti-realists in general turn out to be realists
on Armstrong’s definition of realism. His definition clearly suffers from a categorisation
defect.
So, if we want to take Armstrong’s view at face-value we must either reject it as
providing the wrong substantial notion of realism, or interpret him as deflating the
relevant notion of realism to include anti-realist views (as I shall do with my M-REAL).
Although I shall argue that the latter is the only version of realism central to TT,
I think that this constitutes a problematic dilemma for anyone who wants to have a
metaphysically substantial version of TT, as Armstrong does.
7.2.2 A Defective Account II: Bigelow and Supervenience
Let’s now turn to Bigelow. Bigelow (1988: 123) only says what realism might be in
contrast to standard non-realist theories. Thus it is yet unclear what the appeal of realism
is to TT-ists partly because it is unclear what realism is on his account. However, he gives
some indication of what he might mean via the version of TT he accepts. He accepts
the less metaphysically substantial view (when compared to Armstrong’s T-NEC) that
truth supervenes on being:
SUPERVENIENCE-TT (ST, for short): “If something is true, then it would not be
possible for it to be false unless either certain things were to exist which don’t, or
else certain things had not existed which do.” [Bigelow ibid.: 133]
He is not a T-M-ist because ST allows him to reject the idea that all truths require
TMKs. In particular he can reject the idea that negative truths such as T7: ‘Pegasus
does not exist’ require TMKs. Instead they are true because they lack a falsemaker.
According to ST: if T7 is true, then it would not be possible for T7 to be false unless
2Dummett’s adherence to Principle C makes him a truth-realist in my sense. See Appendix 1 for
further details.
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certain things were to exist which do not. T7 is indeed true and it is indeed not possible
for T7 to be false unless certain things were to exist which do not, namely Pegasus. At
the moment and in our world, T7 is true and this is, in ST terms, due to there not being
a falsemaker3 for this truth, namely Pegasus.
What is Bigelow’s view of realism? According to Bigelow, realism (1) is incompatible
with traditional non-realisms, such as pragmatism and idealism; and (2) has ST as a
necessary condition. To explain (1) let’s assume that Bigelow holds the traditional view
that realism has as a necessary condition that there are entities (and how things are
with those entities) which are essentially mind-and-language independent. In fact, he is,
as he claims, “a congenital realist [in this sense] about almost everything” (ibid.: 123).
Thus, he seems to think that almost all truths supervene on entities which are mind-
and-language independent. However, even if we improve on ST and say that truths do
not just supervene on what exists but on how they exist,4 it is unclear how we can get
the realism that Bigelow wants.
First, it is clear from the views I sketched in the previous section and in previous
chapters that TT is not sufficient for realism in this sense. In fact, one cannot motivate
TT by claiming that TT gives us this metaphysically substantial version of realism or that
it helps to rule out views which, from this perspective, are unsavoury. As I argued in §6.2,
this is question-begging against these views. Idealism5 and language-constructivism6 can
both attempt to give an account of TMKs in terms of mental or linguistic entities. So,
TT is not sufficient for realism in Bigelow’s standard, substantial sense, nor is realism
necessary for TT. The exact same point holds for the ST version of TT, since the
idealist and language-constructivist can claim that truth supervenes on how things are
with mind-dependent or language-dependent reality. To deny this on TT or ST grounds
by building metaphysical assumptions into the theory is question begging. Even if one
is a congenital realist, this is not because TT or ST is sufficient for realism, or because
realism is necessary for TT or ST.
But, this is not the main problem for Bigelow. The fundamental problem with
Bigelow’s view is that it is also clear that TT or ST is not necessary for realism. One
3I have not said much about falsemakers, except for a brief discussion in §3.5. ‘Falsemakers’ is a
common term in the literature. Whenever there are truthmakers for a negation (e.g. not-p), these are
the falsemakers of p. According to Bigelow, falsemakers “are things whose existence entails that [the
TBR] (N) is false” (see [Bigelow 1988: 132]). I reject such a view, as is clear from my favoured version
of TT. TAAT only requires that there are falsemakers for false negative TBRs, such as ‘there are no
giraffes’, which is made false by all and any of the existing giraffes there are. TBRs such as ‘Pegasus
exists’ do not need falsemakers. It is false because it lacks a TMK, not because of the existence of
anything, a falsemaker, but because of the lack of the existence of things which the TBR is about.
4See §4.1.2 for details. Also, see the same section where I discuss other problems for the superve-
nience view, such as its apparent symmetry. Let’s ignore these issues for now.
5See the end of §6.2 for details.
6This is the view that everything that exists is constructed by language and thus dependent on
language. Goodman (1978: 94; 1996: 144) holds such a view although he would deny TT since I think
one should interpret him as a truth-nihilist, someone who believes that there is no such thing as truth,
replacing it with another notion he calls ‘rightness’ (ibid.).
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can be a realist about a certain domain of inquiry, claiming that the entities of the
domain of inquiry exist or are real independently of what we say or think about them
(while remaining, as he would like his preferred realist to be, a “physicalist or naturalist,
loosely construed” [ibid.: 123]), without having any view of the relation between truths
and reality.7 Views concerning what entities there are and concerning what their nature
is, whether realist or anti-realist, have nothing to do with what the nature of the relation
between truth and reality is. For instance, one can be a truth-nihilist and claim that
there is no such property as truth, and at the same time hold the view that most things
exist and are real independently of what we say or think about them. One can thus be
a realist in the relevant sense without being a TT-ist.
Finally, though ST is a substantially weakened version of TT, it is clear that the same
points hold for any version of TT which is not question-begging against anti-realism and
related views.8
7.3 TAAT and the Limits of Realism: A Presentation
of Modest Realism
So much for the intrinsic link between TT and substantial versions of realism. In this
section I shall present what I think of as the right, metaphysically modest view of realism
which comes out of TAAT. As I argued in §1.7, the non-symmetry and general asymmetry
of BATT captured by the dependence of the truth of TBRs on the being of their TMKs
is compatible with a plurality of philosophical views each of which can give candidate
TMKs for the truth of the TBRs. However, given that more must be said about the
relation, we need to go beyond BATT in a modest way. The way that I favour is the
view that T-REL is the dual relation of A-REL, which is captured by the idea that the
TBRs are made true by what they are strictly and fully about: their TMKs. And the
way we identify what the TBRs are about is via the best SEM-TAC.
My hypothesis is that if there is any right story about TT, this story of how to go
beyond BATT is the right story about all positive truths. It accounts for the TMKs
for necessary truth. For example, ‘All bachelors are unmarried’ is about bachelors and
about their being unmarried. Necessary abstract truths are about abstract entities such
as numbers, if contrary to the error theorist there are any such things; for example ‘Five
plus six equals half of twenty-two’ is plausibly about certain numbers and the relations
between them. TAAT also accounts for contingent abstract truths such as truths about
morals. For example, ‘Killing babies is wrong’ is about a certain type of action and its
wrongness, and ‘Saving children from preventable diseases is good’ is about another type
7Dodd (2002b: 284) presents a similar argument against TT being necessary for realism.
8This captures in essence the argument from Beebee and Dodd (2005a: 16), which I presented in
§6.2. Also they argue, more concisely than I do here, that “[t]he truthmaker principle seems to be
neither sufficient nor necessary for realism” (ibid.: 7–8).
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of action and its goodness. All of these truths seem to be about specific entities and
how things are with these entities. The specific sketch of the TMKs for any of these
TBRs might not be the right sketch. This will depend on what the best semantic theory
of what these truths, if they are indeed truths, are about says they are about.
But from this overall sketch, we might extract a workable, general principle capturing
what I call Modest Realism:
MODEST REALISM (M-REAL): If TBR p is true and it is a positive truth, whatever
p is strictly and fully about must be real and make true p.
As we saw with my discussion of disjunctive truths (see §2.4.2.4), not all of the entities
and how things are with the entities need to be real. In the case of disjunctive truths,
only what one of the disjuncts is fully and strictly about needs to be real. Also, as should
be clear, what I mean with “must be real” is just that the TMKs have being (in the way
sketched in §1.2.2 and §4). This is a modest claim about the reality of TMKs. And,
I think it is compatible with most anti-realist views as well as realist views. Most of these
views can attempt to develop a metaphysically more detailed or substantial version of
TAAT by providing an additional story about what the TBRs are about and by linking
TBRs with TMKs in this way. As we saw in previous discussions, however, not all views
are compatible; this includes realist views. TF, for example, can plausibly be construed
as a realist view of the world. However, it falls foul of M-REAL. Most truths, specifically
those truths not about fundamental reality, are made true by whatever they are about,
not the fundamentalia which they may be related to in other ways. Such a view of TT
is incompatible with M-REAL.9
7.3.1 M-REAL and Anti-Realism: No Categorisation Error
I end this section by spelling out how M-REAL is compatible with certain forms of anti-
realism, even though this might already be clear to the reader, and explain why M-REAL
is, hereby, not committing a categorisation error. In my discussion of Armstrong (§7.2.1),
there were at least two forms of anti-realism that his account failed to categorise cor-
rectly: (1) error theories which deny the truth of a domain of discourse; and (2) theories
which claim that the domain of discourse is about something radically different from
what we thought it was about, as I think is the case with anti-realist theories such as
pragmatism and idealism.
The former theory is compatible with M-REAL, because error theorists can consis-
tently deny that a whole domain of discourse is true (or even truth-apt) while holding on
to the idea that if such a domain of discourse did make true positive claims about the
world, then one would have to accept the reality of its TMKs, that is, what the domain
is about. We do not commit a categorisation error, because the error theorist is rightly
9In Appendix 5, I shall argue that certain forms of anti-realism can also be rejected on the basis of
the fact that TAAT and M-REAL are both modest and intuitively plausible.
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categorised as a sort of anti-realist even though the anti-realist can accept M-REAL.
This is a good result.
Anti-realists of the latter sort will similarly give a story of the TMKs, but instead
claim that they are very different from what we might initially have thought they are.
They would have to argue that what the best SEM-TAC says these truths are about
is different from what we thought they are about. As we saw in §2.4.1, discovering
the best SEM-TAC is a complicated matter and in fact is most plausibly not what the
folk think truths are about or what they seem to be about on first consideration. Thus
M-REAL and TAAT are in fact very congenial to anti-realisms which provide revisionary
or even radical accounts of what truths are about and what make them true, as long
as their accounts are grounded in good evidence and can claim to be providing the best
SEM-TAC.
These views would still be best labeled anti-realist because they deny the reality of
what we thought are the TMKs for such truths, and instead accept the reality of other
kinds of TMKs for such truths. For instance, an anti-realist can try to argue that the
best semantics of ordinary claims, which are apparently about medium-sized dry goods
cannot actually be about medium-sized dry goods, but are in fact about certain states
of evidence or acts of verification. Or an intuitionist in mathematics, especially one
following Brouwer (1924) and Heyting (1964), might argue that the right account of
the TMKs for mathematical truths are proof-objects understood as mathematical con-
structions, the objects of acts of construction.10 These are all anti-realist accounts of a
certain domain which accept the modest realism inherent in M-REAL. Thus, M-REAL is
compatible with anti-realisms of different kinds. And instead of committing a categori-
sation error, we not only get the right results (that anti-realists are properly categorised
as anti-realists), but with M-REAL we have a good workable way of distinguishing the
anti-realist from the more substantial realist views, according to whether they provide
radical or revisionary accounts of what the TBRs of a specific domain are about.
7.4 Modest Realism and Commonsense Realism
Liggins (2008: 182ff) has argued that Armstrong and TT-ists are best understood as
appealing to what he calls “commonsense realism”,11 which he describes as a “mod-
est doctrine [since] it is compatible with the idealist claim that everything is mental”
10See (Sundholm 1994: 121–122) for a contemporary Brouwer-Heyting intuitionistic view of the
TMKs. Thanks to Sundholm for making this clear to me in conversation and explaining to me the
subtle distinctions which are of central importance to understanding the intuitionistic conception of
meaning and truth.
11It is important to note that Liggins does not mean what is normally meant by “commonsense
realism.” Normally, as I understand it, a commonsense realist is realist about such things as physical
objects and moral values; a commonsense realist is a realist in the sense that she takes whatever is part
of our pre-theoretical folk conception of the world to be real. Liggins understands the term differently
as should be clear when I present what he means in what follows.
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(ibid.: 178). Liggins points out that commonsense realism is not the same as what he
calls “physical object realism” (ibid.: 183). According to Liggins (ibid.: 183–185), because
TT-ists accept commonsense realism, not physical object realism, the TT-ists’ arguments
“do not beg the question” (ibid.: 185), contra Beebee and Dodd (2005a: 16). In fact, as
Liggins also says, agreeing with what I have argued in the last section, “commonsense
realism is compatible with error theory about any domain” (ibid.: 185). He sums up the
distinction thus: “commonsense realism is a wide-ranging thesis about what determines
the truth-value of propositions, whereas physical object realism is a thesis about the
existence and mind-independence of physical objects” (ibid.). It is clear, then, that what
Liggins calls “commonsense realism” is at least similar to M-REAL. M-REAL, however,
is even more modest than commonsense realism, because it has modest commitments
as to the nature of both TBRs and TMKs, not just TMKs. For instance, Liggins talks
of propositions, whereas M-REAL would be neutral about the nature of TBRs (§1.3).
However, Liggins (ibid.: 185–186) argues that commonsense realism “lends no clear
support to [TT]” (ibid.: 186). It will be illuminating to discuss Liggins’s argument. He
sums up commonsense realism’s commitments thus: “So commonsense realists should
embrace:
EXP[:] For every truth P, there is an explanation of why P is true.
Now there is a VIRTUE [which Liggins discusses as the principle meant to capture
T-REL12] on which it is just another way of articulating EXP. On this reading of VIRTUE,
commonsense realists should endorse it. But this principle is of no obvious use for mo-
tivating [TT]” (ibid.: 185). What Liggins has in mind are:
(V1) For every truth P, there is some entity o such that o determines that P is true.
(V2) For every truth P, there is some entity o such that o explains why P is true. [ibid.]
However, on these readings of VIRTUE, one might say that the truth that the rose is
red is true in virtue of the rose. But, as Liggins rightly points out, this contradicts
NECESSITARIANISM (NEC). What he thinks TT-ists have in mind is:
(V3) For every truth P, there is some entity o such that o’s existence determines that
P is true; or
(V4) For every truth P, there is some entity o such that o’s existence explains why P
is true. [ibid.: 186]
Liggins’s criticism is two-fold: (1) “Commonsense realists think that truth is determined
by reality; but that does not mean that they should think that propositions owe their
truth-values simply to what exists. It is more natural to think that there are propositions
12See §1.4 and Appendix 1 where I do the same.
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which owe their truth-values not just to what exists but also to how it is—which prop-
erties it has and in what relations it stands” (ibid.); and (2) there is no good argument
that existential explanations are the best explanations of truth, as is claimed by TT-ists
such as Read (2000: 76) and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2005: §6).13
As is clear from my discussion in §4.1, I wholeheartedly agree with Liggins here
concerning (1) and (2). Liggins, however, is equating TT with T-NEC. TAAT can
get the result that the truth of the TBR ‘the rose is red’ is determined not just by
the rose but by the rose being red, that is, how things are with the rose concerning
one aspect of the rose, its colour properties. But one does not need NEC for this.
One just needs strict and full aboutness (see §2.4). TT-ists are wrong when they try to
build too much metaphysics into TT (see §4). Instead, insofar as commonsense realism is
plausible and motivated, so is TAAT. In fact, TAAT and M-REAL are more plausible than
commonsense realism. This is because M-REAL claims that truth is not just determined
by reality (as commonsense realism claims), but truth is determined by the reality that
the truths are strictly and fully about (according to the best SEM-TAC). Commonsense
realism, at least as presented by Liggins, is less plausible, because commonsense realism
is open to the criticisms I raised in §4, since both V1 and V2 require that “some entity o”
(Liggins 2008: 185) determines or explains the truths in question. This is metaphysically
too strong and far from commonsensical. The right version of TT is indeed motivated
by the plausible, modest version of realism we get from TAAT and SAC.
As for (2), I agree with Liggins that existential explanation is not properly motivated
and far from the best kind of explanation, as the other TT-ists he cites might claim.
But, this is not a problem. For instance, Lewis (2001a: 611–612), in his discussion with
C. B. Martin about TMKs for negative truths, makes clear that he thinks that TT doesn’t
need to give informative explanations, when he says,
[T]he proposition that there are no unicorns is true just because there are no
unicorns! What sort of explanation is that?—No explanation at all, I agree.
But who says that a Truthmaker Principle, whether weakened or not, must
yield informative explanations? I say to Martin: Tu quoque! [. . . ] The
proposition that there is a cat is true just because there is a cat. What sort
of explanation is that?—No explanation at all, and none the worse for that.
[2001a: 611-612]
As MacBride (2005) has also made clear in his interpretative discussion of Lewis’s version
of TT, “the truth-making role is explanatorily thin” (MacBride 2005: 134). The reason
why Lewis should be interpreted as thinking this is that, as Lewis and Rosen (2003: 39ff)
argue, the TMK-role can be played just as effectively by “qua-versions of things as states
of affairs” (MacBride ibid.).14 MacBride (ibid.: 136) points out that if SOAs are to be
13(Liggins ibid.)
14In Lewis’s “qua-versions of things as states of affairs” the operator ‘. . . qua F’ in ‘a qua F’ is
used to evoke the fine-grained counterpart relation which selects all the counterparts of a in all possible
worlds where a is F. See (MacBride 2005: 129–131) for a thorough presentation of Lewis’s view.
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understood in Armstrong’s way, then the TMKs are explanatorily robust because they are
understood as structurally complex entities. Hence Armstrong demands an extravagant
existential explanation out of TT. But, Lewis shows us a way of understanding SOAs
as things-qua-properties, thinning the explanatory power of TT in a way that doesn’t
require an existential sort of explanation; SOAs understood in the Lewisian qua-version
way are not existing entities over and above things and their relevant counterparts.
This kind of reasoning is compatible with TAAT. There is no reason to think that
TT must be explanatorily robust in the way that the substantial metaphysicians such
as Armstrong think it should be. As I remarked in my criticism of Schaffer in §5.4.1,
TT must be at least somewhat explanatory or useful. However, I do not see any reason
to think, as Liggins (2008: 185) does, that EXP should hold. Commonsense realism, in
the way he presents it, seems to posit an explanatory relation between truths and what
determines those truths. To put his discussion in context, Liggins (2008: §5) provides a
sustained criticism of Rodriguez-Pereyra’s (2005) attempt to account for the explana-
tory asymmetry in terms of grounding. Liggins sums up Rodriguez-Pereyra’s move as:
“the truth asymmetry obtains because the grounding relation is asymmetrical” (Liggins
2008: 188). Liggins’s criticism is that the explanatory asymmetry of
EXPLANATORY ASYMMETRY (EA): (<p> is true because p) and not (p because
<p> is true)
cannot be captured by understanding ‘because’ as picking out the grounding relation
(ibid.: 189),15 nor does EA actually express claims about grounding (ibid.: 190–191).
I won’t rehash his arguments. I agree with his criticisms of Rodriguez-Pereyra; though
Liggins’s conclusion is hesitant as he merely concludes that “Rodriguez-Pereyra’s ar-
gument is [. . . ] inconclusive” (ibid.: 191). I sympathise with Liggins that grounding
relations cannot do the work he thinks they can (see my §5; though I explicitly do
not engage with Rodriguez-Pereyra’s version of TT in terms of grounding). However,
my general response to Liggins is that TAAT does not require TT to account for any
explanatory asymmetry. Whatever explanation-relation TAAT offers is indeed, follow-
ing Lewis-MacBride, a thin one.16 However, as we have seen (see especially §2.5 and
§2.7–2.9), TAAT does a better, more modest job of capturing the asymmetric relation
15As I said in a previous footnote (§1.2 fn. 3), the main argument, presented by Hornsby (2005: 41–42),
is that ‘because’ is a sentential connective connecting sentences and hence not a predicate as it would
be if it picks out the grounding relation. Dodd similarly points out that ‘because’ is “an operator, not
a relational–expression” (2007: 397; original italics) and on this basis points out that the groundedness
of truth, captured by ‘<p> is true because p’, does not express a “grounding-relation” (ibid.: original
italics). But, recall, I’m not addressing these TT-skeptical considerations.
16In fact, the modesty I sketched in §4.1 makes the explanation, if there is any, even thinner than that
sketched by Lewis-MacBride. Instead of thinking of TMKs as entities at all, either as complex SOAs
or Lewisian qua-versions, most TMKs can be understood as merely things and how things are with
those things. This modest view allows us to drop commitment to entities corresponding to the modal
machinery which Lewis relies on, such as a thing’s counterparts in possible worlds which we hardly ever
speak strictly about outside of the context of discussing counterpart theory or Lewis’s views, making
our explanations, if there indeed are any, even thinner.
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between truths and reality than the more metaphysically substantial versions of TT do.
I remain agnostic whether TAAT expresses any explanatory relation, and I reject the
idea that it is a metaphysically substantial explanatory relation. I also remain agnostic
as to whether an account of TAAT needs to capture any claims that can be made with
the sentential connective ‘because’. There is a clear asymmetry between truths and re-
ality when we understand the relation in terms of aboutness. Exactly how explanatory
this and related theses such as M-REAL are is not my business to say here. It is clear
however, that M-REAL does not require any existential explanation. At most it merely
requires that truths are explained by the being of what we are strictly and fully talking
about, which includes how things are with the things we are talking about. Again, this
is a more modest and plausible version of realism than even what Liggins calls “com-
monsense realism.” And its plausibility does motivate at least the metaphysically modest
version of TT that I favour.
7.5 TAAT and the Limits of NEUTRALISM:
A Critical Note on Finean and Yablovian Neutral-
ism
I do not stand alone in defending the kind of modest realism which I have been sketching
and defending as a viable and plausible part of TT in this and the previous chapters. For
instance, Kit Fine’s slogan of metaphysical neutrality is: “Truth is one thing, metaphysical
status another” (2001: 3). Alston’s (1996) position, which he calls “alethic realism” or the
“realist conception of truth” takes an extreme neutralist position, implying that alethic
realism carries no worldly implications whatsoever when he writes, “Though a particular
realist or antirealist metaphysical position (of the sorts we have been considering) has
implications for what propositions are true or false, they have no implications for what
it is for a proposition to be true or false” (ibid.: 78; his italics).17 These are both very
strong statements of metaphysical neutralism tied to an avowed realist conception of
truth and truthmaking.
The question which I want to very briefly explore in this section is: “To what extent
can we remain neutral as to our metaphysical commitments?” In the build-up of my
position, first from BATT to TAAT, and then to M-REAL, I explicated an understanding
of T-REL which explicitly remains neutral about the metaphysical nature of both TBRs
(§1.3) and TMKs (§1.7). My answer to the question then is that if my account has
17Although I do not discuss Alston’s view any further in the main body of the dissertation, I extensively
discuss his extreme neutralism, contrasting it with the modest neutralism of M-REAL, in Appendix 6.
Alston’s view on truth is, in the historical scheme of things, one of the views that my view is most similar
to. My comparison of our views foreshadows areas of potential future research. For example, there
I briefly discuss how M-REAL engages with and stands in regard to the question of the importance
of truth. To properly treat this topic, I would have to engage more directly with the skeptic and
truth-nihilist, with whom, as I pointed out in §0.2, I am not engaging here.
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been plausible and feasible so far, TT-ists can be maximally neutral. All that M-REAL
requires is that when there is positive truth of the relevant sort (e.g. existence-entailing,
and positively about ways the world is), then there must be a TBR of some sort or the
other which is made true, and there must be TMKs which it is about which make the
TBR true. The extent to which there are any metaphysical commitments concerning
either TBRs or especially TMKs depends purely on what they are about, according to
the best semantic account of a TBR’s aboutness.
Other avowed neutralists, as I now want to point out, have been somewhat less neu-
tral. Yablo and Fine are two philosophers who similarly to me have written on aboutness,
content, and the way that TT can inform a theory of these notions.18 They also similarly
embrace what Fine calls the “neutrality requirement on subject matter,” “according to
which it should not in general be possible to determine from the subject matter of a
proposition (and the facts) whether or not the proposition is true” (2015c: 13). Articu-
lating the same requirement, Yablo writes, “one should be able to understand what S is
about while remaining ignorant of its truth-value” (2014: 45). Indeed I think that these
quotations do capture a relevant notion of neutrality, which both these philosophers
agree must be part of an account of subject matter.
However, Fine (2015c: 12–13) argues that Yablo’s account violates the neutrality
requirement (ibid.: 12) since Yablo also believes that, as Fine puts it, “the subject matter
of P, i.e. P itself, will be true just in case one of its verifiers is actual, i.e. belongs to the
actual world” (ibid.: 13). The main reason why Yablo violates neutrality, according to
Fine, is that Yablo restricts TMKs ontologically to actual TMKs. In general, Fine wants
to reject the relevance of a possible worlds analysis to understanding what the TMKs
are for all, though not any, truths. Rather, worlds and world-sized TMKs are only one
kind of TMK and are not relevant for all TMKs.
Fine’s point against Yablo’s neutrality is, I think, a powerful one. Despite a pro-
fessed commitment to the neutrality requirement, Yablo’s framework seems to bring
in metaphysically substantial machinery given the role that possible worlds, however he
construes them metaphysically, play in his understanding of truthmaking. If Fine is right,
the general problem, it seems to me, is that despite some neutrality that is built into
the account, there is not enough neutrality in the overall framework. This kind of neu-
trality—metaphysical neutrality even at the framework level of the theory—is something
I have been at pains to ensure in my way of going beyond BATT.
However, Fine’s own account might also not be in the clear. Though Fine is com-
mitted to neutrality, his discussion of the nature of what he calls “states” as TMKs is
worrying in this regard. For he professes to take “such talk [about ways of being true]
seriously [which involves] at least two elements. The first is that we recognize ‘ways’ of
being true as objects in their own right. They are facts or fact-like entities that might
reasonably [be] regarded as parts or aspects of a world. The second is that they stand in
18See my §2.4.2 for discussion and quotations.
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a distinctive relation of ‘making true’ to sentences of which they are the ways of being
true” (ibid.: 1–2). The latter can allow him to remain neutral, but, as we have seen in
§4, such metaphysical seriousness about facts is distinctly not neutral.
The rationale behind committing oneself to a neutrality requirement when artic-
ulating a theory of aboutness and truth is that these are semantic notions and not
metaphysical ones. Thus, a theory of truth, aboutness, and truthmaking that is more
metaphysically neutral is preferable over ones that are less neutral. Despite a commit-
ment to neutrality, as Yablo and Fine would agree, one should be careful not to build
substantial, non-neutral commitments into one’s framework.
7.6 Conclusions of this Chapter
In conclusion, with TAAT, the TT-ist is able to focus purely on aboutness and can drop
any metaphysically extravagant and question-begging commitments. But the TT-ist still
has enough tools to object to the immodest realists, such as Armstrong and Bigelow,
who think that metaphysically substantial theses follow from or are necessary for TT.
Thus, I sketched some of the limits of our theorising about realism in §7.2–7.3.19 In §7.3,
I argued that a modest and neutral version of realism, which I called M-REAL, does help
motivate TT. In §7.4, I argued that M-REAL is even more plausible than commonsense
realism (of the kind that Liggins discusses). And in §7.5, I sketched some of the limits
of NEUTRALISM by briefly discussing Finean and Yabloian NEUTRALISM.
19I argue that some versions of anti-realism are incoherent and lead to regress on aboutness grounds
in Appendix 5.
Chapter 8
Truthmaking and Inquiry: Some
Everyday Modesty
8.1 Introduction
In this final chapter, I shall argue that TT has a central role in articulating practically
applicable steps of everyday, scientific inquiry. Specifically, I shall be presenting and
defending a “two-step” conception of inquiry. The inquiry with which I am primarily
concerned is ordinary inquiry, but what I say extends to all inquiry that is positively
about the world broadly construed to involve at least all factual1 matters as opposed to
other matters such as fictional matters (see §6.5 for this contrast). First, in §8.2, I explain
that some philosophers conflate truth-conditions2 with TMKs, and draw consequences
for inquiry based on this false starting point. In §8.3, I present my two-step conception
and explain that the first step is to search for TMK-conditions, not truth-conditions.
I then make important distinctions between TMKs and truth-conditions (§8.4.1), and
between TMK-conditions and truth-conditions (in inquiry, §8.4.2; and in a theory of
understanding, §8.4.4). However, I also argue, in §8.4.3, that TMK-conditions and truth-
conditions sometimes come together. In §8.5, I shall present and criticise an alternative,
orthodox conception of what it is to know a claim’s TMKs. I shall argue that knowing a
claim’s TMKs does not require knowing the nature of its TMKs. This is another defence
of my overall metaphysically modest approach to TT.
1There is no commitment to facts involved here.
2I rely on a basic, intuitive understanding of the notion of truth-conditions, partly because I find
it unnecessary, at least for my purposes, to discuss specific views of truth-conditions, which are highly
varied. For instance, Davidson’s “extensional” approach to truth-conditions (see [Davidson 1967: 310ff;
and 1984a]) is very different from a Lewis-style “intensional” approach (see [Lewis 1970: 23ff]) which
identifies a TBR’s meaning with the set of possible worlds in which the TBRs are true. Though extremely
interesting, I must leave a more detailed discussion of how different accounts affect my discussion for
another time. See (Asay 2011: 63–71) for a more thorough treatment of the distinction between TMKs
and truth-conditions in the context of Davidsonian vs Lewisian views.
187
Chapter 8. Truthmaking and Inquiry: Some Everyday Modesty 188
8.2 Conflating Truth-Conditions with Accounting for
TMKs
One of TT’s central aims is to contribute to a theory of meaning, a theory of what
meaning is and how TBRs3 acquire their meanings.4 Crucially, however, TT cannot
provide a full theory of meaning. As I have sketched it so far with TAAT, what TT goes
hand-in-hand with is the best SEM-TAC, which undoubtedly plays a part in a theory of
meaning, but does not wholly constitute it. Other TT-ists are more ambitious than I am
here. Fine (2015a, b, c) and Yablo (2014), for instance, are trying to articulate differ-
ent systematic versions of TMK-semantics, and both are trying to use their respective
versions to provide a comprehensive theory of content and partial content.
More generally, however, one might think that it is only by giving an account of how a
TBR acquires its meaning that we can provide an account of what the truth-conditions
are for the TBR in question. And it is only then that we can figure out whether ‘is
true’ applies to it or not. One might think that accounting for what a TBR’s possible
TMKs are is intimately tied to providing an account of what the truth-conditions are for
the TBR in question. As we shall see in this chapter, although the parallels also make
them intimately connected, there are significant differences which will make us favour
an account of inquiry in terms of TMK-conditions rather than truth-conditions.
Some philosophers take the intimate connection a step further and think that ac-
counting for a TBR’s truth-conditions just is accounting for a TBR’s possible TMKs.
Fox writes, “To spell out the truth-condition for an atomic claim is to spell out what
constitutes its truthmaker” (1987: 204). Blackburn (1987: 52) also explicitly states that
providing a TBR’s truth-conditions gives us an account of what makes the TBR true.
He says, “[T]he answer [to the problem of finding the fugitive fact] would be obtained
by establishing the truth-conditions for such judgements. It would give us an ‘account’
3A virtue of the neutrality about the nature of TBRs, which I sketched in §1.3 and have adopted
ever since, is that I can talk solely about TBRs rather than sentences or propositions. By doing so,
I side-step a few problems with identifying meaning with truth-conditions. For instance, there are
other uses of language. Non-indicative sentences, and speech acts such as questions, orders, requests,
and promises plausibly do not have truth-conditions; they aren’t even truth-apt. Their purpose is to
do something other than convey information about and make reports about the world. See (Austin
1962) and (Searle 1969) for an extensive overview. Instead, they might have what Smart (1984: 16–19)
called compliance conditions. For example, ‘Go to the store!’ is an order which is complied with, if
the person it is directed to goes to the store. Cf. (Parsons 2012) for a recent and extensive challenge
to this orthodoxy about imperatives. By talking about mainly TBRs, and about all relevant linguistic
categories as TBRs, without specifying which if any TBRs I think are primary, I can side-step any or
most of these issues. TBRs are by definition truth-apt and are normally used to convey information
about and describe the world.
4Yablo and Fine are other prominent examples. See §1.3–1.5, for more examples and detailed dis-
cussion and citations. Others think that TT is purely a metaphysical enterprise. See for instance Asay,
who writes, “Here, now, is the proposal. Truthmaker theory is a metaphysical enterprise that gives an
ontological accounting of the truths that we accept” (2011: 25). Though I agree that TT has some,
though very modest, metaphysical implications, I obviously would disagree if one claims that TT is
solely a metaphysical enterprise.
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of the states of affairs in which their truth consists. Or of what it is that makes them
true” (ibid.). Vision (2003) goes further and argues that
The prime target of our inquiry ought to be truth, however we arrive at that
concept. If there are substantial, worldly truth-conditions for a proposition’s
being true, whether or not anyone says so, that should be the central concern
of such a theory. That the conditions do not form a homogeneous class,
each of whose members it is illuminating to call a ‘fact’, can be only of
secondary importance under the circumstances. [ibid.: 141]
This is the conclusion of Vision’s argument against Lewis’s (2001b) position that we can
forget about the correspondence theory (CT) and replace it with TT plus a redundancy
theory of truth. Vision aims to subsume TT under CT. We shall not go into the details
of their debate(s).5 But it is clear from what Fox, Blackburn, and Vision say that
(1) some philosophers conflate accounting for a TBR’s truth-conditions with accounting
for a TBR’s TMKs; and (2) there is a conception of the aims of inquiry as seeking truth
ultimately via elucidating truth-conditions. Whatever role TT has to play in inquiry is
subsumed by the role that truth-conditions play in inquiry. I shall argue that both of
these are mistaken by (1) distinguishing truth-conditions from TMKs and from TMK-
conditions; and (2) sketching an alternative conception of inquiry.
8.3 The Role of Truth in Inquiry: The Two-Step Con-
ception of Everyday Inquiry
Let us first articulate the two-step version of everyday inquiry that I have in mind:
STEP ONE: We look at our claims in a given discourse and figure out what the TMK-
conditions are for these claims.
STEP TWO: We investigate whether there are any of the right kinds of entities that
would fulfill these conditions and try to discover if they are indeed how they are
described to be.
CONCLUDING STEP: Based on our insights or findings in both steps one and two
(and perhaps some background knowledge), we conclude that the discourse makes
true or false claims about the world.
STEPS ONE and TWO mark two different steps in inquiry. In STEP ONE, we find out
what the conditions are that would need to be fulfilled for the claims in question to be
made true. We figure out what the claims entail the being of, for instance, some object
Z and how things are with Z. In STEP TWO, we go out into the world and discover
5This is in the main part because Vision thinks that one of the main arguments against TT as a
version of CT, which is that TMKs do not have to be homogeneous, misconstrues what is at the heart
of CT. He writes: “It is difficult to see how the community of interest is destroyed merely by the lack
of this sort of homogeneity among worldly truthmakers” (2003: 140). See my §1.5 for my arguments
against thinking that TT is a version of CT.
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whether or not Z exists and whether Z is the way described. If we want to mention
TMKs, we can say that we first figure out what the potential TMKs are for the claims
and then explore the world to discover whether there are such TMKs. To successfully
accomplish STEP ONE, we must have a modest understanding of a TBR’s TMKs, the
entities that they are about and how things are with the entities. Extravagance will lead
us astray, and shyness will be deficient. However, it is only in STEP TWO that we might
need to go out into the world to attempt to learn more about what kinds of entities they
are, what their nature is, and the deep story (if there is one) about what it is for entities
to be the way they are described.
To take either step, we might need to have a good amount of background knowledge,
including about the environment in which they apparently exist, and about the other
entities with which they might or might not be related. Background knowledge is even
essential to STEP ONE, since, to understand the claim in question, one will need to have
gone out into the world and to have gained knowledge about many things, including
about how one’s language works.6 But, this additional step is not essential to inquiry
as sketched in the two-step method, in the sense that it is not part of the method (see
§2.4.2.2’s discussion of collateral information). If we understand the TMK-conditions
(understood modestly), we already have sufficient information to look for and potentially
find the TMKs, even though it is only in STEP TWO that we look out in the world and
discover whether the relevant entities exist and have the properties which we hypothesise
they have.
Of course, this is not a general theory of inquiry. This is because within the two-step
structure, the first step is itself an inquiry, about TMKs. Thus, the successful use of
the two-step method presupposes that we already know how to engage in inquiry. But
what I have described is a two-step method for engaging in a specific type of everyday
scientific inquiry with this structure, where we presuppose at least a basic understanding
of how to inquire more generally,7 and in particular an understanding of how to inquire
6One must not ignore the fact that there seems to be pre-linguistic learning, for most of us done in
infancy and childhood, which is a type of learning prior to our simple two-step conception of inquiry.
Pre-linguistic learning is a necessary step in our development which allows us to engage in the more
complex two-step inquiry. This pre-linguistic learning involves only looking out into the world, for
language is part of the world and is something that has to be learnt about as well. Once we learn
language, we can use it for our more complex inquiring activities.
7Perhaps this understanding merely consists in the ability to inquire. But, having the ability to
inquire, for instance because it is perfectly easy for one to do so, doesn’t entail knowing how to inquire
(see [Snowdon 2003: 11f] for examples which illustrate that the ability to X doesn’t entail knowing how
to X). I think that this basic understanding consists in some form of propositional knowledge about
inquiry (see [ibid.: 26]). However, even if the two-step method presupposes propositional knowledge
about inquiry more generally, this does not presuppose that we are able to articulate this knowledge,
let alone give an account of how to inquire more generally (see [ibid.: 27f] for a general discussion of
propositional knowledge in this vein). Also, it may be that no more general account of inquiry can
be given. For instance the basic actions (see [ibid.: 12]) involved in inquiring about where Plato lived
might be very different from the basic actions involved in an inquiry about how much energy it takes to
create a Higgs boson. The two-step conception I sketch is just one way of structuring inquiry or going
about inquiring, which happens to presuppose some knowledge of how to inquire more generally.
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about what the TMK-conditions are for claims. In what follows, I try to make the latter
clearer. I don’t rule out other good methods with other structures, perhaps not involving
TMKs or TMK-conditions. My presentation of this two-step account, however, should
make it clear why this TT-based method of inquiry is an attractive one.
8.4 TMKs, TMK-conditions, and Truth-conditions
Questions arise concerning this two-step method of inquiry. What are TMK-conditions?
Why not just say that STEP ONE can be achieved by understanding the truth-conditions
of the claim in question? In this section, using TAAT/SAC, I distinguish between TMKs
and TMK-conditions, on the one hand, and truth-conditions, on the other.
8.4.1 TMKs are not the same as either Truth-conditions or
TMK-conditions
First, TMKs are not truth-conditions. TMKs are the things (and how things are with the
things) that make TBRs true. When there is truthmaking, the result is that there is a
truth that the TMKs make true. By contrast, the truth-conditions are the conditions that
need to be fulfilled for the TBR to be true. So, the truth-conditions are the conditions
of truth, while the TMKs are the makers of truth, that which fulfills the conditions with
their truthmaking.
Here’s another general reason why TMKs are not truth-conditions.8 All meaningful
TBRs are directed at truth,9 are truth-apt, and can be used to try to say something true.
Hence, all TBRs have truth-conditions, whether or not they are true. However, only true
TBRs have TMKs. What links the two (truth-conditions and TMKs) is that they both
need to be related to TBRs. Further, if a TBR has truth-conditions then it must also
have TMK-conditions (conditions under which the TBR would be made true). When
a TBR has both truth-conditions and TMK-conditions, it is still possible that neither
of these conditions are satisfied, and hence the TBR may not have an actual TMK. In
fact, some claims cannot be true; it is impossible for them to be true. These still have
both truth-conditions and TMK-conditions even though both of these conditions cannot
obtain and they do not have any possible TMKs.
8.4.2 TMK-conditions are not the same as Truth-conditions,
and are better for STEP ONE
Second, although TMKs fulfill both truth-conditions and TMK-conditions when they
make a TBR true, these are different conditions. Consider T10, T11, and T12:
8Dyke (2007: 33ff; 2008: 73–74) also raises this point.
9There are of course many meaningful sentences which are not directed at truth, and hence have nei-
ther truth-conditions nor TMKs, such as questions and orders. They might have satisfaction-conditions
and satisfaction-makers or better, satisfiers.
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T10: Some triangles are equiangular.
T11: Some triangles are equilateral.
T12: Some triangles each have equal vertex angles.
T10 and T11 have the same truth-conditions, are true in all the same possible worlds
and when exactly the same conditions obtain. And, they are necessarily equivalent.
Necessarily, the plurality of triangles that are equiangular are also equilateral, and vice
versa. However, they have different TMKs. In addition to being strictly about the
same triangles they are also strictly about two different properties, or rather, they are
strictly about two different ways things are with these triangles. T10 is strictly and
fully about some triangles being equiangular, and thus involves those triangles and the
property of being equiangular. And T11 is strictly and fully about some triangles being
equilateral, and thus involves the same triangles and another property, the property
of being equilateral. Thus, T10 and T11 have the same truth-conditions but different
TMK-conditions.10 They are strictly and fully about different things (and how things are
with those things).11
However, T10 and T12 have the same truth-conditions and also the same TMK-
conditions. This is because T10 and T12 are strictly and fully about the same triangles
and the same way things are with those triangles, that is, exactly the same properties.
These properties just happen to be talked about differently.
10I want to raise and dispel a potential objection in this footnote, not to get bogged down in the
main body. This is that one might object, as a Davidsonian would, by explaining that in fact T10 and
T11 have different truth-conditions even though they are provably equivalent.
The point I made and the example I used to say that T10 and T11 have the same truth-conditions,
I think, raise a problem, analogous to and perhaps stronger than the one that Glock calls the problem
of “rogue T-sentences” (2003: 234) for Davidsonian theories of meaning in terms of truth-theories. On
such theories the meaning of ‘snow is white’ is captured by the biconditional: ‘snow is white’ is true
iff snow is white. But since ‘is true iff’ is extensional, we have T-sentences which are true but do not
capture the meaning of the quoted object language sentence. For instance, “Schnee ist weiss’ is true iff
snow is white’ is a true T-sentence and so is “Schnee ist weiss’ is true iff grass is green’. Davidsonians
who address the problem of rogue T-sentences might also be able to address the issue I raise concerning
what we might call necessarily co-extensive rogue sentences. In doing so, they might claim that in fact
these rogue T-sentences do not give the truth-conditions for ‘Schnee ist weiss’ and similarly, ‘T10 is
true iff some triangles are equilateral’ does not give the truth-conditions for T10. A Davidsonian, for
instance, might claim that the rogue T-sentences are not semantically relevant and hence do not give
the truth-conditions.
Davidson himself addresses the problem of rogue T-sentences by saying that the relevant T-sentences
which give the truth-conditions must not only be true but lawlike (1967: 26). See (Kölbel 2001: 616–618)
and (Segal 1999: 48–58) for further discussion of alternative Davidsonian replies including to the nec-
essarily and provably co-extensive rogue T-sentences problem.
But, the important point for us is this. The notion of semantic relevance is invoked to explain
why ‘T10 is true iff some triangles are equiangular’ and ‘T10 is true iff some triangles are equilateral’
provide different truth-conditions, and to explain how T10 and T11 have, strictly speaking, different
truth-conditions. However this notion is spelled out (e.g., by invoking being lawlike), the differences
in truth-conditions will not be made on the basis of their having different TMKs or TMK-conditions.
Thus, the distinction I make here on the basis of this example will still hold.
11Mark Jago, who has been working together with Kit Fine on developing a TMK-semantics, raised
a similar point and said that thinking of content in terms of TMK-conditions gives one a “route to
hyperintensionality” See (Jago 2015: §2). However, I rely on no particular understanding of the difference
between being equilateral and being equiangular except that there is such a difference.
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Although all three are equivalent and have the same truth-conditions, T11 differs
from T10 and T12 in that it has different TMK-conditions, and is about different things
and how things are with those things.
I want to add also that one might say that TMK-conditions cut more finely into the
fabric of reality than truth-conditions, and require more detailed distinctions in being. So,
I would say that TMK-conditions are more important for inquiry than truth-conditions
for STEP ONE. Even though knowing the truth-conditions for a claim in most cases
comes together with knowing the TMK-conditions (e.g. with T10 and T12), this is not
always the case (e.g. T10 and T11).
Also, it should be clear that given that I reject T-M, I claim that not all truths require
TMKs to be true. That means that some truths, such as negative truths, do not have
TMK-conditions. They do have truth-conditions however. This is another way that they
can be distinguished.
Clearly, TMK-conditions and truth-conditions are distinct if one has a simple theory
of truth-conditions which merely revolves around ordinary biconditionals. The TMK-
conditions differ from the truth-conditions for ‘snow is white’ if the biconditional “snow
is white’ is true iff coal is black’ counts as a satisfactory example of its truth-conditions.
But, one might respond by saying that this is clearly an inadequate theory of truth-
conditions, especially if we think of them as closely tied to meaning (for instance, by
either being determined by or determining meaning). One might think that we have
to build more into the right account of truth-conditions. Then the distinction between
them and TMK-conditions might not be quite so simple as I have sketched it to be.
My response is just that there are many ways that one can go about building more
detail into what would be a more substantive account of truth-conditions. (See fn. 10
in this section for a discussion of one such account.) Which details one builds into such
an account is crucial, however. If one builds in just those details which I have explained
give us TMK-conditions, then there is no need to draw a distinction.
However, I can imagine that there are plenty of reasons why one wouldn’t want to
give an account of truth-conditions that just mirrors my account of TMK-conditions.
For one, TMK-conditions are determined by what TBRs are about. What a TBR is
about might not fully capture what a TBR means (though, I think that aboutness is
semantic, and hence plays some part in determining meaning). One might think that
a truth-conditional theory of meaning cannot just be determined by the best semantic
theory of TBR-aboutness. Of course, one might actually want to build such an account
of meaning, in which case they are not distinct. However, it is not my task to settle
what is the right theory of meaning, nor whether the right truth-conditional theory of
meaning is just a TMK-conditional theory of meaning. Whatever account turns out to
be the right one, it is clear that an account of TMK-conditions is different from many
standard accounts of truth-conditions, not least the simple biconditional account.
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8.4.3 The TAAT-ist theory of TMK-conditions is a Modest The-
ory of TMK-conditions
Third, my theory of TMK-conditions in terms of TAAT should be a modest theory of
TMK-conditions. Let us consider the case of moral claims. Consider T41,
T41: It is wrong to kill innocent babies.
We might elucidate the truth-conditions for T41 homophonically thus:
T41 is true iff it is wrong to kill innocent babies.
In normal discussions of TMKs, this truth would standardly be thought to be made true
potentially in a variety of ways. For example, T41 can be made true by there being
moral absolutes or universals, by there being a God, by our natures as rational agents
being a specific morality-allowing way, by the nature of biological life being a specific
way, etc. According to TAAT however, none of these aspects of the world, if there are
indeed such aspects, are potential TMKs for T41. If they are TMKs, they are only TMKs
derivatively or indirectly. These aspects of the world are only TMKs if the wrongness
of killing innocent babies is identical to any of these many aspects of the world. For
example, there being moral absolutes or universals is only relevant for the truth of T41 if
one of those moral absolutes or universals is identical to the wrongness of killing innocent
babies. Let us now imagine that it is at least in part because there is a God that killing
innocent babies is wrong. Even if this is the case, unless there being a God is identical
to the wrongness of killing innocent babies, then I do not think that it is a TMK for that
TBR. They are about different things. The fact that there is a God may be related to
the TMK for T41 by a further explanatory relation but it itself does not look like a good
candidate for being such a TMK. Thus, in such a case, the truth-conditions, captured
by the right-hand side of the elucidation of the truth-conditions above, seem to come
together with the TMK-conditions.
This is an attractive result of the modest theory of TMK-conditions, because there
are many attractions to capturing the meaning of TBRs in terms of truth-conditions,
including semantic parsimony.12 So, since TMK-conditions and truth-conditions come
together in the majority of the cases, I hypothesise that whatever benefits we have of
capturing a TBR’s meaning in terms of its truth-conditions is also captured by capturing
the TBR’s meaning in terms of its TMK-conditions.
8.4.4 TMK-conditions vs Truth-conditions in a Theory of Un-
derstanding TBRs: More Modesty and Some Exactness
Fourth, there is another important way that TMK-conditions and truth-conditions do
not come together. Consider another TBR,
12See (Speaks 2014: especially §2.2.1) for a discussion of parsimony in a theory of meaning and why
a Davidsonian truth-conditional theory of meaning is more parsimonious than the alternatives, such as
accounts in terms of propositions, intensions, or Fregean senses.
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T42: There are humans on planet Earth.
One can, presumably, know exactly and fully what T42 means without knowing all the
TMKs that currently make it true, let alone all the things that could possibly make it
true. However, what is it to know all the TMKs that currently make it true? Is knowing
all the TMKs that currently and possibly make T42 true the same as knowing what the
TMK-conditions are for T42?
Perhaps to know all the possible TMKs for T42, one would need to know all the
possible ways that something can be human and on planet Earth. I think that this is
an implausible way to understand what knowing a TBR’s TMK-conditions amounts to.
There are potentially infinitely many ways that something can be human and be on planet
Earth. For example, one can, while living on planet Earth, be born of human parents
in a normal way. This way of being a human might for example exclude the possibility
of being injected with walrus genes as an embryo. One might also be human by being
transformed into a human by God from one of God’s ribs. One can also be human
and have most of the physical parts of every other human but have a slight genetic
deformation and have only half a “normal” brain. Such a human would perhaps require
a little more effort than other full-brained humans to perform the same behaviours, but
such a human would be human nonetheless. These are all ways that humans can be
on planet Earth. However, all these ways of being human are not strictly relevant for
the truth of T42. As long as the humans who are humans in their different ways exist
and are human, and are on planet Earth (whatever way they got here), each of them
and the relevant way they are are enough for them to be TMKs for T42. The rest of
the information about them is extraneous and the other ways they are are not directly
relevant. Thus, I can perfectly well and fully know the meaning of the TBRs, and also
the TMK-conditions of the TBRs, without knowing everything and all the facts about
all their possible and actual TMKs.
As another example, consider
T43: There are humans in space.
One can know what T43 means without knowing that Joey is one of the humans in space
that makes true this TBR. In fact, that Joey is one of the TMKs is also not strictly
relevant. Though he is a TMK for T43, to use Lewis’s parlance, it is not Joey-qua-Joey
(or qua-referent-of-‘Joey’) that makes T43 true, but it is Joey-qua-being-a-human-in-
space that makes T43 true. Thus, we must not only be modest by removing extraneous
information from what we know when we know a TBR’s TMK-conditions, but we must
also be properly focused on exactly the relevant TMKs and exactly the relevant ways
things are with the TMK-entities.
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8.5 A Plea for Scientific Modesty
TMK-conditions cut reality more finely than truth-conditions. And they must be strictly
and fully relevant for the truth of a TBR, making their level of detail much more exact.
These make a search for them better suited for STEP ONE of the two-step method. So
far, I have sketched some correct ways of drawing a distinction between truth-conditions
on one hand and TMKs and TMK-conditions on the other.
In this final section, I shall describe and criticise a wrong way to distinguish between
truth-conditions and TMKs. By doing so, I shall apply distinctions I made throughout
the dissertation to overturn a final aspect of the general immodesty of the current
TT-orthodoxy. While the previous attack on orthodoxy was centred on its extravagant
metaphysics, I shall illustrate how philosophers have also been immodest in regard to
science, specifically concerning what they think we know when we know a TBR’s TMKs.
8.5.1 An Orthodox, but Wrong, Way to Distinguish Truth-condi-
tions and TMKs
Other theorists, for example, Mellor (2009: especially 278–280), Dyke (2007: 33ff; and
2008: especially §2), Asay (2011: 62–71), Mulligan, Simons, and Smith (1984: 9ff), to
name just an important few, also explicitly emphasise the distinction between TMKs and
truth-conditions. However, I think that there is a tendency to draw the distinction in
the wrong way. Specifically, the orthodoxy is that knowing a TBR’s TMKs requires that
we know substantially more information about the scientific nature of TMKs than would
be required to know its truth-conditions. I think that this is captured by an oft-quoted
passage from Mulligan et al.’s influential article, in which they write,
A knowledge of truth-conditions takes us at most one step towards reality:
one can, surely, envisage understanding a sentence (knowing its meaning),
whilst at the same time having only partial knowledge of the nature of
its possible truth-makers. Those who used the term ‘hepatitis’ before the
discovery of its varieties did not fail to understand the term; they were
simply (partly) ignorant about hepatitis. That the investigation of what
makes a particular sentence true is thus fundamentally an empirical, not
a philosophical one, is not belied by the fact that for many sentences we
can pick out the relevant truth-makers by nominalisation. There is, in the
general case, no cheap and easy way to determine the truth-makers even
of simple descriptive sentences via linguistic transformations. [1984: 299; my
emphasis]
They claim that we can know and understand what a TBR means, and thereby know
what its truth-conditions are, without knowing much about what the TMKs would be
if the TBR is true. I take this to be generally true, and there are plenty of examples to
capture this discrepancy. If we accept that a TBR’s meaning is elucidated by its truth-
conditions, the general point that Mulligan et al. are making is right and is captured by my
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distinction between TMK-conditions and truth-conditions. In my way of understanding
things one might say that the best semantic theory of what a truth is about is perhaps
not the same as the best semantic theory of what a truth means.
However, a few questions arise: (1) how much must one know of a TBR’s TMKs to
be able to know what a TBR means?; and (2) how much does one need to know about
any particular TMKs to know that it is one of the TMKs of the particular truths that
they make true? Mulligan et al. seem to think that the answer to (1) is “hardly much,”
but that the answer to (2) is “a lot.”
Mulligan et al. might argue for these answers in the following way. There are plenty
of everyday terms in our language, of which we only roughly know the meanings, but
which we regularly use in true (and false) TBRs. Consider:
T44: Jack is mean-spirited.
T45: The chair is made of plastic.
T44 just means that Jack is mean-spirited. Let us say that one grasps the truth-conditions
of this TBR (which can be stated thus: ‘T44 is true iff Jack is mean-spirited’), and is
able to use the TBR appropriately, such as in conversation and in inferences.13 However,
as the orthodox view goes, one may still be mostly ignorant of what makes the TBR
true; what makes the TBR true may be a rather complicated set of dispositional states
far beyond one’s comprehension.
The truth-conditions for T45 might be: ‘T45 is true iff the chair is made of plastic’.
One may be able to use T45 appropriately in conversation and have a grasp of its truth-
conditions, but have only a very vague idea of what plastic is. This is the case even when
we put the truth-conditions in another way, for example, in a non-homophonic form: ‘T45
is true iff the chair is made out of a synthetic material that can easily be moulded into
objects such as chairs’. As the orthodox story might go, there is a contrast between even
such a specification of the truth-conditions and the TMKs. At least one of the TMKs
for this TBR might be a fact whose constituent parts are rather complicated14 or the
TMK might be a set of extremely complicated empirical facts about the chair’s chemical
composition. On their account, the complications required for an account of the TMKs
go far beyond the complications necessary for stating the TBR’s truth-conditions.
A result of this view is that we do not know what the TMKs are for many claims
that we use competently every day. And, it means that in the 17th century, for instance,
we knew a lot less about TMKs than we do now. To find out more about the TMKs,
according to the orthodox view, one would have to engage in further investigation. For
13Mere understanding does not yield the capacity to take part in a conversation. Taking part and
engaging competently requires more than simply understanding the words and the truth-conditions of
the TBRs being used. For example, it requires such understanding plus a sense of how the speaker or
hearer will respond to the remark, an understanding of what is appropriate conversationally.
14Ignore the fact that Mulligan et al. think that the nature of TMKs are not facts but what they call
“moments” (see especially [1984: §3]), which for all that matters for us are just PAPs.
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example, even to understand what to look for, one would probably have to look up the
various different kinds of plastic in industrial engineering manuals or one would have to
do one’s own detailed empirical investigations into the nature of plastics. Thus, one can
have a perfectly good grasp of a TBR’s truth-conditions and be able to use the TBR
appropriately, while at the same time being mostly ignorant of the various things about
the world that make the TBR true; that is, one might be mostly ignorant of its TMKs.
8.5.2 Why Modesty is Preferable to Orthodoxy
The central problem with the orthodox view is that it seems to be conflating full knowl-
edge of TMKs-qua-entities with knowledge of TMKs-qua-TMKs. One can perfectly
well know the TMKs for T44 and T45, or for the TBR that Jack has hepatitis, without
knowing the things that the orthodox view requires one to know in order to know the
TMKs for these TBRs. For example, one can know the TMKs for T44 even if one is
mostly ignorant about all the specific dispositional states and mental states which consti-
tute mean-spiritedness. One can know the TMKs for T45 even if one is mostly ignorant
about what exactly constitutes being plastic. And in the case of their own example, one
can know and understand that Jack has hepatitis even if one is mostly ignorant about
the extremely various kinds of hepatitis one can have and discover. Let me explain.
If one understands what ‘mean-spirited’ and ‘plastic’ and ‘hepatitis’ mean, presum-
ably one would be able to identify when such terms are used correctly and when they
are not used correctly, at least in a reasonable amount of cases. Linguistic competence
with those terms requires that one is able to identify, at least in some cases, when those
terms apply to things, and thus one needs to know at least some of its (possible) TMKs.
For instance, one needs to know that ‘plastic’ designates plastic. This is important infor-
mation that one needs to be able to generate and understand the TMK-conditions of a
TBR which uses the term. One can know that ‘plastic’ is the name of this stuff without
knowing much about the stuff. One does not need to know much, let alone everything,
about the nature of plastic to know and understand that a table is made out of plastic
and that its being plastic is what makes T45 true.
Further, what this argument indicates is that the orthodox view is conflating material
analysis and scientific discovery of the nature of things with the needs of TT. Perhaps in
certain cases, a fuller explanation of a TBR’s TMKs requires us to know, discover, and
provide an explanation in terms of the exact material nature of the TMKs, such as when
a TBR specifies the exact material nature of some substance. But, this is not always the
case. A modest TMK-explanation does not require that we provide all the information
about the TMKs involved. Let us illustrate this with a simple example. Compare:
T46: I am drinking a mixture of Diet Coke and Coke Zero at the moment and Diet Coke
is different from Coke Zero in that it contains citric acid as one of its ingredients
while Coke Zero contains no citric acid.
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T47: I am drinking a mixture of Diet Coke and Coke Zero right now.
T46 provides more information in terms of the differences in ingredients and chemical
composition between Coke Zero and Diet Coke than T47. T46, hence, is about more
things and how things are with those things, and as a result requires more TMKs. To
understand and know T46, one is required to understand and know at least that Coke
Zero and Diet Coke are different drinks and that one or the other could possibly contain
citric acid. But, I can know what the TMKs for T47 are, even if I lived in a time
before the Coca Cola Company was forced by law to reveal the ingredients of its various
products. Hence, I can know what the TMKs for T47 are, even if I did not know that
citric acid is one of the ingredients of Diet Coke. The TMK for this truth (T47) is my
right now drinking a mixture of Diet Coke and Coke Zero. I can be acquainted with and
know about this TMK completely adequately just by drinking the mixture and knowing
that I am drinking this mixture (rather than, say, the mixture of Diet Coke and Sprite).
But this specification of the TMKs and what we might say are its TMK-conditions
is importantly very similar to the truth-conditions for T47. To understand the TBR
and to know its truth-conditions, all I need to know is that T47 is true iff I am right
now drinking a mixture of Diet Coke and Coke Zero. The TMK-conditions for T47 are
also similarly modest. One might know the TMK-conditions by, for instance, knowing
that T47 is made true iff I am right now drinking a mixture of Diet Coke and Coke
Zero. To know these modest TMK-conditions seems to me to be both necessary and
sufficient for grasping the truth-conditions for this TBR. In this case, if one did not
know the TMK-conditions for this TBR, then one could not grasp its truth-conditions,
and grasping T47’s truth-conditions seems sufficient for knowing its TMK-conditions.
They are, in this case, the same!
T46 constitutes a TBR with more information about the nature of these TMKs of
T47, but the TMK-conditions are importantly different. If knowing the TMK-conditions
for T47 requires knowing and understanding the nature of the TMKs in a more substantial
way than I illustrated, then one would expect the TMK-conditions for T47 and T46 to
be the same. This, it seems to me, is what the orthodox account would require. But
they are not the same. So, the orthodox account does not yield the right account of
knowing a TBR’s TMK-conditions.
It seems that truth-conditions on the one hand, and TMKs and TMK-conditions
on the other hand, are much more intimately tied than the orthodoxy articulated by
Mulligan et al. takes them to be. Specifically, an understanding of TMKs requires far
less empirical knowledge about the nature of the TMKs than they seem to think is
necessary. And given this, the TMK-conditions must also be appropriately modest in
terms of the scientific and empirical knowledge required to grasp these conditions. The
TMK-conditions must reflect what the TBR is strictly and fully about, and not also
all the extraneous, collateral information concerning the empirical nature of the TMKs
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involved. Although, as I have argued in §8.4–8.4.4, TMK-conditions and truth-conditions
are distinct, they are not as different as the orthodox TT-ists think they are.
8.6 Conclusions of this Chapter
In this chapter, I have sketched some of the ways that TT can be used to clarify at
least one kind of standard method of inquiry, what I presented as a two-step method of
everyday inquiry (§8.3). To fill out the details of this two-step method, in §8.4–8.4.4,
I sketched out some of the differences between TMKs and truth-conditions, and between
truth-conditions and TMK-conditions. In §8.5, I argued that the connection between
TMKs and truth-conditions is much closer than the orthodox TT-ist thinks it is. I argued
that an understanding of TMKs (and hence TMK-conditions) requires far less empirical
knowledge than it seems. This was a challenge to the orthodox view, and it constituted
an additional plea for modesty concerning TT.
8.7 Conclusions of the Dissertation and Areas of Fur-
ther Research
We are now at the end. I have argued that TT is important for philosophy, but only
modestly so. The basic aim of TT is to give an account of the relation between truth
and reality (T-REL). Every other task or application comes out of this first task. The
overall structure of my argumentation was as follows.
First, in §1, I presented what I took to be the very basic requirements of TT, in a
version of TT I called BATT. BATT laid out the very basic assumptions and tasks of
any subsequent version of TT, which aims to go beyond it. I then explained that the
version which captures the main tasks and assumptions of TT but moves beyond it in the
most modest possible way, is the more plausible account. BATT and modesty favoured
neutralism and pluralism concerning the nature of TBRs and TMKs, and required that
any version of TT capture the general asymmetric dependence between truths and reality.
However, I also pointed out that it was important not to beg the question against
philosophical theories of very different inclinations, and that thereby BATT’s pluralism
resulted in its compatibility with a wide array of TT-accounts.
Then, in §2, I presented my favoured aboutness-based account (SAC) in detail,
arguing that it was more attractive than other accounts of the nature of T-REL, such as
T-ET and T-NEC. I explained how it is compatible with the basic assumptions and aims
of BATT, how it can answer the lingering problem of negative truths (§3), and in what
way its metaphysical modesty manifests itself (§4). Then, in §5, I argued that SAC is
preferable to a metaphysically extravagant account such as Truthmaker Fundamentalism,
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which violates some of the central requirements of BATT, and is generally riddled with
structural issues.
Finally, I came to the task of addressing what the main applications of TT are.
I argued that they have to be completely overhauled. Cheater-catching (CC-ing), as it
has been understood in the literature, was infused with question-begging, metaphysically
extravagant assumptions about the nature of TMKs. I argued, in §6, that SAC shows us
that the CC-ing task should be understood much more modestly than previously thought,
not as catching metaphysically dubious cheater theories, but as catching semantically
dubious theories which make claims about the positive truth of X but deny that there
are TMKs for X. Then, in §7, I argued that the most plausible version of realism that
can be tied to TT is what I called Modest Realism, which in turn is compatible with
anti-realisms of various sorts. In §8, I argued that we can use TT to sketch a useful two-
step method of everyday inquiry. To help make this clear, I made distinctions between
truth-conditions, TMKs, and TMK-conditions. All in all, I argued that SAC gives us
the resources to present a theory of TT to rival metaphysically extravagant orthodoxy.
I aimed not to address the TT-skeptic, but to re-invigorate an alternative conception of
TT, which would be attractive to those who are swayed and driven first and perhaps
foremost by MP, the modesty principle, with which I started the dissertation.
The running theme throughout has been an attempt to give the most modest possible
account of TT. This resulted in a conception of TT which was more semantically driven
than metaphysically driven, and which was as neutral as possible. This brings me to the
question of where my overall project of giving such a modest account of TT will bring
me in the future, in regard to areas of further research.
First, I made it explicit that I was not addressing the TT-skeptic. Since I have
now presented what I take to be a novel theory of truthmaking and argued that it is
more modest and hence more plausible than the best rival theories, the next step in my
research is to see how far I can address the TT-skeptic head-on.
My starting point, I think, will be to address the issue of the importance of truth, and
how TT can help to give an account of that importance. I go some way to sketch some
of the issues relevant to this at the end of Appendix 5. There I also say more about
how neutral SAC really is, by comparing it with Alston’s realist conception of truth,
which I explain is an extreme neutralist position. There is much more to be said about
this, but I begin to explore some of those issues there. Also, in Appendix 1, I present a
more in-depth discussion of the suggestion that there is no relation between truth and
reality, via a discussion of Künne’s distinction between an ontological and propositional
reading of “Making True”. My relations-come-easy view of relations (§1.4) addresses the
distinction made there. However, there is a serious worry about how alternative accounts
of the nature of truth and the nature of reality can reject the basic assumptions I make
about even my modest view of TT. If even the best, most modest account of TT is
incompatible with very important underlying assumptions about the nature of truth or
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perhaps about the nature of reality, then there might be no hope for the TT-ist to
address the skeptic. I shall investigate this further.
Second, even though I have attempted to give a more semantics-focused account
of TT, there is a lingering set of questions to do with the relation between TT and
semantics more generally, and specifically, about whether TT can contribute to a theory
of meaning, perhaps via a full-blown TMK-semantics. I go some way to start addressing
some of these issues in Appendix 2, where I distinguish further between content-making
and truthmaking, and in Appendix 3, where I go some way into presenting what I call
Sameness and Exact Similarity Criteria for both TBRs and TMKs.
Third, there are lingering questions about the limits of neutrality and modesty. For
instance, are all accounts of anti-realism compatible with my approach? In Appendix 5,
I start investigating this and go some way into arguing that at least one version of anti-
realism, that is, an evidence-based version of anti-realism turns out to be incoherent and
open to regress on the basis of aboutness grounds. Finally, one may wonder whether my
account of SAC’s metaphysical modesty is in fact compatible with categorial pluralism
and nominalism. In Appendix 4, I address this by asking the question: ‘Is SAC a form of
word magic?’, where word magic arguments are a version of nominalist argument, wielded
by philosophers such as Musgrave (2009). I argue there that ways entities are and can
be should be understood pleonastically, but that this can be done in a metaphysically
modest way. In fact, not only is SAC not susceptible to word magic, but SAC can be
used to understand what it is to be guilty of word magic.
All in all, the project that I presented yields many avenues of further research. And
I hope that the dissertation has convincingly illustrated that the first, modest steps to
articulating the project are very attractive. There is still much work to do in the future –
progress in philosophy is, in my view, steady, but hard to come by – but hopefully I have
already gone some way to making this sense of progress, on especially the matter of the




Appendix 1: VIRTUE, Dummett’s
Principle C, and Künne’s Schema P
This first appendix can be seen to be an inessential but interesting supplement to the
points made especially in §1.4 concerning the question of whether BATT requires that
truthmaking is a relation at all.
My understanding of TT and BATT is inclusive and includes all views which accept
a commitment to T-REL, there being a generally asymmetric relation between truths
and reality. These views thus need not speak explicitly about truthmaking. Just for the
sake of clarity, I want to discuss a related way of understanding truth and its relation to
reality. Dummett’s Principle C is:
Principle C: If a statement is true, there must be something in virtue of which it is
true.15
I follow, among others, Sundholm who states that Dummett’s Principle C (‘C’ is short
for ‘correspondence’) is “clearly nothing but a formulation of a truth-maker condition
on truth” (1994: 123–4). I take it that Dummett’s VIRTUE relation is just a version of
what I call T-REL. Of course, I am not committing myself to thinking that VIRTUE is
the right way to characterise T-REL. Künne (2003: 150) discusses Principle C and in
the context of explaining or summarising what Aristotle says on these issues, states that
“the general point can be captured by
(SCHEMA P): If the statement that p is true, then it is true because p.” [ibid.: 150]
Künne (2003: 148–174) nicely points out various different ways of interpreting Principle C
and Schema P, sketching what he calls the “Varieties of Making True,” implying that these
principles are each a variety of TT. Although he discusses many theories and many ways
of drawing the lines, he distinguishes, most fruitfully, between the “propositional reading ”
(ibid.: 154–157, 165–169) and the “ontic reading ” (ibid.: 158–165). The basic difference
between the two comes down to how one reads ‘virtue’ and ‘because’. Neither reading
understands them in terms of a causal connection or causal explanation (ibid.: 154). But
the first, propositional reading, understands them in terms of what Künne (ibid.: 155)
calls “conceptual explanation.” He writes,
15(Dummett 1976: 53). For extended discussion see (ibid.: 51–55).
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This is the ‘because’ of conceptual explanation: the second part of (R*[:
“He is your first cousin because he is a child of a sibling of one of your
parents” (ibid.)]) elucidates the sense of the first part. If we take the use of
‘make’ which is exemplified by (R[: “He is a child of a sibling of one of your
parents, which makes him your first cousin.” (ibid.: 154)]) as our model for
understanding philosophical pronouncements like (S) The fact that snow is
white makes the statement that snow is white true, then they do not affirm
a relation of any kind between a truth vehicle and something in the world.
[ibid.: 155]
Künne clearly thinks here that the key terms that one can use to try to articulate TT
and what Dummett calls Principle C can be interpreted in such a way that they do not
commit themselves to the existence of any relation between TBRs and TMKs. However,
he clearly thinks that this is a version of TT.
Despite what he says here however, it is clear that Künne thinks that these accounts
are inadequate16 and that, as he says, “ ‘makes true’ signifies an asymmetrical relation”
(ibid.: 155). He discusses Rundle (1979: 345–8) as a supporter of the “no relation” claim.
Künne writes,
I disagree with him, however, on one point. In claiming that the fact that p
makes it true that p, Rundle contends, we affirm ‘no more than a deductive
connection between one proposition and another’ (348). This cannot be
the whole story, for the entailment between ‘p’ and ‘It is true that p’ runs
in both directions, whereas ‘makes true’ signifies an asymmetrical relation.
[ibid.]
Künne makes clear in this discussion that any attempt to give an account of ‘makes
true’ in this non-relational way must capture the features of ‘makes true’ as signified in
the relational way. In particular, an attempt must be made to capture the asymmetry
between ‘p’ and ‘it is true that p’. The accounts that he discusses in this context are
Horwich (1998: 105) and Wright (1992: 27), who both try to account for the explanatory
dependence between ‘p’ and ‘it is true that p’ in a non-relational way. Presumably, then,
the reason why there is no relation that needs positing between TMK and TBR making
room for a “propositional reading” of ‘VIRTUE’ and ‘BECAUSE’ is that this reading gives
at least two options for the TT-ist: (1) explain these notions by articulating what the
explanatory dependence is between true TBRs and TMKs or (2) interpret these notions
16In particular, he criticises especially Horwich (1998: 105) and Wright’s (1992: 27) accounts as “not
very illuminating” (ibid.: 157). The latter tries to account for the ‘because’ in SCHEMA P and instances
of it such as “the statement that snow is white is true because snow is white” (this is Künne’s example
on [ibid.: 155]) by, as Künne writes, “appealing to the ‘platitude’ that P is true if and only if things
are as P says they are” (ibid.: 157), and as Wright writes, “whence, given [the platitude], the truth of
the proposition that [snow is white] can quite properly be explained by citing the fact that [snow is
white]” (Wright 1992: 27; Künne’s insertion of ’[the platitude]’). Künne claims that “this is not very
illuminating” (ibid.) and that this is “glaringly obvious if [. . . ] to claim that things are as P says they
are just is to claim that P is true [as he argues in a later chapter]” (ibid.: 157; his emphasis on ‘is’).
I will not go into Künne’s arguments any deeper than this, as it is unnecessary for my purposes.
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in some sort of logical way, in terms of entailment or a “deductive connection” (as Rundle
does).
Künne has deeper reasons, which we do not have space to get into, concerning
the nature of relations and of explanation for thinking that this reading of VIRTUE
and Principle C as conceptual explanation via accounts of explanatory dependence and
logical notions allows the TT-ist not to affirm that there is some sort of relation involved
in truthmaking and making true. However, for the purposes of what I have said in the
dissertation, I shall assume that Künne can be interpreted as meaning merely that there
is no need to posit a relation of a certain special sort (e.g. between physical or otherwise
worldly, non-propositional, non-TBR entities and TBRs). The contrast is with what
he calls the “non-propositional” or “ontic reading” (ibid.: 158–165). To narrow down
this latter reading he writes: “the ‘because’ is neither that of causal explanation nor
that of theoretical reduction nor that of conceptual explanation. It could be called the
‘because’ of ontological grounding ” (ibid.: 162; his emphasis). The way that I suggest
that we should draw the line between the two readings is according to the different kind
of relations involved. On the one hand, the propositional reading does not claim that
there is no relation, rather it claims that the relation is between truths where only other
truths (true TBRs) can play the role of TMKs and hence the relation can be logical
rather than metaphysical. On the other hand, on the ontic reading the relation can
relate TBRs with non-TBRs as TMKs.
But something I want to make absolutely clear is that, with the relations-come-easy
view, I want to assume also that even the propositional reading accepts T-REL, and
instead of rejecting T-REL, tries to account for T-REL with a relation that relates TBRs
and TBRs-as-TMKs. Of course, the “propositional reading” TT-ist who either thinks
that there are no relations at all (e.g. by arguing that they are reducible to monadic
properties) or who thinks that relations only relate worldly things and not propositions
(or any other TBRs) will reject TT’s acceptance of T-REL as part of BATT. But,
throughout the dissertation, I have assumed a more inclusive notion of ‘worldly’ whereby
TBRs count as worldly, and I have taken a much more relaxed attitude towards properties
and relations, one that takes the attitude that relations come easy (see §1.4).
What I said about the relations-come-easy view of relations makes TT compatible
with at least one reading of Dummett’s Principle C, VIRTUE, and Schema P, namely
the “ontic reading.” But, as I hope to have explained, if we accept this view of rela-
tions, the requirement that TT accounts for T-REL is also compatible with what Künne
calls the “propositional reading”, for conceptual explanation also signifies some sort of
relation between the explanans and explanandum. It should be clear, however, that the
propositional reading is unacceptable to BATT-ists since it violates R-ROT (§1.2.1).
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Appendix 2: Making True vs Making
Contentful
In §2.5, I pointed out that A-REL and T-REL have complementary asymmetries going
in opposite directions; they are dual relations. In §2.7, I argued that SAC can give us
a broadly externalist theory of content, where contents depend on real and potential
TMKs, and that this is congenial to TD, the asymmetric dependence between TMKs
and TBRs. In this appendix I shall briefly address a potential worry for these aspects of
my view.
One might argue that because TBRs depend for their content on TMKs, what one
might call the primary TBRs17 (e.g. propositions or contents) also depend for their
existence on TMKs. If this is the case, TBRs would depend on TMKs in other ways
than truthmaking. They would not only depend for truth, but they would also depend
for their existence on putative TMKs. So, as one might argue, dependence on the things
in the world that TBRs are about is nothing special to truthmaking, and hence might
not help clarify truthmaking. The dual role that A-REL and T-REL seem to play on my
account seems to be in question.
The right response to this is that even though the content of the TBRs depend on
the TMKs that the TBRs are about, and even though this dependence-for-content is a
relation that relates TMKs to TBRs in the same asymmetric way that truthmaking does,
it is not the same relation as T-REL, T-REL is the relation that gives truth to TBRs,
while this other relation is a relation that gives content to TBRs. One might call it
“Content-making” (C-REL); it captures the striking idea that there has to be something
in virtue of which there is content, or, to put it in terms of making, there has to be
something that makes content. Although C-REL is closely related to T-REL, it is not
the same relation. It is important to keep these distinct.
In addition, without T-REL, and without a distinction between T-REL and C-REL,
there would be no room for truths or falsehoods. Even if contents are indeed made in
an asymmetric way via C-REL and by the very worldly beings and ways of being which
17Primary TBRs would be the TBRs in virtue of which all other potential TBRs are TBRs. For
example, some think that sentences are not primary TBRs because they derive their status as TBRs
from the contents that they express, what some call the propositions that they express. Sentences, on
this account, are truth-apt because they express truth-apt content or propositions. I have been and
remain neutral on this issue. I remain neutral as to what the primary TBRs are. This footnote is merely
a reminder of my discussion in §1.3.
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can also serve as TMKs, a distinction needs to be made between situations when the
contents are made and situations when the TBRs are made true or situations when they
are, instead, false. There is a distinct and important role that T-REL plays apart from
C-REL, marking them as distinct relations.
Appendix 3: Sameness and Exact
Similarity Conditions for TMKs and
TBRs
One of the ways that our overall project can be extended in the future is by supplementing
SAC with identification conditions for TMKs and TBRs. In Appendix 2, I argued that
T-REL is distinct from C-REL (content-making) and, in §2.7, that SAC is a broadly
externalist theory of content. In §2.9, my argument against NEC relied on the fact that
TBRs can change their aboutness. As I discussed in §8.3, the proper use of the two-
step method of everyday inquiry assumed, in its STEP ONE, at least a pre-theoretical
understanding of how to identify TMKs. In this appendix, I extend all four discussions
and give more precise identification conditions, in the form of what I call Sameness and
Exact Similarity Conditions for both TMKs and TBRs. These conditions, so articulated,
are not essential to my arguments in the dissertation. Instead, they take us a step
forward in articulating conditions (1) which shed light on how my overall project will
proceed in the future, and (2) which are part of the fuller articulation of SAC than what
is necessary for the aims of this dissertation.
Strict and full aboutness can be used as part of the criteria for identifying which
are the TMKs for specific TBRs. Understanding what the contents of the TBRs are,
and understanding what the TBRs are about, allows one to be able to identify their
TMKs. For example, understanding what T1 is about, that is, that table, allows one to
be able to identify that the table is the TMK for T1. Also, understanding what TBRs
are strictly and fully about can be crucial in identifying and distinguishing between the
different TMKs which make true very similar but subtly different TBRs. This is clear for
instance when we consider and come to understand the following two different TBRs:
T10: Some triangles are equiangular.
T11: Some triangles are equilateral.
These two TBRs are both made true in part by any triangle that is equiangular and
any triangle that is equilateral (these can be the same triangle). However, strictly, they
are also about two different properties. T10 is strictly and fully about some triangles
being equiangular, and thus involves those triangles and their being equiangular, and
T11 is strictly and fully about some triangles being equilateral, and thus involves the
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same triangles and another property, the property of being equilateral. The truth of
different TBRs asymmetrically depends on the existence of different things in the world
and usually, especially in the case of non-existential TBRs, also how things are with
those things. And identifying which things in the world make the TBRs true is aided
by knowing what they are about. On these bases, I think that we have good grounds
for trying to formulate criteria for identifying TBRs, since their truth-aptness-endowing
contents are individuated by which TMKs they are strictly and fully about. To do this,
we might give a Criterion for the Sameness (or Exact Similarity18) of TBRs. We might
say:19
Criterion for TBR-Sameness-or-Exact-Similarity (TBR-Criterion): TBR p is the
same or an exactly similar TBR as q at time t iff p and q are strictly and fully
about and made true by all the same TMKs at time t.
For example, T10 is strictly and fully about the same things and the same ways things
are with those things as
T12: Some triangles each have equal vertex angles.
The property being equiangular and the property having equal vertex angles is the same
property. So, the TMKs which make these TBRs true are also the same TMKs.
However, we have to restrict identifying their sameness to a time because clearly
what these TBRs are strictly and fully about can change over time.20 This can happen
in various ways. Most clearly this happens with changes in TMKs. For example some
triangles which were equiangular might cease to exist or cease to be equiangular at an-
other time. This happens frequently when one draws a triangle on a computer illustrator
program and then changes the features of the triangle illustration, for example from an
equiangular triangle to a non-equiangular triangle, with the simple clicking and dragging
of the mouse. In this case, TBR p at time t is not strictly and fully about the same
TMKs as p at some other time, but p is clearly still the same TBR at these different
times. As we’ll see, it is important that the aboutness of TBRs can change over time,
and the criterion I have given is compatible with this.
Similarly, we might present criteria for TMK sameness or exact similarity:21
18I mention and include exact similarity here because philosophers of a non-Platonic persuasion who
take properties to be modes or tropes would reject the idea that, say, the redness of one umbrella
could ever be self-same or identical to the redness of another umbrella, even if their redness is exactly
similar. See (Heil 2012: 93–95) and (Williams 1953: 5) for further discussion. One might think in a
similar non-Platonic way about TMKs which sometimes involve the way things are, and even of TBRs.
19In presenting the identification criteria for TBRs in this way, I am inspired by the similar move
made by Sundholm (1994: 118).
20The same can be said of possible worlds, but I ignore talking about and relativising things to
possible worlds because doing so would make things unnecessarily complicated.
21As should be clear, the following criterion allows us to reject or at least remain agnostic about
whether TMKs are entities. I am not giving identity-conditions for TMKs since I remain pluralist, even
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Criterion for TMK-Sameness-or-Exact-Similarity (TMK-Criterion): TMK α is the
same as or exactly similar TMK-qua-TMKs as TMK β at time t iff α makes true
all the same TBRs as β at time t.
If two TMKs make true different TBRs, it is clear that they would not be the same
TMKs. For instance both Jack the giraffe and Jones the giraffe make true the TBR ‘At
least one giraffe exists’, but only Jack makes true the TBR ‘Jack the giraffe exists’, and
only Jones makes true ‘Jones the giraffe exists’. It is clear that they are neither the same
nor exactly similar TMKs and the above criterion helps us see this.
though the conditions I give can help us identify TMKs for TBRs. In particular, ways of being or
how things are with entities are themselves not entities, but they are often part of TMKs for TBRs.
Sameness and exact similarity conditions allow us to say things of the form: a way of being X is the
same as (or exactly similar to) a way of being Y just in case some condition C obtains. This does not
commit one to the view that ways of being are entities.
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Appendix 4: Is SAC a Form of Word
Magic?: A Nominalist Challenge to
SAC’s Metaphysical Modesty
In this appendix, which is a supplement to §4 and its presentation of metaphysical
modesty, I want to address a possible worry about TMKs as I have construed them.
Addressing this worry is not essential to my defence of metaphysical modesty, but goes
into more detail in regard to my criticisms of metaphysical immodesty. My discussion in
this appendix goes into further illuminating detail about (1) the way in which my account
is metaphysically modest and (2) what kinds of views are cheaters. What I present here
helps us see more of the details of my account and project, but it illuminates them in
ways that go beyond what is necessary for the dissertation. In short, what I do is to
defend SAC against one line of argumentation that the nominalist can press against the
metaphysical modesty of the account. As I shall argue, nominalism is compatible with
SAC and understanding the nominalist challenge properly adds support to my claim in §6
that metaphysical immodest accounts of TT should be seen as what I called extravagant
cheaters.
Although I follow Lewis and Dodd in providing an interpretation of the being involved
in TMKs as not constituting a commitment to any substantial metaphysical theses, one
might still make the traditional charge that nominalists make against realists concerning
properties, states, events, etc., that I am trying to get away with what Musgrave calls
“word magic” (Musgrave 2009: 69; 2001: 29), a kind of supernatural conjuring trick in
which the introduction of a term in our language introduces an entity in the world. I shall
present the case for understanding what word magic is. It should be clear that my charge,
in §4.2, against Marcus and Steward (at least in the way she presents her conclusions
in [1997]) can be interpreted as a version of Musgrave’s charge. This is because I have
argued, in short, that their move from ‘S is talking about states and not events’ to
‘What S is talking about commits her to a metaphysically substantial view of states in
ontologically categorial distinction from events’ is unwarranted by the semantic data that
they have provided. However, Musgrave might claim that my own suggestions are open
to the charge of word magic. For example, I still accept that we can talk about states
and confuse talk about states with talk about events. This means that I accept some
215
Appendix 4 216
sort of distinction between states and events, even if it is a (metaphysically neutral)
distinction merely in the ways of being of objects rather than an ontological distinction
in different kinds of entities. One might wonder: ‘Is SAC committing some version of
word magic?’ I shall argue that this is not the case.
I have argued that one must understand what Mourelatos, Steward, Marcus, et al.,
are doing not as successfully establishing the metaphysically substantial conclusions that
some of them presumably hope they are making. Rather, I think it is metaphysically
innocuous to talk about states, events, processes, stuff (e.g. water and mercury), etc.
However, it is only innocuous if one remains metaphysically neutral and one does not
build into talking about states, events, processes, etc., a commitment to SOAs or other
metaphysically substantial, complexly structured entities. For example, I claim that we
can talk truly about a specific mental state of Margot (say, her happiness) without being
committed to there existing an entity: the happiness of Margot. But what I say, for
example, ‘Margot’s happiness filled the room with joy’, will be made true by what I am
talking about, specifically things really being such that Margot’s happiness filled the
room with joy, whatever Margot’s happiness and the states of the room and the people
in it are ontologically, whether or not all these states are entities over and above the
people who are in the states. These states are minimally construed as just how things
are with the relevant entities (Margot, the room, and the people in it). What I want
to argue in this section is that Mourelatos, Steward, Marcus, and others’ conclusions
can and perhaps should be interpreted pleonastically. For instance, the nominalisations
from T22 to T23 and T24 to T25 and T26, can be taken not to indicate any hidden
substantial metaphysical quantification over entities in the non-nominalised T22 and T24,
but rather can be taken to display a hidden commitment to innocuous parts of TMKs,22
construed as ways things are and how things stand with things, in the spirit of Lewis
and Dodd. However, the pleonastic ontology of Schiffer (2003) and Thomasson (2001)
is importantly different from this strategy since they consider pleonastic entities to be
entities, though apparently ontologically minimal ones. Their ontological minimalism,
I think Musgrave (2009: 69ff) is right to argue, is problematic and is a form of word
magic. My strategy would be not to consider them not to be entities, as that would
be to make a substantial metaphysical commitment to denying them this status, but to
leave it open whether they are entities or merely how things are with entities.
Referring to how things are and talking about how things are does not commit one
to the existence of how things are, as an entity in its own right. The fact that we
can nominalise, quantify (either in a count or mass way), and refer-via-singular terms to
different ways of being does not indicate that what we are speaking about are substantial
22As should be clear already, since I’ve repeated this point several times now, I am not using ‘parts’
in the spatial sense, as in my arm is a part of my body. I think we can talk of how things are with me
as a part of the TMKs which involve me as the substance without committing us to the existence of
this part over and above my existence. If this talk of parts is too loose for the reader, then just think
of me as writing ‘aspect’, ‘ways’, or ‘how things are’ instead of ‘part’.
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entities. We obviously talk about the TMKs and the parts of TMKs in the ways that
we do, both by means of sentential-level referring terms (e.g. ‘the state of Margot’s
love for Pim’) and by means of the various sub-sentential, referential vehicles we use to
construct TBRs. But this does not indicate any substantial metaphysical commitment to
the nature of TMKs. I think this is the right way forward for a plausible and sufficiently
rich TT. TT must commit us only to what we talk about and the ways we talk about
them must be rich enough that we can accommodate further investigation into what
the TMKs are that is independent of TT-grounds. Any theory of TT which violates this
is inadequate. And, it is my view that one of the main ways to violate this is to bring
substantial metaphysical commitments into TT.
The following is a sketch of my overall reasoning in this appendix. I shall start by
briefly presenting Musgrave’s (2001 and 2009) “word magic” argument. I shall argue
that this argument is misdirected when applied to the kinds of transformations that
Schiffer (2003) and Thomasson (2001) use to explicitly refer to properties, states, facts,
events, etc., which they call “pleonastic entities.” However, I shall briefly point out that
the misdirection is understandable and not misdirected when targeted at Schiffer and
Thomasson’s own view, because they problematically talk about them as “language-
created” entities, which suggest that they are entities with a substantial ontological
status. But, the charge is misdirected in general because what these transformations al-
low us to do is make explicit our TMK-commitments to the various ways that entities are
and not just the entities themselves. These TMK-commitments are kept largely implicit
in the more commonly used TBRs of everyday use. However, these TMK-commitments
are not ontological commitments. These transformations of common TBRs into TBRs
that seem to make explicit reference to pleonastic entities merely reveal a reference to
metaphysically innocuous ways that things are which are in part what serve as TMKs.
Thus, I argue that explicit reference to such ways of being construed pleonastically,
though not as pleonastic entities, does not constitute instances of word magic and does
not constitute a metaphysically substantial move or commitment. The use of the sin-
gular terms which are used to refer to those entities do not create entities which were
not already there (hence are neither language-created nor created in any other way).
Rather, the use of the singular terms help make explicit our commitments to how things
are with the entities that are there. These pleonastic ways of being, furthermore, play
a part in making true the TBRs that refer to them, whether explicitly or implicitly. But
since these entities are metaphysically neutral, committing ourselves to them is only
committing ourselves to how things are with things.
Just to be absolutely clear about my central move in what follows, I reject Schiffer
and Thomasson’s theory of pleonastic entities as language-created. Creation implies
existence. Pleonastic ways of being are better understood as intentional objects, which
we can talk about but which do not exist in themselves over and above the entities and
how things are with these entities. Thus by talking about such ways of being we make
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an even finer distinction than the distinction Crane (2001; discussed above in §2.6) made
when he distinguished between real and existing intentional objects (as the table is when
it is what T1 is about [recall, T1 is the TBR ‘the table exists’] and is what makes T1
true) and non-real and non-existing intentional objects (such as Pegasus, the intentional
object of T8). We need a further distinction between real and existing intentional
objects and real intentional objects, understood as real ways things are (though such
ways do not constitute further existing entities). Of course, there is a further distinction
still between real intentional objects (e.g. how things are with the table) and non-real
intentional objects (how things are with Pegasus).
To make these points clear, I intend to properly introduce the notion of “word magic”
in §A4.1, making a distinction between two general Options for interpreting the charge in
our context.23 Then in §A4.2, I explore and reject Option 1, explaining that this is what
Musgrave himself probably thinks word magic is. In §A4.3, I make a distinction between
the Representationalist and the SAC-ist, generally Cranean, reading of Option 2. I argue
that on the first reading, Option 2 should be rejected as an incoherent notion of word
magic. I then argue that Option 2 should be embraced on the second reading, and that it
should be wielded against both metaphysically substantial views such as those of Marcus
and Steward and those views intended to be metaphysically and ontologically minimal
such as Schiffer and Thomasson’s. Whether this strategy is ultimately viable is a matter
that can only be decided when we discover what the best semantic theory will say about
what the truths are about. My general aim here is to help contribute to our understanding
of what this best semantic theory might hold. I think that understood properly and seen
in the light I put it in, SAC is not committed to “word magic,” and instead can use the
charge of “word magic” to describe metaphysically less modest theories.
A4.1 Understanding the Charge of Word Magic
Let us start with a few examples, some of which are explicitly TMK-involving-TBRs:
T31: The cat is happy.
T32: The cat’s being happy makes true T31.
T33: The fact that the cat is happy makes true T31.
T34: Fido is a dog.
T35: Fido has the property of being a dog.
T36: Fido has the appearance of being a dog.
23I ignore most of the detail of Musgrave’s actual critique of Schiffer and Thomasson, as a proper
treatment of that would get us too far off track. I focus on and distill the elements that I think are
most important. However, I do briefly mention relevant aspects of the critique and of Schiffer and
Thomasson’s views which illuminate my discussion. As will be clear, in my discussion, I agree with
Musgrave’s general line of reasoning against Schiffer and Thomasson’s theory.
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T37: Fido has the luck to be a dog.
T38: Osama Bin Laden gives me the creeps.
T39: The teacher left the students in the lurch.
T34 is a TBR whose only singular term is ‘Fido’, that is, the proper name that refers
to Fido. T35 is a TBR which has two singular terms: ‘Fido’ and ‘the property of being
a dog’, the latter being a definite description which, according to Schiffer (2003: 61),24
refers to the property of being a dog. Importantly, we can make a conceptually valid
inference from T34 to T35, since both entail each other. However, T34 and T35 do not
seem to have the same meaning; their truth-conditions seem to be different. ‘Fido is a
dog’ is true iff Fido is a dog, and ‘Fido has the property of being a dog’ is true iff Fido
has the property of being a dog. In each case, the information conveyed is different. In
the case of T34, the information that is conveyed tells us that Fido is a dog, that is,
there is such a thing, Fido, and that thing is a dog. In the case of T35, the information
that is conveyed tells us that Fido has the property of being a dog; that is, there is such
a thing, Fido, and that thing has something referred to by the definite description ‘the
property of being a dog’. However, the reason why T34 and T35 entail each other is
that what it is for Fido to be a dog is the same as for Fido to have the property of
being a dog. The predicate ‘is a dog’ in T34 implicitly refers to the same thing that
the predicate ‘has the property of being a dog’ in T35 refers to, that is, the property of
being a dog.
By contrast, however, T36 and T37 contain singular terms which refer to and are
about Fido (in both T36 and T37) and the appearance of being a dog (in T36) and
the luck of being a dog (in T37). Unlike with T34 and T35, we cannot make a similar
inference from T34 to T36 or T37, since neither T36 nor T37 are entailed by T34.
Neither having the appearance of being a dog nor having the luck of being a dog is the
same thing as (or follows from) being a dog. Being a dog is a property which one can
have without either having the appearance of being a dog (one can still be a dog while
looking like a cat for instance) or having the luck of being a dog (in certain circumstances
being a dog may be rather unlucky, as when one is running for mayor of London). Let
us assume, however, that T34–T37 are all true; Fido is a dog that has the appearance
of being a dog and has the luck of being a dog. What each of these sentences indicate
is something about Fido: T34 and T35 indicate what species of animal Fido is;25 what
T36 tells us is something about Fido’s appearance; what T37 tells us is something about
Fido’s luck. The important point is that each of these TBRs, partly because they are
true and partly because they convey different pieces of information about the world, tell
us something about the world, or more specifically, different ways that Fido is, differences
in how things are with Fido.
24Let’s just follow Schiffer and his way of describing matters for now.
25I assume that biological kinds are properties.
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One way to analyse or explain what is happening is in terms of the TMKs. In the
case of T34 and T35, we may say that they are each made true by the same parts of the
world: Fido, the property of being a dog, and perhaps also the fact that Fido has this
property.26 T36 and T37, on the other hand, have different TMKs, from both T34 and
T35 and each other. T36 is made true by Fido, the appearance of being a dog, and the
fact that Fido has this appearance. The same TMKs that make T36 true presumably
also make this TBR true:
T36*: Fido appears to be a dog.
Further, T36 and T36* mutually entail each other – it is not possible for one to be true
without the other being true. What T35 and T36 have in common however, and which
both T34 and T36* lack, are that they both have two singular terms (‘Fido’ and ‘the
property of being a dog’ in the case of T35 and ‘Fido’ and ‘the appearance of being a
dog’ in the case of T36). Furthermore, the TBRs each explicitly refer to Fido and also
express information about some way that Fido is: being a dog and appearing to be a
dog.
Musgrave (2009: 69ff), however, argues that the singular terms in T35–T37, which
seem to refer to an appearance, an instance of luck, and a (biological) property, only seem
or appear to do so explicitly. In fact, if one were to reify each of these entities, or ways
that Fido is, one would be performing what he calls “word magic.” What exactly is “word
magic?” He says, word magic is: “The idea that once we invent or create a word or phrase,
we invent or create an entity for that word or phrase to stand for” (2009: 69). What might
he mean by this? Musgrave’s charge against Schiffer and Thomasson is essentially that
they claim that entities are created merely by the use of language; for example, we have
created the property being a dog via the pleonastic transformation from T34 to T35.
Thomasson (2001: 323–325) calls the language-created, pleonastic entities “ontologically
minimal” because they are causally inert,27 and unlike non-language-created entities such
as dogs, their natures and everything there is to know about them can be known about
them by “study[ing] the language games by means of which they are deposited in our
ontology” (Thomasson 2001: 321).28 Musgrave thinks this view is absurd (ibid.: 68).
But, leaving aside the language-created entities element of his intended target view,
let’s try to understand what word magic is from other angles more congenial to our
interests. I want to highlight two possible readings of what one may mean, which I shall
focus on in the rest of my discussion:
26Just to be clear, by speaking of this fact, we are not committing ourselves to any metaphysical
theory of the nature of facts, just as we are not committing ourselves to any metaphysical theory of
the nature of properties, appearances, or lucks.
27See also Schiffer who writes that pleonastic entities, “come softly into existence, without disturbing
the preexisting causal order in any way” (2003: 59).
28See also (Schiffer 1996: 159) for the same point.
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Option 1: The singular terms (except ‘Fido’) in T35–T37 are not genuinely referential
singular terms and thereby are not about anything at all. Instead the truth of
T35–T37 can be accounted for in other ways.
Option 2: The singular terms in T35–T37 fail to refer to any entities at all, even though
they are genuinely referential singular terms which purport to and when successful
do refer to genuine entities. In fact there are no such entities as properties,
appearances, and lucks.
According to Option 1, one is committing word magic by taking T35–T37 to contain
genuinely referential singular terms which are about properties, appearances, lucks, etc.,
when they aren’t such terms. The fact that they aren’t genuinely referential is explained
by some alternative way of accounting for what makes T35–37 true; that is, T35–37
are made true not by properties, appearances, lucks, nor by TMKs that involve them.
According to Option 2, one is committing word magic because, although the terms are
indeed genuine singular terms, they fail to refer, and the word magician claims that such
entities exist anyway. The word magician is stepping out of his boots by positing a
bloated ontology when the language we use, the TBRs we use to say true things, and
the TMKs they are about, do not require it.
First, I shall explain that, as a matter of interpretation based on some of the other
cases he presents,29 Musgrave probably means Option 1. However, Musgrave is wrong
to think that the terms in T35–T37 are not genuinely referential singular terms.30 This
option is not properly motivated. Second, I shall argue that Option 2 can be interpreted
in two further ways, according to two theories of aboutness. I shall explain that on one
of the interpretations, Option 2 can be rejected offhand. But, I shall argue that the other
interpretation is the right and most attractive interpretation of “word magic” overall, and
is the interpretation consistent with SAC.
A4.2 Rejecting Option 1
Option 1 is probably what Musgrave has in mind. In fact, his discussion of what he calls
“Creeps Realism” (2009: 66ff) I think confirms this. Let’s take the sentences T38 and T39
(from above) involving the creepy Osama Bin Laden and the teacher who leaves students
in the lurch. Musgrave (and Dyke, who makes exactly the same point in her discussion
of Lurch-Realism [2008: 1ff]) argues that we should not reify creeps, but still thinks that
T38 (and T39) is true. ‘The creeps’ on his reading is not a genuinely referring singular
term, but rather, a mere façon de parler. It would be absurd to reify creeps just because
we can use words which apparently refer to them as part of a predicative expression and
29We’ll look at T38 and T39, which we’ve neglected to discuss so far.
30I want to emphasise the fact that from now on, unless I am directly discussing a quotation from
Musgrave, I want to be discussing not Musgrave himself, but one like Musgrave (and Dyke) who would
take his line of reasoning to charge others of word magic.
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via singular term expressions. Creeps Realism is absurd; no one thinks that there are
such things as the creeps. However, Musgrave continues, creeps anti-realists who say
that there are no such things as creeps and who say that TBRs such as T38 are false,
apparently are also “guilty of the same oversight as creeps realists” (Musgrave 2009: 68).
This is because such anti-realists are, as he describes them, “guilty of plonking literalism
and insensitivity to idiom” (ibid.). According to Musgrave, the use of ‘the creeps’ in
a TBR is idiomatic, and thus should not be taken literally. It is a referring expression
but does not refer to anything. According to him, the anti-realist is right that it is not
literally true but is wrong when she thinks that “every time we use an empty referring
term, we say something false” (ibid.). To illustrate this, he uses a comparison with other
empty referring expressions such as Santa Claus, of which one can presumably say many
idiomatically (and fictionally), though not literally, true things. He writes:
“Santa Claus” is an empty term. But “Santa Claus does not exist” is true.
And so are “I believed in Santa Claus when I was four,” “I was once delighted
that Santa Claus had not forgotten me,” and so forth. Idiomatic uses of
empty singular terms are similar. Creeps antirealists are right that they are
not literally true, of course—just wrong that they are not true. [2009: 68]
Thus, just as TBRs containing reference to Santa Claus can be true, TBRs containing
reference to creeps can be true too. However, creeps-talk, in TBRs apparently referring
to creeps, is not literally true. Instead they are often true, in a non-literal, idiomatic way.
Musgrave (ibid.) now invokes a version of a TT-proposal31 to illustrate why T38 is
true. T38 is materially equivalent to:
T38*: Osama Bin Laden makes me nervous.
T38* and T38 are made true by the same fact, that is, the fact that Osama Bin Laden
makes him nervous.32 He provides two reasons for thinking that T38 and T38* are not
semantically equivalent: (1) neither T38 nor T38* can be obtained from the other by
the substitution of synonymous expressions (unlike for example ‘Osama is a bachelor’
and ‘Osama is an unmarried man’); and (2) that we distort ordinary English usage if
we say that they mean the same thing and that they can be translated without loss
of meaning. This is a straightforward case of two (apparently) non-synonymous truths
having the same TMK. It is also a seemingly straightforward case in which the predicate-
expression’s apparently referring singular terms do not in fact refer to a property. And,
if this creeps-case is not just a special case, then we can conclude that reading off our
ontology from language is problematic. We can perhaps generalise from this case to
31He even explicitly states that he “prefer[s] to speak of “truthmakers” rather than the more familiar
“truth conditions.” The latter tend to hover somewhere in between things in the world (truthmakers) and
meanings—as in the idea that “Meanings are truth conditions” ” (ibid.: 68). I also distinguish between
TMKs and truth-conditions in §8.4.1.
32Remember, we’re not reifying facts.
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all cases involving apparently singular terms which are created by Schiffer’s “pleonastic
transformations” (e.g. the transformation from T34 to T35). If ‘the creeps’ does not
refer to anything in the world, then perhaps neither do any other of these pleonastically
transformed (apparently) singular term.
Many of the steps in this argument are dubious. Two of the most important dubious
steps are (1) his analysis of why ‘the creeps’ does not refer and thereby why we should
be anti-realists about the creeps; and (2) his generalization from this case to other cases.
Against the first step, I’ll make two points. First, the comment about empty referring
terms being idiomatically true but literally false is wrong. The “plonking literalism” he
claims that both creeps-realists and anti-realists are guilty of is not just not a problem but
the way forward. His analysis of empty referring terms such as ‘creeps’ being idiomatic,
I think, is where he runs into problems. He is right that there are plenty of true TBRs
with empty referring expressions. But they are not all just not literally true. Negative
existential truths such as T14: ‘there are no hobbits’, or his example about Santa Claus,
are literally true because what the TBRs claim not to exist do not exist; their intentional
objects do not exist. Just because ‘hobbits’ and ‘Santa Claus’ are fictional names does
not mean that TBRs denying the existence of what they are about cannot be literally
true. The other two examples he uses by way of analogy (“I believed in Santa Claus
when I was four,” “I was once delighted that Santa Claus had not forgotten me,” from
the quotation above) are true because the only things that the TBRs are about that
would need to exist for them to be true is himself and how things were with him in terms
of his beliefs and his delights at the relevant time. In neither case does Santa Claus
need to exist or not. Things are a bit trickier with ‘creeps’ as I shall explain. True and
false TBRs using that term are also true and false literally, though the expression itself
is idiomatic.
As competent speakers of English, we know that ‘the creeps’ does not mean anything
outside of the context of the overall predicative expression in which it is embedded. ‘To
give someone the creeps’ is indeed, as Musgrave explains, an idiomatic expression in
English. But importantly, and this seems to be a point that Musgrave misses, it is an
idiomatic expression which any competent speaker of English who knows how to use the
expression and who knows its place in the English language understands. It is what is
called a petrified, or dead, metaphor, whose metaphoric use has been lost to us, and
which now literally means the same thing as ‘gives someone the feeling of revulsion or
fear’ or in some contexts ‘makes someone nervous’. It is a noun that we have ended up
with in our language, in such a way that no one actually knows what the noun means,33
but it is embedded in an expression which we understand.
In fact, one way to understand a phrase such as ‘the creeps’ is that it is not a singular
33I am leaving aside those philologists who are working hard at uncovering the right etymology of
the noun.
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term at all,34 despite the fact that its surface grammar is very much like that of singular
terms such as ‘the chairs’ or ‘the men’. It is an expression petrified in our language in
such a way that it loses all meaning when taken out of the context, that is, the verb
phrase in which it is petrified, and thus does not permit of normal usage. For instance,
one cannot feel the creeps, or send someone the creeps, or give someone a creep, or help
someone acquire a creep. It is, despite appearances, also a term whose usage has been
petrified in other ways, which make it not just different from other apparent singular
terms, but which make it not a singular term at all. It cannot, for instance, take on an
indefinite article. It cannot take a plural form (and even though it looks plural, it cannot
take on the singular form). One cannot amplify it; for instance, one cannot say ‘He gave
me a big creep(s)’. It is not a singular term, despite the fact that the phrase ‘the creeps’
contains a definite article and a noun. This all brings out the fact that language develops
over time, and in a living language you have fossilized nouns, the meaning or significance
of which has been lost, and is hidden in the mists of time,35 even though the phrase
in which it is embedded retains a meaning, and thus can be given a semantic account.
Everyone who competently understands ‘gives me the creeps’ knows all of this. Thus,
against possible step (1) above, terms such as ‘the creeps’ are not just not genuinely
referential singular terms, but not singular terms at all.
Musgrave’s analysis is wrong. The reason why claims such as
T40: There is no such thing as the creeps.
are true is not just because, as he claims, ‘the creeps’ is an idiomatic expression and
thereby not a genuinely referential expression, but because it is not a singular term at all.
One might claim that it is about the creeps in Crane’s sense of intentional object, which
I am generally working with. This is because if we understand things in my favoured
TT-SAC way, positive TBRs that commit us to the existence of creeps are false because
there is aboutness-failure when there should not be and the intentional object does not
exist, and negative TBRs which are committed to the denial of the existence of such
things are true because there is aboutness-failure when there should be. However, most
of the time that we use the term ‘the creeps’ in a TBR, we are not committed to the
existence of creeps because what those TBRs are about and what they claim to be the
case is not that some thing the creeps exists, but that some person is some way (for
example, that someone is nervous or is mildly fearful of whatever gives one the creeps).
This is why, as I see it, T38 and T38* are, despite Musgrave’s claim, not just materially
equivalent but also in some sense semantically equivalent; the best semantic theory of
34Musgrave would be right if this is what he means when he says that expressions involving ‘the
creeps’ is idiomatic and not genuinely referential, but what I am doing is explicitly presenting the right
reasons for thinking this as something that Musgrave misses.
35This is one of the reasons behind my statement in §2.9 that what a TBR is about can change over
time.
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what they are about has it that they are about the same things and the same ways things
are with those things.
To respond to the word magic charge as read in the Option 1 way above we need to
explain that the singular terms referring to such things as properties, appearances, lucks,
in such TBRs as T35–37, are indeed genuinely referential and about things. I think we
can clearly do this. The way that I see singular terms such as ‘the property’, ‘the state’,
‘the luck’, and ‘the appearance’, is not that they are not genuinely singular terms, as
‘the creeps’ is not a genuinely singular term. They are also clearly not idiomatic. When
T35–T37 are true, they are true not in some non-literal sense but because Fido indeed
does have the appearance of being a dog, the property of being a dog, and the luck to
be a dog. I cannot see how one can claim, in the same way that one might interpret
‘the creeps’ to be not a singular term, that these phrases are somehow not singular.
They are genuinely singular terms; they just don’t refer to and aren’t about individual
objects but rather refer to and are about how things are with objects in terms of their
biological kinds, their appearance, their lucks, etc. So we must look to Option 2 for a
better understanding of how one might be committed to word magic.
A4.3 Embracing Option 2 & Utilising the Charge of
Word Magic
There are at least two further ways of interpreting Option 2, one according to the Rep-
resentationalist intentionalist and the other according to the SAC-ist, generally Cranean
intentionalist (see §2.6.1 for the distinction and §2.6.2 for why the SAC-ist is generally
Cranean in a certain sense). I think that if one interprets things in terms of the Rep-
resentationalist, one can reject the charge of word magic quite easily. However, if one
interprets things in terms of the Cranean and SAC-ist, one can accept that the charge of
word magic is an important charge that applies to theorists such as the metaphysically
substantialist or metaphysically minimalist TT-ists, but definitely doesn’t apply to the
metaphysically modest TAAT-ist.
On the Representationalist reading, Option 2 can be rejected almost offhand. On this
reading, if a singular term purports to refer to an entity (and is committed to the positive
being of what it is about) but the aboutness fails, the TBR in which it is embedded is
false. A consequence of this is that T34 and T35 (and similarly T36 and T36*) turn out
to have different truth-values, and hence they turn out not to entail each other when
they should. To make vivid the problem that I am raising, let’s use Schiffer’s notion of
an algorithm for elimination. To explain what this notion is, he writes,
Let Φ be a notion that is believed to have application and that is typically
ascribed on the basis of certain kinds of evidence (Φ’s ascription basis).
Then Φ contains an algorithm for elimination provided that there is some
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scientifically discoverable proposition p that is consistent with Φ’s ascription
basis and such that it’s a priori that Φ doesn’t have application if it should
turn out that p. [1990: 177]36
We, for instance, are able to eliminate witches from both our ontology and the realm of
intentional objects that we can successfully talk about, or rather we learn that there are
no witches when we learn that there are no such women with certain causal powers. We
have an algorithm for elimination for the notion ‘witch’ as it is a priori for those who use
the notion that the notion doesn’t apply if no women have the relevant causal powers
(and this is, further, consistent with its ascription basis). Similarly, we safely eliminate
phlogiston from our ontology and realm of potential reference when we learn that there
is no substance that is given off with burning. There is a clear algorithm for elimination
for both witches and phlogiston. However, what is the algorithm for elimination for
properties, appearances, and lucks? Presumably, when something is a certain way, then
that thing has a property. When something appears a certain way, that thing has an
appearance. Some thing’s being a certain way is just the same thing as that thing’s
having a property, and some thing’s appearing some way just is the same thing as that
thing having a certain appearance. On what grounds should one or can one eliminate
these things? As Schiffer claims, “Our linguistic and conceptual practices give bases for
asserting sentences that ostensibly entail reference to properties and propositions, but
these practices give us nothing like an algorithm for elimination” (Schiffer 1996: 152).
Presumably this lack of an algorithm for elimination is encoded in our normal linguistic
practices concerning properties, appearances, and lucks. In our normal linguistic practice,
the relevant TBR-pairs are in fact equivalent. Option 2, read in the Representationalist
way, would require that T35 is false because ‘the property of being a dog’, according to
the word magic charge, attempts, but fails to refer even if T34 is true and Fido is a dog.
Read in this way, they are not equivalent, and this is clearly problematic. For instance,
a consequence of the view would be a total revision of our normal linguistic practices.
So, Option 2 (read in this Representationalist way) should be rejected.
The right way to understand what the charge of word magic amounts to in general,
I think, is as Option 2 read in a SAC way which generally accepts Craneanism (as
I presented it in §2.6). On this reading, one is committing word magic if one uses
singular terms to refer to and to be about genuine entities, thereby committing one to
such entities, and such entities don’t in fact genuinely exist (or there is no good non-
linguistic nor linguistic reason to think that they do). I think that one can clearly be a
word magician, and that this might be the right diagnosis for those who claim that the
transformations, from T34 to T35 for instance, commit us to the existence of an entity
which is the property of being a dog. This is what Thomasson and Schiffer would claim,
even though they think that such properties are pleonastic and hence “ontologically
minimal” (see above). And, I think this is what the categorial ontologist such as Marcus
36See also (Schiffer 1996: 152).
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(and probably also Steward) would claim, especially as illustrated by the consequences
for ontology that they want to draw from the nominalisation strategy of Mourelatos (see
§4.2.4), which I think is akin to Schiffer’s pleonastic transformations. Unlike Thomasson
and Schiffer with their pleonastic entities, the ontologists think it is possible for one
to argue for the existence of events, processes, states, etc., by other than linguistic
means. They are not merely language-created entities. But if an ontologist thinks that
one can argue for the existence of these entities purely on the basis of linguistic data,
nominalisations, and transformations, then it is hard to see how they are not committing
some form of word magic.
However, of course, it might be possible that language can give us evidence about
the world. For instance, genealogical investigations into the nature of such things as
truth, which closely study the etymology and the history of the use of the concept and
the term ‘truth’, assume that language encodes our knowledge of the world and can yield
evidence about the world.37 But this is different from claiming that we are committed
to the existence of entities just because we can nominalise ordinary TBRs to refer to
things such as states, events, processes, and facts. And it is different from arguing that
because we know many of these nominalised TBRs to be true, that they must exist.
This seems to be a version of word magic.
My SAC-version of TT can avoid the charge of word magic. This is because it is
not committed to the existence of any entities such as SOAs and it is metaphysically
non-committal or neutral about the existence of states, events, processes, properties,
etc., as entities. Yet, the account can still accept that nominalised TBRs supposedly
referring to such entities are true. For what we are ultimately talking about is fixed
by what the best semantic account says they are about. The singular terms which
are supposedly referring to states, events, process, etc., as entities are more than likely
just referring to them or about them by being linguistic tools for talking about how
things are with objects (recall in §2.4.2.1, I made clear that the toolbox of aboutness
apparatuses extends beyond reference to objects). This doesn’t commit the SAC-TT-ist
to the existence of any further entity. But importantly also, it is not committing the
SAC-TT-ist to what Schiffer and Thomasson call pleonastic entities. When we talk (in
part) about appearances, lucks, and properties with T36, T37, and T35 respectively, we
are not committed to their existence as entities in and of themselves, but are merely
talking about how things are with Fido in the relevant way. Unlike pleonastic entities,
these are real aspects and modes of being that we can talk about and are part of the
TMKs for those TBRs when they are true.
When we make explicit reference to them we are in some sense talking about them
pleonastically, in the sense found in any dictionary; for example Dictionary.com defines
‘pleonasm’ as “the use of more words than are necessary to express an idea; redundancy.”
37See for instance (Williams 2002: especially §4) for such a study of truth, especially where his
discussion presents what he calls the “real history” (ibid.: 20) aspects of the genealogical narrative.
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That means that the two phrases T36 and T36*, T34 and T35, one of which nominalises
what we are talking about, and the other of which does not, are not just equivalent but
basically mean the same thing and are strictly and fully about the same things and same
ways things are with the objects we are also talking about. When we talk pleonastically
about properties of Fido we are talking about properties merely in a different, though
linguistically redundant, and perhaps at best wordy and at worst misleading, but still
metaphysically non-committal, way of talking about how things are with Fido.38
In conclusion, there is no reason to think that the SAC-TT-ist is committing an
unsavoury form of word magic as some of the ontologists or the ontological minimalists
might be interpreted as doing, nor is the SAC-TT-ist performing any kind of word magic.
Rather, on the basis of the account’s metaphysical neutrality and insubstantiality, it can
utilise the charge of word magic to catch out those who are committing themselves to
a kind of word magic. In §6, I spelled this out as cheating . And I presented my revised
notion of catching cheaters as one of the tasks of TT.
38In the terms I put it in fn. 3 of §4 above, in my brief discussion of Yablo’s criticism of Lewis’s
paraphrase argument for modal realism, and as Yablo (1996: 267) explains as well, we do not need to
entitatively or objectually quantify over hows or ways, though we refer to them.
Appendix 5: TAAT and the Limits of
Anti-Realism: The Implausibility of
Epistemic TMKs on Aboutness
Grounds
This appendix can be seen as an appendix to §7. However, the content is inessential
to the overall argumentation of the dissertation. In §7, I argued that TAAT can help
articulate what I call M-REAL, a modest form of realism which is compatible with most
forms of anti-realism. M-REAL is, for instance, compatible with anti-realist versions
of TT which go beyond BATT by providing pragmatist TMKs for all TBRs. In this
appendix I shall argue, however, that a focus on TAAT and M-REAL can reveal some of
the limits of anti-realism. In particular, I argue that some epistemic-focused versions of
TT become implausible, since we can see, on aboutness grounds, that their version of
anti-realism leads to incoherence and regress.
A5.1 Epistemic Anti-Realism
Dummett thinks that his Principle C, which I discussed in §1.4 and Appendix 1 and took
to be a version of TT, is compatible with anti-realism. The basic anti-realist TT-move,
in TMK terms,39 is to claim that for some TBR p, p is made true by something40 in
the world, and that something is the evidence for p, the knowability or provability of p,
the quality of our evidence for p, or some other epistemic facts. What this formulation
captures is that the anti-realist believes that the right theory of meaning (the theory that
explicates what TBRs mean) and the right theory of truth (the theory which tells us what
truth is) are verificationist or epistemic. According to the Dummett-style41 anti-realist,
both the meaning of p and the truth of p consist in the epistemic status of p. The
meaning of p consists in the conditions under which p is verifiable or provable. And, the
39It’s fair to put the anti-realist move in TMK-terms because the relevant anti-realist here is one who
is also a TT-ist.
40I write ‘something’ here, not ‘some thing ’.
41By writing ‘Dummett-style’ I want to emphasise that I am completely agnostic as to whether this is
Dummett’s actual view or one that is merely inspired by Dummett’s explication of anti-realism. I shall
use some quotations from Dummett and interpret what he says there in a way that sheds light on what
I call the “Dummettian.”
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truth of p consists in whether or not p is provable or verifiable. Principle C is understood
in terms of VIRTUE, which is just the claim that truths are true in virtue of something in
the world. But, VIRTUE leaves open the idea that the something in the world in virtue
of which truths are true are epistemic facts. This view of truth and meaning is opposed
to what Dummettians and others call the “truth-conditional theory of meaning,” where
the meaning of TBRs, including those of some disputed class of entities, is given by their
truth-conditions, the possibly verification- and evidence-transcendent conditions which
must be satisfied for some TBR to be true.42 The anti-realist claims that this is a faulty
theory of meaning and that the meaning of a statement consists in the conditions under
which there is evidence for it. So truth has to do with conditions, but specifically with
verification or evidence conditions. Dummett says this about the conflict:
The conflict between realism and anti-realism is a conflict about the kind of
meaning possessed by statements of the disputed class. For the anti-realist,
an understanding of such a statement consists in knowing what counts as
evidence adequate for the assertion of the statement, and the truth of the
statement can consist only in the existence of such evidence. For the realist,
the notion of truth plays a more crucial rôle in the manner of determining
the meaning of the statement. To know the meaning of the statement is to
know what it is for the statement to be true: we may in the first place derive
such knowledge from learning what is counted as evidence for its truth, but
in this case we do so in such a way as to have a conception of the statement’s
being true even in the absence of such evidence. [1963: 155]
Elsewhere, Dummett emphasises the same point slightly differently:
Realism I characterise as the belief that statements of the disputed class
possess an objective truth-value, independently of our means of knowing it:
they are true or false in virtue of a reality existing independently of us. The
anti-realist opposes to this the view that statements of the disputed class
are to be understood only by reference to the sort of thing that we count
as evidence for a statement of that class. That is, the realist holds that the
meanings of statements of the disputed class are not directly tied to the
kind of evidence for them that we can have, but consist in the manner of
their determination as true or false by states of affairs whose existence is not
dependent on our possession of evidence for them. The anti-realist insists,
on the contrary, that the meanings of these statements are tied directly to
what we count as evidence for them, in such a way that a statement of the
disputed class, if true at all, can be true only in virtue of something of which
we could know and which we should count as evidence for its truth. The
dispute thus concerns the notion of truth appropriate for statements of the
disputed class; and this means that it is a dispute concerning the kind of
meaning which these statements have. [1963: 146; my emphases]
42It is interesting to note that paradoxically, if truth is knowability and knowability conditions are
conditions for truth and such conditions are such that one understands a sentence by knowing them,
then even according to the Dummettian, meaning turns out to be truth-conditions. But, the point that
the Dummettian is trying to make is that on the theory that truth is recognition-transcendent, one
cannot say that truth-conditions capture a good theory of meaning and understanding.
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As Dummett makes clear, the distinction between the realist and the anti-realist, as he
understands them in these two passages, has to do with the fact that the anti-realist
thinks that the TMKs for TBRs (of the disputed class) essentially just are the evidence
we have for those TBRs. And, rightly I think, Dummett points out that this dispute
has also fundamentally to do with the fact that the anti-realist thinks that the meaning
of the TBRs are directly tied to the kind of evidence we can have for those TBRs. As
I have already argued (see §4.3 above), this version of anti-realist TT is compatible
with M-REAL. The anti-realist obviously thinks that the evidential facts must be real
evidential facts for those facts to count as TMKs.
Let’s compare this with the normal realist TT-ist (not the modest realist TT-ist). Her
view is that ordinary claims about tables and chairs are about tables and chairs. There
is a clear conflict here between the realist TT-ist and the anti-realist TT-ist. Consider
even a metaphysically modest version of the normal realist TT-ist. Such a TT-ist might
remain agnostic about the nature of tables and chairs and can even be an idealist about
the nature of tables and chairs. Even then, however, it is very clear that, minimally, there
is a distinction being made between tables-and-chairs-whatever-their-intrinsic-nature-is
and evidence for the existence of tables and chairs. This is the other, deeper side of the
meaning thesis of the Dummettian anti-realist. As Dummett points out, the meaning
thesis is that what it is to understand any TBR of the disputed class is to know what
counts as the evidence for that statement. This anti-realist position which takes truths
to be made true by epistemic facts is an obvious problem for any commonsense realism
(in the normal, non-Ligginsian sense; see §7.4). This is because if anti-realism about the
disputed domain is true then we are not talking about evidence-transcendent entities,
whether they are material or ideas or whatever, in the way we thought we were when
talking about them, but we are rather talking about the evidence for them. However,
even such an anti-realist view is compatible with M-REAL since the anti-realist account
of truth might be the best semantic account of what truths are about.
A5.2 The Problems for the Dummettian Anti-Realist
TT-ist
Without going into the details of the various anti-realist arguments for their semantic
theory, by agreeing that this articulation of the debate captures the distinction between
realists and anti-realists, this sort of anti-realist will already have made her position
open to attack.43 One might argue that the anti-realist misunderstands what it is for
43I will not go into the details of this, but there are other sorts of anti-realists who are immune to the
considerations I raise in the following sections. Just as one example, I don’t think my considerations
apply to anti-realists such as the pragmatists I discussed in §1.6.1 who give an anti-realist account of
T-REL itself, rather than of the TMKs.
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something to be a TMK, for the way the Dummettian anti-realist understands things
leads to (1) incoherence, and (2) to regress.
A5.2.1 The Problem 1: Incoherence
Independently of any commitments to any sort of metaphysical account of TMKs, there
are strong reasons purely on the basis of aboutness grounds for limiting what are possible
candidates for something to be a TMK that make it clear that this brand of anti-realism
is not plausible. This anti-realist is wrong because TBRs about x cannot be about our
evidence for x but are just about x. For example, TBRs about cars are not about our
evidence for there being cars; they are just about cars, whatever the nature of cars
is. Without making a distinction between cars and the evidence we have for them, we
cannot make sense of the fact that a piece of evidence for the existence of a particular
car is in fact evidence for there being the car. The existence and identity of the car itself
is what constitutes a piece of evidence’s being the evidence it is; it helps constitute the
fact that the evidence is evidence for the existence of the car rather than for something
else like the existence of a hippo.44 Unless we can think and talk about cars, and not
just our evidence for them, and hence be able to make a distinction between the cars
and the evidence for the cars, then we lose the ability to talk about the evidence. This
is because it will be impossible to individuate between different pieces of evidence for
different things. Thus, unless we can make a general distinction between x and evidence
for x, then thinking about either becomes incoherent.
Obviously, sometimes TBRs are actually about the evidence for something. For
example, the TBR ‘The evidence for this TBR is captured by what this TBR is (strictly
and fully) about’ is in part about its own evidence. Sometimes TBRs are about the
knowability of something. For example, the TBR ‘I know that this TBR is true’ is about
the knowability of that TBR. But this is rarely the case. So the anti-realist cannot argue
that in most cases, for example in ordinary TBRs about cars, the TMKs or what the
TBRs are about is the evidence for the TBR being true or the evidence for what it is
about being the case. This would lead to incoherence.
A5.2.2 The Problem 2: Regress
Further, there are other reasons why it is implausible that what it is to understand TBR
x is what it would be to have evidence that x. Let us consider a specific piece of evidence
44I assume of course that evidence is always evidence for something. Something cannot be evidence
without being evidence for something. For example, a dagger cannot competently be picked as evidence
unless it is picked up as evidence for something, say, the murder of Caesar. A policeman might pick
up a blood-stained dagger without knowing what exactly it is evidence for, but its status as evidence is
contingent on there being something for which it is evidence.
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for the fact that there is a yellow car across the road from where I am. One (good) piece
of evidence for this might be that it looks as if there is a yellow car across the road from
where I am.
Let us say that the meaning thesis (above) is correct; let us say that it is correct
that understanding that there is a yellow car across the road from where I am consists in
what it would be to have evidence for it. For example, it might consist in facts such as
that it looks like there is a yellow car across the road. But one might then ask what does
understanding the latter evidential fact consist in? According to the theory, there being
evidence that there is a yellow car across the road would consist in there being evidence
that there is evidence that there is a yellow car across the road, that is, that it looks like
it looks like there is a yellow car across the road. And so on. Thus, not only is such an
account of what truths are about incoherent (as I argued in the previous section), but it
also leads to what looks to be an infinite regress. Understanding a simple-non-evidential
fact, such as the fact that there is a yellow car across the road, turns out not to be
understanding that fact at all. Rather it has now become too difficult to pick out what
one understands, in the constantly shifting sands of what it is that we are talking about.
We never get to say what we intend to say. At best, what one understands is a deeply,
perhaps infinitely, embedded evidential fact. This, however, is not plausible. Therefore,
this sort of anti-realist account of what truths are about is not satisfactory.
Thus, the anti-realist who takes the TMKs of ordinary TBRs to be evidential facts
have an unsatisfactory account of what we are talking and thinking about and what
makes what we say true. This kind of anti-realist view is an example of an anti-realist
view which is incompatible with the more plausible M-REAL and TAAT. And we have
achieved the result that such a view is unsatisfactory merely by reflecting on what could
plausibly count as the best semantic theory of what truths are about (and not by begging
the question against the anti-realist).
A5.3 A General Lesson to Draw from this Discussion:
Distinguishing p from evidence for p
I want to make a further, general point now. I have argued in several places that TT
is compatible with anti-realism. But in the preceding discussion of this section I have
tried to draw some limits to TT-anti-realism by ruling out theories on which TMKs are
solely evidential facts. Knowing what we intend to mean when we use language grounds
or underlies our ability to then go out and try to discover whether what we say is true.
Knowing what we are talking about is a crucial step in inquiry, and allows us then to
go out and find evidence for it (§8). If we never know what we intend to say, or as the
evidence-focused anti-realist must say, that we never mean what we intend to mean,
then we cannot even begin to gather evidence for what we say. Understanding p (in the
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normal understanding of p) comes prior to knowing what counts as evidence for p. At
the very least, perhaps they go hand-in-hand, but they must be conceptually distinct.
We must understand separately and be able to distinguish between what p is from what
counts as evidence for p. Otherwise we will not be able to identify that the piece of
evidence is a piece of evidence for p. For example, even if one has stumbled upon the
evidence for water’s being H2O, unless one understands what it is evidence for, one will
not be able to understand that it is evidence for water’s being H2O. Further, one can
understand that water is H2O even though one might not be able to prove that this
is the case nor have any idea as to what would make a good experiment or piece of
evidence to prove it. Thus, it seems much more plausible that coming to know what
would constitute evidence for water’s being H2O comes after first understanding water
is H2O, rather than the other way around and rather than their being the same thing.
So, it cannot be right that understanding p is knowing what it would be to have evidence
for it; they must be distinguished. For these reasons, we need to distinguish between,
on the one side, the evidence for x justifying our beliefs and helping us have knowledge
of x, and, on the other side, (where p is about x) p’s being true and being made true
not by our having evidence for or knowledge that x but by x itself.
It is interesting to note that Strawson (1977: 19–20) has a similar argument con-
cerning the aboutness of truths. Strawson points out (ibid.) that sentences, such as
‘Lord Anglesey had his leg shot off at Wellington’s side’, must mean the same thing
when uttered by two different people even if they are in radically different situations in
terms of their access to evidence for this statement. A man who was there on the day
in question is warranted in uttering it on the basis of memory and observation, while we,
centuries after the fact, only have access to historical evidence. The intuition underlying
Strawson’s argument and point is that, as I say, we must be able to distinguish between
the evidence for p and p; they are two different subject-matters and, thus, sentences
referring to them are about different subject-matters too.45
We might call this the Aboutness Objection to evidence-focused anti-realists and to
others who give a revisionary theory of meaning in terms of epistemic conditions. As
the reader might recall, different forms of this objection are wielded throughout this
dissertation; for example I also use it to challenge TF-ist in §5. I think that what
underlies this style of objection is that when we use TBR some ‘p’ assertorically and to
state a fact about the world, it is unlikely and implausible that we are not saying what
we mean to express. It is implausible and unlikely that the TBR we are using is not
about what we think it is about, as long as we are semantically competent and have a
refined, semantically plausible sense of aboutness with a good awareness of some of the
45And there are others too who wield a kind of aboutness objection to certain forms of anti-realism.
See especially (Johnston 1993: 307–312) for an extended argument of this sort against verificationists
about meaning (specifically Dummett and Putnam). See also (Loux 2003: 655–656) against Dummett’s
positive programme.
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deeper issues concerning what the best SEM-TAC is (see §2.4.1). It is, however, also
unlikely that the TBRs we use are about something radically different than we think,
such as our evidence for p. M-REAL properly captures the realist insight that underlies
this objection. M-REAL is clearly compatible with most anti-realist theories which differ
from realist theories only by providing a radically different view of the metaphysical
nature of what we are talking about. For example, it is clearly compatible with error
theories, idealism, and intuitionism concerning mathematics, where a proof-construction
theory of the subject matter of mathematical truth is far more plausible than let’s say an
evidence-focused theory of ordinary truths about tables, chairs, and yellow cars. Despite
this compatibility with anti-realism, M-REAL clearly can be used in a non-question-
begging way, using only the tools of semantic theory to try to undermine theories which




NEUTRALISM is Compatible with
M-REAL
As the reader will recall, in §7.5, I favourably mentioned Alston’s (1996) position on truth
called “alethic realism” and called his view an extreme neutralist view. His neutralism is
captured by the following sentence which I favourably quoted already:
Though a particular realist or antirealist metaphysical position (of the sorts
we have been considering) has implications for what propositions are true or
false, they have no implications for what it is for a proposition to be true or
false. [ibid.: 78; his italics]
In this appendix, which can be seen to be an appendix to §7, I compare Alston’s (1996)
alethic realism with my version of TT. I shall argue that Alston’s view is a version
of TAAT or at least that what he says about his view is compatible with TAAT and
M-REAL. I then explain what is so extreme about his neutralism. I present and defend
Alston against van Woudenberg’s (2002) argument that Alston is not actually neutralist.
My interpretation and defence of Alston reveal how extreme his neutralism is. I then
discuss some of Alston’s remarks about the nature and importance of truth. I argue
that to preserve his stance on the importance of truth, he should retreat from extreme
neutralism to a more modest neutralism, which I think should be integrated into M-
REAL.
Alston claims to articulate his view on truth, namely “alethic realism,” thus: “A
statement (proposition, belief . . . ) is true if and only if what the statement says to be
the case actually is the case” (1996: 5). He adds, “The “content” of a statement –– what
it states to be the case — gives us everything we need to specify what it takes for the
statement to be true” (ibid.). He also puts it explicitly in terms of what the TBRs are
about thus: “a proposition is true if and only if what the maker of a statement with
that proposition as content is attributing to what the statement is about, in making that
statement, does actually qualify what the statement is about [. . . ] And so on” (ibid.: 26;
my emphases). He even puts things in explicitly TMK-terms, arguing that the Tarski
formulation commits us to a TMK-formulation, when he says,
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[I]n saying that the proposition that lemons are sour is true if and only if
lemons are sour, we are, in effect, committing ourselves to the thesis that
this proposition is made true by lemons being sour. And that could just as
well be put as saying that it is made true by the fact that lemons are sour.
[ibid.: 32; his emphases]
Thus it is obvious that Alston is a confirmed believer of TAAT or at least a TT-ist of
similar persuasions.
However, as is clear from the quote at the beginning, he claims that his alethic
realism carries no worldly implications whatsoever. He also adds,
Just as the issues between metaphysical realism and a nonrealist opposition
is not an issue about what truth is, so the question of how truth should be
construed is not an issue over the existence, or metaphysical constitution
or status, of one or another type of entity. Alethic realism is a view about
what truth is, whereas the metaphysical positions in question have to do
with what kinds of propositions are true. And just as we must not confuse
the question of what virtue is with the question of what virtues there are, as
Socrates liked to remind us, so we must not confuse the question of what
truth is with the question of what truths there are. [ibid.: 80; his emphases]
As I have made clear in §6.4, I am deeply sympathetic with what Alston says here.
He even defends alethic realism from, and puts it in opposition to, any epistemic the-
ory of truth, such as the ones I discussed in Appendix 5.46 However, as he remarks
further, “[A]lethic realism is neutral with respect to virtually all the controversies over
the metaphysical status of this or that domain that go under the name of “realism vs.
antirealism,” including the relatively global ones” (ibid.: 84). In particular, even idealist
positions, which take “most of reality to be independent[47] of anything human [such
as] Berkeleyan idealism, Leibnizian and Whiteheadian panpsychism, and absolute ideal-
ism [. . . ] can be as enthusiastic an alethic realist as his realist opponent” (ibid.: 81–82).
Thus Alston agrees with what I have argued throughout §7 that TT and especially TAAT
is compatible with all sorts of anti-realisms and non-realist views.
Alston’s main argument for this is that the nature of truth itself is distinct from
whether any truths are true. He claims that all these views on either side of the
realism/anti-realism debate must presuppose alethic realism but the metaphysical status
of any of the entities in question has no bearing on or consequences for the truth of
alethic realism itself. To illustrate this Alston (ibid.: 78–79) says that the quark realist
and anti-realist will hold that the TBR ‘quarks exist’ is true iff quarks exist, but they’ll
disagree about the truth of the TBR. Both the phenomenalist and Berkeleyan idealist
can (and should) believe that p is true iff p, but they will disagree that the sentence
‘there is a spruce tree in front of my house’ expresses the proposition <there is a spruce
46See especially his (ibid.: §7, 188–231) for an extended discussion of epistemic conceptions of truth.
47Alston says “independent” here presumably because the views he lists are idealist because reality
depends on something else (e.g. the ideas of God) than the ideas of humans.
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tree in front of my house>. Rather they will claim that the proposition expressed is
a complex one about ideas and the experiences one will have in certain circumstances
(the phenomena). Obviously the robust realist will claim that the ordinary, perhaps folk,
interpretation applies to the sentence. This all perfectly illustrates what I have been
saying thus far.
Alston claims further that even the truth of alethic realism does not imply anything
about reality (see [ibid.: 79–82]). This is because alethic realism is not committed to
any view about the metaphysical status of either the TBRs, such as the propositions,
statements, beliefs, that are either true or false, the property of truth (which one can
be nominalist about even if one is an alethic realist), or the TMKs. Presumably conclu-
sions about the metaphysical status about any of these depend on the truth of certain
metaphysical theses (concerning them) which are neither presupposed by nor affect the
truth of alethic realism. Recall, this is also how I set up BATT in §1.3 and §1.7.
However, there are several responses that I want to give to Alston’s neutralism. They
boil down to the fact that Alston’s neutralism seems not to be as neutral as he thinks
it is. First, as has been pointed out by others, what Alston says in several places in his
book seems to be inconsistent with his neutralist stance. For instance, van Woudenberg
(2002: 122) points out that Alston explicitly argues against Strawson’s view of facts,
which Alston summarises as the view that facts are “mere shadows of our practice of
making statements – mere pseudo entities that have no standing independent of our
linguistic activity” (1996: 39). Alston claims that Strawson’s notion of facts makes the
connection between facts (i.e. what he takes to be the TMKs) and TBRs too intimate
(ibid.). And, if the connection is too intimate, it renders expressions of alethic realism,
for example “that the statement that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass
is green,” as Alston writes, “not so much false as vacuous” (ibid.).
Instead, according to Alston, facts have “objective reality independent of our linguistic
and cognitive activities” (ibid.). Of course, I agree with van Woudenberg (ibid.: 122–123)
that Alston’s discussion here points to the fact that Alston must be a realist, at least
about facts. However, this is perfectly consistent with the fact that alethic realism does
not entail realism, even about facts. The truth of alethic realism is consistent with its
being vacuous, as Alston implies in his discussion.
Again, van Woudenberg (2002: 122) cites another discussion that shows that Alston
is committed to realism concerning facts. He cites Alston’s statement in his book’s
epilogue that the fundamental root of the opposition to alethic realism lies in what he calls
the “intolerance of vulnerability” (Alston 1996: 264), which Alston explains thus: “This
vulnerability to the outside world, this ‘subjection’ to stubborn, unyielding facts beyond
our thought, experience, and discourse, seems powerfully repugnant, even intolerable to
many” (ibid.). Thus, as van Woudenberg points out, Alston diagnoses the opposition
to alethic realism as a rejection of facts having a metaphysically realist characterisation,
as “beyond our thoughts, experience, and discourse” (2002: 122), thereby implying that
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alethic realism is committed to this.
In fact, I disagree with van Woudenberg here; it seems to me that what Alston
is doing is pointing out that the opposition to alethic realism stems from a conflation
of alethic realism with metaphysical realism. He is not committing alethic realism to
metaphysical realism.
However, despite the fact that van Woudenberg’s discussion here is, I think, incon-
clusive, I agree with him that Alston is in many ways, despite his insistence on neutrality,
committed to the connection between alethic realism and worldly realism at least of the
M-REAL sort. But more importantly, given what he himself writes about alethic realism,
he cannot deny that alethic realism (and TT), when properly understood, commits us
to M-REAL. Alston writes that alethic realism is made up of two theses:
(1) that alethic realism is the correct account of truth relevant for and “confined [not
just] to academic philosophy [but. . . ] widespread in theology and religious studies,
in literary theory, in the social sciences, and elsewhere” (ibid.: 7); and
(2) “It is important, for a variety of purposes, that statements, beliefs, and so on, be
assessed for truth value. Truth is important” (ibid.: 6).
I think that Alston is right that what truth is, is one thing, what the truths are, another.
This means that one can be completely neutral about the metaphysical status of almost
anything and about the truth of TBRs about them. And at the same time, one can
consistently think that alethic realism and TAAT are correct and thereby that truths are
true in virtue of what they are about being the case. All one is committed to is just that
fact and nothing else about the nature of what it is for things to be the case, or what
the in virtue of relation amounts to.
But, Alston cannot hold those two additional theses about alethic realism and main-
tain his extreme neutralism. Obviously the truth of alethic realism is compatible with
there being no other truth (except perhaps those that it strictly entails). But the fact
that there are no truths about anything is not compatible with alethic realism (1) ap-
plying to academic philosophy, the various sciences, religious studies, etc., and (2) its
being important. Strictly speaking and as I have maintained throughout my dissertation,
metaphysical neutralism and modesty are correct. However, in the background of the
debate there must be a commitment to there being plenty of truths. Otherwise Alston
is admitting defeat to the truth nihilists who claim that truth is insignificant and not
important at all and does not apply to any domain of inquiry. Because there are many
truths, and because the realist conception of truth is the right one, we must at the very
least be realists about what we are talking about. We must be M-REAL-ists.
In fact, Alston ends his discussion with a discussion of what he calls “the grain of
truth” (ibid.: 83) in the idea that “alethic realism is committed to the independent (of
human cognition) reality of everything we think or talk about, except, of course, human
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cognition itself” (ibid.: 82), which he admits he subscribed to fully in the past (ibid.).
This grain of truth is that, as he explains
[A]lethic realism, together with the obvious fact that self-reference in state-
ment or belief is rare at best [i.e. that statements or beliefs are rarely about
themselves but are almost always about other things], implies that (almost
always) what confers a truth value on a statement is something independent
of the cognitive-linguistic goings on that issued in that statement, including
any epistemic status of those goings on. To that extent, alethic realism im-
plies that what makes statements true or false is independent of our thought
and talk. This could be taken as a minimal sense in which alethic realism
carries with it a metaphysical realism concerning the status of truth makers.
[ibid.: 84]
What Alston is clearly agreeing with is the kind of modesty that I have been spelling
out throughout the thesis. His NEUTRALISM does not build-in substantial metaphysical
commitments into his version of TT. Although his version of what truths are about
assumes that they are independent of “cognitive-linguistic goings on” (ibid.), he clearly
does not think that this is always the case; for instance when we are explicitly talking
about TBRs or about cognitive matters. But, I think it is plausible to agree with Alston
that generally what we are talking about are not our cognitive-linguistic goings on,
including the epistemic status of those goings on. The independence-of-thought-and-
talk inherent in this claim is clearly a very modest one. In particular, it is compatible
with idealism and other theories of the nature of reality; though importantly, it does not
say anything about the truth of such views either.
In effect, I think Alston’s NEUTRALISM, when properly interpreted is compatible with
M-REAL and helps mark the limits of both TT-realism and TT-anti-realism, and reveals
to what extent we can and should be neutral about either.
And, as I hope to argue in the future, both our views, his alethic realism about truth,
and my modest realism about TMKs and what truths are strictly and fully about, leave
sufficient room for establishing not just the importance of the relation between truth
and reality, but also the importance of truth itself. This concludes my discussion.
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